5 


O  -"^jr 


m 


I   ACCUSE! 

(/'  ACCUSE!) 


BY 

A   GERMAN 


TRANSLATED  BY 

ALEXANDER  GRAY 


"A  pitiable  wretch  is  he 
Who  knows  the  truth  and  yet  can  silent  be^ 


NEW  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


Copyright,  1915, 
Bt  Geoege  H.  Doran  Compani' 


D5  I  I 

PREFACE 

/'Accuse,  a  work  recently  published  anonymously  in 
Lausanne,  has  deservedly  attracted  much  attention  on 
the  Continent  on  account  of  the  independent  standpoint 
of  the  author,  the  penetration  shown  in  his  analysis  of 
the  critical  events  of  last  year,  and  the  vigour  and 
clarity  which  characterise  his  presentation  of  the  case. 

The  German  edition  is  prefaced  by  the  following 
note : — ■ 

"The  book  J' Accuse,  written  by  a  German  patriot, 
and  entrusted  to  me,  is  herewith  presented  to  the  public. 
"I  regard  this  work  as  an  act  which  can  only  confer 
a  blessing  on  the  German  people  and  on  humanity, 
and  I  accordingly  assume  responsibility  for  its  publi- 
cation. 
|2  "Dr.  Anton  Suter. 

^  "Lausanne,  April  20th,  191 5." 


A  further  note  is  added  in  the  following  terms : — 


TC 


C3  "Having  regard   to  the  situation  arising  from  the 

c  war  and  the  conditions  of  the  censorship,  certain  pas- 
sages in  the  manuscript  have  for  the  present  been 
omitted.  These  passages  are  indicated  by  blank 
spaces." 

In  the  present  translation  the  censored  passages  have 
been  indicated  in  the  same  way. 

The  very  few  explanatory  footnotes  added  in  the 
course  of  translation  arc  indicated  by  square  brackets. 

I  desire  to  express  my  indebtedness  to  Mr.  T.  Lindsay 
for  his  assistance  in  the  work  of  revision  and  correction 
of  proofs. 

July,  19 1 5.  A.  G. 


3454  J  2 


CONTENTS 

I 

GERMANY   AWAKE 

PAGE 

Can  the  Victory  of  Germany  and  Austria  be  expected? — 
The  economic  position  of  belligerent  countries — The  po- 
litical and  military  position  of  the  belligerent  countries — 
The  situation  in  France — Partie  Remise — The  question 
of    guilt 11—34 

II 

HISTORICAL    ANTECEDENTS    OF    THE    CRIME 

Our  Imperialists :  Bernhardi  and  Co. — Have  we  been  attacked 
or  were  we  going  to  be  attacked? — The  head  of  the  War 
Party — The  Imperial  War — The  place  in  the  sun — The 
chosen  people — Germany's  brilliant  development — In- 
crease of  population  and  the  colonics — Our  true  colonies 
— ^What  advantage  has  France  drawn  from  her  colonies? 
— The  Germans  abroad:  France,  England,  America — The 
place  in  the  sun  for  us,  the  place  in  the  shadow  for  the 
others — The  fear  of  Germany — Diplomatic  success  of  the 
Triple  Alliance — Austria's  Balkan  policy — The  Crown 
Prince  and  the  war  party — The  policy  of  encirclement — 
England  and  Germany :  The  first  Hague  Conference — Be- 
tween the  first  and  second  Hague  Conferences :  The 
English  Liberal  Government — Second  Hague  Conference : 
England  and  Germany — English  proposals  for  a  political 
understanding  and  for  a  naval  agreement  with  Germany 
— What  are  we  fighting  for? — The  freedom  which  they 
mean — The  end  of  peace:  Security? — Did  France  mean 
to  attack  us? — Did  Russia  mean  to  attack  us? — The 
Triple  Entente  a  defensive  alliance — Giolitti's  revelations 
—The  change  of  front  in  Berlin ;  the  war  party       .     26— 141 


viii  CONTENTS 

III 

THE   CRIME 

PAGE 

A.  Austria „        .         ,  146 

B.  Germany 170 

C.  England 24S 

D.  Russia 289 

E.  France 295 

F.  Appendix:  The  Austrian  Red  Book 31S 

IV 

THE   CONSEQUENCES    OF   THE   DEED 

How  beautiful  to  die  for  the  Fatherland! — Prestige — Prole- 
tarians of  all  countries,  massacre  each  other ! — Political 
morality — Moral  politics — Quidquid  dclirant  rcges,  plec- 
tuntur  Achivi — Dreams  of  world  power — Who  will  pay 
the  cost  of  the  war? — Quousque  tandem f        .         .     353 — 3^5 

V 

THE  FUTURE 

What  should  peace  bring  us? — The  system  of  armed  peace — 
A  covenant  of  peace  between  free  nations — Is  this  a 
Utopia? — The  coercive  force — What  will  peace  bring  us? 
— Should  it  happen  otherwise — The  twilight  of  the  Gods 

386—419 

EPILOGUE 420—423 

APPENDICES 

Speech    delivered    by    Dr.    von    Bethmann-HoUweg,    August 

4th,  1914 424' 

Speech    delivered  by   Dr.    von   Bethmann-Hollweg,   December 

2nd,  1914 430 

Circular  note  of  Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  December  24th, 

1914 "        •    440 


1  ACCUSE* 


I  ACCUSE! 


GERMANY   AWAKE! 

La   viRITE  EST  EN    MARCHE. 

If  there  were  in  Prussian-Germany  a  system  of  minis- 
terial responsibility,  such  as  exists  in  all  other  countries 
with  effective  Parliamentary  Government,  and  such  as 
has  been  held  out  with  many  other  fair  promises  to 
the  Prussian  people  for  more  than  sixty-four  years,  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  and  President  of  the  Prussian 
Council,  Dr.  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  would  have  to  be 
arraigned  and 

condemned. 

It  might  be  allowed  in  his  favour,  as  an  extenuating 
circumstance,  that  he  was  not  the  driving  force  of  the 
war,  but  that  he  was  driven  to  it — driven  from  above 
and  from  below.  But  a  Minister,  who  yields  himself 
as  the  tool  of  those  who  instigate  war,  who  covers  those 
who  are  irresponsible  with  his  responsibility,  who  ac- 
cepts the  despicable  task  of  representing  to  his  nation 
and  to  all  the  world  as  a  war  of  defence  the 

offensive  war  which  was  prepared  long  in  advance, 
who  by  this  falsehood  unchains  the  most  fearful  disaster 
which  has  ever  fallen  upon  our  globe,  and  which  is 
inflicting  on  his  Fatherland,  whether  victorious  or  de- 
feated, wounds  which  will  be  incurable  for  generations 
to  come;  who  delivers  over  to  death  and  to  mutilation 

IX 


12  I    ACCUSE! 

hundreds  of  thousands  of  his  countrymen  in  the  flower 
of  their  age,  annihilates  at  a  stroke  the  arduous  labour 
of  half  a  century,  suddenly  wrenches  asunder  the  bonds 
of  culture  between  civilised  nations,  and  transforms 
prosperous  regions  of  Europe  into  ruinous  wastes — such 
a  man  must  bear  the  punishment  which  is  due  to  his 
crime. 


In  gathering  together  in  the  following  pages  the  vari- 
ous points  in  the  indictment  which  reveal  the  exclusive 
guilt  of  Germany  and  her  ally,  Austria-Hungary,  in 
provoking  the  universal  war,  I  am  well  aware  of  the 
fact  that  I  will  expose  myself  to  the  disapproving  criti- 
cism of  a  large  section  of  the  German  public,  which 
proclaims  it  to  be  a  patriotic  duty  to  shut  one's  eyes  to 
the  truth,  or  if  the  truth  be  recognised,  to  conceal  it 
in  silence  for  the  duration  of  the  war. 

Only  by  bearing  in  mind  these  two  points  of  view  is 
it  possible  to  understand  the  present  frame  of  mind 
of  such  a  highly  intelligent  people  as  the  German  nation. 
The  "State  of  War"  {Kriegszustand),  proclaimed  on 
the  31st  July,  which  placed  the  intellectual  life  of  Ger- 
many under  the  supervision  of  Generals,  and  which  even 


GERMANY    AWAKE!  IS 

to-day,  after  more  than  six  months  have  elapsed,  care- 
fully keeps  watch  on  the  frontiers  lest  there  should  pene- 
trate into  the  country  so  much  as  a  suggestion  of  the 
intellectual  life  or  of  the  views  of  foreign  countries 
which  might  disturb  the  unity  of  Germany,  or  of  foreign 
information  or  evidence  which  might  illumine  the  Ger- 
man people — this  "state  of  war"  has  produced  the  result 
that  nine-tenths  of  the  whole  German  people  have  blindly 
followed  the  dexterously  coined  phrases  about  the  "state 
of  defence  which  is  forced  upon  us,"  about  "the  strug- 
gle for  our  freedom  and  culture  against  aggression  and 
oppression."  "The  French  and  the  Russians  have  al- 
ready pressed  over  our  frontiers";  "The  Fatherland  is 
in  danger" ;  "They  mean  to  humiliate  us" ;  "In  the  midst 
of  peace  the  enemy  falls  upon  us";  "The  existence  of 
our  Empire  is  at  stake";  "We  are  called  upon  to  de- 
fend our  holiest  possessions,  our  Fatherland,  our  very 
hearths  against  an  unscrupulous  attack" ;  "We  are  fight- 
ing for  the  fruits  of  our  works  of  peace,  for  the  in- 
heritance of  a  great  past  and  for  our  future."  These 
and  similar  phrases  (all  taken  from  official  documents) 
have  been  used  with  the  conscious  intention  of  deceiv- 
ing the  German  people,  of  inflaming  its  patriotism,  and 
of  inspiring  it  to  unutterable  and  incalculable  sacrifices 
in  wealth  and  in  life. 

"The  few,  who  here  have  aught  of  Truth  divined, 
Yet  foolishly  revealed  their  inner  heart. 
Who  showed  the  mob  their  feeling  and  their  mind — 
The  cross,  the  stake  have  always  been  their  part."  ^ 

The  few  who,  after  the  first  days  of   intoxication, 
gradually  returned  to  their  senses,  and  who  were  able 

^"Die  wenigen,  die  was  davon  erkannt, 

Die  töricht  g'nug  ihr  volles  Herz  nicht  wahrten, 
Dem  Pöbel  ihr  Gefühl,  ihr  Schauen  offenbarten 
Hat  man  von  Je  gekreuzigt  und  verbrannt." 


14  I    ACCUSE! 

to  procure  foreign  documents  and  representations  behind 
the  backs  of  the  military  censors,  and  by  careful  study 
and  comparison  of  these  slowly  arrived  at  the  truth, — 
these  had  to  shut  the  truth  within  them,  since  it  was 
and  is  considered  unpatriotic  to  give  expression  to  it, 
since  every  utterance  in  word  or  in  writing  would  be 
suppressed  by  the  military  authorities,  and  the  offender 
would  expose  himself  to  the  risk  of  punishment. 

It  is  to  escape  this  fate  that  those  who  know  the  facts 
have  kept,  and  still  keep,  silence.  Those,  however,  who 
do  not  know  the  truth,  or  do  not  wish  to  know  it,  cry 
out  all  the  more  loudly,  and  as  a  work  of  illumination 
scatter  broadcast  the  foolish  products  of  their  minds 
throughout  the  world,  where  no  one  believes  them,  even 
if  they  were  to  repeat  the  German  lies  a  million  times. 
What  are  we  to  say  when  Germans  of  the  highest  emi- 
nence, from  Bode  to  Dehmel,^  from  Haeckel  to  Haupt- 
mann/ from  Liszt  to  Sudermann,  from  Laband  to  Lie- 
bermann,^  (in  all  nearly  a  hundred  of  them),  distribute 
in  foreign  countries  an  appeal,  which  immediately  after 
the  opening  words  contains  the  following  sentence : — 


"Germany  on  the  other  hand  made  every  effort  to  avoid 
war.     The  incontestable  evidence  in  support  of  this  fact 

^Decorated  on  the  Emperor's  birthday  1915,  Fourth  Class  of  the 
Red  Eagle. 

^Wilhelm  von  Bode,  General  Director  of  the  Royal  Museum,  Ber- 
lin, a  leading  authority  on  art,  Richard  Dehmel  a  distinguished  poet, 
Ernst  Haeckel,  the  celebrated  Professor  of  Zoology  at  Jena;  Ger- 
hardt Hauptmann,  perhaps  the  most  eminent  of  contemporary 
poets;  Franz  von  Liszt,  Professor  of  Jurisprudence  at  Berlin,  a 
leading  criminologist;  Hermann  Sudermann,  the  novelist;  Paul 
Laband,  Professor  of  Jurisprudence  at  Strassburg;  Max  Lieber- 
mann,  a  distinguished  painter. 


GERMANY    AWAKE!  15 

are  open  to  all  the  world.  .  .  .  Only  when  the  overwhelm- 
ing forces  of  the  enemy,  who  had  long  been  lying  in  am- 
bush on  our  frontiers,  fell  into  our  country  from  three 
sides  (!),  only  then  did  the  German  people  rise  like  one 
man." 


And  with  such  robber-stories  as  these  about  the  enemy 
lurking  in  ambush — one  thinks  involuntarily  of  Leder- 
strumpf  and  Ali  Baba — they  dare  to  humbug  such  highly 
educated,  cultured  nations  as,  for  instance,  the  Italians 
(among  whom  even  a  street-porter  has  to-day  a  better 
knowledge  of  the  historical  truth  about  the  war  than  a 
Harnack  has  among  us),  among  a  people  whose  Gov- 
ernment, with  the  approval  of  tlie  whole  country,  de- 
clared that  the  war  was  an  offensive  war  on  the  part 
of  Germany  and  Austria,  and  rightly  and  of  necessity  so 
declared  unless  it  wished  to  charge  itself  with  faithless- 
ness and  the  breach  of  its  own  word. 

It  is  to  these  men  a  self-evident  fact  that  we  are  the 
leading  culture-people  of  the  world,  and  consequently 
(such  is  the  logic  of  these  gentlemen!)  we  are  called 
upon  to  impose  our  culture  forcibly  on  the  other  inferior 
races  and  even  on  neutrals  by  means  of  bombs  and 
grenades,  by  fire  and  devastation.  Such  is  the  mission 
which  Providence  has  pointed  out  to  us,  as  it  called 
upon  the  Crusaders  to  fight  against  the  Crescent  (which 
now  we  have  gained  as  an  ally  in  the  struggle  against 
Christian  nations),  and  as  it  instigated  the  Catholics  in 
the  Thirty  Years'  War  to  cast  out  of  the  Protestants  by 
fire  and  sword  their  new-won  faith.  In  the  view  of  our 
leading  spirits,  in  place  of  the  wars  of  religion  there  has 
suddenly  arisen  since  the  ist  August,  19 14,  a  culture- 
war,  in  which  the  nations  are  fighting  for  the  equal 
privileges  or  the  supremacy  of  the  various  "hostile  cul- 
tures." Has  ever  a  greater  madness  than  this  been  con- 
ceived?   In  1870  when  France  was  defeated  and  crushed. 


16  I   ACCUSE! 

did  we  suppress,  did  we  so  much  as  touch,  the  culture 
of  that  country?  Did  the  foreign  domination  of  Na- 
poleon wipe  out  even  a  trace  of  our  German  spiritual  cul- 
ture, which  just  then  had  reached  an  incomparable 
height?  When  the  Romans  conquered  Greece  did  they 
at  the  same  time  overthrow  Greek  culture?  Precisely 
the  opposite  took  place.  The  captor  was  made  captive. 
The  mind  of  Greece,  the  art  of  Greece,  subdued  Rome. 
And  we  find  the  same  thing  in  the  history  of  Christian- 
ity. In  the  end  was  it  not  the  small  province  of  Galilee 
that  imposed  its  spirit  on  the  world-empire  of  Rome? 
How  indeed  is  it  possible  for  anyone  to  speak  of  the 
present  struggle  as  a  struggle  of  cultures  when  what 
we  really  have  before  us  is  merely  a  struggle  of  anti- 
cultures,  of  barbarisms,  against  each  other, — a  struggle 
which  from  day  to  day  becomes  more  bitter,  more  cruel, 
and  more  murderous, — a  struggle  in  which  all  the  prin- 
ciples of  international  law  and  of  humanity  are  more 
and  more  forgotten,  if  indeed  it  is  still  possible  to  speak 
of  humanity  in  face  of  this  inhuman  massacre?  What 
has  all  this  got  to  do  mith  culture f  Do  we  intend  in 
any  way  to  suppress  the  culture  of  England  and  France, 
of  Russia  and  Belgium?  Do  we  mean  to  renounce 
Shakespeare,  Darwin,  Newton,  and  Spencer,  Tolstoy  and 
Dostoiewsky,  Voltaire,  Rousseau,  Zola,  Goncourt,  Ru- 
bens, Van  Eyck,  Meunier,  and  Maeterlinck,  or  do  we 
mean  to  rid  the  world  of  their  achievements?  With 
what  right,  then,  do  we  impute  to  the  others  intentions 
against  us  which  we  do  not  have  against  them,  and  to 
which  we  could  not  give  effect  even  if  we  entertained 
them?  If  we  had  not  read  it  daily  in  print,  we  would 
not  have  believed  that  the  intellectuals  of  Germany  could 
have  persuaded  themselves  and  the  German  people  that 
Gennan  culture  is  in  danger,  and  that  it  must  be  de- 
fended with  Zeppelins  and  with  42-centimetre  artillery. 
The  "neurosis  of  war"  has  indeed  become  epidemic,. 


GERMANY    AWAKE!  17 

like  St.  Vitus's  dance  or  flagellantism  in  the  Middle 
Ages.  As  the  Dervishes  in  the  East  for  hours  at  a  time 
utter  the  same  formulae  of  prayer  and  go  through  the 
same  contortions  with  their  arms  and  legs  and  their 
bodies  until  at  last  they  fall  down  foaming  at  the  mouth 
and  overpowered,  so  now  we  have  seen  the  learned  men 
of  Germany  repeating  for  months  past  the  same  patri- 
otic litanies,  the  same  unproved  assertions  (assertions 
indeed  of  which  the  contrary  is  proved)  ;  at  all  times 
reaching  upwards  with  their  arms  and  their  legs  and 
indeed  their  whole  body,  until  in  their  opinion  they  and 
their  people  surpass  all  other  nations  of  the  earth,  and 
if  they  do  not  become  like  to  God,  they  at  least  be- 
come the  chosen  people  of  God.  They  overpower  them- 
selves with  their  own  phrases,  until  they  foam  at  the 
mouth  from  sheer  patriotism  and  fall  down  in  adoration 
of  themselves.  .  .  .  But  they  will  in  time  awake  from 
their  stupefaction,  and  the  wild  intoxication  will  be  fol- 
lowed by  the  terrible  discomfort  of  returning  sobriety. 


The  purpose  of  this  book  is  to  hasten  this  awakening. 
This  /  regard  as  a  patriotic  duty ;  for  the  longer  the  in- 
toxication lasts,  the  worse  will  be  the  consequences  for 
the  German  people,  and  the  process  of  awakening  will 
be  more  difficult  and  more  terrible.  It  is  only  a  better 
knowledge  of  the  origins  and  objects  of  this  war,  a 
recognition  of  the  guilt  and  responsibility  for  this  war, 
that  can  bring  about  a  change  for  the  better. 


18  I    ACCUSE! 


Can   the   Victory   of   Germany    and   Austria   Be 
Expected? 

the  economic   position  of   belligerent  countries 

To-day  it  is  no  longer  permissible  to  imagine  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  victory  of  the  Allied  Empires.  The  finan- 
cial and  military  superiority  of  the  countries  allied 
against  them  is  so  great  that  they  cannot  be  counter- 
balanced by  military  efficiency  on  the  part  of  Germany, 
nor  even  by  the  greatest  sacrifices  in  life  and  well-being. 
No  declamatory  statements  about  "holding  out  till  the 
last  breath,"  no  false  and  dazzling  promises  about  the 
economic  resisting  power  of  Germany  can  in  any  way 
alter  this  fact.  The  balance  of  gold  in  the  imperial  bank 
is  no  proof  that  the  economical  position  is  still  tolerable ; 
for  indeed  nearly  all  the  gold  in  circulation  has  flowed 
to  the  bank,  and  the  notes  for  the  hundred  and  fifty 
million  pound  sterling  issued  by  the  loan  fund  have  been 
covered  not  by  gold  but  by  unrealisable  goods  and  ef- 
fects. Manufactures  find  employment  only  in  so  far 
as  they  are  engaged  for  the  internal  needs  of  the  coun- 
try and  for  military  purposes.  The  money  required  for 
the  supply  of  military  stores  is,  however,  raised  from 
the  German  taxpayer,  and  as  it  represents  an  unpro- 
ductive investment  it  must  be  entered  in  the  books  as 
a  pure  loss.  One  class  at  least  has  nothing  to  complain 
of;  I  mean  the  agrarian  class.  It  is  they  who  have 
sounded  the  call  to  the  battle,  who  have  stirred  up  war, 
the  imperialists  and  the  chauvinists,  whom  the  German 
people  have  to  thank  for  this  hideous  war.  From  their 
ranks  come  the  colonels  and  the  generals,  the  Bernhardis 
and  the  Frobeniuses,  who  prescribe  to  the  German  Em- 
pire its  historical  mission,  "world-power  or  downfall," 
and  who  announce  to  it  its  "hour  of  destiny."     These 


I 


GERMANY    AWAKE!  19 

are  the  men  who  possess  the  ear  of  the  highest  in  the 
country,  and  who  instil  into  them  the  poison  of  their 
selfish  ideas.  These  are  the  men  who  at  the  same  time 
are  making  the  best  profit  out  of  the  war.  They  and 
their  comrades  must  of  course  also  bleed,  but  what  they 
lose  in  blood  flows  back  to  them  in  gold,  gold  in  the 
form  of  gold-lace  and  in  glittering  coins.  They  are 
also  making  a  career  for  themselves,  and  the  more  of- 
ficers fall,  so  much  the  better  for  the  younger  men.  They 
are,  too,  succeeding  in  business  more  brilliantly  than 
they  could  ever  have  done  in  time  of  peace.  The  prices 
of  their  produce,  grain,  potatoes,  and  cattle,  would  have 
risen  immeasurably  if  the  Government  had  not  in  the 
end  seen  the  necessity  of  fixing  maximum  prices.  But 
even  these  maximum  prices  are  already  enormously 
above  the  prices  ever  paid  in  times  of  peace.^ 

The  workmen  and  the  middle  classes  however  perish 
and  decay.  The  longer  the  war  lasts,  the  more  surely 
will  German  trade,  the  German  system  of  finance  and 
German  manufactures,  be  deprived  of  their  connections 
with  foreign  countries.  The  seas  of  the  world  are  open 
to  our  enemies,  England  and  France,  as  well  as  to 
neutral  States,  and  it  would  be  a  surprising  fact  if  they 
did  not  gradually  usurp  our  place  in  markets  abroad. 
The  exports  and  imports  of  Italy  and  of  Holland  must 
necessarily  show  an  upward  tendency  after  Germany 
is  ruled  out  of  account.  The  longer  the  war  lasts,  the 
more  successful  will  be  the  efforts  of  England  to  drive 
our  trade  out  of  America,  Asia,  and  Africa,  and  in  any 
case  decades  will  pass  before  we  again  reach  the  position 
we  occupied  before  the  war.  And  while  the  economic 
life  of  Germany  is  thus  advancing  to  a  stage  at  which 
it   will    slowly   bleed   to    death,    this    process    can   only 

'  Brend  has  meanwhile  become  constantly  scarcer,  and  the  mo- 
nopoly of  grain  and  the  distribution  of  bread  by  the  State  has  al- 
ready been   introduced. 


20  I    ACCUSE! 

be  accelerated  by  tbe  necessity  of  producing  the  enor- 
mous stores  of  materials  required  for  the  maintenance 
of  our  annies  of  millions,  and  for  the  conduct  of  the 
war.  It  has  been  estimated  by  an  expert  that  the  cost 
of  maintenance  per  man  per  day  may  be  reckoned  at 
lo  marks,  and  this  estimate  takes  no  account  of  the 
wear  and  tear  of  materials,  the  ammunition  used  up  (a 
single  shot  from  our  42-centimetre  guns  is  said  to  cost 
thousands  of  marks),  or  the  loss  of  all  kinds  of  instru- 
ments of  war.  If  we  maintain  five  million  soldiers  under 
arms,  the  war  will  cost  us  in  ready  money  paid  out  of 
our  pockets  two  and  a  half  million  pounds  sterling  a  day; 
it  will  cost  monthly  75  million  pounds,  it  will  cost  in  a 
year  900  million  pounds  sterling.  If  we  include  in  our 
estimate  the  sums  indicated  above,  for  ordinary  wear 
and  tear,  for  material  used  up  or  lost,  it  will  be  impos- 
sible to  estimate  the  yearly  cost  of  the  war  at  anything 
less  than  1,250  million  pounds  sterling,  that  is  to  say 
250  millions  more  than  the  sum-total  of  the  debts  of 
the  German  Empire  and  of  the  individual  States  in  1912. 

Further,  the  justice  of  this  calculation  is  more  or  less 
confirmed  by  the  war-loans  which  so  far  have  been 
asked  and  approved  in  the  German  Empire,  amounting 
to  500  million  pounds,  to  which  the  war  contribution 
of  19 1 3  amounting  to  50  millions  must  be  added.  These 
war  loans  were  intended  to  reach  until  somewhere  about 
the  end  of  the  financial  year,  that  is  to  say  until  about 
31st  March,  19 15,  but  doubtless  they  are  not  intended, 
and  are  not  sufficient  to  provide  for  a  complete  current 
renewal  of  the  material  of  the  war  which  has  been  lost 
or  used  up.  If  we  add  the  sums  necessary  for  this 
purpose  we  will  arrive  more  or  less  at  the  sum  estimated 
above,  as  that  required  for  the  conduct  of  the  war  for  a 
year,  that  is  to  say  1,250  million  pounds  sterling. 

The  countless  millions  of  pounds  which  the  war  is 
costing  and  has  already  cost  our  economic  life,  surpasses 


GERMANY    AWAKE!  21 

all  estimation.  The  Exchanges  are  closed.  No  one 
knows  to-day  what  he  possesses.  In  any  case  nearly 
all  effects  are  as  good  as  unrealisable ;  and  without  the 
cunningly  devised  system  of  loan-funds,  a  system  in 
essence  supported  on  feet  of  clay,  without  the  protective 
laws  of  the  4th  August  and  all  the  other  conceivable 
measures  which  were  passed,  intended  partly  to  stave 
off  the  malady  and  partly  to  conceal  it,  the  collapse  of 
our  German  economic  life  would  within  a  short  time 
become  an  accomplished  fact 

At  the  same  time  England  is  abused  in  every  key 
because  she  avails  herself  of  the  advantages  conferred 
on  her  by  her  geographical  and  economical  position. 
Had  we  been  in  England's  place  would  we  have  behaved 
otherwise?  ''A  la  guerre  comme  ä  la  guerre."  Every- 
one defends  himself  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  and  if  the 
English,  apart  from  their  land  forces  and  their  navy, 
can  make  use  of  their  economic  superiority  to  defeat  us, 
who  has  any  right  to  reproach  them  with  the  fact? 
Are  we  not  speculating  on  the  possibility  of  Mohamme- 
dan risings  in  English  colonies,  behind  which  we  stand 
as  Spiritus  rector?  Are  we  not  levying  from  the 
wretched  and  desolate  Belgium,  the  prey  of  penury  and 
soon  to  be  the  prey  of  famine, — a  country  which  after 
all  is  only  defending  its  independence  and  freedom  (a 
war  of  liberation  in  the  true  sense!) — ^are  we  not  levying 
from  this  exhausted  country  and  from  its  wholly  or 
partly  devastated  cities  many  hundreds  of  millions  of 
marks  as  a  so-called  "war  contribution"?  From  my 
own  points  of  view  the  economic  war  which  England 
is  waging  against  us  is  far  preferable  to  the  warfare  of 
blood  which  we  have  brought  upon  the  world.  The  war 
of  blood  involves  the  loss  both  of  human  life  and  of 
economic  values;  the  war  of  trade  demands  only  eco- 
nomic sacrifices,  but  spares  that  which  in  the  end  has 
the  greater  value,  the  life  of  men.    In  this  it  to  a  certain 


22  I    ACCUSE! 

extent  approaches  the  conditions  of  peace  which  exist 
between  countries  whose  relations  are  not  regulated  by 
treaties  of  commerce;  in  this  case  also  we  find  economic 
struggle  without  loss  of  life.  Here  there  is  indeed 
opened  to  our  vision  a  prospect  of  the  form  which  strug- 
gles will  assume  in  the  future  configuration  of  human 
society.  It  will  no  longer  be  a  struggle  with  weapons 
forged  of  steel  and  of  iron,  but  a  struggle  of  the  nerves 
and  of  the  brain,  a  more  refined  struggle  between  civil- 
ised men,  who  will  become  more  and  more  removed  from 
the  brutal  bodily  struggle  of  wild  beasts  and  of  barbaric 
nations,  among  whom  Europe  to-day  assumes  the  first 
place. 

It  is  of  course  a  feeble  consolation  that  the  other  belli- 
gerent countries  are  also  exhausting  themselves.  A 
country  so  economically  undeveloped  as  Russia,  whose 
exports  and  imports,  in  spite  of  her  i8o  million  inhabi- 
tants, amounted  in  19 12  only  to  300  million  pounds 
sterling,  need  scarcely  be  considered  in  such  a  compari- 
son. The  more  developed  the  economic  life  of  a  coun- 
try is,  the  more  extensive  its  trade  and  its  industries, 
the  more  sensible  is  it  to  the  effects  of  war.  So  far 
as  England  and  France  are  concerned,  these  countries 
are  in  the  first  place  much  more  wealthy  than  Ger- 
many, and  in  the  second  place,  as  we  have  already  ob- 
served, after  the  disappearance  of  the  few  German  com- 
merce raiders  all  the  seas  of  the  world  are  open  to  them, 
so  that  they  can  export  their  produce  and  bring  back 
again  from  foreign  countries  the  necessary  raw  ma- 
terial, the  means  of  subsistence  and  any  other  articles 
that  may  be  required.  It  is  at  once  foolish  and  per- 
nicious when  the  German  Press  and  the  public  opinion 
of  Germany  seek  to  deceive  themselves  and  others  on 
this  point. 

The  credit  of  the  countries  at  war  with  us,  so  far  as 
France  and  England  are  concerned,  has  so  far  scarcely 


GERMANY    AWAKE!  2S 

suffered  in  any  way.  In  foreign  countries  French  and 
English  notes  have  maintained  their  rate  of  exchange 
ahnost  unaltered,  whereas  German  notes  are  constantly 
sinking  in  value.  A  loo-mark  note  can  already  be  pur- 
chased abroad  for  112  francs  (instead  of  nominally 
125  fr.),  whereas  English  £1  notes  cost  at  the  same  time 
26  francs  (instead  of  nominally  25   fr.). 

The  German  5  per  cent,  war-loan  was  issued  at  97 
per  cent,  whereas  the  English  3^  per  cent,  war-loan 
was  issued  at  95  per  cent.  If  the  wealth  and  credit  of 
the  German  Empire  were  equal  to  that  of  England,  the 
German  5  per  cent,  imperial  loan  would  have  been  about 
40  per  cent,  more  valuable  than  the  English  3>^  per 
cent.,  and  instead  of  being  issued  at  97>4  per  cent,  it 
could  have  been  issued  somewhere  about  135  per  cent. 

In  this  enormous  difference  there  is  clearly  revealed 
the  comparative  economic  strength  and  the  power  of 
resistance  possessed  by  the  two  countries.  No  patriotic 
talk,  no  stifling  of  the  truth,  will  help  us  here.  Hard 
facts  are  the  best  arguments.  The  more  we  ignore  the 
facts,  the  worse  will  it  be  for  us.  We  do  not  succeed  in 
throwing  sand  into  the  eyes  of  others,  but  in  lying  to 
ourselves,  we  lull  ourselves  in  hopes  impossible  of  ful- 
filment, we  become  ever  more  stiff-necked  in  the  pursuit 
of  the  unholy  struggle,  and  in  the  end  we  will  accom- 
plish our  own  destruction. 

THE    POLITICAL    AND    MILITARY    POSITION    OF    THE 
BELLIGERENT    COUNTRIES 

The  political  and  military  aspect  of  affairs  is  precisely 
similar  to  the  economic  aspect. 

The  whole  of  our  Colonies,  built  up  by  the  expendi- 
ture of  many  hundreds  of  millions  of  marks,  and  tended 
with  something  of  a  mother's  love,  have  been  lost.  Aus- 
tria has  lost  Galicia  and  part  of  Bukovina,  and  Hun- 


24  I   ACCUSE! 

gary  is  in  danger  of  being  overrun  by  the  Russians.  On 
the  other  side,  Belgium  and  the  eastern  corner  of  France 
are  occupied  by  the  Germans  and  a  small  part  of  east- 
ern Poland  is  occupied  by  the  allied  German  and  Austrian 
forces.  But  we  must  not  forget  that  French  troops  are 
still  in  Upper  Alsace  and  that  until  a  few  days  ago 
Russian  troops  were  still  in  East  Prussia.^ 

Thus  we  see  that  both  sides  have  in  their  possession 
a  number  of  objects  of  barter  which  at  the  end  of  the 
war  should  be  mutually  returned  as  is  done  in  the  case 
of  prisoners.  The  longer  the  war  lasts  and  the  more 
extensive  it  becomes,  the  more  other  countries  unite 
themselves  to  the  belligerent  parties,  the  more  will  the 
number  of  these  objects  of  barter  increase.  While  the 
Turks  are  pressing  forward  towards  the  Suez  Canal,  the 
English  are  making  progress  in  Persia,  Mesoptomia,  and 
Arabia ;  here  also  it  may  be  presumed  that  territory  will 
be  seized  on  both  sides,  which  on  the  conclusion  of  peace 
will  have  to  be  exchanged. 

The  world-war,  notwithstanding  the  fearful  daily  im- 
pacts and  loss  of  blood,  is,  as  it  were,  being  conducted 
in  such  a  way  that  the  opponents  pass  each  other  by, 
and  it  would  be  the  best,  because  the  most  humane  so- 
lution, if  the  impacts  were  to  become  constantly  less, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  possession  of  territory  be- 
longing to  the  other  side  were  to  become  constantly  more 
extensive.  The  result  would  be  the  same  as  now,  only 
with  less  loss  of  blood.  For  from  the  military,  just  as 
little  as  from  the  economic,  point  of  view  no  one  can 
still  entertain  the  illusion  that  the  war  may  end  with  a 
victory  of  the  allied  empires. 

To-day  the  possibility  of  such  an  issue  must  already 
be  regarded  as  completely  excluded.     The  battles  in  the 

*  This  book  was  completed  in  February,  and  cannot  therefore 
take  account  of  later  events;  these,  however,  cannot  affect  the 
final  result  of  the  war. 


GERMANY    AWAKE!  25 

East  are  essentially  no  more  than  a  defensive,  unsnc- 
cess fully  conducted  so  far  as  Austria  is  concerned,  but 
hitherto  maintained  with  success  by  Germany  after  the 
first  blows  fell.  What  does  the  occupation  of  Lodz, 
and  even,  so  far  as  I  am  concerned,  the  conquest  of 
Warsaw  mean  against  such  a  colossus  as  the  Russian 
Empire?  Will  Russia  be  defeated  when  we  get  posses- 
sion of  the  half  or  the  whole  of  Poland?  It  will  be 
nothing  but  a  new  object  of  barter  given  into  our  hands, 
but  will  it  mean  the  conquest  of  Russia?  Not  in  the 
slightest. 

And  what  about  the  situation  in  France  ?    What  diffi- 
culties have  we  to  overcome  to  gain  possession  of  even 
the  small  north-western  corner  of  Belgium!     What  un- 
speakable sacrifices  does  that  involve !    How  many  thou- 
sands of  poor,  deluded,  heroic  soldiers  have  miserably 
perished  in  snow  and  in  ice,  in  the  trenches  and  in  the 
canals,  in  mud  and  in  mire,  on  their  lips  a  last  whisper 
of  farewell  to  wife  and  child  and  mother,  in  their  hearts 
a  last  thought  of  peace  and  home!    And  why?    To  gain 
possession  of  a   few   square  metres  of   inundated  and 
impoverished  country  with  ruined  towns   and  villages, 
and  then  on  to  the  pursuit  of  the  great  illusion:  on  to 
Calais!  on  to  England!     All  this  reminds  me  of  a  pic- 
ture by  Spangenberg  entitled  "The  Pursuit  of  Happi- 
ness," which  thirty  years  ago   was  rightly  the  subject 
of  much  admiration  in  the  Berlin  Art  Exhibition.     A 
beautiful  naked  woman  was  represented  hovering  over 
a  shining  iridescent  ball  of  glass  before  a  troop  of  wild 
horsemen  who,  with  gestures  of  passion,  are  seeking  to 
reach  the  crown  of  laurels  which   she   holds  aloft   in 
her  right  hand.     She  entices  them  on  with  her  ensnaring 
eyes ;  her  golden  yellow  hair  flutters  in  the  wind,  almost 
reaching  the  horsemen  who  are  nearest  to  her.     But  the 
crown,  the  object  of  their  passionate  desires,  ever  eludes 
their  longing  grasp.     An  abyss  yawns  in  front,  crossed 


26  I   ACCUSE! 

only  b}'  a  narrow  bridge,  just  broad  enough  to  ensure 
a  passage  for  the  Ball  of  happiness  and  the  goddess 
who  hovers  above  it,  but  which  means  inevitable  death 
for  the  warriors  in  pursuit.  The  first  is  already  tot- 
tering into  the  chasm,  the  others  will  follow,  and  the 
vision  of  happiness  dissolves,  never  to  be  seen  again. 

So  will  it  be,  I  fear,  with  the  invasion  of  England, 
which  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  has  been  held  out 
to  the  German  people  as  a  seductive  magic  picture.  Near 
as  the  other  side  may  appear,  we  will  not  succeed  in 
getting  over,  "the  water  is  much  too  deep."  Hundreds 
of  thousands  of  men  might  perish  in  the  effort,  were 
the  venture  risked,  and  even  if  we  were  over  there, 
a  war  of  the  people  would  be  let  loose,  and  our  troops, 
deprived  of  their  connections  with  the  home  country, 
would  be  crushed  by  the  enemy.  What  every  German 
for  months  back  has  been  whispering  to  his  neighbour 
in  desire  and  in  hope  appears  to  me  to  be  nothing  but 
a  daring  flight  of  the  imagination,  which  wilt  break 
miserably  on  England's  unbroken  sea  power. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  admiration  we  may  feel  for 
the  achievements  of  our  heroic  navy,  it  would  be  foolish 
to  close  our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  the  gigantic  superiority 
of  the  English  fleet  cannot  be  equalised  by  means  of 
Zeppelins  and  submarines — of  which  latter,  be  it  ob- 
sei-ved,  England  possesses  a  greater  number  than  we 
do  (in  1912,  85,  to  which  must  be  added  90  French). 
And  in  all  this  we  have  to  bear  in  mind  the  fact  that 
the  English  fleet  would  be  the  assailant;  the  German 
fleet  would  be  the  fleet  assailed,  in  so  far  as  it  man- 
aged to  press  forward  to  the  Channel.  The  German 
fleet  would,  however,  have  to  protect  not  only  itself, 
but  also  clumsy  cargo-boats,  incapable  of  self-defence, 
on  which  there  would  have  to  be  transported  to  England 
a  number  of  army  corps,  with  the  appropriate  light  and 
heavy  artillery,  cavalry,  trains,  pioneer  troops,  automo- 


GERMANY    AWAKE!  27 

biles,  and  air-craft  material.  Is  such  an  attempt  at 
all  conceivable?  Is  it  possible  that  there  are  human 
beings  who  are  prepared  to  expose  to  destruction  at  a 
blow,  on  such  a  scale  as  this,  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
their  fellow  men, 


It  should  be  enough  for  us  to  have  those  mountains  of 
corpses  and  of  mutilated  bodies  which  to-day  already 
cover  the  battle-fields  of  Europe,  Asia  and  Africa,  and 
which  for  centuries,  in  virtue  of  their  fertilising  proper- 
ties, will  be  an  advantage  to  agriculture.  Must  even 
the  bottom  of  the  sea  also  be  covered  with  human 
bodies  ?  Are  the  thousands  of  brave  mariners,  who  have 
already  found  death  in  a  watery  grave,  not  sufficient? 
Must  whole  army-corps  at  one  stroke  be  swallowed  up 
in  the  waves? 

And  even  assuming  that  we  were  on  the  other  side, 
would  the  war  then  in  any  sense  be  won,  would  England 
thereby  be  defeated?  Will  the  English  nation  allow 
terms  of  peace  to  be  dictated  to  them  by  the  Germans 
in  London,  as  one  can  daily  hear  from  every  babbler 
and  every  seer  of  visions  in  Gennany?  Will  the  English 
colonies  then  fall  into  our  possession?  Nothing  of  the 
sort  will  happen,  I  should  like  to  see  how  Canada, 
India,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand  would  acclaim  the 
German  conqueror,  who,  as  the  Chancellor  has  so  beauti- 
fully expressed  it  to  an  American  journalist,  is  des- 
tined to  bring  freedom  to  the  world.  Charity  begins 
at  home.  He  who  imposes  bondage  in  his  own  house 
cannot   bring    freedom   to   the   world.      What   country 


28  I   ACCUSE! 

politically  is  so  undeveloped  and  so  gagged  as  Prussian 
Germany,  if  we  except  Russia  and  our  illustrious  ally 
Austria-Hungary?  What  country  has  as  little  under- 
standing as  Germany  of  the  art  of  assimilating  to  itself 
foreign  nationalities,  of  allowing  them  to  live  according 
to  their  own  habits  and  customs,  according  to  their  own 
culture  and  language,  of  making  them  happy  and  there- 
fore making  them  faithful?  Our  policy  towards  the 
Poles  and  the  Danes,  and  towards  Alsace-Lorraine, 
speaks  volumes  on  this  point.  All  opposition  to  this 
species  of  Germanisation  has  exhausted  itself  without 
fruitful  result.  Zabern  is  the  illuminating  zenith  of  this 
policy  in  the  West.  The  Polish  laws  with  their  compul- 
sory expropriation  of  land  possessed  by  inheritance, 
laws  which  have  uselessly  cost  us  hundreds  of  millions 
of  marks,  and  which  have  only  produced  the  opposite 
effect  of  that  intended,  will  remain  a  perpetual  memorial 
of  this  policy  in  the  East.  In  the  North  against  Den- 
mark things  are  no  better.  At  present,  of  course,  in 
the  necessity  of  war,  this  vexatious  policy  is  being  miti- 
gated. The  Poles  have  now  suddenly  become  the  good 
child  of  the  family.  If  formerly  they  protested  that 
they  had  no  sympathy  with  efforts  hostile  to  Prussia, 
and  that  they  were  only  urged  to  join  the  opposition 
in  defence  of  their  speech  and  of  their  nationality,  their 
protests  were  constantly  answered  by  new  coercionary 
measures,  and  by  an  extension  of  the  Polish  laws.  Since 
there  cannot  be  a  Parliamentary  opposition  in  the  mis- 
erable Junker-Parliament  of  Prussia,  all  warnings  of 
the  left  wing  were  constantly  scattered  to  the  wind,  and 
a  courageous  advance  was  made  along  the  false  and 
the  costly  path  of  Germanisation. 

And  is  it  supposed  that  this  Germany,  conducted  on 
Prussian  principles,  is  endowed  with  the  gifts  neces- 
sary to  assume  England's  position  as  a  world-power,  the 
position  of   England  which  owes  its  world-power  not 


GERMANY    AWAKE!  29 

merely  to  the  cold  pursuit  of  her  interests  in  the  course 
of  the  centuries,  but  above  all  to  her  genius  in  under- 
standing how  to  link  foreign  nations  to  her  world  em- 
pire, without  oppressing  them,  without  even  wishing 
to  assimilate  them? 

The  English  language  does  not  know  the  word  "An- 
glicisation,"  because  the  idea  is  absent  in  English  poli- 
tics, as  indeed  language,  at  least  in  politics,  ever  halts 
behind  the  ''thing,"  and  only  gives  expression  to  what 
already  is.     Here  the  saying  of  Goethe  does  not  hold: 

For  where  the  understanding  falters 
A  word  steps  in  to  take  its  place.^ 

In  politics  the  reverse  is  the  case.  The  word  is  dis- 
covered, when  the  idea  exists.  The  word  culture-strug- 
gle (Kulturkampf)  arose  only  when  this  struggle  had 
already  broken  out. 

And  so  the  English  colonies  will  fly  to  us  and  hail  us 
as  liberators,  should  we  ever  succeed  in  penetrating  to 
England?  Far  from  it.  They  also  will  defend  them- 
selves to  the  last  ship  and  the  last  man,  before  they 
give  up  English  freedom  and  independence,  and  sur- 
render to  German  bondage  and  oppression. 

THE    SITUATION    IN    FRANCE 

So  far  as  can  be  foreseen,  the  war  in  France  also  will 
lead  to  no  result  which  could  be  regarded  as  a  victory 
for  Germany.  A  war  of  ofYence  which  ends  in  the 
trenches  has  in  advance  failed  in  its  purpose — in  trenches 
whose  amenities  have  been  enjoyed  by  our  brave  troops 
for  more  than  five  months,  in  wind  and  weather,  in  rain 
and  in  snow,  in  a  monotony  destructive  of  the  body  and 

*Denn   eben  wo    BegrifTe   fehlen, 
Da  stellt  ein  Wort  zur  rechten  Zeit  sich   eim. 


30  I    ACCUSE! 

of  the  soul,  a  monotony  however  agreeably  interrupted 
from  time  to  time  by  bombs,  shells,  and  airmen's  darts. 
On  the  eastern  frontier  of  France  the  line  of  fortifi- 
cations Verdun,  Toul,  Nancy,  Epinal,  and  Belfort  still 
stands  almost  unshaken,  so  little  affected  by  the  be- 
sieging German  arniies  that  the  French  ministers  and 
the  President  can  undertake  continuous  tours  of  in- 
spection from  one  fortress  to  the  other.  Fortunately 
for  a  long  time  nothing  has  been  heard  of  the  victor  of 
Longwy,  the  "heroic  son,"  as  the  Emperor  Francis  Jo- 
seph called  him  in  his  telegram  to  the  Emperor  William. 
The  famous  saying  of  Count  Häseler,  passed  from  mouth 
to  mouth  in  Berlin,  that  he  intended  to  breakfast  on 
Sedan  day  in  the  Cafe  de  la  Paix  in  the  Place  de  I'Opera 
has  not  proved  true.  Perhaps  the  Field  Marshal  has 
postponed  his  breakfast  until  next  Sedan  day,  unless  in- 
deed, as  I  fear,  he  has  had  to  postpone  it  ad  calendas 
teiitonicas.  The  French  Government  and  the  entire  dip- 
lomatic circle  are  back  again  in  Paris,  and  it  does  not 
look  as  if  they  had  any  intention  of  making  a  speedy 
return  to  Bordeaux.  As  every  honest  observer  of  the 
situation  must  admit,  the  v^ar  with  France  has  come 
to  a  standstill,  and  here,  if  anywhere,  a  standstill 
amounts  to  a  withdrawal. 

The  plans  of  our  General  Staff,  weighed  and  matured 
for  years  in  advance,  contained  as  the  cardinal  point  of 
the  long-intended  European  war  the  rapid  overthrow  of 
France,  followed  by  a  violent  attack  on  the  Russian 
Colossus,  with  our  liberated  forces  united  with  those  of 
Austria.  Providence — almost  involuntarily  one  falls  into 
the  jargon  of  the  German  despatch — providence  has 
ruled  otherwise.  After  seven  months  of  fearful  conflict 
France  is  not  overthrown.  Our  victorious  career  has 
been  unexpectedly  checked  by  the  brilliant  strategy  of 
Joffre,  tlie  French  Moltke — (the  uncle,  be  it  observed, 
not    the    nephew,    who    at    present    is    being   medically 


GERMANY    AWAKE!  31 

treated  at  Homburg  for  biliousness) — and  our  conquer- 
ing army  has  been  forced  to  a  fortification  war  in  the 
trenches.  The  fluctuations  of  this  fortification  war, 
which  for  the  most  part  oscillate  over  advances  or  with- 
drawals of  kilometres  or  half-kilometres,  are  so  insig- 
nificant that  a  decisive  turn  of  events  is  scarcely  to  be 
expected,  unless  our  leaders  resolve  to  throw  aside  every 
consideration  for  human  life,  unless  they  call  our  brave 
German  soldiers  from  the  trenches  and  expose  them  in 
frontal  attacks  to  the  devastating  fire  of  the  hostile 
rifles,  machine-guns,  and  artillery.  In  a  few  places  this 
has  already  happened,^  and  to  judge  from  the  views 
and  sentiments  of  those  in  our  leading  circles  (has  not 
the  telegram  of  the  Gemian  Crown  Prince  to  Colonel 
Reuter,  so  full  of  wit  and  taste,  "hammer  away,"  be- 
come the  catchword  and  the  watchword  of  the  nation 
of  poets  and  thinkers?)  the  generals  will  soon  lose  all 
patience 


And  if  these  further  incalculable  hecatombs  in  human 
blood  and  human  happiness  are  sacrificed,  shall  we  then 
have  gained  the  victory?  In  no  way.  Even  if  we  should 
succeed  with  all  these  sacrifices  in  making  a  consider- 

^Just  before  this  book  went  to  press  I  read  the  official  report 
of  the  General  Staff  of  January  15th,  1915,  in  which  it  is  pointed 
out  with  pride  that  in  the  battles  around  Soissons  from  4,000  to 
5,000  French  bodies  had  been  found  on  the  field  of  battle.  And 
how  many  German  bodies  were  there?  And  how  many  wounded 
on  both  sides?  The  Germans  as  the  attacking  party  will  certainly 
have  suffered  as  severely  as  the  defenders.  So  altogether  there 
would  be  10,000  dead.  To  this,  as  experience  has  shown,  there 
must  be  added  at  least  three  times  as  many  wounded.  There 
would   thus   be  40,000  soldiers   sacrificed   in   one   battle! 


32  I   ACCUSE! 

able  advance,  we  shall  only  have  gained  what  in  the 
war  of  1870  we  had  achieved  in  four  weeks.  Without 
doubt  the  French  have  made  use  of  the  five  months' 
standstill  to  increase  still  more  the  strength  of  their 
fortifications  and  their  possible  lines  of  retreat.  Con- 
stant reinforcements  of  English  and  French  Colonial 
troops,  of  which  the  end  cannot  be  foreseen,  fill  up  the 
gaps  and  increase  the  number  of  the  troops  in  the  field. 
With  every  week  which  passes  in  the  indecisive  trench 
warfare,  the  difficulties  of  our  victorious  advance  are 
increased.  Even  in  the  Boer  war  the  English  showed 
how  many  troops  they  could  raise  in  the  event  of  war, 
in  spite  of  their  small  standing  army.  Then  they  carried 
out  the  long-distance  transport  of  troops  to  South 
Africa;  to-day  they  have  only  to  cross  the  narrow  Chan- 
nel. Our  opponents  continue  to  increase,  and  to-day  we 
have  with  luck  already  got  as  far  as  the  second  levy  of 
the  Landsturm. 

PARTIE     REMISE 

How  is  it  to  endf  In  the  most  favourable  circum- 
stances as  partie  remise, — ^with  a  conclusion  of  hostili- 
ties which  for  both  sides  will  mean  a  complete  exhaus- 
tion in  men  and  in  wealth,  but  which  will  mean  for 
neither  side  a  victory. 

According  to  my  sure  and  earnest  conviction  that  is 
the  most  favourable  result  which  Germany  can  still  ex- 
pect. The  possibility  of  an  issue  which  could  more  or 
less  be  designated  as  a  victory,  I  regard  as  wholly  ex- 
cluded. And  the  longer  the  war  lasts  the  less  chance 
will  there  be  of  this  relatively  favourable  issue,  the 
greater  will  be  the  probability  of  a  development,  which 
if  not  a  decisive  defeat  of  Germany,  would  yet  represent 
an  overwhelming  exhaustion  of  her  resources  in  com- 
parison with  those  of  her  opponents,  and  which  would 
therefore  inevitably  lead  to  the  conditions  of  peace  being 


GERMANY   AWAKE!  88 

framed  on  less  favourable  lines  than  would  now  be 
granted. 

Austria  has  already  reached  the  limits  of  her  strength. 
In  the  case  of  Germany  it  is  not  yet  possible  to  speak 
of  any  decisive  weakening.  We  still  stand  erect;  we 
can  still  offer  everywhere  a  bold  forehead  to  the  enemy. 
Our  resources  in  men  and  in  money  are  not  yet  ex- 
hausted. But  this  condition  of  "not  yet"  cannot  now 
endure  for  long.  It  is  foolish  to  pursue  an  ostrich 
policy.  No  matter  how  dexterously,  following  the 
watchword  that  has  been  issued,  we  hide  our  head  in 
the  sand,  the  enemy  still  sees  the  weaknesses  which 
shake  the  body  of  our  people,  they  still  see  the  seeds 
of  that  malady  which  must  lead  to  our  destruction. 

We  can  still  ask  for  an  honourable  peace.  If  we 
from  our  side  freely  ask  it  we  will  atone  for  a  small  part 
of  the  wrong  which  we  have  committed  by  conjuring 
up  this  world  catastrophe,  the  wrong  which  has  drawn 
upon  us  the  hatred  and  the  loathing  of  the  whole  civ- 
ilised world,  not  of  our  enemies  merely,  but  also  of 
neutral  nations. 

The  Question  of  Guilt 

That  we  have  forfeited  the  sympathies  of  the  world  is 
not  due  to  malevolence,  envy,  and  lies ;  our  own  actions 
must  bear  the  responsibility  for  this.  Foreign  countries, 
and  above  all  those  which  are  neutral,  know  better  than 
the  German  nation  the  development  of  events,  they  know 
who  bears  the  guilt  of  the  world  catastrophe.  Foreign 
neutral  countries  know  well  enough  our  political  con- 
ditions. They  know  that  under  a  mask  of  constitution- 
•alism  we  are  in  fact  ruled  absolutely.  Recently  they 
observed  how  an  Imperial  Chancellor  of  Germany, 
against  whom  Parliament  by  a  three-fifths  majority 
passed  a  vote  expressive  of  its  lack  of  confidence,  could 


34  I   ACCUSE! 

yet  continue  to  hold  office  unshaken,  secure  in  the  sup- 
port of  the  Court  and  the  miHtary  circles, — an  occur- 
rence which,  apart  from  Russia,  is  no  longer  possible  in 
any  other  civilised  country.  They  know  that  the  Prus- 
sian people  are  politically  without  rights,  and  that  they 
are  governed  by  a  small  clique  of  Junkers  who  have 
taken  in  fee  all  the  high  offices  in  the  Government  and 
in  the  army. 

Above  all  neutral  countries  know — and  now  I  come 
to  the  cardinal  points  in  what  I  have  to  say — 

that  the  plans  and  the  preparations  for  this  war  have 
long  been  made  by  Germany  and  Austria  not  only  from 
a  military  but  also  from  a  political  point  of  view; 

that  for  long  it  had  been  resolved  to  represent  this 
offensive  war  to  the  German  people  as  a  war  of  libera- 
tion,  because  it  was  known  that  only  thus  coidd  the 
necessary  popular  enthusiasm  be  awakened; 

that  the  object  of  this  war  is  an  attempt  to  establish 
a  hegemony  on  the  continent  and,  as  a  later  sequel,  the 
acquisition  of  England's  position  of  power  in  the  world 
according  to  the  principle  "otc-toi  de  la  que  je  m'y 
mette." 

For  these  facts  and  endeavours  there  is  in  existence 
evidence  of  so  convincing  a  character  written  by  our- 
selves in  the  German  language,  that  it  is  a  task  as  in- 
fatuated as  it  is  hopeless  to  try  to  combat  the  convic- 
tion of  the  whole  world  by  the  untenable  publications  of 
those  who  take  it  upon  themselves  to  "enlighten"  the 
world  about  Germany. 


II 

HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OE  THE  CRIME 

OUR     IMPERIALISTS  :     BERNHARDI     AND     CO. 

The  writings  of  Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the  Next  War, 
of  Frobenius,  The  German  Empire's  Hour  of  Destiny, 
the  books  of  Treitschke,  German  History  and  Politics, 
are  as  well  known  abroad  as  in  Germany,  and  they  have 
in  part  been  translated  into  foreign  languages.  The  im- 
perialistic tendencies  of  a  political  clique  have  never  been 
more  distinctly  expressed  than  in  these  writings,  and, 
in  the  view  of  their  originators,  justified. 

A  few  quotations  from  Bernhardi  may  suffice.  This 
man  is  a  Prussian  Cavalry  General,  and,  if  I  am  not  mis- 
taken, has  been  entrusted  with  a  command  in  the  East, 
and  he  has  already  been  decorated  with  the  Iron  Cross 
of  the  First  Class.  That  he  is  competent  and  authorised 
to  give  expression  to  the  views  of  authoritative  German 
circles  can  scarcely  be  disputed. 

On  page  255  of  his  book  we  find  ^ : 

"The  Government  will  never  be  able  to  count  upon  a  well- 
armed  and  self-sacrificing  people  in  the  hour  of  danger  or 
necessity,  if  it  calmly  looks  on  while  the  war-like  spirit  is 
being  systematically  undermined  by  the  Press  and  a  feeble 
peace  policy  preached,  still  less  if  it  allows  its  own  organs  to 
join  in  with  the  same  note,  and  continually  to  emphasise  the 
maintenance  of  peace  as  the  object  of  all  policy.  It  must 
rather  do  everything  to  foster  a  military  spirit,  and  to  make 
the  nation  comprehend  the  duties  and  aims  of  an  imperial 
policy, 

^[References  are  to  the  English  translation  (popular  edition). 
Edward  Arnold,  London.] 

35 


86  I   ACCUSE! 

"It  must  continually  point  to  the  significance  and  the 
necessity  of  war  as  an  indispensable  agent  in  policy  and 
civilisation  together  with  the  duty  of  self-sacrifice  and  de- 
votion to  State  and  country." 

Page  257 : 

"The  soul  of  our  nation  is  not  reflected  in  that  part  of 
the  Press  with  its  continual  dwelling  on  the  necessity  of  up- 
holding peace,  and  its  denunciation  of  any  bold  and  com-- 
prehensive  political  measure  as  a  policy  of  recklessness. 

"On  the  contrary,  an  intense  longing  for  a  foremost  place 
among  the  Poivers  and  for  manly  action  fills  our  nation. 
Every  vigorous  utterance,  every  bold  political  step  of  the 
Government,  finds  in  the  soul  of  the  people  a  deeply  felt 
echo,  and  loosens  the  bonds  which  fetter  all  their  forces. 
In  a  great  part  of  the  national  Press  this  feeling  has  again 
and  again  found  noble  expression.  But  the  statesman  who 
could  satisfy  this  yearning,  which  slumbers  in  the  heart 
of  our  people  undisturbed  by  the  clamour  of  parties  and 
the  party  Press,  would  carry  all  spirits  with  him." 

Page  258 : 

"Such  a  policy  (i.e.,  a  military  policy)  is  also  the  best 
school  in  which  to  educate  a  nation  to  great  military  achieve- 
ments. When  their  spirits  are  turned  towards  high  aims 
they  feel  themselves  compelled  to  contemplate  war  bravely, 
and  to  prepare  their  minds  to  it: 

"  'The  man  grows  up,  with  manhood's  nobler  aims.'  "... 

.  .  .  "We  Germans  have  a  far  greater  and  more  urgent 
duty  towards  civilisation  to  perform  than  the  Greek  Asiatic 
Power.  We,  like  the  Japanese,  can  only  fulfil  it  by  the 
szvord. 

"Shall  we,  then,  decline  to  adopt  a  bold  and  active  policy, 
the  most  effective  means  with  which  we  can  prepare  our 
people  for  its  military  duty?" 

On  page  275 : 

"A  successful  policy,  therefore,  cannot  be  followed  with- 
out taking  chances  and  facing  risks.    It  must  be  conscious 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  37 

of  its  goal,  and  keep  this  goal  steadily  in  view.  It  must 
press  every  change  of  circumstances  and  all  unforeseen 
occurrences  into  the  service  of  its  own  ideas.  Above  all 
things,  it  must  be  ready  to  seize  the  psychological  moment, 
and  take  bold  action  if  the  general  position  of  affairs  indi- 
cates the  possibility  of  realising  political  ambitions  or  of 
tvaging  a  necessary  ivar  under  favourable  conditions," 

Pages  275-6 : 

"  'Old  Fritz'  must  be  our  model  in  this  respect  {i.e.,  in 
disregarding  historical  rights),  and  must  teach  us  with  re- 
morseless realism  so  to  guide  our  policy  that  the  position  of 
the  political  world  may  be  favourable  for  us,  and  that  we  do 
not  miss  the  golden  opportunity. 

"It  is  an  abuse  of  language  if  our  unenterprising  age  tries 
to  stigmatise  that  energetic  policy  which  pursued  positive 
aims  as  an  adventurist  policy." 

On  page  277  the  author  points  out  that  the  military 
and  political  preparation  for  war  must  go  hand  in  hand 
in  order  to  make  it  possible  to  strike  at  the  moment 
zvhich  from  the  military  point  of  view  is  the  most  un- 
favourable. 

"The  obligation  imposed  on  the  General  to  stand  aloof 
from  politics  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war  only  holds  good  in  a 
limited  sense.  The  War  Minister  and  the  Head  of  the 
General  Staff  must  be  kept  au  courant  with  the  all-fluctu- 
ating phases  of  policy ;  indeed,  they  must  be  allowed  a  cer- 
tain influence  over  policy,  in  order  to  adapt  their  measures 
to  its  needs,  and  are  entitled  to  call  upon  the  statesman  to 
act  if  the  military  situation  is  peculiarly  favourable." 

Page  280 : 

"The  disadvantages  of  such  a  situation  (i.e.,  the  war  on 
two  fronts)  can  only  be  avoided  by  a  policy  which  makes  it 
feasible  to  act  on  the  offensive,  and,  if  possible,  to  overthrow 
the  one  antagonist  before  the  other  can  actively  interfere. 


345112 


38  I   ACCUSE! 

On  this  initiative  our  safety  now  depends  just  as  it  did  in  the 
days  of  Frederick  the  Great.  We  must  look  this  truth 
boldly  in  the  face." 

On  the  same  page  our  diplomacy  is  entrusted  with 
the  task  of  so  "shuffling  the  cards  that  we  may  be  at- 
tacked by  France."     The  author  then  continues : 

"This  view  undoubtedly  deserves  attention,  but  we  must 
not  hope  to  bring  about  this  attack  by  waiting  passively. 
Neither  France  nor  Russia  nor  England  need  to  attack  in 
order  to  further  their  interests.  So  long  as  we  shrink  from 
attack  they  can  force  us  to  submit  to  their  will  by  diplomacy, 
as  the  upshot  of  the  Morocco  negotiations  shows,  and  as  the 
issue  of  the  Balkan  crisis  will  probably  also  demonstrate. 

"If  we  wish  to  bring  about  an  attack  by  our  opponents, 
we  tnust  initiate  an  active  policy,  which,  without  attacking 
France,  will  so  prejudice  her  interests  or  those  of  England, 
that  both  these  States  would  feel  themselves  compelled  to 
attack  us.  Opportunities  for  such  procedure  are  offered 
both  in  Africa  and  in  Europe." 

That  is  plain  enough,  is  it  not?  Not  only  the  ten- 
dencies of  German  policy  are  revealed  without  any  dis- 
guise, but  the  manner  in  which  these  tendencies  are  to 
be  realised  is  prescribed  with  the  minutest  detail.  The 
Chancellor,  it  must  be  admitted,  has  been  an  apt  pupil 
of  the  General  and  has  fulfilled  in  a  masterly  fashion 
his  task  of  so  shuffling  the  cards  that  out  of  the  offen- 
sive war  there  has  been  created  a  war  of  liberation.  At 
least  that  is  how  it  appears  in  the  eyes  of  the  simple 
Michael,^  for  the  rest  of  the  world  has  long  ago  seen 
through  the  gigantic  fraud. 

But  let  us  hear  further  how  Mr.  Bernhardi  chatters 
out  of  school. 

'[Michael,  a  name  commonly  given  to  the  German  people,  some- 
what analogous  to  John  Bull.  The  chief  features  of  the  German 
Michael  are  simplicity  and  honesty,  amounting  almost  to  stupidity.] 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  39 

Page  286: 

"The  worst  result  of  our  Morocco  policy  is,  however,  un- 
doubtedly the  deep  rift  which  has  been  formed  in  conse- 
quence between  the  Government  and  the  mass  of  the  na- 
tionalist party,  the  loss  of  confidence  among  large  sections 
of  the  nations,  extending  even  to  classes  of  society  which,  in 
spite  of  their  regular  opposition  to  the  Government,  had 
heartily  supported  it  as  the  representative  of  the  Empire 
abroad.  In  this  weakening  of  public  confidence,  which  is 
undisguisedly  shown  both  in  the  Press  and  in  the  Reichstag, 
lies  in  my  opinion  the  great  disadvantage  of  the  Franco- 
German  understanding." 

Bernhardi  would  naturally  have  preferred  that  we 
should  even  have  allowed  a  European  war  to  break  out 
on  account  of  the  Morocco  dispute,  but  he  consoles 
himself  with  the  thought  that  all  chances  are  not  yet 
past. 

Page  285 : 

"We  need  not,  therefore,  regard  this  convention  as  defin- 
itive. It  is  as  liable  to  revision  as  the  Algeciras  treaty,  and 
indeed  offers,  in  this  respect,  the  advantage  that  it  creates 
new  opportunities  of  friction  with  France." 

That  is  the  Record:  an  International  treaty  which 
has  prevented  a  world-war,  meets  with  the  conditional 
approval  of  the  author,  only  because  it  offers  new  sources 
of  friction,  and  so,  it  may  he  hoped,  will  soon  lead  to 
the  world-war  which  he  desires. 

Particularly  instructive  is  his  discussion  of  our  rela- 
tions to  England  and  of  the  negotiations  then  being 
conducted  in  Berlin  by  Lord  Haldane.  These  negotia- 
tions along  with  the  previous  and  subsequent  English 
proposals  with  a  view  to  arriving  at  a  political  and 
naval  understanding  with  Germany  deserve  a  special 
chapter,  in  which  it  will  be  clearly  shown  that  England 


40  I   ACCUSE! 

constantly  and  in  the  most  earnest  mariner  took  the  in- 
itiative in  these  negotiations,  but  that  these  were  al- 
ways wrecked  on  the  refusal  of  Germany  or  on  the 
impossible  conditions  which  she  sought  to  impose.  Per- 
haps on  this  point  also  they  were  following  the  pre- 
scription of  Bernhardi,  which  runs : 

Page  287 : 

"Even  English  attempts  at  a  rapprochement  must  not 
blind  us  as  to  the  real  situation.  We  may  at  most  use  them 
to  delay  the  necessary  inevitable  war,  until  we  may  fairly 
imagine  we  have- some  prospect  of  success." 

In  the  concluding  apostrophe  of  his  book  the  author 
emphatically  exclaims: 

Pages  287-8 : 

"If  the  Imperial  Government  was  of  the  opinion  that  it 
was  necessary  in  the  present  circumstances  to  avoid  war, 
still  the  situation  in  the  world  generally  shows  there  can 
only  be  a  short  respite,  before  we  once  more  face  the  ques- 
tion zvhether  we  will  draw  the  szvord  for  our  position  in 
the  world  or  renounce  such  position  once  and  for  all.  We 
must  not  in  any  case  wait.  .  .  .  The  political  situation  of- 
fers many  points  on  which  to  rest  our  lever.  England,  too, 
is  in  a  most  difficult  position.  .  .  .  The  disturbances  in  the 
Far  East  will  probably  fetter  Russia's  forces,  and  Eng- 
land's interests  will  suffer  in  sympathy.  These  are  all  con- 
ditions which  an  energetic  and  far-sighted  German  policy 
can  utilise  in  order  to  influence  the  general  political  situa- 
tion in  the  interests  of  our  Fatherland. 

"If  people  and  Government  stand  together,  resolved  to 
guard  the  honour  of  Germany  and  make  every  sacrifice  of 
blood  and  treasure  to  insure  the  future  of  our  country  and 
our  State  ...  we  need  not  fear  to  fight  for  our  position  in 
the  world,  but  we  may,  with  Ernst  Moritz  Arndt,  raise  our 
hands  to  heaven  and  cry  to  God: 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME   41 

'From  the  height  of  the  starry  sky- 
May  thy  ringing  sword  flash  bright; 
Let  every  craven  cry 
Be  silenced  by  thy  might !' " 

In  conclusion  I  should  further  like  merely  to  draw 
attention  to  the  headings  of  the  chapters  of  Bernhardi's 
book,  which  afford  so  clear  an  insight  into  the  tendencies 
of  the  author,  that  it  might  appear  almost  superfluous 
to  read  his  work. 

Chapter  i.     The  right  to  make  war. 

Chapter  2.     The  duty  to  make  war. 

Chapter  3.  A  brief  survey  of  Germany's  historical 
development. 

Chapter  4.     Germany's  historical  mission. 

Chapter  5.     World  power  or  downfall. 

Chapter  6.     The  character  of  our  next  war. 

Chapter  7.     The  next  naval  war,  &c. 

I  wish  once  more  in  as  emphatic  a  manner  as  possible 
to  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  Bernhardi  expressly 
excludes  an  offensive  war  on  the  part  of  the  Triple  En- 
tente, and  he  indicates  that  the  only  method  of  arriv- 
ing at  the  desired  world-war,  and  at  the  same  time  at 
world-dominion,  is  that  Germany  must  act  as  an  agent 
provocateur  and  must  so  shuffle  the  cards  that  the  other 
side  will  be  compelled  to  attack. 

This  of  course  does  not  prevent  Bernhardi  and  his 
comrades  in  the  faith,  especially  Frobenius,  from  speak- 
ing elsewhere  of  the  aggressive  intentions  of  the  Triple 
Entente,  and  from  depicting  the  dangers  to  which  Ger- 
many is  exposed,  unless  she  anticipates  these  intentions. 

HAVE    WE    BEEN    ATTACKED    OR    WERE    WE    GOING    TO    BE 
ATTACKED? 

This  is  the  same  logic  as  we  hear  to-day  in  every 
corner  of  Germany,  if  indeed  what  is  heard  in  Germany 


42  I    ACCUSE! 

can  still  be  designated  as  logic.  The  official  version 
states  that  the  Triple  Entente  has  attacked  us.  "We 
have  to  protect  our  holiest  possessions,  the  Fatherland 
and  our  own  hearths  against  a  sudden  ruthless  attack." 
(The  appeal  of  the  Emperor  on  the  6th  August  to  the 
German  army.  "The  sword  must  then  decide.  In  the 
midst  of  peace  the  enemy  falls  upon  us,  therefore  to 
arms!  Every  hesitation,  every  delay,  would  be  treach- 
ery to  the  Fatherland.  The  existence  of  our  empire 
is  at  stake — the  existence  of  German  power  and  German 
character." 

Such  is  the  official  version  which  crops  up  in  a  thou- 
sand various  forms  from  the  Chancellor  down  to  the 
last  street-sweeper. 

Semi-officially  however  and  in  the  confidence  of 
secrecy  many  Germans  can  be  heard  asserting  that  we 
were  not,  it  is  true,  attacked,  but  that  we  would  have 
been  attacked  later,  if  we  had  not  now  begun  the  war 
at  a  moment  favourable  for  us.  Should  we  then  ask 
for  evidence  in  support  of  this  hypothesis,  most  of 
those  who  maintain  this  view  have  nothing  to  say,  or 
else  they  declare  that  the  intention  of  the  enemy  to 
attack  us  was  so  obvious  that  any  proof  would  be 
superfluous.  "What  did  they  mean  by  their  enormous 
preparations?"  is  what  they  most  frequently  say.  And 
what  about  our  preparations?  I  reply,  which  were 
certainly  greater  and  more  comprehensive  than  in  any 
other  country  in  the  world.  Did  ever  any  country  in 
time  of  peace  act  as  we  did  in  19 13  when  we  suddenly 
raised  the  strength  of  our  army  on  a  peace  footing  by 
140,000  men,  that  is  to  say,  from  720,000  to  860,000, 
and  when  we  rose  to  an  extraordinary  war  tax  of 
£50,000,000?  "What  was  the  meaning  of  the  Entente, 
the  celebrated  policy  of  'encirclement'  {Einkreisung), 
if  they  did  not  mean  to  attack  us?"  is  what  they  next 
say.    And  what,  I  reply,  was  the  meaning  of  the  Triple 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDI^NTS  OF  THE  CRIME   43 

Alliance  which  involved  even  stricter  obligations  than 
the  Entente,  and  in  spite  of  this,  according  to  our  as- 
sertions, was  defensive  in  its  nature?  "Yes,  but  think 
of  the  Pan-Slavs!"  is  urged  as  an  objection  against  me. 
And  what  about  the  Pan-Germans?  I  venture  to  an- 
swer. Are  our  "Alldeutschen,"  our  national  party,  our 
Pan-Germans  of  the  school  of  Treitschke  and  Bernhardi, 
in  any  way  better  or  less  aggressive  than  the  Pan-Slavs? 
Such  "Pan-tendencies"  are  to  be  found  in  all  coun- 
tries. They  are  harmless,  so  long  as  they  do  not  ad- 
vance to  action.  The  decisive  act  was  however  taken 
by  our  Pan-Germans,  when  they  drove  us  into  this 
horrible  war — a  war  desired  and  openly  proclaimed  by 
them. 

The  Head  of  tpie  War  Party 

And  they  had  and  still  have  friends  and  patrons  in 
high  places.  They  have  gradually  acquired  more  Influ- 
ence in  our  authoritative  circles  than  ever  the  Pan-Slavs 
exercised  at  the  Russian  court.  I  need  not  mention  by 
name  the  person  who  for  years  has  been  the  influential 
head  and  the  battering-ram  of  this  movement  against 
the  originally  peace-loving  mind  of  the  Emperor.  Every- 
one knows  to  whom  I  refer.  The  Zabern  telegram, 
the  message  of  farewell  to  the  Danzig  Hussars,  the  open 
demonstration  from  the  tribune  of  the  Reichstag  against 
our  Morocco  policy,  which  was  at  the  time  still  peaceful 
in  intention — these  and  countless  other  occurrences  and 
suggestions  leave  not  the  slightest  room  for  doubt  as  to 
the  quarter  and  the  camp  from  which  the  inciters  to 
war  have  discharged  their  destructive  missiles  over  Ger- 
many. One  has  but  to  wander  along  the  streets  of  Ber- 
lin to  see  in  all  bookshops  the  work  of  Frobenius  en- 
titled The  German  Empire's  Hour  of  Destiny,  with  the 
commendatory  telegram  of  the  exalted  gentleman  on 
the  outside.     In  his  recommendation  he  expresses  the 


44  I   ACCUSE! 

desire  that  this  "distinguished  book"  which  he  has  "read 
with  the  greatest  interest"  will  find  the  widest  circula- 
tion among  the  German  people.  And  this  Frobenius  is 
a  comrade  in  thought  of  Bernhardi,  and  the  whole  pur- 
port of  his  book  is  that  we  should  strike  before  it  is 
too  late;  since  the  others  mean  to  attack  us,  we  must 
anticipate  them  and  attack  them.  Of  course  no  proof, 
not  the  shadow  of  a  proof,  is  advanced  in  support  of 
this  premise,  which  in  reality  is  but  a  pretext,  and  which 
is  denied  by  Bernhardi  himself  in  the  passage  quoted 
above  (page  280)* 

But  that  does  not  inconvenience  these  great  minds; 
they  do  not  recognise  the  defects  of  their  logic.  They 
do  not  see  that  of  the  two  assertions  only  one  can  be 
true.  Either  we  have  been  attacked,  in  which  case  we 
are  conducting  a  defensive  war,  or  else  we  were  going  to 
be  attacked,  and  in  that  case  we  are  conducting  a  pre- 
ventive war.  If  the  second  statement  is  true  the  first 
must  be  untrue;  and  in  that  case  all  official  utterances 
from  the  Imperial  speech  from  the  Palace  on  the  31st 
July  down  to  the  speech  of  the  Chancellor  on  the  2nd 
December  are  branded  as  lies. 

If  the  assertion  that  it  is  a  defensive  war  is  true,  the 
idea  of  a  preventive  war  is  at  once  put  completely  aside, 
and  it  is  superfluous  to  discuss  further  whether  the 
presuppositions  of  a  preventive  war  in  fact  existed,  or 
whether  such  a  preventive  war  politically  and  morally 
can  be  defended.  Bismarck,  who  after  all  knew  some- 
thing about  politics,  emphatically  answered  this  latter 
question  in  the  negative,  in  stating  that  "even  victori- 
ous wars  cannot  be  justified  unless  they  are  forced  upon 
one,  and  that  one  cannot  see  the  cards  of  Providence 
far  enough  ahead  to  anticipate  historical  development 
according  to  one's  own  calculation."  ^ 

*  Bismarck  Gedanken  und  Erinnerungen   [Vol.  IL  p.   102  of  the 
English  translation.     Smith,  Elder  and  Co.] 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  45 

This  dictum  of  the  great  man  of  the  past  appears  to 
have  fallen  into  oblivion.  While  monument  after  monu- 
ment has  been  erected  to  his  memory,  this  sentence  might 
have  been  inscribed  in  brass  and  in  marble  in  the  walls 
of  the  palaces  of  kings  and  of  governments  in  places 
where  it  would  at  all  times  have  been  visible;  then  per- 
haps the  German  people  and  the  world  might  have  been 
spared  this  most  terrible  of  evils.  Bismarck  also  after 
1870  was  repeatedly  urged  by  Generals  and  by  the  in- 
stigators of  war  to  undertake  a  new  campaign  against 
France  in  order  to  crush  once  for  all  and  to  make  harm- 
less for  all  time  the  country  that  was  again  raising  its 
head.  All  such  efforts  he  constantly  rejected  with  un- 
yielding energy,  and  the  idea  of  initiating  a  war  because 
it  must  come  sooner  or  later,  he  declared  to  be  "criminal" 
and  "insane." 

The  saying  is  apposite,  and  those  whom  it  fits  will  not 
be  able  to  escape  its  application. 

The   Imperial   War 
the  place  in  the  sun 

It  will  be  obvious  from  all  that  I  have  so  far  said 
that  I  regard  the  present  war  neither  as  a  defensive  nor 
as  a  preventive  war.  This  war  is  purely  a  war  of  con- 
quest, born  of  imperialist  ideas  and  serving  imperialist 
ends.     It  is  nothing  else. 

It  is  a  war  for  the  celebrated  "Place  in  the  sun/* 
which  it  is  supposed  is  being  refused  us,  and  which  we 
must  take  forcibly  with  the  sword  in  our  hand. 

What  is  the  meaning  of  the  "Place  in  the  sun"?  No 
one  says  clearly  what  it  is,  and  everyone  understands 
the  phrase  in  a  different  sense. 

The  idea  is  so  alien  to  the  people  that  it  may  be  pre- 
sumed that  they  would  not  have  allowed  themselves  to 


46  I    ACCUSE! 

have  been  sacrificed,  if  it  had  been  said  to  them :    "You 
must  gain  for  us  a  place  in  the  sun." 

For  the  initiated  however  it  is  the  magic  spell  which 
unites  their  imperialistic  desires.  "Only  thus  relying  on 
the  sword,  can  we  gain  the  place  in  the  sun,  which  is  our 
due,  but  which  is  not  voluntarily  accorded  to  us"  (Crown 
Prince  Wilhelm).  With  this  inscription,  and  with  the 
motto  "pro  patria  et  gloria,"  the  photograph  of  the 
German  Crown  Prince  is  sold  in  German  bookshops. 

THE     CHOSEN     PEOPLE 

The  place  in  the  sun  is  the  world-power  which  is  due 
to  us,  as  to  the  chosen  people  of  God.  From  the  point 
of  view  of  the  psychology  of  the  nation  it  is  remark- 
able how  the  old  Jewish  idea  has  mastered  the  good, 
Christian,  Protestant,  anti-semitic  Empire,  and  how  it 
has  ousted  the  true  teaching  of  Christ,  that  all  men  art 
brothers. 

We  change  our  religious  ideas,  like  our  uniforms, 
according  to  our  needs  and  our  circumstances. 


The  God,  whom  in  war  we  invoke  every  day,  whom 
we  entreat  to  grant  that  we  may  destroy  as  many  of  the 
enemy  as  possible,  and  to  whom  we  give  thanks  when 
he  fulfils  our  prayers  is  the  old  Jewish  God,  Jehovah, 
the  God  of  battles  and  of  vengeance,  to  whom  no  sacri- 
fice appears  too  great,  if  it  is  to  serve  the  power  and 
the  dominion  of  his  chosen  people.  The  Christian  God, 
however,  and  his  "only-begotten  Son,"  who  wandered 
about  on  earth  preaching  love  and  sacrifice,  whose  king- 
dom is  not  of  this  world — they  have  nothing  to  do  with 
this  shedding  of  blood,  which  is  entirely  contradictory 
to  the  doctrine  they  taught. 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  47 

The  observations  of  Kant  in  his  essay  on  Everlasting 
Peace  are  entirely  in  the  spirit  of  the  Christian  religion. 

"On  the  conclusion  of  peace  at  the  end  of  the  war  it 
might  not  be  unseemly  for  a  nation  to  appoint  a  day  of 
humiliation,  after  the  festival  of  thanksgiving,  on  which 
to  invoke  the  mercy  of  Heaven  for  the  terrible  sin  which 
the  human  race  are  guilty  of,  in  their  continued  unwilling- 
ness to  submit  (in  their  relations  with  other  States)  to  a 
law-governed  constitution,  preferring  rather  in  the  pride 
of  their  independence  to  use  the  barbarous  method  of  war, 
which  after  all  does  not  really  settle  what  is  wanted,  namely, 
the  right  of  each  State  in  a  quarrel.  The  feasts  of  thanks- 
giving during  a  war  for  a  victorious  battle,  the  hymns  which 
are  sung — to  use  the  Jewish  expression — 'to  the  Lord  of 
Hosts,'  are  not  in  less  strong  contrast  to  the  ethical  idea  of 
a  father  of  mankind ;  for,  apart  from  the  indifference  these 
customs  show  to  the  way  in  which  nations  seek  to  establish 
their  rights — sad  enough  as  it  is — these  rejoicings  bring  in 
an  element  of  exultation  that  a  great  number  of  lives,  or  at 
least  the  happiness  of  many,  has  been  destroyed."  ^ 

That  is  true  Christianity,  and  at  the  same  time  it  is 
the  true  crown  of  German  culture.  Those  same  people, 
however,  who  profess  that  they  are  drawing  the  sword 
on  behalf  of  this  culture  trample  its  finest  products  In 
the  dust,  and  rattle  over  it  with  their  cannons. 

If  it  were  known  in  certain  places  in  Germany  how 
educated  men  and  religious  people  throughout  the  whole 
world  judge  these  continual  blasphemous  appeals  to  God, 


*  [Perpetual  Peace.  English  translation  by  Miss  Campbell  Smith 
(George  Allen  and  Unwin),  p.  136-7.  Later  references  to  Kant's 
essay  are  also  adapted  to  this  edition.] 


48  I   ACCUSE! 


Luigi  Luzzatti,  one  of  the  most  distinguished  pohti- 
cians  and  most  important  thinkers  in  Italy,  who,  as  is 
well  known,  has  more  than  once  been  Prime  Minister 
(be  it  observed  a  strict  Jew — this  I  mention  as  an  ex- 
ample to  Germany  whose  mission  is  to  "bring  free- 
dom," although  in  time  of  peace  it  does  not  go  so  far 
as  to  promote  a  Jew  to  be  a  Second  Lieutenant),  Luigi 
Luzzatti  has  recently  published  in  the  Corriere  delta 
Sera  a  remarkable  article  bearing  the  title  "The  abuse 
of  the  name  of  God,"  from  which  I  quote  some  sen- 
tences : 

"From  the  day  on  which  this  fearful  war  broke  out 
Princes  (not  the  people,  it  must  be  said)  have  bored  every- 
one by  the  use  and  abuse  of  the  name  of  God.  In  the  tele- 
grams which  were  recently  exchanged  between  the  Austrian 
Emperor  and  the  Sultan  the  Almighty  makes  his  appear- 
ance. The  matter  would  take  on  an  ironical  tinge  if  up  in 
Heaven  the  conquerors  and  the  defeated  of  Lepanto  and  the 
soul  of  John  Sobicski  were  to  hear  of  it.  One  could  have 
wished  that  at  least  on  this  occasion  they  might  have  felt 
enough  shame  to  induce  them  to  leave  heaven  in  peace  out 
of  the  question !  .  .  .  Fortunately  God  has  not  yet  appeared 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CREME  49 

in  the  telegrams  exchanged  between  the  monarchs  of  Eng- 
land and  Japan.  And  indeed  it  would  have  been  a  difficult 
matter  to  reconcile  in  the  same  fearful  uproar  of  war  Jesus 
and  Buddha,  a  religion  without  God  and  a  religion  which 
rests  on  a  personal  God  and  Saviour.  We  are  reminded 
of  a  bitterly  ironical  saying  of  Voltaire,  who  observed 
'Since  God  created  man  in  his  own  image,  how  often  has 
man  endeavoured  to  render  a  similar  service  to  God.'  .  .  . 
Let  us  save  God  from  such  profanation !  Let  us  leave  in 
peace  the  Father  of  all  mankind  who  punishes  guilt  and  re- 
wards virtue,  and  who  gives  no  one  the  right  to  represent 
Him  on  earth,  and  to  claim  for  himself  His  omnipotence 
in  this  tragedy  of  war." 

Such  is  the  judgment  of  serious  men  abroad  on  certain 
German  peculiarities  and  on  the  presumption  of  Ger- 
many to  be  the  chosen  people  of  God. 

The  place  in  the  sun  which  is  due  to  us  as  the  chosen 
people,  thus  represents  the  true  object  of  this  war,  even 
if  it  is  not  admitted  to  the  nation  that  this  is  the  object. 


GERMANY  S     BRILLIANT    DEVELOPMENT 

If  anyone  seeks  a  place  in  the  sun,  and  seeks  it  sword 
in  hand,  it  must  be  assumed  that  hitherto  he  has  stood 
in  the  shadow.  Is  this  so  in  the  case  of  Germany?  I 
maintain  that  the  opposite  is  the  case,  and  in  support 
of  this  assertion  I  rely  on  those  very  people,  who  have 
pressed  the  sword  into  our  hand  to  enable  us  to  seek 
a  place  in  the  sun.  In  the  chapter  entitled  "Financial 
and  Political  Preparation  for  War"  (p.  260  ct  seq.) 
Bernhardi  gives  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  brilliant 
and  unprecedented  economic  development  of  Germany 
since  the  Franco-Prussian  war.  He  points  out,  and 
supports  his  assertion  freely  with  statistics,  that  the 
increase  of  wealth  continues  on  an  ascending  scale,  and 
that  the  advance  in  trade  and  industry  since  the  founda- 


60  I   ACCUSE! 

tion  of  the  Empire  has  been  extraordinary.  He  quotes 
a  lecture  dehvered  by  Professor  Dade  before  a  general 
meeting  of  the  Finance  and  Tax-Reformers  held  on  the 
22nd  February,  19 10,  from  which  we  gather  that  the 
value  of  German  imports  and  exports  in  the  last  years 
before  19 10  had  increased  from  300  million  pounds 
sterling  to  between  725  million  pounds  and  800  million 
pounds.  In  19 12  German  imports  and  exports  reached 
a  value  of  approximately  1,200  million  pounds  sterling. 
The  value  of  the  import  of  raw  material  for  industrial 
purposes  rose  from  75  million  pounds  in  1879  to  225 
million  pounds;  the  import  of  manufactured  goods  rose 
from  30  million  pounds  in  1879  to  62 >4  million  pounds 
in  1908,  and  the  export  of  manufactured  goods  during 
the  same  period  rose  from  50  million  pounds  to  over 
200  million.  The  amount  of  coal  raised  in  1879  was 
only  42  million  tons;  in  1908  it  was  I48><  million  tons, 
and  the  value  of  the  coal  raised  increased  from  5  mil- 
lion pounds  to  75  millions.  The  production  of  iron 
ore  rose  from  6  million  to  27  million  tons,  and  in  value 
it  rose  from  £1,350,000  to  £5,950,000.  From  1888  to 
1908  the  amount  of  coal  raised  in  Germany  increased 
by  127  per  cent.,  as  against  only  59  per  cent,  in  Eng- 
land. The  production  of  pig  iron  in  Germany  in  the 
twenty  years  mentioned  above  rose  172  per  cent.,  as* 
against  only  27  per  cent,  in  England.  Similar  figures, 
according  to  Dade  and  Bernhardi,  can  be  adduced  in  all 
other  spheres. 

At  the  same  time  there  took  place  a  continued  growth 
in  revenue  and  a  progressive  capitalisation.  From  1892 
to  1905  an  increase  in  national  wealth  of  about  100  mil- 
lion pounds  sterling  has  taken  place  annually  in  Prussia 
alone.  In  the  grades  of  the  Property  Tax  ranging 
from  £300  to  £5,000  the  number  of  those  taxed  and  the 
number  of  properties  on  which  taxes  are  paid  has  in- 
creased in  these  fourteen  years  by  29  per  cent.,  whereas 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  51 

from  1905  to  1908  the  increase  was  11  per  cent.,  that 
is  to  say,  in  the  first  period  the  yearly  increase  was 
2  per  cent.,  but  in  recent  years  3  per  cent. 

An  even  greater  increase  has  taken  place  in  the  case 
of  the  large  fortunes.  In  the  grades  of  the  property 
tax  ranging  from  £5,000  to  £25,000  the  increase  in  the 
numbers  paying,  and  the  properties  on  which  payment 
is  made  has  been  about  44  per  cent.,  that  is,  on  an 
average  of  the  fourteen  years,  3  per  cent,  annually ;  in 
the  last  three  years  however  it  has  been  46  per  cent. 
The  higher  the  grades  of  the  tax,  the  greater  is  the 
increase;  in  the  grades  from  £300  to  £5,000  the  in- 
crease per  head  of  the  population  has  been  £32 
los. ;  in  the  grades  from  £5,000  to  £25,000  there 
was  an  increase  per  head  of  £320,  and  in  the  grades 
above  £25,000  there  was  an  increase  of  £3,5223/2  per 
hear  per  year. 

Emphasis  is  further  laid  on  the  increase  of  wages,  on 
the  decrease  of  unemployment  and  of  emigration  as 
signs  of  our  economic  prosperity,  and  statistics  are  ad- 
duced in  support  of  these  contentions.  In  1908  only 
20,000  emigrants  left  our  country,  whereas  in  the  same 
year  336,000  persons  emigrated  from  Great  Britain. 
The  investment  of  capital  in  State  railways  amounted 
at  the  end  of  March,  1908,  in  Prussia  to  £494,400,000 
and  at  the  end  of  191 1  to  £552,500,000. 

This  brilliant  picture  of  our  industrial  development, 
which  could  be  supported  by  a  series  of  other  figures,  is 
naturally  of  use  to  General  Bernhardi,  only  in  so  far  as 
it  enables  him  to  represent  as  tolerable  a  further  in- 
crease of  military  burdens.  He  forgets,  however,  that 
in  thus  demonstrating  our  continuous  increase  of  na- 
tional wealth,  and  in  particular  in  emphasising  our  in- 
creasing advantage  over  England,  he  cuts  from  under 
his  own  feet  the  ground  on  which  there  should  be  erected 
the   edifice   of   his    Imperialism.      If    we   already   have 


52  I   ACCUSE! 

such  a  sunny  corner  in  the  sun,  what  is  still  lacking? 
What  more  do  we  want? 

If  in  many  respects  we,  the  most  recent  industrial 
State  in  the  world,  the  growth  of  scarcely  more  than 
two  generations,  are  already  placing  England,  the  old- 
est industrial  State,  in  the  shadow,  we  certainly  cannot 
complain  of  any  deficiency  of  sunshine. 

What  about  extension  of  territory?  What  about 
Colonies?  Does  the  happiness  of  nations  depend  on  the 
number  of  square  miles  which  they  possess,  or  does  it 
depend  on  their  Colonies?  If  that  were  the  case,  small 
countries  like  Belgium,  Holland,  Switzerland,  Denmark, 
Sweden,  and  Norway  would  necessarily  be  poor  in  com- 
parison with  Great  States,  whereas  as  a  matter  of  fact 
the  opposite  is  the  case.  The  highest  figures  for  im- 
ports and  exports  per  head  of  the  population  are  shown 
by  Holland,  followed  by  Belgium,  Switzerland,  and  Den- 
mark, and  then  only  after  these  the  great  Powers.  The 
Belgian  3  per  cents,  stood  at  96  when  the  German  stood 
at  83  per  cent.  The  Norwegian  3^  per  cents,  stood 
at  102,  when  the  Russian  could  be  had  at  81.  Similar 
figures  may  be  adduced  in  every  sphere  of  economic  life. 
The  greatness  of  a  country,  and  in  particidar  the  extent 
of  its  Colonial  possessions,  has  no  relation  to  the  pros- 
perity of  a  country. 

The  best  proof  for  this  fact  is  found  in  Germany 
Itself.  No  one,  not  even  the  most  fanatical  nationalist, 
will  or  can  dispute  the  fact  that  the  increase  in  pros- 
perity of  Germany  in  the  last  forty  years,  and  in  par- 
ticular in  the  twenty-six  years  which  have  elapsed  since 
the  present  Emperor  ascended  the  throne,  has  been  with- 
out precedent  in  the  history  of  the  world.  On  the  oc- 
casion of  the  celebration  of  the  twenty-fifth  anniver- 
sary of  the  accession  of  William  II.  a  compilation  ap- 
peared under  the  title,  Social  Culture  and  the  Well- 
being  of  the  People  during  the  first  25   Years  of  the 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  53 

Reign  of  William  II.  This  work  describes,  and  supports 
with  statistics,  the  prosperity  of  Germany  in  all  branches 
of  human  culture  during  this  period.  It  is  superfluous 
to  reproduce  here  these  well-known  figures.  Only  a  few 
need  here  be  cited.  The  population  has  increased  from 
forty-eight  millions  in  1888  to  sixty-seven  millions  in 
19 14.  The  yearly  increase  due  to  births  amounted  In 
191 1  to  ii°3  per  thousand  inhabitants,  and  was  only 
exceeded  by  Russia  with  17  per  thousand.  The  produc- 
tion of  pig-iron  (estimated  in  thousands  of  tons)  rose 
from  4,024  in  1887  to  17,853  in  1912,  that  is  to  say,  by 
343'6  per  cent.,  whilst  the  production  of  Great  Britain 
in  the  same  time  only  increased  by  17*6  per  cent.,  namely, 
from  7,681  to  9,031.  The  production  of  America  in 
pig-iron  increased  in  the  same  time  by  363*2  per  cent., 
that  is,  from  6,520  to  30,203,  and  thus  America  still 
takes  the  first  place  in  this  field  of  production,  while 
Germany  has  advanced  from  the  third  place  in  1887  to 
the  second  place  in  19 12,  thereby  outstripping  England 
and  attaining  a  percentage  of  increase  twenty  times  as 
great. 

A  development  on  exactly  similar  lines  is  shown  in 
the  production  of  steel,  which  (also  estimated  in  thou- 
sands of  tons)  has  risen  from  1163*9  in  1887  to  17,302 
in  19 12.  Here  also  we  have  advanced  from  the  third 
place  to  the  second  in  the  production  of  the  world,  and 
have  considerably  outstripped  England,  whose  produc- 
tion has  only  increased  from  3,196*8  in  1887  to  6,563*3 
in  191 1.  Estimating  the  increase  by  percentages,  Ger- 
many here  takes  the  first  place,  and  leaves  far  behind 
both  of  her  competitors,  America  and  England.  The 
increase  in  percentage  amounted  in  the  twenty-five  years 
mentioned  in  Germany  to  no  less  than  1,377  per  cent., 
in  America  835  per  cent.,  and  in  England  only  105 
per  cent. 

The  net  tonnage  of  our  German  mercantile  fleet  has 


54  I   ACCUSE! 

increased  from  1,240,182  in  1888  to  3,153,724  in  1913, 
and  at  the  same  time  it  is  specially  to  be  noted  that  the 
commercial  value  of  the  individual  vessels  has  been 
enormously  increased  by  the  transformation  from  sail- 
ing ships  into  steamships.  The  net  tonnage  of  steam- 
ships alone  has  almost  increased  six-fold  in  the  period 
mentioned;  it  has  risen  from  470,364  in  1888  to  2,655,- 
496  in  1913. 

The  increase  of  the  national  income  and  the  national 
wealth  correspond  to  the  commercial  and  industrial  de- 
velopment of  Germany.  Dr.  Karl  Helfferich,  Director 
of  the  German  Bank,^  in  his  contribution  to  the  compila- 
tion mentioned  above,  summarises  his  conclusions  in 
the  following  words: 

"The  German  national  income  amounts  to-day  to  2,150 
million  pounds  annually  as  against  from  1,150  to  1,250  mil- 
lion pounds  in  1895. 

"Of  these  2,150  millions  about  350  millions,  that  is  to  say 
a  bare  sixth,  are  applied  annually  for  public  purposes ;  from 
1,350  to  1,450  million  pounds  are  used  privately,  and  about 
400  to  425  millions,  which  may  be  raised  by  the  automatic 
increase  in  value  of  wealth  now  in  existence  to  500  million 
pounds,  grow  as  an  increase  of  the  wealth  of  the  nation  as 
against  a  sum  of  from  225  to  250  millions  15  years  ago. 

"The  wealth  of  the  German  people  amounts  to-day  to 
more  than  15,000  million  pounds,  as  against  about  10,000 
million  pounds  about  the  middle  of  the  'nineties  of  last 
century. 

"These  solid  figures  summarise,  expressed  in  money,  the 
result  of  the  enormous  economic  labour,  which  Germany 
has  achieved  under  the  government  of  our  Emperor." 

That  is  the  place  in  the  sun  which  we  occupy,  which 
no  one  has  disputed,  can  dispute,  or  means  to  dispute,  a 
place  in  the  sun  for  which  we  are  indebted  to  the  spirit 

^  Now  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  55 

of  enterprise,  the  pertinacity  and  the  skilful  methods  of 
our  merchants  and  our  manufacturers,  but  not  to  the 
braggart  company  of  our  nationalists,  and  just  as  little 
to  the  sword  of  our  Generals  or  the  plans  of  campaign 
of  our  General  Staff. 

It  is  exclusively  the  work  of  the  German  merchant 
and  his  motto  "My  field  is  the  world,"  exclusively  the 
result  of  the  long-enduring  condition  of  peace,  which, 
to  judge  from  the  experience  of  the  past,  the  longer  it 
lasted  would  have  more  and  more  promoted  the  pros- 
perity of  the  German  people. 

INCREASE     OF     POPULATION     AND     THE     COLONIES 

The  objection  is  advanced  that  it  is  indeed  precisely 
the  increase  of  the  German  people,  the  yearly  accession 
to  our  population  of  about  800,000  souls,  which  neces- 
sarily demands  such  an  extension  of  territory.  Where, 
It  is  asked,  are  all  these  new  people  to  find  sustenance 
and  a  home?  The  objection  is  as  insecurely  founded 
as  all  the  others.  If  Germany  were  too  small  to  support 
its  increasing  population,  the  emigration  statistics  would 
show  a  constant  rise.  The  opposite,  however,  is  the  case. 
The  number  of  emigrants  from  188 1  to  1890  amounted 
yearly  to  134,200,  from  1891  to  19 10  to  only  52,800 
yearly,  and  in  19 12  only  18,500  people  emigrated  from 
Germany. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  number  of  immigrants  has 
increased.  Whereas,  formerly,  immigrants  were  con- 
siderably fewer  than  emigrants,  in  the  last  fifteen  years 
or  so  they  have  exceeded  the  latter  so  that  the  stream 
of  emigration  is  on  the  point  of  flowing  towards  instead 
of  away  from  Germany. 

From  these  figures  it  may  be  deduced  that  Germany, 
so  far  from  not  being  in  a  position  to  give  employment 
and  nourishment  to  its  increasing  population,  offers,  on 


56  I   ACCUSE! 

the  contrary,  increasing  opportunities  of  employment 
and  nourishment,  not  only  for  its  own  population,  but 
also  for  those  persons  who  stream  to  it  from  abroad. 
At  the  same  time  wages  show  a  constant,  although  by 
no  means  a  sufficient,  rise. 

And  this  fabulous  development  took  place  at  a  time 
when  other  countries,  and  particularly  France,  were 
substantially  extending  their  Colonial  possessions,  while 
our  Colonial  possessions  remained  limited  to  the  few 
places  in  Africa,  East  Asia,  and  in  the  Pacific  which 
could  still  be  acquired  by  a  Germany  which  arrived  too 
late  on  the  scene.  What  has  the  importance  of  these 
Colonies  been  in  connection  with  our  economic  develop- 
ment in  the  last  forty  years?  In  this  they  have  played 
no  part,  not  the  slightest.  If  we  add  together  the  sums 
which  our  Colonies  have  cost  us  directly  and  indirectly 
(in  the  indirect  cost  we  must  allow  for  the  increase  of 
the  fleet  abroad  rendered  necessary  for  their  protection), 
and  if  on  the  other  side  we  reckon  the  financial  advan- 
tages obtained  from  these  Colonies,  we  shall  find  as  the 
result  that  we  have  made  a  miserable  bargain. 

In  this  respect  also  Bismarck  saw  much  further  than 
his  successors.  He  resolved  on  the  first  steps  towards 
a  colonial  policy,  only  when  subjected  to  strong  pressure 
and  almost  against  his  will,  and  he  constantly  remained 
aware  of  the  fact  that  this  policy  is  one  that  cuts  both 
ways;  he  realised  that  it  would  afford  our  enemies  new 
points  of  attack,  while  furnishing  us  with  no  correspond- 
ing advantages. 

The  present  occurrences  have  proved  the  justice  of  his 
foresight.  Our  Colonies  have  delivered  into  our  ene- 
mies' hands  objects  of  exchange,  which  are  indeed  ma- 
terially of  no  value  to  us,  but  in  our  imagination,  seeing 
that  we  have  once  possessed  them,  they  have  for  us 
a  certain  worth,  which  our  enemies  will  make  us  pay  dear 
for  on  the  conclusion  of  peace. 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  57 

Materially  they  have  no  value  for  us.  Will  anyone 
venture  to  assert  that  our  economical  prosperity  (which 
I  have  supported  with  figures  quoted  above)  would  have 
been  diminished  by  one  iota  if  we  had  never  possessed 
either  South  West  or  East  Africa,  Kiao-chau,  or  Samoa? 
The  total  white  population  of  our  Colonies  amounted  in 
1913  to  something  over  27,000,  that  is  to  say,  about 
3*5  per  cent,  of  the  annual  increase  of  the  population 
of  Germany.  Would  there  have  arisen  in  our  country 
any  question  of  over-population  or  of  a  scarcity  of  food 
if  these  27,000  people  had  remained  in  Germany?  Would 
this  increase,  or  rather  this  non-withdrawal,  have  ex- 
ercised the  slightest  effect  on  our  economic  life,  on  the 
life  of  67  million  people? 

Further,  the  entire  commercial  intercourse  of  Ger- 
many with  her  Colonies  in  imports  and  exports  amounts 
to-day  to  something  over  £5,000,000.  The  total  imports 
and  exports  of  Germany  in  19 12  amounted  in  round 
figures  to  £1,000,000,000.  The  trade  with  the  Colonies 
thus  amounts  to  0*5  per  cent,  of  our  total  foreign  trade. 
If  this  o"5  per  cent,  fell  away,  would  Gennany  economi- 
cally so  much  as  feel  the  effect?  But  indeed  this  per- 
centage would  not  fall  away,  if  we  did  not  possess  these 
Colonies.  If  the  Colonies  need  our  products  they  would 
buy  them  just  as  much  if  they  were  not  our  possessions, 
but  were  either  independent,  or  were  subject  to  the  rule 
of  another  people.  We  have  indeed  no  monopoly  of 
trade  with  our  Colonies,  but  they  belong  to  the  territory 
of  the  German  Empire,  and  are  bound  to  the  commercial 
treaties  concluded  by  Germany.  In  spite  of  the  fact 
that  we  possess  our  Colonies,  we  meet  within  them  the 
competition  of  all  industrial  countries,  regulated  by  com- 
mercial treaties;  it  follov/s  that  even  if  we  were  not  the 
owners,  they  would  still  buy  from  us  those  of  our  wares 
which  we  could  deliver  better  and  at  a  cheaper  rate  than 
others  could. 


58  I    ACCUSE! 

Our  True   Colonies 

Onr  best  customers  are  in  fact  precisely  those  conn- 
tries  which  -we  have  never  possessed,  and  which  we  never 
can  possess:  England,  Russia,  France,  Italy,  America, 
Brazil,  the  Argentine — these  are  our  true  Colonies ;  these 
are  the  countries  which,  in  the  enormous  developments 
of  exchange  in  the  modern  world  of  trade,  make  us  rich 
by  the  purchase  of  our  manufactures,  while  we  draw 
from  them  as  an  equivalent  the  raw  material  which  we 
need,  as  well  as  manufactures  of  foreign  origin.  These 
are  the  countries  which  open  to  the  German  merchant 
inexhaustible  fields  of  activity,  where  in  free  competition 
with  the  trading  nations  of  the  world  he  can  spread 
his  pinions  and  can  make  his  efficiency  felt.  These  are 
the  gigantic  sponges  which  absorb  millions  in  the  form 
of  German  produce  transferred  thither  by  German  mer- 
chants settled  abroad,  and  there  distributed  through  all 
the  industrial  channels.  Throughout  the  whole  world 
huge  German  trading  firms,  either  enjoying  a  position 
of  independence  or  acting  as  the  branches  of  the  central 
house,  may  be  seen  flourishing  and  developing  their 
strength  in  the  struggle  with  English  and  American  com- 
petition. That  is  the  biological  struggle  for  existence 
which  to-day  rules  the  zvorld,  not  the  armed  struggle 
of  barbaric  times.  That  is  the  struggle  that  will  always 
remain,  the  struggle  of  efficiency  against  inefficiency,  the 
struggle  of  skill  against  stupidity,  the  struggle  of  en- 
durance against  slackness,  above  all  the  struggle  which 
in  reality  produces  the  flower  of  the  higher  modern  type 
of  humanity,  the  spiritually  higher  which  on  the  firm 
basis  of  a  wellbeing  embracing  all  circles  of  the  people 
can  rise  even  to  higher  levels  of  morality  and  of  culture. 

Those  who  speak  for  our  imperialist  party  naturally 
know  nothing  of  this  struggle;  for  them  the  merchant 
will  always  remain  a  term  of  contempt,  no  matter  how 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  ö9 

glad  they  may  be  to  take  home  in  marriage  to  their 
noble  castles  the  daughters  of  wealthy  merchants.  The 
officers  and  the  junkers  still  remain  the  highest  caste 
in  the  country.  They  remain  the  props  of  the  throne 
and  of  the  altar,  of  discipline  and  of  morals.  They 
would  not  care  a  brass  button  if,  as  a  consequence  of 
their  militant  undertakings,  all  that  the  merchant  has 
through  long  generations  built  up  as  a  result  of  arduous 
daily  labour  should  perish  at  a  stroke.  For  them  the 
economic  prosperity  of  a  country  exists  only  in  so  far 
as  it  prepares  the  means  for  military  undertakings : 
these  are  the  true  aims  of  national  existence,  and  its 
prosperity  is  of  use  only  in  so  far  as  it  assists  in  the 
fulfilment  of  this  end. 


WHAT     ADVANTAGE     HAS     FRANCE     DRAWN     FROM      HER 
COLONIES? 

Let  US  however  come  back  to  the  question  of  colonies. 
We  have  seen  that  the  lack  of  important  colonies  has 
not  injured  Germany;  it  has  not  hindered  our  enormous 
boom  of  prosperity.  What  is  the  position  in  the  case  of 
Franccf  Has  the  acquisition  of  her  North  African 
Colonial  Empire,  of  her  East  Asian  possession,  of  Mada- 
gascar yielded  her  any  profit  or  furnished  her  with  any 
advantage  over  the  German  Empire?  None  whatever; 
the  reverse  is  indeed  the  case.  The  economic  develop- 
ment of  France  has  in  some  branches  remained  at  a 
complete  standstill ;  on  others  it  has  shown  a  progress 
which  is  out  of  all  proportion  less  than  in  the  case  of 
Germany.  The  entire  foreign  trade  of  France  amounted 
in  1912  to  only  580  million  pounds  sterling,  although 
her  foreign  possessions  contain  more  than  four  times  the 
superficial  area  of  those  of  the  German  Empire.  Her 
population  of  about  forty  millions  has,  as  is  well  known, 
remained  almost  stationary.     Above  all  we  should  ex- 


60  I    ACCUSE! 

pect,  according  to  the  theory  of  our  imperiahsts,  that 
the  estabhshment  of  a  great  Colonial  Empire  would 
result  in  an  enormous  increase  in  the  mercantile  navy. 
Nothing  of  all  this  has  taken  place.  The  tonnage  of 
French  commercial  vessels  has  indeed  fallen  (expressed 
in  thousands  of  tons)  from  1,492  tons  in  1885  to  i,462'6 
in  191 1,  whereas  in  the  same  period,  as  shown  above, 
the  tonnage  of  German  vessels  has  risen  from  1,275*5 
to  3,0237. 

The  production  of  pig-iron  which,  as  shown  above, 
rose  in  Germany  in  twenty-five  years  by  3436  per  cent., 
rose  in  France  in  the  same  period  only  210*7  P^'*  cent. 
The  production  of  steel  in  the  same  twenty-five  years 
rose  in  Germany  by  1,377  P^^  cent,  on  17,302  (estimated 
in  thousands  of  tons),  whereas  the  French  production 
rose  by  only  727  per  cent,  on  4,078*4  (in  thousands  of 
tons). 

Similar  figures  can  be  adduced  in  nearly  all  branches 
of  economic  life.  Where,  then,  I  ask,  is  the  advantage 
which  France  has  drawn  from  her  Colonial  Empire  f 
She  would  probably  have  done  better  if  she  had  left 
the  yellow  and  the  black  and  the  brown  inhabitants  of 
her  Colonial  possessions  to  themselves,  and  if  she  had 
kept  in  her  own  pocket  the  enormous  expenditure  in- 
volved in  the  military  acquisition  and  the  civil  admin- 
istration of  these  wide  territories.  Above  all,  she  would 
then  have  had  no  Morocco  dispute,  no  Agadir  incident, 
and  in  consequence  no  foaming  of  the  imperialistic  beast 
in  Germany,  and  very  probably  no  war  to-day.  After 
all,  the  dead  Archduke  has  only  had  to  wipe  out  the 
"discomfiture"  of  Agadir. 

The  French  people  were  instinctively  right  when  they 
constantly  moved  their  Colonial  conquerors  on  a  step  and 
threw  them  into  the  lumber-room.  So  it  happened  to 
Jules  Ferry  the  man  of  Tonkin,  so  it  happened  to  Jo- 
seph Caillaux  the  man  of  Morocco.     This  is  indeed  a 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  61 

peculiar  irony  of  history!  The  French  drive  away  in 
disgrace  those  who  have  gained  for  them  their  Colonies, 
and  in  our  country  the  national  party  spits  out  fire  and 
destruction  because  France  has  snapped  up  these  won- 
derful Colonies  from  under  her  nose.  In  this  the  French 
gentlemen  have  at  least  the  excuse  that  they  have  ac- 
complished their  extension  of  territory  without  drawing 
the  sword  in  Europe  (the  modern  man  scarcely  speaks 
of  the  lives  of  the  natives),  whereas  we  consider  these 
same  seductive  corners  of  the  world  of  sufficient  value 
to  pour  out  on  their  account  oceans  of  the  best  blood 
of  Europe  and  to  pile  up  for  their  sake  hecatombs  of 
corpses. 

Truly,  we  may  exclaim  with  Ulrich  von  Hütten,  "It 
is  a  pleasure  to  be  alive,"  or  better  still  with  Nunne  in 
Ulk  ^ :  "Nowhere  do  things  happen  so  funnily  as  in  this 
world." 

THE    GERMANS     ABROAD!     FRANCE,     ENGLAND,     AMERICA 

When  on  the  occasion  of  the  Agadir  incident  someone 
observed  to  a  witty  Parisian:  "Have  you  heard  that 
the  Germans  are  at  Agadir?"  he  replied  quite  coolly, 
"I  don't  care;  they  are  in  the  heart  of  Paris,  at  the 
Champs  Elysees ;  that  is  what  matters." 

And  in  fact,  that  is  what  matters.  Not  only  in 
countries  beyond  the  ocean,  but  above  all  even  in  Euro- 
pean countries,  in  those  now  neutral  as  well  as  in  those 
which  are  now  at  war  with  us,  everywhere  the  Ger- 
mans sat  in  the  heart  of  trade  and  commerce  until  the 
outbreak  of  this  fearful  war — in  Germany  it  is  called  the 
"Dawn  of  the  Great  Time."  Everywhere  they  conducted 
important  undertakings  of  their  own,  or  represented 
German  firms,  or  they  managed  banks,  manufactories, 

^  [  Ulk,  a  weekly  humorous  paper,  published  by  the  Berliner  Tagc- 
blat.] 


62  I   ACCUSE! 

or  trading  concerns  which  belonged  to  foreigners.  The 
Paris  Bourse,  the  high  finance  of  Paris,  is  full  of  Ger- 
man names;  Rothschild,  Heine,  Seligmann,  Porges, 
Schickler,  and  all  the  rest  of  them  control  the  French 
money-market.  German  breweries  have  effected  a  revo- 
lution in  the  restaurant  life  of  France,  and  with  their 
sumptuous  beer-palaces  have  driven  out  more  and  more 
the  fine  intimacy  of  the  French  eating-house  in  honour 
of  which  we  older  people  may  at  least  shed  many  a 
tear  of  joyful-sorrowful  remembrance.  The  same  holds 
good  of  countless  other  fields  of  activity  in  France,  in 
which  Geraians  play  an  authoritative  role. 

This  holds,  however,  with  even  greater  truth  in  the 
case  of  England.  It  is  well  known  how  great  a  section 
of  the  trade  and  the  industry  of  Manchester,  Liverpool, 
Binningham  and  other  industrial  centres  is  in  German 
hands,  and  how  Germans  occupy  a  leading  position  in 
leading  English  firms  as  well.  Anyone  who  is  ignorant 
of  this  should  read  the  reports  of  the  Parliamentaiy 
Committee  of  Enquiry  which  was  appointed  to  devise 
measures  against  the  threatened  dispossession  of  Eng- 
lishmen in  their  own  country,  not  forcible  measures,  it 
is  true,  for  the  Englishman  is  far  too  much  a  practical 
man  of  business  not  to  know  that  any  forcible  measure 
would  cut  into  his  own  flesh.  Measures  were  aimed  at 
whereby  the  young  Englishmen  would  acquire  German 
education,  German  methods,  Gemian  adaptability — ■ 
qualities  which  it  was  supposed  would  enable  them  to 
withstand  the  competition  of  young  Germans  in  their 
own  country. 

not  to  speak  of  North  or  South  America. 
The  difference  between  the  two  Americas  consists  chiefly 
in  the  fact  that  the  Germans  in  the  United  States  to  a 
large  extent  assume  a  new  nationality,  whereas  those  in 
South  America  for  the  most  part  hold  firm  to  their  Ger- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  63 

man  nationality.  Both  are  of  use  to  the  Fatherland,  and 
it  is  one  of  the  many  conventional  lies  to  assert,  as  is 
repeatedly  done,  that  the  German  who  assumes  a  new 
nationality  is  a  loss  for  the  German  Fatherland.  The 
opposite  is  nearer  the  truth.  The  German  who  is  nat- 
uralised in  the  United  States  does  not  by  any  means 
lose  his  German  character.  He  remains  German  in 
blood,  in  language,  in  culture,  and  in  thought.  Who 
will  dispute  this  fact?  Are  not  the  artists,  writers,  and 
learned  men  of  Germany  who  tour  the  American  towns 
received  everywhere  with  enthusiasm  by  millions  of 
German  colonists — indeed,  often  with  most  exaggerated 
and  unjustifiable  enthusiasm?  Even  the  minores  gentcs, 
who  in  Germany  have  fallen  more  or  less  out  of  the 
running,  endeavour  to  rehabilitate  themselves  by  the 
na'ive  undistinguishing  national  enthusiasm  (which  of 
course  they  promptly  telegraph  home). 

The  Germans  in  North  America,  whether  naturalised 
or  not,  are  politically  and  economically  an  enonnous  gain 
for  our  Fatherland.  The  intimate  political  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries  rest  in  no  small  degree  on  the 
strong  percentage  of  naturalised  Germans  included  in 
the  American  population.  The  whole  American  culture 
may  be  designated  as  a  German-Anglo-Saxon  mixture. 
A  section  of  the  American  newspapers,  which  is  not 
without  influence  on  public  opinion,  appears  in  the  Ger- 
man language.  The  export  of  German  books  to  Amer- 
ica is  enonnous.  As  in  democratically-governed  coun- 
tries the  representatives  in  Parliament  and  the  Govern- 
ment must  consider  the  views  of  the  electors  more  than 
in  our  countr}'^,  a  policy  directed  in  principle  against 
Germany  would  over  there  be  impossible. 

We  are  ourselves  to  blame  for  the  fact  that  we  have 
destroyed  the  favourable  attitude  of  the  American  peo- 
ple by  this  war,  the  blame  for  which  is  rightly  put  upon 
us  by  all  Americans,   almost  without  exception,    from 


64  I   ACCUSE! 

Roosevelt  down  to  the  last  newspaper  scribbler;  and 
this  fact  represents  a  new  and  important  entry  in  the 
negative  side  of  our  books,  in  balancing  the  results  of 
the  war. 

The  economical  advantages  which  Germanism  in 
America  creates  for  us  is  so  obvious  and  so  universally 
known  that  a  more  detailed  discussion  may  be  regarded 
as  superfluous.  In  the  high  finance  of  New  York,  as  in 
that  of  Paris,  naturalised  Germans  play  a  distinguished 
part.  We  need  but  mention  the  names  of  Ladenburg, 
Thalmann,  Warburg,  Speyer,  Ellissen,  Kuhn,  Loeb  and 
Co.,  Schiff,  &c.  The  enormous  imports  and  exports  of 
the  two  countries,  which  in  union  with  England  occupy 
the  leading  place  in  the  trade  of  the  world,  is  to  a  large 
extent  conducted  over  there  by  German  merchants  who 
almost  without  exception  have  assumed  American  na- 
tionality— presumably  because  the  political  conditions 
there  suit  them  better  than  those  in  our  country,  a  fact 
which  indeed  is  not  to  be  wondered  at.  The  greatest 
American  breweries  are  in  the  possession  of  Germans, 
for  example,  the  brewery  of  Pabst  in  Milwaukee,  and 
of  Peter  Dölger  in  New  York.  In  connection  with  the 
brewery  of  Pabst  there  are  benevolent  institutions  on  a 
large  scale  as  well  as  schools  in  which  the  children  of 
the  employees  receive,  along  with  the  children  of  the 
proprietors,  instruction  in  the  German  and  English  lan- 
guage. The  greatest  toyshops,  for  example,  those  of 
Schwarz  in  New  York,  are  in  German  hands  and  they 
naturally  obtain  their  goods  from  Germany,  A  very 
considerable  section  of  American  doctors  are  German 
by  birth,  and  thus  they  not  merely  spread  German  science 
in  America,  but  also  obtain  from  Germany  their  in- 
struments and  their  medicinal  supplies. 

The  greatest  warehouses  in  New  York,  the  American 
Gorringe  or  Peter  Robinson,  are  in  German  hands.  They 
bear  such  names  as  Altmann,  Strauss,  Gimbel,  Blumen- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  65 

daal,  &c.  It  is  natural  that  all  these  German  "captains 
of  industry"  should  make  use  of  their  knowledge  of 
Gemian  sources  of  supply  which  they  took  over  with 
them,  and  should  thus  take  their  wares  from  the  Ger- 
man contractor,  so  long  as  he  is  in  a  position  to  com- 
pete with  the  foreigner.  The  German  contractor  thus 
learns,  in  his  turn,  to  know  the  requirements  of  the 
market  there,  he  adapts  himself  to  the  circumstances, 
and  thus  there  naturally  arises  from  the  German  origin 
of  the  American  firm  a  lasting  connection  between  the 
German  producers  and  the  German-American  customer. 

Whether  the  latter  remains  a  German  or  becomes  an 
American  is  naturally  a  matter  of  complete  indifference. 
It  is  part  of  the  complete  ignorance  of  our  nationalist 
brawlers  that  they  constantly  repeat  the  foolish  asser- 
tion— false  assertions  as  is  known  do  not  become  more 
true  by  frequent  repetition — that  Germans  who  are  nat- 
uralised abroad  are  lost  to  the  Fatherland. 

The  exact  opposite  may  be  maintained  and  proved  by 
reference  to  the  example  of  South  America.  Whereas  in 
North  America  the  transition  to  foreign  nationality 
represents  the  rule,  it  is  in  South  America  the  excep- 
tion. The  Germans  in  Brazil,  in  the  Argentine,  in  Chile 
only  in  exceptional  cases  become  Brazilians,  Argentiners, 
Chilians;  in  most  cases  they  remain  Gennans.  They 
are  thus  subject  even  in  times  of  peace  to  the  disadvan- 
tage that  they  must  return  to  Germany  for  military 
training — many  of  them  are  officers  of  the  reserve  and 
of  the  Landwehr — and  thus  they  are  obliged  to  interrupt 
their  mercantile  activities.  When  however  a  war  breaks 
out  as  has  now  occurred,  and  suddenly  calls  them  with- 
out any  preparation  to  the  home  country,  they  have 
frequently  to  pay  for  their  adherence  to  German 
nationality  by  the  complete  ruin  of  their  business,  even 
if  they  should  return  alive  and  unmutilated.  This  ruin 
is  accelerated  by  the   fact  that,  as  is  well  known,  the 


66  I   ACCUSE! 

South  American  people,  like  the  rest  of  the  neutral 
world,  brand  us  as  the  disturbers  of  the  peace,  and 
rightly  hold  us  responsible  for  the  severe  blow  sustained 
by  their  economic  life,  and  thus  they  are  without  excep- 
tion sympathetic  to  the  other  side.  Owing  to  the  ex- 
citable temperament  of  the  Spanish  population  of  South 
America  this  attitude  against  Germany  manifested  itself 
so  strongly  against  Germans  living  there,  that  frequently 
even  those  who  were  not  called  to  arms  packed  up  their 
knapsacks  and   returned   to   Europe. 

This  judgment  is  based  not  on  newspaper  reports  but 
on  my  personal  observations.  About  the  end  of  August 
while  travelling  from  America  to  Germany  I  had  an 
opportunity  of  speaking  to  many  Germans  returning  by 
Genoa  from  Brazil,  Argentine  and  Chile.  They  painted 
to  me  the  condition  of  affairs  in  these  countries  in  the 
manner  indicated  above;  they  were  naturally  glowing 
with  patriotic  enthusiasm  (they  could  not  be  expected, 
in  South  America  in  the  month  of  August,  to  guess  at 
the  gigantic  lie  about  the  war,  which  to-day  professors 
in  Germany  have  as  yet  failed  to  recognise),  yet  they  all 
admitted  that  everything  which  they  had  laboriously 
built  up  in  the  course  of  many  years,  in  many  cases  in 
the  course  of  decades,  had  been  destroyed  at  a  blow 
by  the  outbreak  of  war.  Young  men,  who  had  crossed 
at  an  early  age,  and  who  had  slowly  worked  their  way 
up  by  industry  and  efficiency  in  the  great  German  ex- 
port-houses, had  been  obliged  to  leave  their  situations 
to  defend  their  Fatherland  "threatened"  by  Russians  and 
Frenchmen,  to  defend  the  freedom  and  existence  of  the 
German  people. 

But  even  without  the  order  of  recall  they  would 
probably  have  lost  their  situations,  since  their  firms 
under  the  effects  of  the  war,  which  in  these  countries 
has  produced  an  almost  universal  condition  of  bank- 
ruptcy, would  have  had  either  to  close  their  doors,  or  at 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME*  67 

least  to  restrict  their  business  as  far  as  possible.  Older 
people  who  through  many  trials  and  difficulties  had  ac- 
quired a  position  of  independence  were  obliged  to  give 
up  the  conduct  of  their  business  in  consequence  of  the 
war  and  the  antipathy  felt  towards  them  by  the  popu- 
lation, and  had  to  struggle  back  to  the  homeland  with 
wife  and  child.  These  also  were  the  innocent  victims 
of  their  adherence  to  their  German  nationality.  On 
the  long  fifty- two-hours'  railway  journey  from  Ala  to 
Munich  it  was  moving  to  listen  to  all  these  stories  of 
broken  existences,  of  shattered  hopes,  and  to  observe  the 
quiet  spirit  of  surrender  with  which  all  these  active 
pioneers  of  Germanism  abroad,  yielding  themselves  to 
the  inevitable,  laid  down  on  the  altar  of  the  Fatherland 
their  success  and  their  hopes,  built  up  with  so  much 
labour. 

The  inevitable !  So  they  believed  these  good,  trusting 
people.  If  they  had  but  known,  and  if  they  only  knew 
how  little  there  was  of  the  inevitable  in  all  this!  If 
they  only  knew  that  they  were  but  the  marionettes,  di- 
rected by  invisible  wire-pullers,  to  pay  with  their  lives 
and  fortunes  for  the  selfish  interests  and  the  insane 
dreams  of  world-power  and  Pan-Germanism  which  these 
men  entertain;  if  they  had  but  known  that  all  this  was 
arranged  and  prepared  by  criminal  and  ignorant  men, 
who  seek  to  achieve  by  fire  and  blood,  by  murder  and 
devastation,  what  can  only  be  obtained  by  the  patient, 
peaceful  labour  continued  through  generations  of  the 
merchant  and  the  manufacturer,  the  man  of  science 
and  the  man  of  knowledge — if  these  vigorous  men  had 
but  known  all  that — men  who  even  across  the  sea  had 
not  forgotten  German  dreams  and  German  idealism, 
and  who  had  not  lost  the  confidence  that  the  cause  for 
which  the  German  draws  the  sword  must  necessarily 
be  a  just  cause — ^had  they  but  known  the  truth,  they 
would  scarcely  have  crossed  the  sea;  they  would  not 


68  I   ACCUSE! 

have  left  the  soil,  which  had  given  to  them  and  their 
families  a  second  home. 

They  were  all  agreed  that  the  thought  of  rebuilding 
their  existence  in  South  America  could  not  be  enter- 
tained, and  that  the  years  and  decades  laboriously  spent 
by  them  there  were  merely  thrown  away. 

Which  German  then  is  of  most  use  to  the  Fatherland? 
He  who  assumes  a  foreign  nationality,  as  in  North 
America,  or  he  whp  remains  by  nationality  a  German,  as 
in  South  America?  The  former,  in  my  opinion.  If  we 
survey  the  collapse  into  which  our  business  relations 
with  South  America  have  fallen,  and  if  we  transfer  this 
phenomenon  to  the  gigantic  proportions  of  North  Amer- 
ica, we  may  congratulate  ourselves  on  the  fact  that  the 
Germans  of  North  America  have  for  the  most  part  not 
remained  Germans,  but  have  become  Americans.  What 
would  have  been  the  result  if  the  effects  of  the  war  had 
revealed  themselves  in  North  America  in  a  way  similar 
to  that  in  which  they  have  been  manifested  in  South 
America,  if  nearly  all  Germans,  those  subject  to  mili- 
tary service  as  well  as  those  exempt  from  service,  had 
had  to  leave  North  America,  their  adopted  Fatherland, 
their  positions  and  their  business?  An  irreparable  eco- 
nomic disaster  for  Germany  would  have  resulted.  As 
we  shall  in  any  case  gradually  bleed  to  death  if  the  war 
endures  for  any  length  of  time,  in  consequence  of  the 
breach  in  our  business  relations  with  belligerent  coun- 
tries which  must  remain  for  many  years,  such  a  blow 
from  the  neutral  country  of  North  America  might  well 
have  been  for  us  the  finishing  stroke.  Thank  God  that 
our  Gennan-Americans  have  always  been  more  sober 
and  more  reasonable  in  their  thoughts  than  our  Pan- 
Germans.  By  giving  up  their  German  nationality  they 
have  rendered  Germany  the  best  service. 

This  again  disposes  of  one  of  the  theories  on  which 
territorial  expansion  is  supported,  one  of  the  theories 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  69 

productive  of  constant  friction  between  civilised  peoples. 
Our  true  colonies  lie  where  we  do  not  possess  a  square 
metre  of  territory:  in  North  and  South  America,  in 
England,  Prance,  Russia,  and  Italy,  in  North  and  South 
Africa,  in  Canada,  and  Australia.^ 

Our  commercial  intercourse  with  England  amounts 
to  about  185  million  pounds  sterling,  with  France  about 
77^/2  million  pounds  sterling,  with  both  countries  to- 
gether about  262 1/2  million  pounds  sterling,  that  is  to 
say,  to  more  than  a  quarter  of  our  total  foreign  trade. 
At  the  same  time  we  sell  more  to  these  countries  than 
we  buy  from  them.  We  sell  to  them  in  round  figures 
to  the  extent  of  162^  million  pounds,  and  we  buy 
from  them  100  million  pounds.  The  value  of  our  ex- 
ports thus  amounts  to  more  than  50  per  cent,  above  our 
imports.  About  44  per  cent,  of  German  foreign  trade, 
that  is  to  say,  about  425  million  pounds,  is  accounted 
for  by  all  our  enemy  countries  taken  together.  What  is 
the  significance  of  these  figures  when  we  contrast  them 
with  the  miserable  scraps  of  country — in  part  wild  and 
unfertile,  uninhabitable  by  Europeans — over  which 
diplomatists  wrangle,  nations  are  incited  against  each 
other,  money  is  uselessly  squandered  in  gigantic  arm- 
aments, and  for  which  in  the  end,  since  the  bomb  must 
explode  sooner  or  later,  the  bloodiest  of  all  wars  has 
been  conjured  up? 

When  will  the  peoples  of  the  world  at  last  compre- 
hend the  madness  of  this  situation?  When  at  last  will 
they  call  aloud  to  their  rulers,  and  above  all  when  will 
the  Germans  exclaim  to  the  rulers  of  Germany:  ^'We 
have  indeed  already  got  the  place  in  the  sun.  Only 
leave  us  alone  in  peace  and  quietness  to  warm  ourselves 
in  the  sunshine  and  to  do  our  work.  Do  not  for  ever 
oppress  us  with  burdens  too  grievous  to  be  borne.    Free 

*  These  ideas  are  developed  in  an  admirable  manner  in  The  Great 
Illusion,  by  Norman  Angell  (William  Heinemann,  London). 


70  I   ACCUSE! 

yourselves  at  last  from  the  geographical  monomania, 
whose  ambition  is  to  devour  square  miles,  but  which 
has  already  almost  devoured  us  poor  nations." 

THE     PLACE     IN     THE     SUN      FOR     US — THE     PLACE     IN 
THE    SHADOW     FOR    THE    OTHERS 

In  reality  our  imperialists  are  seeking  to  achieve  some- 
thing quite  different.  They  also  know,  even  if  they  do 
not  say  it  to  the  stupid  people  (and  Bernhardi's  book 
proves  that  this  is  so)  that  we  have  indeed  the  place 
in  the  sun,  that  no  one  seeks  to  dispute  it,  and  that  if 
anyone  were  to  seek  to  do  so,  he  would  necessarily  fail. 
But  it  is  something  else  that  they  want.  They  want 
the  exclusive  place  in  the  sun;  they  are  striving  for  the 
world-dominion  of  Germany,  and  that  at  any  rate  is 
what  the  others  are  not  prepared  to  yield  to  them. 

The  German  Wehr-Verein,  in  a  meeting  held  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  has  quite  recently  expressed 
this  with  all  the  lucidity  that  can  be  desired.  In  this 
manifesto  we  find  the  following  words: 

"We  need  room  and  air  for  the  further  development  of 
our  German  nationality.  The  time  for  moderation  is  past. 
Relentlessly  thinking  only  of  our  interests,  we  must  and  we 
will  dictate  peace.  Only  one  peace  can  be  thought  of,  a 
peace  which  assures  the  permanent  leading  world-position 
of  Germany.  .  .  .The  criminal  breakers  of  the  peace  ,  .  . 
England,  France  and  Russia,  must  be  so  weakened  that  in 
future  they  will  cease  to  be  a  danger  to  the  peace  of  the 
world." 

Thus  we  find,  on  the  one  side,  breakers  of  the  peace, 
and  on  the  other  a  permanent  leading  world-position! 
Explain  this  to  me,  Count  Oerindur !  Here  we  find  truth 
and  falsehood  mingled  in  a  most  dexterous  manner. 
On  the  one  side  the  true  aims  of   the  war-party  are 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  71 

openly  proclaimed,  and  yet  on  the  other  the  pretence 
that  the  peace  was  broken  by  the  other  party  is  boldly 
maintained.  Nevertheless,  these  gentlemen  do  not  suc- 
ceed in  their  sommersault  over  logic.  If  to  extend  our 
nationality  we  must  obtain  for  Germany  the  permanent 
leading  position  in  the  world,  that  is  equivalent  to  say- 
ing in  other  words  that  we  must  compel  the  others  to 
subject  themselves  to  our  leadership,  since  to-day  we 
already  enjoy  equal  privileges  with  others,  but  not  a 
leadership.  If,  however,  we  do  this,  it  is  we  who  are 
the  breakers  of  the  peace,  and  not  the  others. 

In  reality  that  is  the  position  of  affairs,  as  I  will 
point  out  in  the  second  section  of  this  book.  It  is  none 
the  less  of  great  value  that  these  gentlemen,  even  while 
they  attempt  to  deny  this,  yet  admit  it  against  their  will. 

THE    FEAR    OF    GERMANY 

It  is  leadership  that  we  seek,  not  merely  equal  privi- 
leges with  others.  It  would  be  nonsense  to  say  that 
we  seek  the  latter,  since  we  already  possess  in  the  fullest 
measure  such  equal  privileges.  If  we  are  not,  as  a  Ger- 
man professor  has  expressed  it,  "morally  and  intellec- 
tually beyond  all  comparison  superior  to  all  other  na- 
tions," ^  there  is  at  least  one  superiority  which  has  will- 
ingly been  granted  to  our  Prussian  Germany  by  the 
rest  of  the  world  for  a  century  and  a  half.  I  refer  to 
our  military  superiority.  While  we  need  only  fear  God, 
but  nothing  else  in  the  world,  Germany  has  been  feared 
by  all — almost  more  than  God  Himself.  Even  Tacitus 
long  ago  pointed  out  that  the  defectiveness  of  the  Ger- 
man frontiers  was  made  good  by  fear  of  the  Teutons : 
"A  Sarmatio  Dacisque  mutuo  metu  aut  montibus  separa- 
tur."  The  fear  of  Germany  produces  the  effect  that 
our  word  weighs  heavily  in  the  council  of  the  nations 
*  Professor  Lasson. 


72  I   ACCUSE! 

despite  all  "encirclement,"  and  despite  the  wretchedness 
of  our  diplomacy. 

On  a  certain  occasion  recently  the  most  important 
conditions  of  peace  were  being  discussed  in  a  lively  con- 
versation. Frenchmen,  Germans,  and  Englishmen  living 
abroad  were  taking  part  in  the  discussion  seated  round 
the  common  table,  and  in  the  end  they  almost  arrived 
at  an  agreement  as  to  the  terms  of  peace.  Then,  how- 
ever, the  German  observed  in  jest,  "One  more  condi- 
tion; you  French  must  take  over  en  bloc  our  German 
diplomatists."  The  Frenchman  sprang  up  in  indigna- 
tion and  broke  off  the  peace  negotiations,  exclaiming, 
"Ah  ga,  non!  Ca  c'est  trop.  Nous  continuerons  ä  com- 
battre."     And  with  these  words  he  left  the  restaurant. 

DIPLOMATIC     SUCCESS     OF     THE     TRIPLE     ALLIANCE 

The  lack  of  dexterity  shown  by  our  diplomacy — ■ 
where  could  all  the  high-born  Borussen  and  Saxo- 
Borussen  be  expected  to  learn  skill  in  business! — the 
defects  of  our  diplomacy  are  constantly  made  good  by 
the  weight  of  the  amiy,  standing  in  the  background. 
For  long  the  Triple  Alliance  was  indeed  only  a  sham, 
but  it  looked  quite  well  from  the  outside,  and  it  worked 
almost  like  a  being  of  flesh  and  blood. 

Thus  in  all  the  conflicts  of  recent  years  Germany,  in 
union  with  Austria  and  Italy,  has  come  out  quite  well 
in  the  end,  and  her  allies,  relying  on  the  power  of  Ger- 
many, have  been  able  to  bear  home  spoil,  with  which 
it  would  scarcely  be  proper  to  compare  the  acquisi- 
tions of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Was  Austria  not  able  in 
1908  to  bag  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  a  fat  morsel  of 
more  importance  than  twenty  Moroccos  ?  Was  Italy  not 
able  to  appropriate  without  a  European  conflict  Tripoli 
and  the  ^gean  islands — acquisitions  which  it  can 
scarcely  be  expected  to  disgorge  again?    In  addition  to 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  73 

the  open  door  in  Morocco,  which  is  o£  more  value  than 
any  costly  rights  of  possession  demanding  the  expendi- 
ture of  blood,  have  we  not  got  into  the  bargain  a  con- 
siderable piece  of  the  French  Congo — an  exchange  which 
cost  Caillaux,  the  Minister  responsible  for  it,  his  pres- 
tige and  his  position,  and  which  almost  cost  his  wife 
her  life?  Did  we  not,  acting  with  our  ally  Austria, 
achieve  in  her  interests  the  great  feat  of  gracefully 
turning  the  Montenegrins  out  of  Scutari,  which  they 
had  purchased  with  streams  of  blood,  and  of  introduc- 
ing there  an  international  garrison?  Was  not  the  crea- 
tion of  that  mannikin-kingdom  of  Albania,  that  "vile 
abortion  of  filth  and  fire,"  ^  accomplished  exclusively  in 
the  interests  of  our  allies  Austria  and  Italy?  Were  we 
not  able  to  complete  with  England  and  Turkey  an  agree- 
ment that  was  favourable  to  us  in  connection  with  Asia 
Minor  and  the  Bagdad  line  ? 

This  list  of  successes  could  be  considerably  lengthened. 
I  need  not  emphasise  the  fact  that,  from  my  point  of 
view,  many — indeed  nearly  all — of  these  diplomatic 
bickerings,  these  alterations  and  annexations  of  terri- 
tory have  not  the  slightest  connection  with  the  real 
interests  of  the  nations.  When  we  reflect  that  a  Euro- 
pean war,  like  that  raging  to-day,  almost  broke  out  in 
19 1 2  on  the  question  whether  Serbia  should  receive  her 
celebrated  "window  on  the  Adriatic" — when  we  reflect 
that  nearly  every  one  of  the  questions  mentioned  above 
brought  Europe  for  the  time  being  to  the  verge  of  an 
armed  conflict,  while  these  so-called  "vital  questions" 
frequently  had  not  in  any  way  decisive  importance  for 
the  well-being,  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word,  of  the 
States  immediately  concerned,  we  are  constantly  con- 
strained to  admire  anew  the  lamb-like  patience  of  the 
nations  and  the  craziness  of  the  diplomatists,  and  to 
concur  in  the  saying  of  the  good  Oxenstjerna  in  con- 
^  Spottegeburt  aus  Dreck  und  Feuer — Faust. 


74  I    ACCUSE! 

soling  his  son  who  professed  himself  unfit  for  the  post 
of  Swedish  Ambassador,  "An  nescis,  mi  fili,  quantilla 
prudentia  mundus  regatur?" 

Austria's   balkan    policy 

What  advantage  has  Austria  derived  from  her  an- 
nexation of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina? — One  more  worry 
added  to  the  many  by  which  she  was  already  plagued. 
Would  it  not  have  been  better  for  Austria  and  for  the 
whole  world  if  the  Empire  had  remained  content  with 
an  occupation  such  as  had  existed  since  1878  on  the 
basis  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  ?  The  Great-Serbian  move- 
ment was  fanned  into  more  vigorous  life  than  ever  be- 
fore by  the  formal  annexation  in  1908,  and  notwith- 
standing the  propitiatory  declaration  of  Serbia  in  March, 
1909,  it  continued  to  take  its  course.  National  move- 
ments in  fact  cannot  be  suppressed.  The  practical  poli- 
tician must  deal  with  them  as  facts,  and  if  he  desires 
to  conduct  them  in  the  desired  direction,  he  must  en- 
deavour as  far  as  possible  to  satisfy  their  demands 
which  rest  on  community  of  race,  of  language,  and  often 
of  religion,  demands  which  are  thus  healthy  and  justi- 
fied. Therein  lies  the  skill  of  the  English,  and  the  true 
basis  of  the  colonial  greatness  of  this  people.  They 
subdued  the  South  African  republics,  but  almost  imme- 
diately after  their  subjection  they  gave  them  self-gov- 
ernment within  the  framework  of  the  great  South 
African  Union,  and  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Union 
General  Botha,  their  most  distinguished  military  leader. 
They  have  acted  in  the  same  way  towards  all  their  other 
colonies  throughout  the  world  as  soon  as  these  were 
sufficiently  far  developed  for  self-government.  Under 
the  flexible  suzerainty  of  Britain,  Canada  and  Australia 
are  independent  States  enjoying  merely  the  advantages 
which   spring   from  their  connection   with   the   world- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  75 

empire,  while  suffering  no  disadvantage  from  this  con- 
nection. This  is  the  source  of  the  attachment  shown 
by  all  these  colonies  to  the  Mother  Country,  even  by  the 
one  most  recently  acquired  by  force  of  arms.  This 
explains  the  complete  failure  of  Germany's  speculations 
on  rebellions  or  secessions,  which  might  create  difficul- 
ties for  the  English,  and  drive  their  colonies  into  the 
arms  of  the  Germans, — these  same  Germans  who  even 
to-day,  before  they  have  yet  annexed  Belgium,  can  find 
nothing  better  to  do  than  banish  the  French  language 
from  the  streets  of  Brussels  and  Antwerp  and  from 
public  life  by  command  of  the  military  authorities. 

If  Austria,  instead  of  annexing  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina to  the  accompaniment  of  the  rattling  sabre  of 
her  German  ally,  had  accepted  the  Serbian  national 
movement  as  a  natural  fact,  and  had  made  reasonable 
concessions  to  it  on  the  principle  "naturam  expellas 
furca,  tamen  usque  recurret,"  we  would  to-day — this 
can  be  definitely  asserted — we  would  to-day  have  had 
no  world-war.  But  clearly  the  Austrians  understand 
these  things  better.  They  consider  it  right  to  treat  all 
their  foreign  nationalities,  Italians,  Croats,  Slavonians, 
Rumanians,  Serbians,  according  to  the  principle: 

"A  brother's  love,  sir,  ere  too  late ! 
Or  with  this  stick  I'll  break  your  pate."  ^ 

How  far  they  have  got  with  this  we  see  to-day,  not 
only  on  the  Serbian,  but  also  on  the  Italian  side,  and 
how  long  will  it  be  until  we  see,  on  the  Rumanian 
frontier  as  well,  the  effects  of  this  extreme  reactionary 
policy  of  oppression! 

But  the  worse  Austrian  policy  has  been,  the  more  as- 
tonishing are  the  diplomatic  successes  which   in  recent 

^  "Und  willst  du  nicht  mein  Bruder  sein 
So  schlag  ich  dir  den  Schädel  ein." 


76  I   ACCUSE! 

years  she  has  everywhere  been  able  to  gain,  relying  on 
the  armed  force  of  Germany.  Germany  and  Austria 
have  indeed  no  reason  to  complain  that  European 
diplomatists  have  constantly  trodden  on  their  corns. 
Apart  from  the  Morocco  question,  the  questions  which 
have  cropped  up  in  recent  years  were  all  what  are  called 
"vital  questions"  for  Austria,  if  indeed  It  is  possible 
to  speak  of  vital  questions  in  the  case  of  a  corpse.  With 
this  corpse  the  dexterity  of  German  diplomacy  has  linked 
for  weal  or  for  woe  (unfortunately  more  for  woe  than 
for  weal)  the  German  national  organism,  in  itself 
healthy  and  vigorous.  This  is  in  the  interest  of  the 
"Germanic  races  in  central  Europe,"  to  use  the  beauti- 
ful expression  of  our  White  Book.  Does  anyone  feel 
inclined  to  laugh  at  this?  Austria,  as  is  well  known, 
consists  only  so  far  as  a  fourth  part  is  concerned  of 
inhabitants  of  the  Germanic  race,  yet  with  this  idea  of 
"race-protection"  we  have  fortunately  advanced  so  far 
that  these  Eastern  questions,  which  to  a  Bismarck  were 
not  worth  the  bones  of  a  Pomeranian  grenadier,  are 
likely  to  cost  us  the  bones  of  many  hundreds  of  thou- 
sands of  our  countrymen  in  the  prime  of  their  life,  and 
rob  us  of  the  labour  of  many  generations. 

This  is  indeed  a  sorry  transaction,  yet  it  is  one  which 
would  have  succeeded  brilliantly,  if  it  had  been  left  in 
the  field  of  diplomacy,  like  all  similar  transactions  in 
recent  years,  and  if  it  had  not  been  transplanted  to  the 
battlefield.  The  diplomatic  success  which  was  attained 
on  the  evening  of  the  25th  July  in  the  Serbian  answer 
to  the  Austrian  Note  was  one  of  the  most  brilliant  in 
the  whole  diplomatic  history  of  Europe.  Austria  had 
gained  everything  of  importance  which  she  had  de- 
manded apart  from  a  few  points,  and  these  not  decisive, 
on  which  Serbia  expressed  her  readiness  to  negotiate 
further;  moreover,  what  she  had  won  exceeded  anything 
that  ever  one  State  had  obtained   from  another  inde- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  77 

pendent  State  by  diplomatic  means  in  time  of  peace. 
Further,  the  humiliation  of  Serbia  was  at  the  same  time 
a  humiliation  of  Russia,  and  the  prestige  of  Austria 
at  the  moment  when  she  insolently  and  without  any 
grounds  recalled  her  ambassador  from  Belgrade,  stood 
higher  in  the  Balkans  than  it  had  ever  done  before, 
and  certainly  higher  than  it  will  ever  stand  hereafter. 
This  success  she  owed  entirely  to  the  unflinching  sup- 
port of  her  German  ally. 

Why,  notwithstanding  this,  the  situation  was  allowed 
to  lead  to  war,  or  rather  why  war  was  intentionally 
produced,  can  only  be  explained  by  reference  to  German 
policy  and  the  tendencies  in  Berlin,  as  I  will  demon- 
strate by  documentary  evidence  in  the  second  section  of 
this  work.  For  the  present  discussion  it  is  enough  to 
establish  the  fact  that  the  assertion  constantly  repeated 
in  Germany  that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  always  left 
in  the  cold  or  beaten  over  the  ears  by  the  diplomacy 
of  the  Entente,  rests  on  a  falsehood,  and  that  on  the 
contrary  the  policy  of  the  Triple  Alliance  on  all  occa- 
sions— even  at  the  very  last  in  July,  19 14 — was  bril- 
liantly victorious. 

THE    CROWN    PRINCE   AND    WAR    PARTY 

Everyone  in  Germany  constantly  speaks  about  the 
"policy  of  encirclement"  {Einkreisung s p olitik) ,  to  which 
the  present  catastrophe  is  attributed.  Here  also  we 
naturally  meet  with  the  same  phenomenon  as  in  the 
whole  campaign  of  justification,  which  seeks  to  repre- 
sent Germany  as  the  innocent  lamb  and  England  as 
the  ravening  wolf.  Those  who  are  initiated,  however, 
know  quite  well  how  the  matter  stands,  and  if  the 
Crown  Prince  were  to  meet  Bernhardi  or  Frobenius  in 
the  field,  these  comrades  in  the  faith  would  smile  to 
each  other  like  Roman  augurs.    They  know  quite  well 


78  I    ACCUSE! 

that  it  is  no  foreign  policy  but  our  own  will — or  rather 
their  will — that  has  urged  us  into  this  war,  and  if  they 
were  to  deny  it,  now  that  they  see  the  fearful  conse- 
quences, their  own  writings  would  rise  up  against  them 
as  bloody  witnesses. 

What  do  we  find  in  the  introduction  to  the  Crown 
Prince's  book,  Germany  in  Arms? 

"To-day,  indeed,  we  live  in  a  time  which  points  with 
special  satisfaction  to  the  proud  height  of  its  culture,  which 
is  only  too  willing  to  boast  of  its  international  cosmopoli-* 
tanism,  and  flatters  itself  with  visionary  dreams  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  an  everlasting  peace  throughout  the  world.  This 
view  of  life  is  un-German  and  does  not  suit  us.  The  Ger- 
man who  loves  his  people,  who  believes  in  the  greatness  and 
the  future  of  our  homeland,  and  who  is  unwilling  to  see  its 
position  diminished,  dare  not  close  his  eyes  in  the  indul- 
gence of  dreams  such  as  these,  he  dare  not  allow  himself  to 
be  lulled  into  indolent  sleep  by  the  lullabies  of  peace  sung 
by  the  Eutopians.  .  .  .  Germany  has  behind  her  since  the 
last  great  war  a  period  of  economic  prosperity,  which  has 
in  it  something  almost  disconcerting.  Comfort  has  so  in- 
creased in  all  circles  of  our  people,  that  luxury  and  claims  to 
a  certain  style  of  life  have  undergone  a  rank  development. 
Now  certainly  we  must  not  thanklessly  deny  that  a  wave  of 
economic  prosperity  brings  with  it  much  that  is  good.  But 
the  shady  side  of  this  too  rapid  development  often  mani- 
fests itself  in  a  painful  and  threatening  manner.  Already 
the  appreciation  of  wealth  has  gained  in  our  country  an 
importance,  which  we  can  only  observe  with  anxiety.  .  .  . 
The  old  ideals,  even  the  position  and  the  honour  of  the 
nation,  may  be  sympathetically  affected;  for  peace,  peace 
at  any  price,  is  necessary  for  the  undisturbed  acquisition  of 
money.  But  the  study  of  history  teaches  us  that  all  those 
States  which  in  the  decisive  hour  have  been  guided  by 
purely  commercial  considerations  have  miserably  come  to 
grief.  The  sympathies  of  civilised  nations  are  to-day,  as  in 
the  battles  of  antiquity,  still  with  the  sturdy  and  the  bold 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  79 

fighting  armies  ^ ;  they  are  with  the  brave  combatants  who, 
in  the  words  which  Lessing  puts  in  the  mouth  of  Tellheim, 
are  soldiers  for  their  country,  and  out  of  the  love  which 
they  bear  to  the  cause  for  which  they  are  fighting.  .  .  . 
Certainly  diplomatic  dexterity  can,  and  should,  postpone  the 
conflict  for  a  time,  and  at  times  disentangle  the  difficulties. 
Certainly  all  those  in  authority  must  and  will  be  fully  con- 
scious of  their  enormous  responsibility  in  the  grave  hour 
of  decision.  They  must  make  it  clear  to  their  own  minds 
that  the  gigantic  conflagration,  once  enkindled,  cannot  be 
so  easily  or  so  quickly  extinguished.  As,  however,  lightning 
is  an  adjustment  of  the  tension  between  two  differently 
charged  strata  of  the  atmosphere,  so  the  sword  will  always 
be  and  remain  until  the  end  of  the  world  the  decisive  fac- 
tor. .  .  .  And  therefore  everyone,  to  whom  his  country  is 
dear,  and  who  believes  in  a  great  future  for  our  nation, 
must  joyfully  do  his  part  in  the  task  of  seeing  that  the  old 
military  spirit  of  our  fathers  is  not  lost,  and  that  it  is  not 
sicklied  o'er  with  the  pale  cast  of  thought.  For  the  sword 
alone  is  not  decisive,  but  the  arm  steeled  in  exercise  which 
bears  the  sword.  Each  of  us  must  keep  himself  fit  for  arms 
and  also  prepared  in  his  mind  for  the  great  solemn  hour 
when  the  Emperor  calls  us  to  the  standard — the  hour  when 
we  no  longer  belong  to  ourselves,  but  to  the  Fatherland  with 
all  the  forces  of  our  mind  and  our  body ;  for  all  these  facul- 
ties must  be  brought  to  the  highest  exertion,  to  that  'will 
to  victory'  which  has  never  been  without  success  in  his- 
tory." 

That  should  be  sufficient,  but  there  is  something  better 
to  come.  The  royal  author  describes  a  regimental 
manoeuvre  of  the  guards  on  the  field  at  Döberitz: 

"The  steel  helmets  glitter  in  the  sunshine ;  in  the  galloping 
exercises  every  individual  horseman  endeavours  to  keep  on 
to  the  man  in  front,  and  to  keep  the  right  direction — no  easy 
matter  when  there  is  dust,  and  the  ground  is  rough.  Many 
a  one  stumbles,  and  away  past  him  gallops  the  company  of 

^  This  has  now  been  shown  to  be  true. 


80  I    ACCUSE! 

riders.  What  does  it  matter !  When  you  plane  wood,  shav- 
ings must  fall.  .  .  .  And  there  the  call  resounds  over  the 
field,  clear  and  quivering  amid  the  uproar  of  the  galloping 
inass,  'Front !'  The  reins  whirl  round,  and  as  if  by  a  stroke 
of  magic,  the  line  is  formed  again,  with  a  front  of  five 
impetuous  squadrons  of  the  guards, — and  then  comes  the 
signal  'Charge.'  Then  the  last  ounce  is  taken  out  of  the 
horses,  and  with  bodies  strained  forward  and  with  lances 
in  rest  with  a  'hurrah'  we  ride  to  the  attack.  .  .  .  For  any- 
one who  has  taken  part  in  such  attacks,  there  is  nothing 
fairer  in  the  world!  .  .  .  And  yet  to  the  true  horseman 
there  is  one  thing  which  appears  more  beautiful:  if  all 
that  were  the  same,  but  if  only  at  the  end  of  the  rapid 
charge,  the  enemy  were  to  ride  out  against  us,  and  the 
struggle  for  which  we  have  been  drilled  and  trained,  the 
struggle  for  life  and  death,  were  to  begin.  How  often  dur- 
ing such  attacks  have  I  heard  the  yearning  call  of  a  comrade 
riding  behind :  'Donnezvetter!  if  that  were  only  the  real 
thing!'  .  .  .  O  horseman's  spirit !  All  who  are  true  soldiers 
must  know  and  feel :  'Duke  et  decorum  est  pro  patria 
mori.' " 

The  same  spirit  of  the  attack  finds  expression  in  the 
message  of  farewell  to  the  Danzig  Hussars.  The  young 
war-hero  becomes  sentimental,  because  he  can  no  longer 
ride  through  life  at  the  head  of  his  Hussars.  Already 
he  is  "bearing  his  youth  to  its  grave,"  but  he  is  con- 
soled by  the  thought: 

"It  is  indeed  possible  for  me  to  be  separated  from  you; 
but  my  heart  and  my  spirit  remain  yours.  H  some  day  the 
King  calls,  and  the  bugle  sounds  the  signal  'Charge,'  then  I 
ask  you  to  think  on  him  whose  most  ardent  wish  it  has  al- 
ivays  been  to  be  allowed  to  share  at  your  side  this,  the  su- 
preme moment  of  a  soldier's  happiness." 

This  moment  has  now  come.  It  is  now,  donnerwetter ! 
the  real  thing.  The  deathhead-hussars  have  charged 
into  death;  they  have  been  mown  down  like  stalks  of 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  81 

corn.  But  where  at  this  moment  was  the  gallant  colonel 
of  cavalry?  Why  did  he,  who  still  to-day  wears  the 
effective  unifonn  of  his  hussars,  not  put  himself  at  their 
head  with  a  "hurrah"  against  the  enemy?  Why  did 
he  allow  to  pass  ungarnered  the  supreme  moment  of  a 
soldier's  happiness? 


"What  are  the  real  merits  of  this  young  gentleman?" 
asked  Bebel  in  the  Reichstag  on  the  occasion  of  a  discus- 
sion on  the  Crown  Prince's  demonstration,  and  this 
young  gentleman  might  be  left  quietly  to  himself,  to  his 
conscience,  and  to  his  further  self-education,  had  he  not 
unfortunately  been  advanced  to  the  position  of  a  na- 
tional hero  in  the  course  of  this  war  for  which  he  and 
bis  friends  bear  the  chief  load  of  guilt. 

For  long  he  has  been  the  undisputed  head  of  the 
German  nationalist  party  and  of  the  chauvinists,  and  his 
views  give  the  key  to  the  German  National  Orchestra. 
Great  is  the  Crown  Prince,  and  Liman  is  his  prophet.^ 
In  fighting  against  him  we  are  fighting  against  the 
tendency  which  without  any  provocation,  without  any 
practical  attainable  end,  has  dragged  Germany  into  this 
unfortunate  war,  and  which,  if  we  do  not  repent  in  time, 
will  irredeemably  lead  to  our  destruction. 

It  is  the  misfortune  of  kings  that  they  are  unwilling 
to  hear  the  truth.  But  Truth  is  stronger  than  they. 
With  stern  finger  it  knocks  at  their  doors.  With  rever- 
berating sound  it  pierces  their  ears,  and  if  Germany, 
as  the  Chancellor  says,  cannot  be  crushed,  still  less  is 
Truth  capable  of  being  thus  dealt  with.  It  tears  asunder 
the  veil,  with  which  it  is  sought  to  shroud  it,  and  in 
triumphant  nakedness  it  advances  to  meet  the  light  of 
day. 

"^The  Crown  Prince:  Thoughts  on  Germany's  Future  by  Dr.  Paul 
Liman  (Wilhelm  Köhler,  Minden). 


82  I   ACCUSE! 

THE   POLICY   OF   ENCIRCLEMENT    (EinkreisungspoHHk) 

The  policy  of  encirclement  is  one  of  the  veils  with 
which  it  is  sought  to  shroud  the  truth.  What  do  we 
mean  by  the  phrase:  a  policy  of  encirclement?  Every- 
one uses  the  expression,  and  no  one  connects  with  it 
any  clear  idea.  If  it  is  supposed  to  have  any  meaning, 
it  can  only  mean  a  policy  which  seeks  to  enclose  Ger- 
many and  Austria,  the  central  Powers,  by  an  opposing 
alliance  of  the  peripheral  Powers.  That  is  to  say  it  is 
a  geographical  idea. 

What  specially  aggressive  tendency  is  to  be  found  in 
the  fortuitous  geographical  situation  of  the  Powers  of 
the  Entente?  Are  aggressive  intentions  in  any  way 
determined  or  proved  by  geographical  situation?  Would 
it  not  have  been  equally  dangerous,  or  perhaps  even 
more  dangerous,  for  Germany  and  Austria,  if  Italy  in 
place  of  one  or  other  of  the  Entente  Powers  had  be- 
longed to  the  opposing  alliance?  Or  perhaps  even 
America  might  have  been  a  member.  In  the  case  of 
Italy  or  America  could  we  have  spoken  of  an  "inten- 
tion to  encircle"?  At  the  most  we  could  have  done  so 
in  the  sense  in  which  Fusilier  Kutschke  maintained  that 
"he  had  alone  and  without  assistance  surrounded  a 
whole  company  of  the  enemy." 

It  is  clear  that  geography  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
danger  of  war  or  with  the  intention  to  make  war.  Just 
as  the  Triple  Entente  is  called  an  encirclement,  the 
Triple  Alliance  could  be  called  an  "excirclement" 
(Auskrcisung) ,  since  indeed  Germany,  Austria,  and 
Italy  form  a  sort  of  central  block,  from  which  the 
Powers  of  the  Entente  are  excluded.  The  one  is  just 
as  much  defensive  or  aggressive  as  the  other.  The 
geographical  constellation  is  a  mere  fortuitous  conse- 
quence of  the  chronological  development  of  the  alliance. 
Had   Italy  still  been   free  when  King  Edward   trans- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  83 

formed  the  Victorian  policy  of  splendid  isolation  into 
a  policy  of  alliances,  he  would  probably  have  introduced 
Italy  rather  than  Russia  into  his  system  of  alliances. 
Without  doubt  he  would  have  preferred  the  democratic 
Italy,  with  which  he  had  no  conflicting  interest,  but 
merely  interests  in  common,  to  an  ally  whose  political 
backwardness  as  well  as  her  conflicting  interests  in 
Asia  must  necessarily  make  her  a  very  unwelcome  friend 
for  England.  The  grouping  of  the  six  Powers  in 
Europe  has  arisen  from  historical  circumstances  and 
from  communities  of  interest.  Their  geographical 
position  is  purely  accidental,  and  ha?  nothing  to  do 
with  the  character  and  the  tendency  of  these  two 
groups. 

It  is  thus  as  false  as  it  is  superficial  to  regard  the 
circumferential  situation  of  the  Powers  of  the  Entente 
as  merely  in  itself  a  danger  for  the  Empires.  He  who 
asserts  that  aggressive  intentions  exist  is  imder  an  obli- 
gation to  prove  their  existence,  and  further  to  do  so 
on  grounds  other  than  the  geographical  situation  of  the 
Powers  concerned.  These  other  grounds,  however,  are 
completely  lacking.  In  Germany  no  matter  how  much 
we  inquire,  no  one  is  in  a  position  to  give  a  definite 
answer.  England  is  said  to  have  been  envious  of  our 
commercial  development.  Envy  is  an  attitude  of  mind, 
but  not  an  action.  Just  as  I  can  compel  no  one  to  love, 
so  I  cannot  forcibly  drive  out  of  anyone  envy  and  ha- 
tred. I  must  rest  content  if  he  does  not  transform  his 
evil  thoughts  into  actions,  just  as  I  also  on  my  side 
would  not  submit  to  be  called  to  account  by  my  neigh- 
bour merely  on  account  of  my  disposition.  Thoughts 
indeed  are  duty-free,  and  even  in  reactionary  Prussia 
every  citizen,  according  to  the  constitution,  has  the  right 
not  only  to  think  as  he  will,  but  to  give  expression  to  his 
thoughts  "in  word,  writing  or  printing."  Criminal  law 
punishes  not  the  mere  will  to  do  the  act,  but  (with  few 


84.  I    ACCUSE! 

exceptions)  only  the  attempt  to  do  the  act,  which  it 
defines  as  the  "first  step  in  the  commission  of  it." 

Where,  how  and  when  has  England  ever  attempted  to 
transform  her  envy  of  Germany  into  action?  In  other 
words,  when  has  she  sought  to  attack  Germany  ?  Never 
at  any  time.  Not  one  action  of  England  can  be  pointed 
out,  from  which  the  intention  to  make  a  military  at- 
tack, in  common  with  her  Allies,  on  Germany  could  be 
deduced.  You  may  say  that  she  gave  diplomatic  sup- 
port to  France  on  the  occasion  of  the  Morocco  dispute. 
But  England  had  a  right  to  do  so  and  indeed  a  duty, 
based  on  the  Anglo-French  agreement  with  regard  to 
Egypt  and  Morocco.  And  did  our  ally  Austria  not 
adhere  to  us  in  this  conflict?  Have  we  not  adhered 
to  Austria  in  all  Eastern  questions?  Why  should  diplo- 
matic support  extended  to  a  friendly  or  an  allied  power 
in  the  one  case  be  defensive,  in  the  other  aggressive? 
Is  England  not  free  in  diplomatic  negotiations  to  judge 
of  her  own  interests  and  obligations  according  to  her 
own  standard,  as  we  ourselves  do  with  regard  to  our 
interests  and  obligations  ?  Again  I  ask :  where  is  the 
proof  of  aggressive  intentions  on  the  part  of  England 
against  us? 

Objection  will  be  taken  to  what  I  have  said  on  the 
ground  of  the  military  and  naval  agreements  which  Eng- 
land had  concluded  with  France,  and  which  she  was 
on  the  point  of  concluding  with  Russia.  Have  we  then 
concluded  no  military  agreements  with  Austria  regulat- 
ing the  support  to  be  given  on  either  side  in  a  European 
war  down  to  the  last  cannon  and  company?  Have  not 
visits  and  conferences  constantly  been  taking  place  be- 
tween the  two  General  Staffs?  If  our  much  stricter 
military  agreement  with  Austria  had  no  aggressive 
character,  why  should  there  be  an  aggressive  character 
in  the  much  looser  adjustments  between  English  and 
French   experts,   which   scarcely   extended   beyond   the 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  85 

scope  of  a  discussion?^  These  discussions  were,  as 
is  documentarily  established,  entirely  of  a  noncommittal 
character,  because  they  did  not  rest  on  any  obligation 
imposed  by  the  terms  of  an  alliance  to  afford  to  each 
other  mutual  military  support.  The  Anglo-French  En- 
tente did  not  contain  such  obligations,  but  left  it  to 
each  party  in  any  given  case  to  decide  freely  according 
to  her  own  judgment  whether  she  should  or  should 
not  afford  military  support  to  the  other. ^  Even  in 
the  event  of  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power 
this  freedom  remained,  and  it  was  only  in  the  case 
where  both  Powers  freely  decided  to  co-operate  that  the 
discussions  of  the  military  experts  were  intended  to  have 
practical  consequences. 

The  relations  between  England  and  Russia  were,  so 
far  as  general  European  poHtics  are  concerned,  much 
looser  even  than  those  between  England  and  France. 
The  adjustments  between  Russia  and  England  were 
concerned  exclusively  with  territorial  interests  in  Asia, 
and  contained  no  obligations  with  regard  to  Europe. 
England  had  so  little  concern  in  the  Franco-Russian 
Alliance  that  it  was  not  even  acquainted  with  the  word- 
ing of  the  terms  of  the  Alliance.^ 

Apart  from  any  obligation  or  intention  to  attack  us 
there  was  also,  so  far  as  England  was  concerned,  a  com- 
plete absence  of  any  inducement  to  do  so.  What  advan- 
tage could  England  hope  to  gain  from  a  war  against 
iisf  We  who  constantly  have  on  our  lips  "the  English 
shopkeeper-spirit,"  and  contrast  the  cold  calculating 
business-sense  of  the  Englishman  with  our  patriotic  en- 
thusiasm, should  really  not  attribute  to  this  nation  of 
shopkeepers  the  insanity  of  desiring  to  kill  their  best  ciis- 

"■  See  Grey's  speech  in  the  House  of  Commons  of  August  3rd,  1914. 
*See    Grey's   letter   to   Cambon,    November  22nd,    1912.     English 
Blue  Book,  No.  105. 
^  See  Grey's  speech  August  3rd,  1914. 


86  I   ACCUSE! 

tomer  in  order  to  improve  their  business.  Such  a  hare- 
brained course  of  action  is  indeed  possible  in  a  nation 
in  which  cavalry-colonels  and  generals  and  the  oppo- 
nents of  the  trading  classes  have  the  decisive  word, 
but  not  in  a  nation  of  merchantmen  in  which  even  the 
leading  politicians  in  part  have  their  origins  in  the  world 
of  trade,  and  in  any  case  are  without  exception  fully 
acquainted  with  the  ideas  of  the  modern  commercial 
spirit. 

The  fact  is  that  England  has  never  had  aggressive 
intentions  against  us;  she  has  never  concluded  an  al- 
liance with  aggressive  intentions  against  us,  and  she  has 
never  done  anything  whatever  to  urge  on  others  to  at- 
tack us. 

Anyone  who  maintains  the  contrary  is  obliged,  ac- 
cording to  general  rules  of  procedure,  to  prove  it.  I 
have  hitherto  looked  in  vain  in  German  speeches  and 
writings  for  the  submission  of  this  evidence.  Every- 
where there  is  the  empty  assertion,  without  the  shadow 
of  a  proof. 

So  far,  however,  as  this  assertion  is  advanced  in  our 
country  by  official  quarters,  that  is  by  people  who  are 
acquainted  with  the  diplomatic  history  of  the  last  fifteen 
years,  the  assertion  is  made  against  their  better  knowl- 
edge, that  is  to  say  it  is  a  lie. 

These  last  fifteen  years,  since  the  first  Hague  Confer- 
ence of  1899,  are  nothing  but  a  continuous  series  of 
attempts  on  the  part  of  England  to  arrive  at  a  political 
entente  with  Germany,  and  on  the  basis  of  this  to  effect 
a  limitation  of  naval  armaments  on  both  sides — attempts 
which  on  every  occasion  have  been  wrecked  on  the  lack 
of  judgment  or  on  the  evil  will  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment. 

It  is  well  known,  and  does  not  here  require  any  de- 
tailed demonstration,  that  England  on  the  occasion  of 
the  Fashoda  incident,  when  her  relations  to  France  were 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  87 

becoming  ever  more  strained  and  were  almost  impelling 
her  to  a  conflict  of  arms,  endeavoured  to  give  up  her 
"splendid  isolation,"  and  to  conclude  an  entente  with 
us.  Our  far-seeing  politicians,  as  so  often  happens,  did 
not  seize  the  opportunity.  They  allowed  to  slip  past 
them  the  favourable  moment  in  which,  without  ruinous 
preparations,  without  drawing  the  sword,  and  in  the 
enjoyment  of  a  lasting  security,  they  might  have  pro- 
moted our  further  prosperity  in  industry  and  in  culture, 
and  gained  for  the  world  an  enduring  peace. 

England  and  Germany 
the  first   hague   conference 

On  the  28th  of  August,  1898,  there  appeared  in  the 
Petrograd  Official  Journal  the  celebrated  Peace  Mani- 
festo of  the  Tsar.  On  the  mention  of  this  manifesto  our 
war-brawlers  smile  and  point  in  contempt  to  the  "Tsar 
of  blood"  who  has  now  let  loose  the  second  fearful  war 
since  that  message  of  peace. 

We  shall  see  later  how  far  Russia  is  concerned  in 
letting  loose  the  present  war.  How  far  Russia  was  to 
blame  for  the  Japanese  war  is  a  chapter  by  itself,  which 
should  scarcely  be  allowed  to  end  with  the  condemna- 
tion of  Russia  alone.  The  intention  of  the  manifesto 
was  in  any  case  correct  and  honourable,  and  the  aims 
proposed  to  the  nations  of  Europe:  true  and  enduring 
peace,  and  the  limitation  of  armaments  which  even  in 
peace  slowly  lead  nations  to  their  economic  destruction, 
— these  aims  will  be,  and  must  continue  to  be,  the  un- 
alterable rule  of  conduct  governing  the  efforts  of  all  who 
guide  the  destinies  of  European  States.  Even  the  pres- 
ent war,  unless  it  is  to  be  nothing  but  an  insane  and 
purposeless  shedding  of  blood,  can  have  no  other  aim 
than  this. 


88  I   ACCUSE! 

What  was  the  attitude  of  England  towards  this  mani- 
festo? What  was  the  attitude  of  Germany?  While  in 
England  public  opinion  in  harmony  with  the  Govern- 
ment hailed  the  manifesto  with  the  greatest  sympathy, 
and  the  English  Foreign  Minister  could  report  to  Petro- 
grad this  unanimous  approval,  there  developed  in  Ger- 
many also  a  popular  movement  in  favour  of  the  ideas 
expressed  by  the  Tsar.  But  the  Government  maintained 
a  frigid  attitude,  and  only  the  social  democratic  party 
recognised  the  epoch-making  significance  of  these  ideas 
— ideas  which  they  had  constantly  advocated,  but  which 
now  for  the  first  time  received  expression  in  high  places. 
That  the  idea  was  Utopian,  that  it  was  but  a  chim?era 
— these  were  the  least  reproaches  thrown  at  the  origina- 
tor of  the  manifesto.  In  conformity  with  the  customary 
tactics  which  have  since  been  constantly  followed,  many 
rose  to  the  crazy  heights  of  asserting  that  Russia  only 
desired  to  entice  other  States  to  a  limitation  of  arma- 
ments in  order  that  she  herself  might  be  able  to  pile 
up  in  secret  still  greater  armaments  and  thus  with  greater 
security  pursue  her  Pan-Slav  efforts. 

The  record  in  malicious  attacks  was  naturally  achieved 
even  then  by  a  German  professor,  Stengel,  the  lecturer 
in  international  law  at  Munich,  who  prophesied  in  ad- 
vance the  most  dismal  results  of  the  Conference  which 
at  the  time  had  not  yet  assembled.  In  recognition  of 
this,  he  was  straightway  sent  by  the  Foreign  Office  to 
the  Hague  Conference  as  one  of  Germany's  representa- 
tives. 

After  the  epoch-making  memorials  of  the  Russian 
Councillor  Von  Bloch,  the  Conference  owed  its  origin 
chiefly  to  English  influences.  As  early  as  1891  the 
English  Prime  Minister,  Lord  Salisbury,  had  had  a  state- 
ment of  the  cost  of  European  military  preparations  com- 
piled, and  had  transmitted  this  confidential  document  to 
the  German  Emperor  without,  it  is  true,  achieving  any 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  89 

success.  The  efforts  of  Lord  Salisbury  met  with  suc- 
cess only  when  they  were  emphasised  by  the  inter-par- 
liamentary conference  of  1896.  On  that  occasion  Lord 
Salisbury  in  a  remarkable  speech  in  the  Guildhall  re- 
gretted the  ruinousness  of  constantly  increasing  arm- 
aments, and  in  the  end,  through  the  instrumentality  of 
Count  Lambsdorf,  laid  the  whole  of  the  material  bearing 
on  the  question  before  the  Tsar.^ 

The  preludes  played  by  Germany  and  by  England  were 
in  harmony  with  the  performances  given  by  these  two 
States  at  the  Conference  itself,  which  in  spite  of  all 
hostility  assembled  at  the  Hague  on  the  i8th  of  May, 
1899,  under  the  participation  of  twenty-six  States. 
Throughout  the  whole  proceedings  of  the  Conference  we 
find  the  same  picture,  that,  namely,  of  England  leading 
in  all  efforts  the  aim  of  which  was  to  diminish  the  in- 
tolerable burdens  of  armaments  and,  in  an  ever-widening 
degree,  to  place  the  differences  arising  between  civilised 
nations  on  a  legal  basis.  On  the  side  of  England  there 
were  France,  Russia,  America,  and  naturally  all  the 
smaller  States.  On  the  other  side,  however,  there  con- 
stantly stood  Germany  with  her  true  ally,  Austria-Hun- 
gary. 

The  opposition  of  Germany  to  all  progressive  efforts 
was  at  times  so  pronounced  that  if  the  others  had  not 
repressed  their  desires,  the  whole  Conference  would  have 
broken  up.  So  it  was  on  the  question  of  armaments ;  so 
also  on  that  of  arbitration. 

By  way  of  introduction  to  the  discussion  on  arma- 
ments the  German  Emperor  delivered  a  speech  in 
Wiesbaden  in  which  he  declared  that  the  best  pledge 
of  peace  was  the  "sharp,  gleaming  sword."  In  the 
course  of  this  discussion  we  shall  have  occasion  to  ob- 
serve that  it  is  a  part  of  the  German  system  to  furnish 
on  every  occasion  an  introduction  to  the  concert  of  the 

^  See  Fried.    Handbuch  der  Friedensbewegung,  Vol.  I,  p.  204. 


90  I    ACCUSE! 

European  pipes  of  peace  by  blowing  a  war-fanfare  on 
the  Prussian  bugle. 

The  Russian  proposal  was  to  the  effect  that  the 
strength  of  the  Army  on  a  peace  basis  and  the  military 
estimates  should  not  be  increased  in  the  next  five  years, 
and  that  in  the  case  of  the  navy  this  respite  should  be 
fixed  for  three  years.  This  proposal,  which  was  bril- 
liantly defended  by  the  Russian  military  plenipotentiary 
— (he  emphasised  above  all  the  incontestable  fact  that 
the  competition  in  armaments  was  futile,  since  the  rela- 
tive strength  between  the  various  States  still  remained 
constant) — was  energetically  rejected  by  the  German 
military  plenipotentiary  General  Gross  von  Schwarzhof. 
If  the  French  plenipotentiary  Leon  Bourgeois,  who  rep- 
resented the  restriction  of  armaments  as  a  requirement  of 
civilisation  and  a  duty  imposed  on  all  States,  had  not 
succeeded  in  uniting  the  votes  of  the  commission  in  sup- 
port of  a  resolution  formulated  by  him  (a  resolution,  it 
is  true,  wholly  without  effect  in  practice)  the  negotia- 
tions of  the  Conference  on  this  point  would  have  been 
completely  wrecked. 

The  resolution  ran:  "The  Conference  is  of  opinion 
that  the  restriction  of  military  charges,  which  are  at 
present  a  heavy  burden  on  the  world,  is  extremely  desir- 
able for  the  increase  of  the  material  and  moral  welfare 
of  mankind." 

The  recognition  of  this  fact  has  not  prevented  Euro- 
pean Governments,  under  the  leadership  of  the  German 
Empire,  from  inflating  their  armaments  to  such  an  extent 
that  in  the  end  the  balloon,  distended  to  the  bursting- 
point,  was  bound  to  explode  and  set  the  whole  world 
in  flames. 

Even  worse  was  the  fate  of  the  Russian  proposal  for 
the  establishment  of  international  arbitration.  This  pro- 
posal, indeed,  was  modest  enough  in  what  it  contem- 
plated; obligatory  arbitration  on  principle  was,  it  is  true, 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME   91 

to  be  introduced,  but  this  was  to  be  excluded  in  all  cases 
affecting  vital  interests  or  the  honour  of  a  State.  As 
each  State  was  to  remain  its  own  judge  as  to  what  it 
should  regard  as  a  cjuestion  of  honour  or  of  vital  inter- 
ests, the  Russian  proposal  cannot  be  said  to  have  had  a 
revolutionary  character,  a  matter  to  be  regretted,  for  the 
most  important  steps  forward  in  the  history  of  mankind 
are  achieved  by  revolutions  and  not  by  warfare  as  is 
maintained  by  those  who  pay  homage  to  war.  The  pro- 
posal, then,  secured  the  approval  of  almost  all  taking 
part  in  the  Conference;  on  this  point  also  Germany  alone 
raised  objection  on  the  ground  that  subjection  to  a  court 
of  arbitration  was  not,  as  Professor  Zorn  maintained, 
"in  conformity  with  the  traditions  of  the  Bismarckian 
policy." 

The  opposition  of  Germany  was  so  violent  that  nego- 
tiations came  to  a  dead  stop,  and  they  had  to  be  post- 
poned for  a  period  of  fourteen  days  to  enable  Professor 
Zorn  to  receive  new  instructions  from  Berlin.  The  Con- 
ference very  nearly  proceeded  without  the  co-operation 
of  Germany.  But  here  again,  rather  than  allow  the 
whole  proposal  to  be  wrecked,  it  was  resolved  in  the 
end  to  yield  to  the  will  of  Germany  and  in  all  cases 
to  allow  optional  in  place  of  compulsory  jurisdiction. 

Here  again  Germany  had  the  undisputed  merit  of  hav- 
ing barred  the  way  to  a  decisive  step  forward  in  the 
peaceful  organisation  of  the  nations. 

The  establishment  of  a  perpetual  court  of  arbitration 
at  the  Hague  was  similarly  refused  by  Germany  from 
the  outset,  and  it  was  admitted  only  when  it  was  made 
optional  and  not  compulsory  to  summon  this  court. 
Thus  the  first  Hague  conference  ended,  in  spite  of  Ger- 
many and  Austria,  and  owing  to  the  active  exertions  of 
France  and  England  in  support  of  the  efforts  of  Russia 
for  peace,  with  a  final  result  which  after  all  represented 
a  first  important  step  towards  the  aim  of  an  organisa- 


92  I    ACCUSE! 

tion  of  States  based  on  law  and  of  a  gradual  liberation 
of  the  nations  from  the  intolerable  oppression  of  their 
armaments. 

BETWEEN  THE  FIRST  AND  SECOND  HAGUE  CONFERENCES  : 
THE   ENGLISH    LIBERAL    GOVERNMENT. 

Between  the  first  and  the  second  Hague  Conferences 
— the  second  was  held  from  July  to  October,  1907 — 
the  development  of  events  in  the  different  European 
countries  was  highly  characteristic  of  the  attitude  of 
these  countries  and  of  their  governments  towards  the 
problems  of  the  Hague,  and  the  occurrences  during  this 
period  serve  to  emphasise  in  the  sharpest  manner  the 
difference  between  England  and  Germany. 

Even  before  the  first  Conference  was  held,  Goschen, 
the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  speaking  on  behalf  of 
the  English  Conservative  Government,  made  a  definite 
declaration  on  March  9th,  1899,  in  favour  of  a  regulation 
by  treaty  of  the  system  of  armaments.  This  declaration 
was  confirmed  in  July,  1903,  by  Mr,  Chamberlain,  a 
member  of  the  Government,  with  the  observation  that 
it  was  still  regarded  as  binding  on  the  English  Cabinet.^ 

When  in  1905  the  Liberal  party  came  into  power  and 
Campbell-Bannerman,  a  convinced  pacifist,  became 
leader  of  the  Ministry,  the  English  Government  at  once 
began  to  display  an  energetic  and  untiring  activity  on 
the  same  lines  as  the  efforts  which  at  the  first  Hague 
Conference  had,  chiefly  in  consequence  of  the  opposition 
of  Germany,  produced  only  very  modest  results. 

This  activity  of  the  English  Liberal  Government  was 
on  so  large  a  scale  and  was  so  comprehensive  that  it 
is  impossible  within  the  limits  of  this  work  to  emphasise 
all  their  individual  acts.  In  Parliament,  at  inter-Parlia- 
mentary Conferences,  in  speeches  at  clubs  and  at  the 
^  See  Fried.     Handbuch  der  Friedensbewegung,  II,  p.  767. 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME   93 

Guildhall,  in  diplomatic  negotiations  with  other  Powers, 
in  newspaper  and  magazine  articles,  English  Ministers 
never  grew  weary  of  laying  stress  on  the  perniciousness 
for  all  nations  of  the  competition  in  armaments  by  land 
and  by  sea,  and  never  flagged  in  their  efforts  to  devise 
remedial  measures  for  this  ruinous  situation.  These 
same  men  who  are  to-day  represented  to  the  deluded  and 
infatuated  German  people  as  men  refined  in  the  prepara- 
tion and  instigation  of  war,  whose  personal  honour  Ger- 
man historians  dare  to  deny,  men  like  Grey.  Haldane, 
Lloyd  George,  Campbell-Bannerman,  Asquith,  and  the 
others,  these  men  devoted  themselves  with  the  utmost 
zeal  to  these  problems,  which,  as  they  well  saw,  affected 
the  vital  nerve  not  only  of  England,  but  of  all  European 
states.  "A  policy  of  huge  armaments,"  exclaimed  Camp- 
bell-Bannerman in  his  programme,  "keeps  alive  and 
stimulates  and  feeds  the  belief  that  force  is  the  best,  if 
not  the  only,  solution  of  international  differences."  ^ 

"I  wish,"  Haldane,  then  Minister  for  War,  declared 
in  the  House  of  Commons  on  March  8th,  1906,  "we  were 
near  the  time  when  the  nations  would  consider  together 
the  reduction  of  armaments  .  .  .  only  by  united  action 
can  we  get  rid  of  the  burden  which  is  pressing  so  heavily 
on  all  civilised  nations."  ^ 

On  the  occasion  of  a  banciuet  on  September  26th  in 
the  same  year  the  Prime  Minister  expressed  the  hope 
that  the  understanding  then  reached  with  regard  to 
Morocco  (the  Algeciras  Convention  had  been  completed 
on  April  7th)  would  lead  to  a  possibility  of  reducing  the 
oppressive  military  expenditure,  and  he  declared  that 
England  would  put  itself  at  the  head  in  this  matter. 

To  this  intention  the  English  Government  gave  effect. 
The  outline  of  the  Russian  programme  for  the  second 
Hague  Conference,  published  in  spring,  1906,  contained 

^  [Albert  Hall  speech  December  21st,  1905.] 
*  [Hansard,  1906,  Vol.  153,  8,  674.] 


94  I    ACCUSE! 

nothing  on  the  problem  of  armaments,  presumably  be- 
cause the  Russian  Government  had  gathered  from  the 
attitude  of  Germany  at  the  first  Conference  that  any  dis- 
cussion of  this  question  would  be  useless.  The  English 
Liberal  Government  now  made  the  most  determined 
efforts  to  secure  the  inclusion  in  the  programme  of  the 
Conference  of  the  question  of  armaments  as  well  as  the 
question  of  arbitration.  A  proposal  on  this  point,  put 
forward  in  the  House  of  Commons  by  the  Labour  mem- 
ber, Mr.  Vivian,  was  accepted  unanimously  amid  ap- 
plause, and  the  Foreign  Secretary,  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
associated  himself  with  the  resolution  on  behalf  of  the 
Government. 

*T  do  not  believe,"  said  Grey,  "that  at  any  time  has 
the  conscious  public  opinion  in  the  various  countries 
of  Europe  set  more  strongly  in  the  direction  of  peace 
than  at  the  present  time,  and  yet  the  burden  of  military 
and  naval  expenditure  goes  on  increasing.  .  .  .  No 
greater  service  could  it  (the  Hague  Conference)  do, 
than  to  make  the  conditions  of  peace  less  expensive  than 
they  are  at  the  present  time.  ...  It  is  said  we  are  wait- 
ing upon  foreign  nations  in  order  to  reduce  our  expen- 
diture. As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  are  all  waiting  on  each 
other.  Some  day  or  other  somebody  must  take  the  first 
step.  ...  I  do,  on  behalf  of  the  Government,  not  only 
accept,  but  welcome  such  a  resolution  as  this  as  a  whole- 
some and  beneficial  expression  of  opinion."  ^ 

When  in  July,  1906,  the  Interparliamentary  Union, 
including  620  representatives  from  twenty-three  coun- 
tries, met  in  London,  the  Prime  Minister,  Campbell-Ban- 
nerman,  made  a  memorable  speech  in  opening  the  pro- 
ceedings :  "Insist,  in  the  name  of  humanity,"  he  ex- 
claimed to  the  members,  "that  your  Government  should 
go  to  the  Conference  at  the  Hague  with  the  firm  inten- 
tion with  which  we  ourselves  are  going,  with  the  inten- 
^  [Hansard,    1906,   Vol.    156,   78,    1414-5.] 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME   95 

tion  of  diminishing  the  burdens  of  the  Army  and  Navy 
Estimates." 

The  American  pohtician,  William  Jennings  Bryan, 
who  also  was  present,  expressed  himself  in  the  same 
sense.  A  resolution,  corresponding  to  the  views  then 
expressed,  was  carried  unanimously. 

In  the  following  year,  some  months  before  the  open- 
ing of  the  Conference,  Campbell-Bannerman  spoke  even 
more  strongly  in  a  meeting  of  the  House  of  Commons 
on  March  5th,  1907,  in  support  of  the  idea  of  a  common 
restriction  of  armaments.  He  declared  that  it  was  the 
duty  of  England  to  bring  this  matter  forward  for  dis- 
cussion before  the  second  Hague  Conference,  "holding 
the  opinion  that  there  is  a  great  movement  of  feeling 
among  thinking  people  in  all  the  nations  of  the  world 
in  favour  of  .  .  .  some  restraint  on  the  enormous  ex- 
penditure involved  in  the  present  system  so  long  as  it 
exists.  .  .  .  We  have  desired  and  still  desire  to  place 
ourselves  in  the  very  front  rank  of  those  who  think  that 
the  warlike  attitude  of  Powers  as  displayed  by  the  ex- 
cessive growth  of  arviainents  is  a  curse  to  Europe,  and 
that  the  sooner  it  is  checked,  in  however  moderate  a  de- 
gree, the  better."  ^ 

The  leading  men  in  the  other  countries  of  Europe  and 
of  America  also  gave  expression  to  views  similar  to 
those  of  the  English  Ministers.  Leon  Bourgeois  in  Paris, 
Tittoni,  then  Foreign  Minister  in  Rome,  Roosevelt  in 
his  message  to  Congress,  all  expressed  themselves  in 
favour  of  an  agreement  with  regard  to  armaments,  and 
a  discussion  of  this  question  at  the  Hague  Conference. 

Only  Austria  and  Germany  made  once  again  a  vain- 
glorious exception.  Li  reply  to  an  inquiry  on  the  sub- 
ject Count  Gulochowski  gave  in  the  Austrian  Delega- 
tions only  an  evasive  answer.  In  Germany  the  mere 
idea  of  an  international  discussion  of  these  questions 
'  '  [Hansard,  1907,  Vol.  170,  78,  675.] 


96  I   ACCUSE! 

was  at  once  enough  to  let  loose  the  devil  of  nationalism. 
Behind  the  efforts  of  the  other  Powers  they  scented,  as 
usual,  a  cunning  trick  to  deprive  Germany  of  her  de- 
fences, and  they  professed  to  see  the  danger  of  war 
threatening  them  in  the  inclusion  of  such  a  point  in  the 
Hague  programme.  "The  nearer  the  Peace  Conference 
approaches,"  so  wrote  the  Tägliche  Rundschau  in  a  lead- 
ing article  on  April  9th,  1907,  "the  clearer  it  becomes 
that  it  is  expressly  characterised  by  tendencies  inimical 
to  peace."  Herr  Bassermann,  a  representative  in  the 
Reichstag,  did  not  venture  to  hope  for  a  more  peaceful 
situation  until  after  the  Hague  Conference  had  been 
safely  got  over.  The  Prussian  Minister  of  War  osten- 
tatiously emphasised  Germany's  readiness  for  war. 
Liebermann  von  Sonnenberg,  a  representative  in  the 
House,  concluded  a  patriotic  Pan-German  speech  in  the 
Reichstag  with  the  courageous  words  :  "Let  them  come." 
And  last,  but  not  least.  Prince  Bülow  did  not  allow 
himself  to  hope  for  any  results  from  the  discussion  of 
the  problem  at  the  Hague,  and  publicly  expressed  his 
intention  of  "leaving  the  discussion  to  be  conducted  by 
those  Powers  alone  who  hoped  that  any  success  might 
result  from  it." 

That  was  the  answer  which  Gennany  gave  to  the  Eng- 
lish proposal  for  an  international  agreement  on  arma- 
ments. 

SECOND    HAGUE  CONFERENCE:     ENGLAND   AND   GERMANY 

The  negotiations  which  took  place  at  the  Conference 
corresponded  to  the  very  promising  way  in  which  it 
began.  Matters  took  pretty  much  the  same  course  as 
at  the  first  Conference.  England  wanted  a  discussion 
of  the  problem  of  armaments;  Germany,  however,  de- 
clined it.  To  avoid  a  conflict  a  way  out  was  sought  and 
found.     The  first  representative  of  England,  the  Lord 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME   97 

Chief  Justice,  Sir  Edward  Fry,  delivered  a  speech  in 
which  he  elucidated  the  problem  from  every  point  of 
view,  and  proposed  a  resolution  which  declared  that  it 
was  eminently  desirable  that  Governments  should  re- 
sume their  study  of  the  question.  This  resolution  was 
unanimously  adopted,  since  according  to  the  arrange- 
ment made  no  discussion  could  take  place. 

Once  more  we  see  that  Germany  scored  a  brilliant 
success;  once  again  a  pathway  to  progress  was  barri- 
caded ! 

When  a  member  of  the  House,  Bebel,  interpellated 
Prince  Biilow  in  the  sitting  of  the  Reichstag  of  Novem- 
ber 2 ist,  1907,  with  regard  to  the  attitude  of  the  German 
delegates,  the  Imperial  Chancellor  could  truthfully  reply 
that  the  German  delegates  had  taken  no  part  in  a  dis- 
cussion on  the  question  of  armaments,  because  such  a 
discussion  had  not  taken  place.  But  he  forgot  to  add 
that  this  exclusion  of  a  debate  had  been  dictated  by 
Germany. 

In  England  there  was  naturally  universal  disappoint- 
ment over  the  failure  of  the  noble-minded  efforts  of 
leading  Liberal  Ministers,  A  few  months  before  his 
death  Campbell-Bannerman  gave  expression  to  this  dis- 
appointment in  the  words :  "We  had  hoped  that  a  great 
step  forward  might  be  made  in  the  direction  of  putting 
a  stop  to  the  increasing  competition  of  armaments.  We 
were  disappointed." 

They  were  disappointed  but  not  disheartened.  After 
this  failure  to  arrive  at  the  desired  end  along  the  path  of 
international  agreement  the  method  of  private  negotior- 
tions  with  Germany  was  adopted.  We  shall  see  later 
with  what  success. 

Apart  from  the  problem  of  armaments  the  question 
which  chiefly  engaged  the  attention  of  the  second  Hague 
Conference  was  naturally  that  of  international  arbitra- 
tion.   The  problem  before  them  was  to  give  to  the  torso 


98  I   ACCUSE! 

of  1889  a  firmer  and  more  harmonious  form.  It  was  in- 
tended that  the  compulsory  element,  which  had  miscar- 
ried owing  to  Germany,  should  be  inserted  in  the  earlier 
resolutions.  In  order  not  to  encounter  once  more  the 
opposition  of  Germany  a  very  complicated  proposal  had 
been  prepared,  which,  it  is  true,  made  it  compulsory  for 
the  contracting  Powers  to  submit  to  arbitration,  but  only 
subject  to  the  exclusion  of  all  questions  which  affected 
important  interests  or  the  independence  of  the  parties 
to  the  dispute. 

Even  this  limited  element  of  compulsion  encountered 
the  determined  resistance  of  Germany.  The  proposal 
was  remodelled  in  every  direction  in  order  to  meet  Ger- 
many; but  not  even  this  watery  proposal  gained  the  ap- 
proval of  Germany,  which  voted  against  it  along  with 
Austria,  while  the  great  majority  of  States,  Including 
England,  France,  and  Russia,  accepted  the  proposal  by 
32  votes  to  9. 

But  even  then  the  path  of  tribulation  of  international 
arbitration  was  not  ended.  The  proposal  was  put  for- 
ward that  the  agreement  accepted  by  so  great  a  majority 
should  be  binding  at  least  on  those  Powers  which  had 
concurred  in  it.  But  the  German  representative,  Frei- 
herr von  Marschall,  protested  against  this  as  a  violation 
of  the  principle  of  unanimity,  and  no  other  course  was 
open  to  the  Conference  than  to  be  content  on  this  ques- 
tion also  with  a  declaration  which,  indeed,  expressed  the 
platonic  inclination  of  the  Powers  to  the  principle  of 
compulsory  arbitration,  but,  in  practice,  "preserved  for 
each  of  the  Powers  represented  the  maintenance  of  its 
own  standpoint." 

Thus  the  number  of  Germany's  successes  increase! 
Our  title  of  glory,  that  of  being  everywhere  a  drag  on 
the  peaceful  understanding  between  the  nations,  will 
remain  undisputed,  but  it  can  scarcely  contribute  to  mak- 
ing us  loved  throughout  the  world. 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME   99 

ENGLISH    PROPOSALS    FOR    A    POLITICAL    UNDERSTANDING 
AND   FOR   A   NAVAL   AGREEMENT    WITH    GERMANY. 

Scarcely  had  the  sound  of  the  peaceful  concluding 
words  of  the  President  of  the  Conference  died  away  in 
the  Rittersaal  at  the  Hague  when  the  English  Ministers 
began  to  turn  their  attention  to  devising  new  ways 
whereby  they  could  attain  the  object  that  hovered  be- 
fore them — an  end  equally  advantageous  to  all  the  na- 
tions. After  all  outstanding  questions  between  England 
and  France  had  been  disposed  of  by  the  Convention  of 
April,  1904,  and  the  conflicts  of  interest  between  Eng- 
land and  Russia  had  likewise  been  overcome  by  the 
Agreement  of  1907,  the  Liberal  Government,  which, 
after  the  death  of  Campbell-Bannerman,  was  now  under 
the  leadership  of  Asquith,  regarded  it  as  the  most  impor- 
tant task  of  its  foreign  policy  to  establish  its  relations 
with  Germany  on  a  basis  calculated  to  exclude,  as  far  as 
possible,  the  occurrence  of  conflicts.  There  were  no  real 
conflicting  interests  or  occasions  of  friction  between 
England  and  Germany,  or  at  most  these  only  existed 
to  a  very  small  extent.  The  difficulties  in  East  Africa 
had  been  regulated  by  the  treaty  concluded  in  1890  by 
Salisbury  and  Caprivi  whereby  Heligoland  was  handed 
over  to  Germany,  and  in  return  concessions  were  made 
to  England  in  East  Africa.  Questions  arising  in  Asia 
Minor  scarcely  offered  enough  material  for  a  serious  con- 
flict, and  the  treaty  concluded  in  the  early  summer  of 
1914,  notwithstanding  the  tension  in  the  political  situa- 
tion, shows  that  the  peaceful  demarcation  of  spheres 
of  interest  between  England  and  Germany  involved  no 
particular  difficulty  where  there  was  mutual  good  will. 

"What,  then,  is  the  object  of  this  competition  in  naval 
armaments,  which  constantly  grows  more  fatal  for  both 
sides?" — this  was  the  question  which  the  English  Gov- 
ernment and  English  public  opinion  was  bound  to  ask. 


100  I    ACCUSE! 

If  both  countries  desired  peace,  why  should  they  ruin 
each  other  in  armaments?  If,  however,  one  side  pro- 
poses limitation  of  armament  by  treaty,  as  England  did 
at  the  Hague  in  1889  and  1907,  and  the  other  side  con- 
stantly declines  any  such  limitation,  is  it  not,  in  these 
circumstances,  a  justifiable  suspicion  that  the  party  which 
declines  entertains  unconfessed  intentions  against  the 
party  which  makes  the  proposal? 

The  English  public  were  logically  bound  to  propound 
such  questions  to  themselves,  and  they  might  quite  rightly 
put  the  further  question :  What  would  Germany,  what 
would  the  whole  of  Europe  say,  if  England,  the  leading 
Power  on  sea,  zvere  suddenly  to  begin  to  create  a  force 
by  land,  which  sooner  or  later  might  become  equal  to  the 
German  in  strength  ?  Would  not  this  rightly  be  regarded 
as  a  threat  against  the  Power  competing  against  her 
on  the  Continent ?  The  German  naval  law  and  the  con- 
stant increases  in  naval  strength  effected  at  short  inter- 
vals of  time,  whereby  Gennany,  in  the  course  of  twenty 
years,  has  become  the  second  naval  Power  in  the  world, 
was  bound  to  place  the  English  Government  before  the 
alternative  of  either  answering  Germany's  naval  arma- 
ments by  a  corresponding  increase  in  their  own  or  em- 
barking on  the  attempt  to  make  good,  by  a  private  agree- 
ment between  Germany  and  England,  the  general  ar- 
rangements which  had  been  wrecked  at  the  Hague.  Mr. 
Asquith's  Government  chose  in  the  first  place  the  latter 
way,  which  was  thorny  enough  in  view  of  Germany's 
opposition  in  principle  to  restrictions  of  armaments  of 
any  kind,  imposed  by  way  of  a  treaty. 

This  disinclination  must,  indeed  remain  entirely  in- 
comprehensible to  the  ordinary  man.  It  is  probably  a 
part  of  the  superior  insight  of  those  who  govern  by  the 
grace  of  God  to  be  in  a  position  to  dispute  the  correct- 
ness of  the  following  simple  calculations.  The  English 
say  to  the  Germans :    "We  consider  that  the  present  re- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  101 

lation  in  strength  of  our  two  fleets,  sixteen  to  ten,  is  a 
suitable  one,  and  in  any  case,  since  we  do  not  possess  an 
army  of  any  importance,  we  consider  ourselves  under 
an  obligation  to  stick  to  this  proportion  for  the  main- 
tenance of  our  power  and  for  the  protection  of  our 
trade  and  of  our  over-sea  possessions.  If  you,  Germany, 
agree  to  this  proportion  being  fixed,  so  much  the  better 
for  both  of  us ;  further  construction  will  then  be  useless, 
for  the  relative  strength  of  the  one  compared  to  the 
other  will  always  remain  the  same.  If,  however,  you  do 
not  agree,  so  much  the  worse  for  you.  We  on  our  side 
will  then  lay  down  two  ships  for  every  ship  which  you 
lay  down;  the  relation  of  sixteen  to  ten  will  thus  be 
at  once  changed  to  your  disadvantage,  absolutely  as 
well  as  relatively.  When  you  have  built  ten  new  ships, 
that  is  to  say,  when  you  have  got  as  far  as  twenty,  we 
will  have  built  twenty  new  ships,  and  will  have  reached 
thirty-six,  etc.  The  absolute  distance  between  our  two 
fleets  will  thus  constantly  increase,  and  the  relative  posi- 
tion will  constantly  become  more  unfavourable  for  you. 
In  the  end  we  will  ruin  each  other,  and  will  be  like  the 
Kilkenny  cats  which  ate  each  other  up  until  only  the 
tails  were  left.  It  is  for  you  to  choose.  If  you  decide 
on  our  first  proposal,  in  ten  years'  time  you  will  be  in  as 
safe  a  position  as  you  are  to-day,  and  you  will  have 
spared  your  money  and  your  people.  If  you  choose  the 
second  proposal  your  security  will  be  diminished  every 
year,  and  at  the  same  time  you  will  be  gradually  ruining 
yourself;  and  it  will  be  but  a  small  consolation  to  you 
that  you  are  at  the  same  time  bringing  us  to  the  verge 
of  ruin  also. 

One  would  have  thought  that  a  ragged  schoolboy,  who 
had  just  learned  the  first  elements  of  the  multiplication 
table,  would  have  understood  this  calculation,  and  would 
have  been  overjoyed  to  accept  the  first  proposal.  The 
German   Imperial   Government   could   not   rise   to  this 


102  I    ACCUSE! 

height,  and  so  the  wearisome  negotiations  constantly  re- 
newed from  the  side  of  England — they  might  be  called 
the  seven  years'  armaments  war  of  1907-14 — collapsed 
without  result.  Indeed,  it  may  be  asserted  that  the  fail- 
ure of  the  negotiations,  the  constant  increase  of  arma- 
ments caused  thereby,  and  the  increasing  tension  In  the 
political  situation  due  to  the  increased  armaments,  are 
to  a  considerable  extent  responsible  for  the  fact  that  a 
real  war  has  at  last  grown  out  of  the  war  of  arma- 
ments. 

The  responsibility  for  this  is  exclusively  Germany's, 
as  a  short  account  of  the  relevant  events  will  reveal. 

At  the  seventeenth  World  Peace  Congress,  which  met 
in  London  in  July  and  August,  1908,  the  Chancellor  of 
the  Exchequer,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  advocated  with  pas- 
sionate words  an  understanding  between  England  and 
Germany,  and  lamented  "that  it  should  be  necessary  in 
the  twentieth  century  of  the  Christian  Era  to  hold  a 
meeting  in  a  civilised  country  to  protest  against  the  ex- 
penditure by  Christian  communities  of  400  millions  a 
year  upon  preparing  one  nation  to  kill  another."  Mr. 
Asquith,  the  Prime  Minister,  on  the  occasion  of  the  Lord 
Mayor's  banquet  in  1908,  gave  the  assurance  that  Eng- 
land would  "not  be  reluctant  to  grasp  any  hand  that  is 
extended  to  us  in  good  will  and  in  good  faith."  On 
March  i6th  in  the  following  year  Mr.  Asquith  stated  to 
the  House  of  Commons  that  the  question  of  a  mutual 
reduction  of  expenditure  for  naval  purposes  had  more 
than  once  formed  the  subject  of  communications  between 
the  two  Governments,  but  unfortunately  without  result.^ 
This  utterance  of  the  English  Prime  Minister  led,  in  the 
last  days  of  March,  to  a  discussion  in  the  German  Reich- 
stag, in  the  course  of  which  various  speakers  urgently 
besought  the  Government  to  grasp  somewhat  more  ener- 
getically the  hand  offered  by  England.  Bassermann,  a 
^  [Hansard,  1909.    Vol.  72,  8,  i,459] 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  103 

member  of  the  House,  felt,  of  course,  all  kinds  of 
scruples,  and  prepared  the  way  for  Prince  Biilow,  who 
in  the  first  place  denied  that  any  definite  proposal  had 
been  made  by  England,  and  on  the  general  question  "held 
out  no  hope  of  any  effective  results  from  negotia- 
tions with  reference  to  the  limitation  of  naval  con- 
struction." 

These  utterances  of  Biilow  occasioned  a  new  discus- 
sion in  the  English  House  of  Commons,  in  the  course 
of  which  the  Foreign  Secretary,  Sir  E.  Grey,  delivered  a 
highly  Important  speech  on  the  naval  competition  be- 
tween England  and  Germany.  For  England,  declared 
the  Foreign  Secretary,  the  Navy  was  what  the  Army  was 
to  Germany.  The  superiority  of  the  English  Navy  must 
be  maintained,  but  on  the  basis  of  this  superiority  an 
understanding  might  very  well  be  arranged  between  the 
two  countries.  Grey  let  it  be  seen  that  England  might 
be  prepared  to  alter  her  attitude  with  regard  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  capture  of  an  enemy's  private  property  at 
sea,  if  this  would  be  accepted  as  a  starting-point  for 
a  diminution  of  naval  expenditure.^ 

In  introducing  the  Navy  Estimates  in  1909  Mr.  Mc- 
Kenna,  then  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  speaking  in 
the  House  of  Commons  on  July  26th,  declared  that  "the 
British  Government  not  only  expressed  its  desire,  but  by 
something  much  stronger  than  words  showed  its  deter- 
mination to  give  the  lead  in  restricting  armaments,  and 
for  three  successive  years  the  British  Government  did 
its  utmost  to  convince  the  world  of  the  futility  of  Its 
race  in  armaments,  and  of  the  desirability  of  curtailing 
construction."  ^  After  enumerating  all  the  previous  en- 
deavours of  England,  which  unfortunately  had  proved 
fruitless,  Mr.  Asquith  also  declared  that  even  then  the 
door  was  still  open  and  that  they  were  anxious  and  even 

^  [Hansard,  1909.     Vol.  3,  61.] 
'  [Hansard,  1909.     Vol.  8,  859.] 


104  I   ACCUSE! 

eager  to  come  to  some  arrangement  with  other  PoAvers.^ 
Every  indication  that  the  German  Government  dasired 
to  enter  into  such  an  agreement  would  meet  with  the 
heartiest  reception  from  the  English  Government.  In 
answer  to  a  question  of  a  member  Mr.  Asquith  answered 
shortly  and  definitely:     "We  have  taken  the  initiative." 

The  more  the  English  Ministers  revealed  their  en- 
deavour to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with  Germany  on 
the  question  of  naval  armaments,  the  more  did  they  be- 
come an  object  of  attack  and  suspicion  to  the  German 
chauvinist  press.  On  July  14th,  19 10,  Mr.  Asquith  was 
obliged  to  declare  that  the  German  Government  had 
evaded  further  inquiries,  stating  that  they  were  bound 
by  a  law,  and  that  a  modification  of  this  law  would  not 
have  the  support  of  public  opinion  in  Germany.^  On 
the  following  day  Mr,  Lloyd  George,  speaking  at  a  ban- 
quet, denounced  in  passionate  words  **the  epidemic  of 
prodigality  which  seems  to  be  sweeping  over  the  world 
and  sweeping  to  destruction." 

In  reply  to  these  earnest  and  uninterrupted  efforts  of 
the  English  Ministry  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  Bethmann 
Hollweg,  offered  in  December,  19 10,  a  few  platonic  ob- 
servations which  must  have  acted  like  a  stream  of  cold 
water:  England,  he  said,  had  indeed  made  suggestions, 
but  had  submitted  no  positive  proposals ;  Gennany  in  the 
pourparlers  had  constantly  started  from  the  idea  that  an 
open  and  unrestrained  discussion  leading  to  an  under- 
standing with  regard  to  their  interests  on  both  sides  was 
the  surest  means  of  overcoming  any  distrust  due  to 
their  relative  strength  by  land  and  by  water.  "The  mere 
continuance  of  a  free  and  unrestrained  exchange  of 
thought  on  all  questions  connected  with  these  matters  is 
a  guarantee  for  the  friendly  intention  ,  .  ."  &c. 

As  Thoas  says  in  "Iphigenie" : ^ 

-  [Hansard,     1909.    Vol.    8,    879.] 
^  [Hansard,    1910.     Vol.    19,   645.] 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  105 

"A  flood  of  words  is  useless  in  refusing; 
The  other  hears  in  all  the  one  word :  'No.'  "  * 

This  "No!"  resounds  again  with  full  distinctness  in 
the  following  year.  In  the  House  of  Commons  on 
March  13th,  191 1,  Grey  had  once  more  emphasised  the 
necessity  of  arriving  at  an  agreement  with  Germany  and 
of  restricting  the  continuing  increase  of  the  expenditure 
on  armaments.  He  foresaw  that  if  this  tremendous  ex- 
penditure on,  and  rivalry  of,  armaments  continued,  it 
must  in  the  long  run  break  civilisation  down.  The  bur- 
den of  armaments  was  a  greater  danger  than  war  itself, 
since  it  involved  a  bleeding  to  death  in  time  of  peace.^ 

This  speech  of  Grey  formed  the  subject  of  the  debate 
in  the  Reichstag  on  March  30th,  191 1,  in  which  the 
Imperial  Chancellor — ^now  quite  plainly  and  without  any 
concealment — declared  that  the  question  of  an  agreement 
as  to  armaments  was  insoluble  so  long  as  men  were  men 
and  States  were  States. 

Thus  the  decisive  word  was  now  spoken,  and  in  view 
of  Parliamentary  conditions  in  Germany  little  signifi- 
cance could  be  attached  to  the  fact  that  the  Reichstag 
passed  a  resolution  calling  upon  the  Chancellor  to  enter 
into  negotiations  with  other  Powers  wath  regard  to  the 
limitation  of  armaments  should  the  occasion  arise.  Ac- 
cording to  German  political  law  of  the  Bismarckian  tra- 
dition the  Imperial  Chancellor  is,  as  is  well  known, 
merely  the  servant  of  his  lord,  and  is  not  obliged  to  pay 
any  attention  to  Parliamentary  resolutions. 

But  the  English  did  not  yet  relax  their  efforts.  Events 
in  Morocco  had  led  to  the  dispatch  of  a  German  warship 
to  Agadir,  and  to  negotiations  arising  out  of  this  be- 
tween the  Powers   affected — negotiations   which   put   a 

^  "Man  spricht  vergebens  viel,  um  zu  versagen 

Der  andere  hört  in  allem  nur  das  Nein." 
"[Hansard,  191 1.    Vol.  22,  1,985-6.] 


106  I    ACCUSE! 

severe  strain  on  the  peace  of  Europe.  In  the  autumn 
of  191 1,  the  negotiations  at  last  arrived,  through  many 
perils,  at  the  goal,  with  the  result  that  the  disputes  be- 
tween France  and  Germany  with  regard  to  Morocco 
were  finally  composed,  and  as  an  equivalent  for  France's 
freedom  of  action  in  Morocco  a  portion  of  French  Congo 
was  ceded  to  the  German  Empire.  Scarcely  had  this 
cloud  passed  away  from  the  political  horizon  when  Sir 
Edward  Grey  emphasised  anew,  in  the  English  Parlia- 
ment on  November  27th,  191 1,  England's  urgent  desire 
for  the  establishment  of  better  relations  with  Germany. 
The  existing  friendships  of  England  did  not  constitute 
a  hindrance  to  the  conclusion  of  new  friendships.  Eng- 
land had  co-operated  in  securing  a  peaceful  solution  of 
the  Morocco  crisis,  the  air  was  now  purified,  and  he 
would  gladly  welcome  any  wish  on  the  part  of  Ger- 
many for  better  relations  with  England.^ 

In  the  beginning  of  February,  19 12,  the  English  Gov- 
ernment sent  Lord  Haldane  to  Berlin,  not  as  an  official 
plenipotentiary,  but  with  the  task  of  sounding  the  ground 
in  conversations  with  the  Chancellor  and  the  Emperor, 
with  whom  Haldane  was  a  persona  gratissima,  and  if 
possible  of  preparing  the  way  for  the  political  and  naval 
agreement  which  had  been  so  long  sought.  The  prelude 
to  Lord  Haldane's  activity  was  not  exactly  encouraging; 
two  days  before  his  arrival  in  Berlin  the  Emperor,  in 
opening  the  Reichstag,  had  announced  great  increases 
both  in  the  Army  and  in  the  Navy.  The  increase  in  the 
Navy  was  to  extend  to  no  less  than  three  capital  ships, 
many  submarines,  and  fifteen  hundred  men.  On  this 
Lord  Haldane  put  to  the  Chancellor  and  to  Admiral 
von  Tirpitz  the  very  proper  question :  What  would  be 
the  use  of  negotiations  aiming  at  friendly  relations  be- 
tween the  two  Powers,  if  Germany  was  going  at  the 
same  moment  to  increase  her  battle  fleet  as  a  precaution 

^[Hansard,  191 1.     Vol.  32,  43-65.] 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  107 

against  England,  and  thereby  compel  England  to  a  cor- 
responding increase  on  her  side?  Negotiations  with  a 
view  to  friendly  relations  accompanied  by  increases  in 
the  Navy  would  provoke  worldwide  derision.  The  Ger- 
man representatives  indicated  that  a  naval  agreement 
without  a  simultaneous  political  Entente  was  purposeless, 
but  they  also  at  once  emphasised  that  even  in  the  event 
of  a  political  understanding,  there  could  be  no  question 
of  a  reduction  in  the  naval  programme,  but  that  at  the 
most  a  certain  retardation  in  carrying  it  out  might  be 
approved.^  The  promise  of  a  possible  retardation  in 
naval  construction  was  even  further  limited  in  that  it 
was  to  be  an  "understanding  and  not  a  written  agree- 
ment." 

Thus,  while  on  the  one  hand  the  aim  pursued  with  un- 
tiring zeal  by  the  Liberal  English  Government  for  seven 
years,  the  aim  of  arriving  at  a  cessation  of  naval  arma- 
ments on  both  sides,  remained  unachieved — since  the  pro- 
posed retardation,  which  was  not  even  of  a  binding  na- 
ture, would  result  neither  in  such  a  cessation  nor  in  a 
saving  of  expenditure — Germany,  on  the  other  hand, 
demanded,  as  an  equivalent  for  these  so-called  conces- 
sions, political  conditions  which  it  was  simply  impossible 
for  England  to  fulfil.  The  attitude  assumed  by  the  Ger- 
man Government  in  connection  with  all  Anglo-German 
negotiations  is  in  itself  sufficiently  remarkable,  namely, 
that  an  equivalent  could  justifiably  be  demanded  in  re- 
turn for  a  concession,  which,  after  all,  did  not  repre- 
sent a  sacrifice  on  one  side,  but  was  a  duty  implicit  in 
the  vital  interests  of  both.  With  just  as  much  right  an 
equivalent  could  have  been  demanded  by  England,  who 
was  equally  ready  to  bind  herself. 

^  These  and  the  following  facts  are  taken  from  Sir  Edward  Cook's 
pamphlet  entitled :  How  Britain  Strove  for  Peace.  A  Record  of 
Anglo-German  Negotiations  1898-1914.  Told  from  authoritative 
sources.     (Macmillan  and  Co.,  London,  1914.) 


108  I   ACCUSE! 

But,  to  pursue  the  question,  what  was  the  equivalent 
demanded  by  Germany?  Germany  demanded  neither 
more  nor  less — and  here  it  revived  a  demand  already 
formulated  in  previous  years  by  the  Chancellor,  Beth- 
mann  Hollweg — than  the  obligation  for  Britain  of  un- 
conditional neutrality  in  the  event  of  any  European  con- 
flict in  which  Germany  might  be  involved.  England  was 
thus  to  free  herself  from  her  engagements  to  the  En- 
tente and  was  to  withhold  herself  from  every  co-opera- 
tion in  European  questions.  In  view  of  the  close  alliance 
with  Austria  it  was  scarcely  possible  to  conceive  a  con- 
flict in  which  Germany  might  not  be  involved,  either 
on  account  of  her  own  interests  or  on  account  of  those 
of  Austria,  yet  everywhere  England  was  expected  to  re- 
main an  inactive  spectator,  and  to  allow  Germany  and 
her  ally  full  freedom  to  rule  the  roast  on  the  Continent. 
Even  treaty-obligations  to  protect  neutrals  would  have 
been  abolished  had  England  concurred  in  the  German 
proposal  of  an  unconditional  neutrality  in  all  disputes 
affecting  Germany. 

It  is,  therefore,  not  surprising  that  this  suggestion, 
which  had  already  been  rejected  between  1909  and  191 1, 
should  again  have  been  rejected  in  19 12  after  Haldane's 
visit;  indeed,  it  amounted  to  no  more  than  a  demand 
that  England  shoidd  simply  renounce  her  position  as  a 
European  great  Power.  This  demand  would  in  any  case 
have  been  monstrous,  even  if  its  fulfilment  had  been 
sought  to  be  purchased  at  a  high  price.  But  what  was 
the  price  offered  by  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg?  An 
unbinding,  unwritten,  temporary  retardation,  which  in- 
volved no  reduction  in  naval  construction  on  the  basis 
of  the  most  recent  increase  of  the  fleet  in  19 12. 

This  suggestion  was  really  rather  strong,  and  postu- 
lated a  high  degree  of  simplicity  on  the  part  of  the 
shrewd  English  men  of  business.  What,  indeed,  would 
German  diplomacy  have  said  if  it  had  been  suggested 


I 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  109 

that  Germany  should  sell  the  birthright  of  her  position 
as  a  great  Power  in  Europe  in  exchange  for  the  mess 
of  pottage  of  an  English  retardation  in  naval  construc- 
tion ? 

Sir  Edward  Grey  was  obliged  to  decline  the  German 
proposal;  he  did  not,  however,  content  himself  with 
merely  declining  it,  but  he  repeated  again  on  this  occa- 
sion what  he  had  said  in  previous  years  in  public  as  well 
as  in  diplomatic  negotiations;  that  is  to  say: 

1.  That  England  could  not  agree  to  an  unconditional 
obligation  to  observe  neutrality,  such  as  Germany  de- 
manded, but,  on  the  other  hand,  she  would  always  be 
ready,  as  she  had  hitherto  been,  to  work  in  common  with 
Germany  in  the  interests  of  the  peace  of  Europe ; 

2.  That  the  Triple  Entente  was  not  based  on  general 
political  formulas,  but  on  a  settlement  of  specific  ques- 
tions affecting  the  interests  of  the  Entente  Powers,  and 
that  only  indirectly  by  the  settlement  of  these  questions 
and  by  the  removal  of  causes  of  friction  had  relations 
of  friendship  resulted ; 

3.  That  these  relations  had  neither  an  exclusive  nor 
an  offensive  character  against  Germany  and  that  there 
was  no  reason  why  Germany  should  not  enter  into  simi- 
lar relations  with  England. 

In  order  to  give  as  precise  a  fonii  as  possible  to  these 
ideas  the  English  Cabinet  resolved  to  express  them  in 
a  short  formula,  which  was  handed  by  Sir  Edward  Grey 
to  the  German  Ambassador,  Count  Metternich,  and 
which  was  intended  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  further  naval 
negotiations.    The  formula  ran  as  follows : — 

"The  two  Powers  being  naturally  desirous  of  securing 
peace  and  friendship  between  them,  England  declares 
that  she  will  neither  make,  nor  join  in,  a/ny  unprovoked 
attack  upon  Germany.  Aggression  upon  Germany  is 
not  the  subject,  and  forms  no  part,  of  any  treaty,  under- 
standing, or  combination  to  which  England   is  now  a 


110  I    ACCUSE! 

party,  nor  will  she  become  a  party  to  anything  that  has 
such  an  object." 

England  thus  promised  that  she  would,  for  herself, 
make  no  unprovoked  attack  upon  Germany  and  that  she 
would  not  share  in  any  such  venture;  she  further  de- 
clared that  an  attack  upon  Germany  was  neither  contem- 
plated nor  permitted  by  any  treaty  or  convention  to 
which  she  was  a  party.  Lastly,  England  promised  that 
she  would  never  be  a  party  in  any  such  treaty  or  agree- 
ment. This  was  thus  a  promise  of  non-aggression  in 
the  widest  sense  of  the  word.  What  more  could  Ger- 
many reasonably  ask?  Germany  was  secured  against 
every  attack  on  the  part  of  England,  and  with  this  se- 
curity any  reason  or  pretence  for  naval  competition  col- 
lapsed, unless — and  there's  the  rub! — unless  Germany 
herself  had  aggressive  intentions  against  her  neighbours, 
England's  friends  in  the  Entente,  and  thus  indirectly 
against  England.  Here  we  have  the  salient  point,  on 
which  the  year-long  negotiations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries constantly  and  necessarily  came  to  grief, 

England  oifered  the  assurance  that  she  would  not 
attack.  Germany,  however,  asked  for  security  to  he 
able  to  attack  undisturbed.  The  English  offer  had  little 
value  for  Germany,  since  the  German  Government  knew 
quite  well  from  the  attitude  of  the  English  Liberal  Cabi- 
net since  1905  that  there  was  no  ground  to  fear  an  at- 
tack from  the  side  of  England.  The  only  point  that  mat- 
tered to  Germany  was  that  she  should  be  able  to  count 
on  English  neutrality,  under  all  circumstances,  in  all 
Continental  conflicts,  even  if  they  were  provoked  by  Ger- 
many or  her  ally,  and  even  if  they  affected  the  inde- 
pendence of  neutral  countries,  and  thereby  directly  or 
indirectly  affected  English  interests.  By  isolating  Eng- 
land, Germany  desired  to  make  her  path  secure,  in  the 
first  place,  to  a  hegemony  on  the  Continent,  in  order 
later  on  to  rise  from  this  advantageous  position  to  the 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  111 

perpetual  leadership  of  the  world  at  the  cost  of  England. 
This  idea  also  dominates,  as  we  shall  see,  German's  dip- 
lomatic preparations  for  the  war  in  the  last  days  of  July, 
1914. 

"The  thought  is  clever — devilishly  so! 
Apart  from  that,  it  might  be  called  damned  silly."  ^ 

Neither  at  an  earlier  nor  at  a  later  date  did  the  English 
allow  themselves  to  be  entrapped  by  this  lime.  The 
negotiations  of  19 12  failed,  like  all  other  negotiations 
before  and  after  this,  on  Germany's  demand  for  neu- 
trality. 

But  one  last  English  attempt,  again  along  different 
lines,  was  still  to  be  made.  After  the  new  German  navy 
increase  of  19 12,  after  Haldane's  visit  had  passed  with- 
out results,  and  after  the  last  negotiations  between  Grey 
and  Metternich,  the  British  Government  resumed  an  at- 
tempt— already  undertaken  under  Campbell-Bannerman 
in  1906 — to  induce  in  the  other  side  a  better  insight  into 
the  interests  of  both  parties  through  the  measures  actu- 
ally adopted  by  them  in  connection  with  the  Navy,  with- 
out having  recourse  to  any  diplomatic  negotiations.  Al- 
though in  spring,  1906,  the  German  navy  programme  of 
1900  had  again  been  increased  by  six  large  cruisers,  the 
English  Government  announced  in  July  of  the  same 
year  that  the  programme  laid  before  Parliament  in 
March  for  the  construction  of  new  ships  would  be  re- 
duced by  25  per  cent,  in  the  case  of  battleships,  by  60 
per  cent,  in  the  case  of  destroyers,  and  by  33  per  cent, 
in  the  case  of  submarines.  The  reason  for  this  one- 
sided voluntary  reduction  was,  as  the  Government  ex- 
pressly declared,  on  the  one  hand,  to  announce  to  the 
whole  world,  before  the  meeting  of  the  second  Hague 

'■  "War'  der  Gedank'  nicht  so  verwünscht  gescheit, 
Man  war'  versucht,  ihn  herzlich  dumm  zu  nennen." 


112  I    ACCUSE! 

Conference,  England's  firm  intention  to  reduce  the  bur- 
den of  armaments,  and,  on  the  other,  to  induce  other 
Powers  to  follow  the  same  procedure.  This  second 
object  was  of  course  not  realised  in  the  case  of  Germany ; 
rather  the  contrary  effect  was  produced.  On  three  dif- 
ferent occasions — to  the  English  Ambassador,  Sir  F. 
Lascelles,  to  the  English  Under  Secretary  of  State,  Sir 
Charles  Hardinge,  who  accompanied  King  Edward  to 
Germany,  and  to  the  English  Minister  of  War,  Mr. 
Haldane — the  Kaiser  in  the  late  summer  and  in  the 
autumn  of  the  same  year  personally  expressed  strong 
disapprobation  of  any  attempt  to  bring  the  question  of 
armaments  before  the  Hague  Conference,  and  declined 
to  allow  the  German  delegates  to  take  any  part  in  this 
superfluous  and  futile  discussion.  There  could,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  be  no  question  of  the  English  example 
being  followed  on  the  part  of  Germany. 

In  spite  of  this  failure  a  similar  attempt  was  made  In 
19 1 2-1 91 3  by  Mr.  Churchill,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Ad- 
miralty. New  negotiations  with  Germany  after  recent 
experiences  appeared  futile,  but  as  an  alternative  method 
Churchill  declared,  in  introducing  the  estimates  in  the 
two  years  mentioned,  that  he  pledged  himself  that  any 
retardation  or  reduction  in  German  construction  should 
be  followed  by  this  country  in  fidl  proportion.  If  Ger- 
many decided  to  take  a  naval  holiday  and  build  no  ships 
in  any  given  year,  England  would  at  once  follow  suit 
and  drop  her  programme  for  the  year  likewise.  In  this 
way  "without  negotiations,  bargainings,  or  the  slightest 
restriction  upon  the  sovereign  freedom  of  either  power" 
relief  might  be  obtained  for  both  nations. 

This  declaration  of  Churchill,  which  as  we  have  ob- 
served was  officially  repeated  on  two  different  occasions, 
remained  unanswered  and  unreciprocated  by  Germany, 
presumably  because  here  also  she  was  awaiting  "positive 
proposals,"  which  would  then  of  course  have  been  an- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  113 

swered  or  reciprocated  to  no  greater  purpose  than  had 
been  done  on  previous  occasions. 

This  is  the  history  of  the  Anglo-German  negotiations 
extending  over  many  years,  of  the  vain  wooing  of  Eng- 
land for  Germany's  favour — a  wooing  which  was  un- 
attended by  success,  since  the  coy  beauty  would  sell 
her  favour  only  at  a  price  which  the  wooer  could  not 
pay  unless  he  were  prepared  to  sacrifice  himself.  Once 
more  it  appeared,  as  if  in  this  case  also  circumstances 
were  stronger  than  the  will  of  man.  The  work  of  peace 
pursued  in  common  throughout  the  Balkan  crisis,  the 
success  achieved  in  maintaining  peace,  attributable  exclu- 
sively to  the  co-operation  of  the  two  Empires,  had  quite 
automatically  given  a  more  friendly  form  to  the  re- 
lations of  the  two  countries  to  each  other.  The  delimi- 
tation of  the  spheres  of  interest  in  Asia  Minor  held 
out  the  promise  of  a  further  favourable  development  of 
these  relations,  but  unfortunately  this  did  not  touch  the 
kernel  of  the  question;  the  constantly  increasing  danger 
involved  in  the  competition  in  naval  amiaments,  occa- 
sioned by  Germany's  infatuated  refusal  of  every  agree- 
ment. 

What  would  the  world  have  looked  like  to-day  if  Ger- 
many had  accepted  the  last  proposal  put  forward  by 
Grey  in  1912?  The  security  from  every  attack  on  the 
part  of  England  and  her  Allies  would  not  indeed  have 
diverted  Germany  from  her  imperialistic  ambitions, 
which  in  their  nature  were  bound  to  be  aggressive,  but 
it  would  have  deprived  the  German  Government  of  the 
pretext  which  has  enabled  them  to  represent  their  war 
of  prestige  and  expansion  as  a  war  of  defence,  and  with- 
out this  pretext  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  have 
urged  into  so  fearful  a  war  the  Gennan  people,  the 
great  majority  of  whom  are  attached  to  peace.  The 
truce  in  naval  armaments  would  in  addition  have  created 
a  more  friendly  atmosphere  between  Geniiany  and  Eng- 


114  I    ACCUSE! 

land,  and  as  a  consequence  between  the  Triple  Alliance 
and  the  Triple  Entente.  It  may  be  presumed  that  in 
GeiTnany  the  last  enormous  increase  in  the  army  and 
the  measure  providing  for  the  raising  of  millions  of 
pounds  would  not  have  come  into  being.  France  would 
not  have  introduced  her  system  of  three-year  service, 
and  the  Austro-Serbian  dispute — which,  as  we  shall  see 
later,  any  child  could  have  solved — would  not  have  led 
to  the  universal  war. 

What  Are  We  Fighting  for? 

If  Germany  really  had  no  other  objects  than  those 
constantly  advanced  in  all  Imperial  and  princely  speeches 
and  in  all  speeches  by  the  Chancellor,  "Security  from  at- 
tack, free  development  for  her  forces,  unhampered  at- 
tention to  her  culture,"  how  could  all  these  possessions 
have  been  obtained  more  surely  or  more  cheaply  than 
by  accepting  the  English  proposals  ? 

"We  will  persevere  until  we  have  the  assurance  that 
no  one  will  again  disturb  our  peace,  a  peace  in  which 
we  will  care  for  and  develop  German  character  and  Ger- 
man strength  as  a  free  nation," — with  these  words  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  concluded  his  speech  on  the  2nd  of 
December.  A  few  days  later  the  Emperor  delivered  an 
address  on  the  Eastern  scene  of  war  to  the  delegates 
of  the  German  and  Austrian  divisions :  "We  are  fight- 
ing," he  exclaimed,  "for  a  just  cause,  for  freedom,  for 
the  right  of  our  nation  to  exist,  for  a  long  future  peace." 
His  Majesty  might  have  been  respectfully  answered  in 
these  words,  "May  it  please  your  Majesty,  what  we  are 
supposed  to  be  fighting  for  wc  had  before  the  war  began. 
We  had  our  freedom,  the  right  to  our  national  existence, 
which  no  one  disputed,  and  we  had  had  a  long  undis- 
turbed peace.  Why  then,  your  Majesty,  are  we  fight- 
ing?"    And  one  might  have  added:     If  Germany  be- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  115 

lieved  herself  to  be  imperilled — which  is  not  proved,  and 
which  cannot  be  proved — why  then  did  she  not  gain  for 
herself  the  greater  security  ofifered  by  England?  The 
security,  which  was  then  offered  in  peace,  can  never 
again  be  achieved  by  victory  on  the  battlefield.  It  could 
not  only  have  been  obtained  at  less  expense — for  then 
it  would  have  cost  neither  life  nor  treasure — it  would 
also  have  been  more  enduring  and  more  tenable.  Ac- 
cording to  the  dictum  of  Sallust,  Kingdoms  can  only  be 
maintained  by  the  means  by  which  they  were  created, 
and  in  the  same  way  an  international  treaty,  which  is 
intended  to  regulate  the  relations  of  nations  in  peace,  is 
more  surely  cemented  by  peaceful  than  by  military 
means.  Treaties  of  Peace  after  war  always  contain  the 
tacit  clause,  rebus  sic  stantibus,  which  Kant,  in  his  first 
preliminary  article  of  his  work  On  Perpetual  Peace,  re- 
gards as  a  hindrance  to  an  enduring  condition  of  peace. 
Treaties  of  peace,  however,  established  in  time  of  peace, 
which  arise  out  of  common  interests  and  which  do  not 
bear  on  their  forehead  the  remembrance  of  death  and 
destruction,  of  hatred  and  vengeance,  like  the  mark  of 
Cain,  such  treaties  hold  acre  percnnins,  and  like  all  good 
things  carry  in  them  the  seeds  of  further  good. 

So  I  again  say  that  what  we  are  supposed  to  be  fight- 
ing for,  zve  already  possessed.  We  possessed  it  more  se- 
curely than  we  will  possess  it  for  generations  even  after 
a  victorious  war,  and  anything  that  we  lacked  we  could 
have  obtained  without  war  by  a  treaty  in  peace. 

The  Freedom  Which  "They"  Mean.^ 

But  as  we  have  said  the  questions  at  stake  are  quite 
different  from  security,  freedom,  and  the  right  to  exist. 
The  word  "freedom"  is  to-day  very  often  heard  in  the 

^  [The  title  of  this  section  is  an  adaptation  of  Max  von  Schenken- 
dorf's  song:    "Freiheit,  die  ich  meine."] 


116  I   ACCUSE! 

mouths  of  men  who  formerly  crossed  themselves  thrice 
on  hearing  the  forbidden  word  from  any  other  quarter. 
We  have  all,  without  exception,  become  lovers  of  free- 
dom over  night, — above  all  those  who  previously  ex- 
tolled the  "state  of  dependence  willed  by  God."  We 
have  become  so  enamoured  of  freedom  that  we  mean  to 
bring  it  not  only  to  our  nation,  but  also  to  all  the  other 
nations  in  the  world.  (See  the  explanation  of  the  Im- 
perial Chancellor  to  the  American  people.)  We  simply 
no  longer  know  how  far  the  impulse  to  freedom  will 
carry  us.  .  .  . 

"Be  embraced,  ye  countless  millions ! 
With  the  wide  world's  ardent  kiss."  ^ 

Social  democrats,  clericals,  progressives,  Poles,  Danes, 
Alsatians — all  who  were  formerly  enemies  of  the  Empire 
are  now  pressed  by  the  Prussian  Junker  to  his  sensitive 
heart — that  is,  on  the  assumption  that  they'  keep  the 
"peace  within"  -  which,  as  is  known,  consists  in  think- 
ing, speaking,  and  writing  as  the  Junkers  think,  speak, 
and  write.  The  transaction,  however,  is  not  a  mutual 
one,  it  is  a  societas  leonina  in  the  worst  sense  of  the 
word.  Anyone  who  allows  himself  to  think,  or  write,  or 
speak  otherwise  than  is  pleasing  to  the  governing  class 
is  suppressed,  punished,  or  if  need  be,  shot  dead.  That 
is  the  freedom  which  they  mean. 

The  German  people  will  in  time  realise  to  what  bond- 
age these  apostles  of  freedom  are  leading  them.  After 
every  period  of  exaltation  of  the  German  people  a  period 
of  bitterest  bondage  has  always  followed.  It  was  so 
after  1813,  after  1848,  and  after  1870,  when  the  first 
years  of  the  intoxication  of  victory  had  passed  away. 

'  ["Seid  umschlungen,  Millionen  Diesen  Kuss  der  ganzen  Welt."] 
^[Burgfrieden.     The  jurisdiction  of  a  castle,  the  peace  within  the 
castle,  hence  almost  equivalent  to  the  "civil  truce."] 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  117 

It  will  be  precisely  the  same  after  19 14.  The  soldiers 
and  the  Junkers,  who  in  essential  matters  form  one  class, 
feel  themselves  entirely  in  their  element  in  war!  It  is 
quite  to  their  liking  to  suppress  the  freedom  of  the  Press, 
to  suppress  the  right  of  free  assembly,  to  throttle  trade 
and  industry — the  representatives  of  which  had  already 
taken  up  too  much  room  at  the  Imperial  Court.  "Cer- 
tain barriers  of  Court  etiquette" — we  find  in  Liman,  the 
apostle  of  the  Crown  Prince — "still  make  inaccessible 
to  wealth  certain  pathways  which  are  only  open  to  the 
sons  of  the  old  agnati  of  the  kingdom  and  to  officers; 
otherwise  the  millionaire  has  carried  off  the  victory,  and 
the  society  of  the  Court  jostles  in  the  salons  of  lucky 
speculators  or  their  heirs.  The  nobility  of  wealth  grows 
up,  a  new  Junkerdom,  which  never  saw  a  battlefield;  it 
is  even  spreading  to  the  country,  and  already  the  capital 
of  the  Empire  is  surrounded  with  a  golden  girdle  of 
luxurious  estates.  The  list  of  guests  invited  to  accom- 
pany the  Emperor  on  his  northern  tours  shows  the  names 
of  numerous  financial  magnates.  The  new  aristocracy 
carries  instead  of  the  sword  the  dividend  warrant,  in- 
stead of  the  shield  the  company  prospectus,  and  it  bears 
as  its  weapon  the  bill  of  exchange.  The  nobility  of  the 
sword,  however,  withdraws  into  the  background;  the 
sons  of  those  men  who  once  won  the  battles  of  the 
Hohenzollerns  sit  embarrassed  on  their  fathers'  acres. 
And  capital  increases  in  the  hands  of  a  few  until  it  as- 
sumes gigantic  proportions,  and  with  it  respect  for 
money  whether  it  has  been  inherited  or  graspingly  ac- 
quired." 

These  are  the  thoughts  of  authoritative  circles  in 
Prussia  and  in  Germany  on  the  subject  of  trade  and  in- 
dustry. The  dividend  warrant  and  the  bill  of  exchange 
are  for  them  the  contemptible  emblems  of  these  ranks 
of  the  nation  on  which  Germany's  greatness  and  her 
position  in  the  world  are  built,  and  which  in  the  end 


118  I   ACCUSE! 

must  provide  the  means  of  satisfying  the  military  mega- 
lomania of  her  "nobility  of  the  sword."  And  is  it  likely 
that  those  who  entertain  these  thoughts  will  bring  to  the 
German  people  freedom  and  equal  privileges?  When 
the  Moor  has  done  his  duty,  he  will  be  allowed  to  go/ 
just  as  after  1813,  1848,  and  1870.  Even  to-day,  dur- 
ing the  war,  the  smelling-out  of  demagogues  has  begun. 
Everywhere  good  Prussians  are  ferreting  about  for  sus- 
picious people  who  do  not  think  like  good  Prussians  or 
good  Germans.  This  can  be  seen  at  home,  and  even 
more  among  Germans  abroad.  A  military  and  a  Junker 
reaction  will  set  in  after  the  war  such  as  the  present 
generation  has  never  seen.  And  that  is  called  fighting 
for  freedom,  for  German  culture! 

The  End  of  Peace.     Security? 

The  trend  of  thought  of  these  circles  will  be  notice- 
able and  will  make  itself  felt  on  the  conclusion  of  peace. 
While  German  professors  are  bending  over  their  maps 
at  their  study-tables  and  are  elaborating  international 
plans  for  the  future  formation  of  Europe,  these  men  of 
action  are  laughing  at  the  crazy  ideas  of  the  Utopians, 
just  as  they  described  the  negotiations  of  the  Hague 
Conference  as  "chatter  about  everlasting  peace"  (Gen- 
eral-Major von  Deimling)  and  the  English  proposals 
for  agreement  as  lies  and  deception.  For  them  there 
is  only  one  end  of  peace:  oppression  and  security — 
security,  with  the  same  brilliant  success  as  has  been  se- 
cured for  us  by  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine;  that 
annexation  which,  so  far,  has  brought  us  only  difficulties 
and  no  advantages  either  of  a  political  or  of  an  economi- 
cal nature,  which  has,  indeed,  from  a  military  point  of 
view,  been  directly  injurious  to  us,  since  it  led  to  the 

^  ["The  Moor  has  done  his  work, — the  Moor  may  go." — 

— Schiller,  Fiesco.] 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  119 

creation  of  that  new,  and  apparently  impregnable,  line 
of  fortresses,  before  which  we  have  now  been  sitting  for 
more  than  five  months.  Security  of  our  frontiers:  be- 
yond this  the  train  of  thought  of  our  authoritative  cir- 
cles does  not  go,  but  with  security  they  include,  of  course, 
expansion  in  and  outside  Europe.  They  mean  security 
at  any  cost,  without  respect  to  the  rights  of  nationalities, 
the  free  destinies  of  nations,  which  after  all  we  pretend 
that  we  are  defending,  and  without  respect  to  the  fact, 
revealed  by  experience,  that  such  a  brutal  policy  of  se- 
curity constantly  bears  with  itself  the  germs  of  new  wars. 
This  security  we  could  have  had  at  a  cheaper  rate 
and  with  a  better  prospect  of  permanence  by  an  agree- 
ment with  England.  France  and  Russia  were  as  far 
from  entertaining  aggressive  intentions  against  Germany 
as  England  was.  He  who  maintains  that  such  inten- 
tions existed  is  bound  to  produce  evidence  to  prove  their 
existence.  He  who  denies  their  existence  is  not  obliged 
to  prove  the  contrary. 

Did  France  Mean  to  Attack  Us? 

So  far  as  England  is  concerned  I  have  been  able  to 
produce  conclusive  rebutting  evidence.  With  regard  to 
France  I  may  be  allowed  to  deal  with  the  matter  briefly, 
since  there  is  scarcely  anyone  in  Germany — apart,  of 
course,  from  the  Government — who  seriously  maintains 
the  assertion  that  France  intended  to  attack  us.  That 
France  is  not  abused,  but  that,  on  the  contrary,  regret  is 
expressed  that  she  was  drawn  into  the  war,  innocently 
and  against  her  will,  is  one  of  the  few  remaining  sympa- 
thetic traits  in  the  public  life  of  Germany  of  to-day.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  anyone  who  should  advance  the  asser- 
tion that  the  French  Republic  of  19 14  entertained  even 
the  remotest  idea  of  reconquering  Alsace-Lorraine  by 
force  of  arms,  would  merely  prove  that  he  knows  nothing 


UO  I   ACCUSE! 

of  the  history  or  of  the  tendency  of  thought  of  modern 
France,  and  that  his  judgment  is  based  on  impressions, 
which  may  have  been  correct  forty-four  years  ago,  per- 
haps even  thirty-rour  or  twenty-four  years  ago,  but 
which  in  the  last  twenty  years  have  more  and  more 
faded  into  a  phantom. 

In  framing  this  judgment  I  do  not  rely  on  newspaper 
articles,  but  on  personal  impressions  gained  in  France 
during  many  periods  of  residence  there,  extending  over 
many  years.  Until  about  the  middle  of  the  'nineties 
the  wound  of  Alsace-Lorraine  still  ached ;  from  that  time 
it  healed  more  and  more,  and  about  the  beginning  of 
the  new  century  scarcely  a  trace  of  the  old  wound  re- 
mained. The  end  of  Boulangism  rang  in  the  end  of 
the  revanche  idea;  the  worst  of  the  noisy  patriots,  De- 
roulede  at  their  head,  were  condemned  or  banished  from 
France.  The  result  of  the  Dreyfus  affair,  with  the  vic- 
tory of  the  party  of  illumination,  purified  the  atmosphere 
from  the  powers  of  darkness,  from  the  forces  of  political 
and  clerical  reaction,  which  in  France  were  favourable 
to  a  policy  of  war,  as  they  are  to-day  in  Germany.  Con- 
vinced friends  of  peace  like  Jules  Simon,  Frederick 
Passy,  the  Senator  Baron  d'Estournelles  de  Constant, 
and,  above  all,  Jaures,  gained  more  and  more  influence 
on  serious  public  opinion,  and  pressed  into  the  back- 
ground the  noisy  patriots  of  the  Boulevard.  The  intel- 
lectual relations  between  France  and  Gennany  constantly 
became  more  intimate.  Politicians,  writers,  actors  and 
actresses  of  distinction,  learned  men  and  artists,  brought 
about  this  exchange  in  matters  of  the  mind  on  this  side 
and  on  that,  and  by  the  reciprocation  of  visits  succeeded 
in  establishing  personal  relations  between  the  countries. 
Coquelin  and  Sarah  Bernhardt  were  honoured  in  Ger- 
many and  were  received  by  the  Emperor  with  marks  of 
distinction.  In  the  summer  of  190 1  two  French  officers 
of  high  rank  paid  an  official  visit  to  Berlin,  and  were  in- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  121 

vited  by  the  Emperor  to  a  military  banquet  at  which 
one  of  these  officers,  General  Bonnal,  proposed  the  toast 
of  the  German  Army  and  their  soldier-Emperor.  In- 
numerable other  phenomena  could  be  cited  to  show  the 
increasing  understanding  and  friendship  between  the 
two  nations.  The  speech  of  Jaures  in  the  French  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies,  in  June,  1902,  was,  however,  epoch- 
making  ;  in  this  speech  expression  was,  for  the  first  time, 
given,  in  clear  words  and  from  a  responsible  quarter, 
to  the  thought  that  it  was  at  last  time  to  forget  the  ideas 
of  revanche,  to  become  reconciled  with  history,  and  to 
free  the  nations  of  Europe  from  the  intolerable  burden 
of  armaments.  The  speech  of  Jaures  found  almost 
unanimous  approval  in  the  French  Chamber  and  in  the 
whole  of  the  serious-minded  Press.  Certain  chauvinistic 
rags,  of  course,  which,  like  similar  papers  in  our  coun- 
try, earn  their  daily  bread  by  stirring  up  passion,  ex- 
pressed their  discontent  with  Jaures,  but  they  could  not 
alter  the  fact  that  the  .Socialist  leader  had  given  ex- 
pression to  the  views  of  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
the  industrious  and  thrifty  French  nation.  In  a  speech 
in  November,  1904,  Jaures  developed  his  train  of  thought 
and  held  up  an  alliance  with  Germany  based  on  a  renun- 
ciation of  all  retaliation  by  force  as  an  end  worthy  of 
pursuit.  A  few  months  later  the  Morocco  dispute  began, 
when,  in  March,  1905,  the  Emperor  William  landed  in 
Tangier,  and  in  an  address  to  the  Envoys  of  the  Sultan 
ran  counter  to  French  policy  in  Morocco.  Was  France 
to  blame  for  the  tension  which  now  arose?  Must  France 
be  held  responsible  for  the  fact  that  this  challenging 
action  on  the  part  of  Germany  produced — as  in  the  case 
of  the  Krüger  telegram  previously,  and  the  ship  sent  to 
Agadir  later — the  opposite  effect  from  what  was  in- 
tended? These  theatrical  coups  are  indeed  no  proper 
instrument  for  use  in  foreign  policy.  They  are  irri- 
tating rather  than  impressive,  and  since  it  is  more  diffi- 


122  I    ACCUSE! 

cult  to  effect  an  understanding  between  people  In  a  state 
of  irritation  than  between  people  who  are  not  so  irri- 
tated, it  would  be  advisable  to  discontinue  such  theatrical 
coups  and  to  convey  our  wishes  to  foreign  Governments 
in  a  normal,  business-like  way.  The  atmosphere  of  irri- 
tation which  since  then  has  almost  continuously  governed 
our  diplomatic  relations  with  France  must  accordingly 
be  attributed  to  us  and  not  to  France. 

Notwithstanding  all  this  it  was,  as  is  known,  possible 
to  arrive  at  a  definite  settlement  of  the  Morocco  con- 
fusion by  means  of  three  treaties  in  1905,  1909,  and 
191 1.  France,  again,  is  not  to  blame  if  we  came  out 
of  this  worse  than  France  did.  Success  in  diplomatic 
negotiations  depends  not  solely  on  military  strength, 
but  even  more  on  the  diplomatic  dexterity  of  the  Govern- 
ments negotiating.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that,  from  a 
military  point  of  view,  we  are  stronger  than  France. 
There  can  be  equally  little  doubt  that  we  are  diplomati- 
cally the  weaker.  And  this,  indeed,  need  cause  no  sur- 
prise when  we  consider  the  manner  in  which  we  recruit 
and  train  the  scions  of  our  diplomacy.  In  the  list  of 
French  representatives  at  European  Courts  the  names 
which  occur  are  those  of  middle-class  families  only;  in 
the  list  of  German  representatives  there  are  exclusively 
Barons,  Counts,  and  Princes.  This,  of  course,  does  not 
imply  that  a  nobleman  may  not  be  as  competent  in  busi- 
ness as  an  ordinary  citizen.  Since,  however,  the  percen- 
tage of  the  nobility  among  the  German  people  is  quite 
insignificant,  whereas  the  members  of  the  nobility  claim 
100  per  cent,  of  the  diplomatic  representatives,  the  sus- 
picion is  justified  that  it  is  not  their  competence  in  busi- 
ness, but  their  title  of  nobility  which  is  the  decisive 
consideration  in  filling  appointments  in  our  diplomatic 
service.  Diplomacy  is  a  business,  like  any  other;  if  it 
differs  from  others,  it  differs  only  in  the  exceptional  re- 
sponsibilities involved,  and  in  the  most  stupendous  con- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  123 

sequences  which  may  be  entailed  by  errors  committed. 
If  even  a  merchant  chooses  a  clerk  without  regard  to 
whether  he  is  of  high  birth  or  an  officer  in  a  cavalry 
regiment,  how  much  more  is  the  State  in  filling  these 
responsible  offices  under  obligation  to  ignore  these  qual- 
ities, which  may  be  decoratively  beautiful,  but  which 
are  practically  worthless.  If  the  German  Empire  had 
acted  from  this  point  of  view,  the  Morocco  negotiations, 
which,  indeed,  in  the  view  of  our  opponents,  were  not 
entirely  unfavourable  to  us,  might  have  borne  even 
richer  fruit.  Those  who  are  not  satisfied  with  the  result 
should  seek  for  the  cause  where  it  really  is  to  be  found, 
not  in  England  or  in  France,  or  in  anyone  beyond  the 
German  frontier.  They  may  beat  the  breast  and  cry 
aloud  "Mea  culpa,  mea  maxima  culpa!"  In  any  case, 
however,  the  German  people  does  not  appear  to  me 
to  be  under  any  obligation  to  pay  for  the  failures  of  its 
diplomatists  by  the  sacrifice  of  its  blood  and  its  well- 
being.  Here  there  appears  to  me  to  be  clearly  a  lack  of 
proportion  between  the  offence  and  the  expiation,  espe- 
cially since  it  is  not  the  guilty  but  the  innocent  who  Is 
called  upon  to  bear  the  punishment.  Let  us  make  bet- 
ter diplomatists,  voila  tout!  That  is  the  only  practical 
conclusion  which  a  reasonable  nation  can  draw  from  any 
diplomatic  checks  which  it  may  have  suffered.  There 
is,  however,  not  the  slightest  occasion  for  patriotic 
anguish  and  for  bellicose  shrieks  for  revenge. 

Where,  then,  is  the  evidence  for  the  assertion  that 
France  was  evilly  disposed  towards  us?  What  evidence 
is  there  for  supposing  that,  apart  from  the  alleged  dip- 
lomatic defeats,  she  intended  to  inflict  on  us  military  de- 
feats as  well?    I  seek,  but  I  find  none. 

Did  Russia  Mean  to  Attack  Us? 

The  position  is  similar  in  the  case  of  Russia.  For  a 
century  and  a  half  there  have  been  no  conflicts  of  in- 


124  I    ACCUSE! 

terests  between  Germany  and  Russia,  and  such  conflicts 
could,  indeed,  scarcely  arise,  since  the  pressure  exercised 
by  the  two  countries  follows  quite  different  lines  which 
nowhere  intersect.  As  we  have  no  ambitions,  or  at  least 
have  hitherto  had  none,  on  the  Russian  Baltic  Provinces 
— a  Prussian  Irredentism  fortunately  does  not  exist — 
so  Russia  never  thought  of  appropriating  East  Prussia, 
West  Prussia,  or  Posen.  Russia  is  large  enough  to  be 
able  to  do  without  our  provinces.  The  pressure  of  her 
expansion  follows  a  direction  which  touches  neither  our 
property  nor  our  interests. 

The  tension  between  Russia  and  Austria  I  here  leave 
intentionally  out  of  the  question.  It  was  we  who  de- 
clared war  against  Russia  while  she  was  still  living  in 
full  peace  with  Austria,  and  was,  indeed,  still  conduct- 
ing her  negotiations  which  held  out  a  rich  prospect  of 
success.  The  war  between  Austria  and  Russia  only 
broke  out  on  August  6th,  whereas  we  delivered  the 
declaration  of  war  at  Petrograd  on  August  ist.  We 
began  the  war  asserting  that  Russia  meant  to  attack  tis, 
and  we  have  succeeded  in  persuading  the  German  people 
that  she  had  already  attacked  us. 

I  am,  then,  justified  in  asking:  Why  did  Russia  at- 
tack us?  What  end  did  she  have  in  view?  What  did 
she  want  from  us?  It  is  no  sufficient  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion to  refer  to  Pan-Slav  efforts.  Did  Russia  wish  to 
make  us  Slavonic?  Did  she  wish  to  suppress  German 
culture  in  favour  of  Slavonic  culture?  No  one  will 
seriously  maintain  such  a  foolish  assertion.  Russian  cul- 
ture in  the  last  generations  has,  quite  apart  from  this, 
exercised  a  strong  influence  on  our  German  spiritual 
life;  it  would  be  difficult  to  mention  a  German  poet  of 
the  last  fifty  years  who  has  given  an  impulse  to  the 
literature  and  to  the  intellectual  tendencies  of  Germany 
similar  to  that  received  from  Tolstoi.  On  the  other 
hand,  not  merely  the  intellectual  but  also  the  political 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  125 

and  military  life  of  Russia  was  everywhere  permeated 
by  German  elements,  and  everywhere  in  Russia  men 
of  German  name  occupied  leading  positions.  This, 
moreover,  need  cause  no  astonishment,  for  the  Romanovs 
are  themselves  of  German  blood  and  their  wives  have 
nearly  always  been  of  German  stock.  It  may,  indeed, 
be  asserted  that  there  were  scarcely  any  other  two  Eu- 
ropean countries  which  were  more  intimately  connected 
than  Germany  and  Russia  by  means  of  peaceful  pene- 
tration on  both  sides,  thus  constituting  a  league  of  peace 
which  was  crowned  by  the  traditional  friendship  of  the 
two  ruling  houses,  and  sealed  by  the  comradeship  in  arms 
of  a  hundred  years  ago. 

What,  then,  is  the  source  from  which  there  has  sud- 
denly sprung  "the  hatred  of  Germany  nourished  on  Pan- 
Slav  ambitions,"  of  which  the  Chancellor  spoke  on  De- 
cember 2nd?  Do  we  suffer  from  Russophobia?  Had 
this  hatred  of  Germany  not  to  be  expressly  constructed 
in  order  to  give  a  psychological  basis  for  the  alleged 
Russian  attack?  What  facts  are  adduced  in  support  of 
this  hatred  of  Germany?  Out  with  them!  I  fear  we 
may  have  long  to  wait  before  these  facts  are  produced. 

In  any  case,  the  hatred  of  Germany  entertained  in 
Russia  does  not  appear  to  be  insuperable.  Already  we 
begin  to  hear  the  views  of  well-meaning  people  who 
speak  of  peace  at  an  early  date  with  Russia,  and  who 
are  anxious  to  gather  all  our  forces  against  the  chief 
enemy,  England.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  those 
who  declare  that  Muscovitism  and  the  absolutism  of  the 
Tsar  are  our  chief  enemies,  and  who  emphasise  our  com- 
munity of  culture  with  Western  Nations.  Where  is  the 
truth  to  be  founds  What  are  we  really  aiming  at? 
Against  whom,  and  for  what  are  we  -fighting?  These 
are  all  questions  which  are  answered  differently  by  dif- 
ferent people,  producing  a  gigantic  confusion  of  the 
mind,  an  ocean  of  lies  and  of  perversions,  an  ocean. 


126  I    ACCUSE! 

unfortunately,  dyed  in  blood,  which  threatens  completely 
to  sweep  away  German  happiness  and  well-being. 

This  confusion  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that 
there  is,  among  those  who  know,  a  tacit  conspiracy  not 
to  speak  the  truth,  but  that  they  have  overlooked  the 
necessity  of  arriving  at  a  complete  agreement  as  to 
what  is  to  be  established  in  the  place  of  truth.  So  every- 
one tells  lies  on  his  own,  and  the  lies  impinge  on  each 
other,  like  the  electric  sparks  from  two  stations  which 
are  differently  charged;  one  saying  cancels  the  other; 
one  lie  drives  another  out  of  the  field.  Swift,  in  his 
old  age,  was  indeed  right  when  he  said :  "As  universal 
a  practice  as  lying  is,  and  as  easy  a  one  as  it  seems, 
it  is  astonishing  that  it  has  been  brought  to  so  little 
perfection  even  by  those  who  are  most  celebrated  in  that 
faculty." 

The  Triple   Entente  a   Defensive  Alliance 

Not  only  is  there  thus  a  complete  absence  of  evidence 
in  support  of  the  assertion  that  the  Triple  Entente  in- 
tended to  attack  Germany,  but  the  exact  opposite  has 
been  proved  in  the  preceding  discussion.  The  leading 
spirit  in  the  Entente  was  undeniably  England.  We  hear 
this  asserted  daily  in  every  possible  key,  and  quite  re- 
cently it  was  emphatically  advanced  by  the  Chancellor 
in  the  meeting  of  the  Reichstag  on  December  2nd;  the 
statement,  moreover,  rests  on  the  truth.  If,  however, 
this  leading  spirit  has  for  almost  a  decade  striven  only 
for  peace  and  an  understanding  with  Germany,  if  the 
other  two  Entente  Powers  have  never  in  the  slightest 
degree  shown,  by  word  or  by  action,  their  intention  to 
hamper  or  suppress  the  initiative  taken  by  their  political 
friend  in  the  direction  of  peace,  if,  on  the  contrary,  they 
also  have  given  unmistakable  expression  to  their  desire 
for  peace  by  conciliatory  behaviour  on  great  and  small 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  127 

diplomatic  conflicts  (Morocco,  the  Balkan  War,  the 
Potsdam  Agreements  of  191 1,  etc.),  it  would  not  be  a 
bold  conclusion  to  infer  that  the  Triple  Entente  has  been 
a  defensive  alliance,  and  that  it  has  in  no  way  whatever 
had  aggressive  intentions.  He  who  asserts  the  contrary- 
must  submit  proofs  in  support  of  his  statement.  These 
proofs  the  Chancellor  himself  was  unable  to  submit  in 
his  two  speeches  in  the  Reichstag.  The  Entente  Powers 
are  reproached  on  account  of  their  evil  disposition 
towards  Germany,  but  no  actions  are  instanced  which 
have  proceeded  from  such  a  disposition.  We  celebrate 
in  our  enemies  such  beautiful  qualities  of  the  heart  as 
envy,  hatred,  race  antipathy,  the  lust  of  vengeance,  but 
they  cannot  be  reproached  with  a  single  action  in  which 
they  have  endeavoured  to  translate  these  dispositions  into 
deeds.  So  long  as  Germany  is  not  recognised  as  the 
educator  of  the  world — something  after  the  style  of 
"Rembrandt  as  the  educator"  of  the  Germans — we  must 
be  content  to  leave  other  people  in  possession  of  their 
dispositions,  as,  indeed,  they  on  their  side  have  neither 
the  wish  nor  the  power  to  suppress  ours. 

We  must  rest  satisfied  with  combating  their  disposi- 
tions only  when  these  manifest  themselves  as  actions. 
We  are  not  the  rulers  of  foreign  nations  as  Ahlwardt 
was  the  ruler  of  all  the  Germans.  We  are  scarcely 
called  upon  to  give  moral  instructions  to  others  so  long 
as  we  ourselves  need  such  instruction  more  than  they 
do.  The  hatred,  the  envy,  and  rage  for  revenge  which 
has  been  produced  in  our  country — formerly  by  a  small 
section  of  the  people  of  no  intellectual  standing,  but 
since  the  beginning  of  the  war  by  the  greatest  and 
best  part  of  the  German  nation — surpass  in  volume  and 
intensity  all  that  has  been  produced  in  the  three  other 
countries  taken  together. 

But  if  there  were  no  aggressive  intentions,  what  was 
it  that  brought  the  Entente  together  and  cemented  them 


128  I   ACCUSE! 

more  and  more  closely  to  each  other?  It  was  the  fear 
of  Gemiany  and  the  distrust  of  Germany's  imperiahstic 
efforts.  It  was  this  fear  that  united  them  and  gave  in- 
creasing compactness  to  their  alHance.  The  more  they 
saw  Germany  increasing — not  our  trade  nor  our  well 
being,  which  indeed  benefited  their  trade  and  prosperity 
also,  but  our  military  power  and  our  warlike  dispo- 
sition— the  more  they  saw  the  danger  of  German  na- 
tionalism raising  her  head  and  appearing  above  the  steps 
of  the  throne,  the  more  distrustful  and  apprehensive  they 
became,  and  the  more  closely  did  they  draw  together 
for  the  purpose  of  common  defence. 

Everything  combined  in  recent  years  to  increase  their 
apprehensions :  the  enormous  naval  armaments  which, 
in  spite  of  English  proposals  for  agreement,  were  piled 
up  with  constantly  increasing  acceleration,  the  sudden 
increase  of  our  land  army,  quite  unprecedented  in  mili- 
tary history,  the  policy  of  the  mailed  fist,  which  in  all 
international  questions  affecting  the  interest  of  Germany 
or  Austria  struck  on  the  table  and  compelled  the  others 
to  give  way,  above  all,  however,  certain  facts,  which  did 
not  take  place  in  public,  but  which  were  well  known 
to  European  Governments,  These  facts  have  only  re- 
cently received  publicity,  but  must,  at  an  earlier  date, 
already  have  received  from  the  Entente  Powers  the 
attention  they  merited. 

GioLiTTi's  Revelations 

It  is  known  that,  soon  after  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina,  the  Austrian  Government  proposed 
to  take  military  measures  against  the  growing  Great- 
Serbian  movement,  which  had  been  produced  as  a  result 
of  the  annexation.  This  was  an  act  of  criminal  insanity 
on  the  part  of  Austria;  it  was  a  crime,  because  here  the 
violator  intended  to  punish  the  violated  because  he  re- 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  129 

sisted  violation;  it  was  insane,  because  national  ten- 
dencies cannot  be  suppressed  by  force  of  arms.  But  the 
wise  men  of  Austria  thought  otherwise.  Serbia  was 
threatened  with  war,  and  only  through  the  submission 
of  Russia  and  the  mediation  of  England  and  Germany 
was  it  possible  to  prevent,  by  means  of  a  propitiatory 
declaration  on  the  part  of  Serbia,  the  European  war 
which  even  then  threatened  to  break  out.  That  was  in 
March,  1909,  and  is  known  to  everyone.  What,  how- 
ever, was  not  known,  and  has  only  become  known  by 
the  revelations  of  Giolitti  on  December  5th,  1914,  in 
the  Italian  Chamber,  is  the  fact  that  Austria  entertained 
in  August,  19 13,  the  same  intentions  as  in  1909,  and 
was  prevented  from  giving  effect  to  these  intentions  only 
by  the  opposition  of   Italy. 

These  revelations  of  Giolitti  have  rightly  been  re- 
garded in  the  whole  of  the  foreign  Press  as  epoch-mak- 
ing, because  they  revealed  in  an  incontestable  manner 
the  aggressive  intentions  of  Austria.  But  precisely  for 
these  reasons  the  German  and  Austrian  Governments 
have  preserved,  with  regard  to  these  revelations,  a  silence 
as  of  death.  There  is  therefore  all  the  more  reason 
why  I  should  in  this  place  once  more  awaken  the  dead 
to  life. 

In  midsummer,  19 13,  after  the  second  Balkan  War, 
the  relations  in  the  Balkans  between  those  States  im- 
mediately concerned  were  regulated  by  the  Treaty  of 
Bucharest.  Austria-Hungary  was  not  satisfied  with  the 
arrangement  to  which  effect  was  given,  since  in  her  view 
Serbia  had  got  too  much  and  Bulgaria  too  little.  She 
aimed  at  accomplishing  a  revision  of  the  Treaty  and 
in  view  of  Serbia's  opposition  resolved  to  give  effect  to 
her  desires  by  arms.  For  this  purpose  she  naturally 
required  the  support  of  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Al- 
liance and  above  all  of  Italy,  who  had  always  claimed 
the  right  to  make  her  influence  felt  in  the  settlement 


130  I    ACCUSE! 

of  the  Balkan  question.  The  concurrence  of  the  allied 
Powers  in  military  action  against  Serbia  was,  however, 
regarded  as  necessary  by  Austria  chiefly,  because  the 
Austrian  Government  was  even  then  fully  aware  of 
the  fact  that  a  war  with  Serbia  must  lead  to  a  European 
struggle.  Austria  consequently  addressed  inquiries  to 
Italy  with  a  view  to  ascertaining  what  her  attitude 
would  be  in  view  of  her  duties  under  the  Triple  Al- 
liance in  the  event  of  a  Serbian,  and,  should  it  arise,  a 
European  war.  As  a  result  of  the  Austrian  inquiry  the 
following  exchange  of  telegrams  took  place  between 
the  Foreign  Minister,  Di  San  Giuliano,  and  the  Prime 
Minister,  Giolitti,  who  was  then  absent :  "Austria  has 
communicated  to  us  and  to  Germany  her  intention  of 
taking  action  against  Serbia,  and  defines  such  action 
as  defensive,  hoping  to  bring  into  operation  the  casus 
foederis  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  which,  on  the  contrary, 
I  believe  to  be  inapplicable.  I  am  endeavouring  to  ar- 
range for  a  combined  effort  with  Germany  to  prevent 
such  action  on  the  part  of  Austria,  but  it  may  become 
necessary  to  state  clearly  that  we  do  not  consider  such 
action,  if  it  should  be  taken,  as  defensive,  and  that, 
therefore,  we  do  not  consider  that  the  casus  foederis 
arises.  Please  telegraph  to  me  at  Rome  if  you  ap- 
prove." 

Giolitti  replied  to  this:  "If  Austria  intervenes  against 
Serbia  it  is  clear  that  a  casus  foederis  cannot  be  estab- 
lished. It  is  a  step  which  she  is  taking  on  her  own 
account  since  there  is  no  question  of  defence  inasmuch 
as  no  one  is  thinking  of  attacking  her.  It  is  necessary 
that  a  declaration  to  this  effect  should  be  made  to  Aus- 
tria in  the  most  formal  manner,  and  we  must  hope  for 
action  on  the  part  of  Germany  to  dissuade  Austria  from 
this  most  perilous  adventure  (pericolosissima  awen- 
tura)." 

On  this  occasion  success,  in  fact,  attended  the  task  of 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  131 

restraining  Austria  from  a  war  against  Serbia,  but 
whether  this  was  due  to  Germany's  efforts  or  to  Italy's 
opposition  is  not  known.  What,  however,  is  to-day  of 
the  highest  interest  is  the  fact  that,  even  a  year  before 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  war,  Austria  was  finnly 
resolved  to  initiate,  without  any  urgent  reason,  a  mili- 
tary conflict  with  Serbia,  for  there  was  then  no  ques- 
tion of  the  death  of  an  Archduke,  nor  had  a  specially 
dangerous  Serbian  propaganda  been  developed  against 
Austria,  since  Serbia  had  been  sufficiently  engrossed  by 
the  war  against  the  Turks,  and  later  against  her  own 
ally,  Bulgaria. 

This  fact  is  of  the  greatest  importance  in  judging  the 
question  of  guilt  in  the  present  war.  But  there  is  one 
other  point  which  may  be  learned  from  the  events  of 
1913;  first,  that  the  danger  of  a  European  war  as  a 
consequence  of  an  Austro-Serbian  war  was  even  at  that 
time  clear  to  the  minds  of  the  politicians  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  and,  secondly,  that  it  was  possible  to  exorcise 
this  danger  by  dissuading  Austria  from  the  perilous  ad- 
venture, and  by  refusing  to  furnish  her  with  assistance. 
If  these  lessons  of  the  past  had  been  observed  a  year 
later  the  present  war  would  not  have  broken  out.  Italy 
has  observed  these  lessons,  and  her  attitude  is  morally 
and  legally  incontestable.  Germany,  however,  did  not 
desire  to  do  so,  and  she  cannot,  therefore,  object  if 
her  attitude  is  described  in  terms  which  are  exactly 
opposite  to  those  applied  to  Italy.  The  fact  that  Ger- 
many in  July,  19 14,  neglected  to  exercise  on  Austria 
the  moderating  influence  which  she  had  successfully 
brought  to  bear  on  her  a  year  before  is  capable  of  a 
simple  explanation.  Germany  at  that  time  did  not  de- 
sire a  European  war,  or  more  correctly  expressed,  she 
did  not  yet  desire  it,  whereas  in  1914  she  did  desire 
this  war. 


132  I   ACCUSE! 

The    Change    of    Front    in    Berlin.      The    War 

Party 

The  tendencies  in  Berlin  which  led  to  this  change  of 
front  are  placed  in  a  most  interesting  light  by  the  French 
Yellow  Book.^ 

If  these  French  Reports  were  the  only  sources  of  in- 
formation available  for  this  period  of  contemporary 
history  they  might  be  regarded  with  distrust.  As,  how- 
ever, they  are  in  accordance  with  all  the  facts,  which 
have  been  distinctly  manifested  in  the  political  life  and 
in  the  politico-military  literature  of  Germany,^  these 
French  Reports  on  the  state  of  opinion  in  Germany 
must  be  recognised  as  entirely  accurate,  and,  indeed, 
the  clear  analysis  of  German  conditions  contained  in 
them  can  only  evoke  admiration. 

I  have  already  in  an  earlier  passage  dealt  with  the 
dangers  involved  in  the  efforts  of  the  war  party  whose 
exercising  ground  was  exclusively  in  North  Germany 
and  whose  headquarters  were  situated  at  the  Court  of 
Berlin.  The  leaders  of  this  party  were  for  the  most 
part  Generals  who  devoted  the  pensioned  leisure  of  their 
retirement  to  the  creation  of  something  approaching  a 
military  organisation  of  their  forces,  and  both  by  the 
spoken  and  the  written  word  prepared  the  German  peo- 

*  Report  of  the  French  Ambassador,  Cambon,  dated  the  17th 
March,  1913,  enclosing  two  reports  of  the  MiHtary  and  Naval  At- 
taches; further,  a  report  of  Etienne,  the  Minister  of  War,  to  Jon- 
nard,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  dated  the  2nd  April,  1913, 
with  enclosure;  a  report  of  Cambon  to  Pichon,  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  dated  6th  May,  1913,  a  report  to  the  same  Minister 
dated  30th  July,  and  a  report  of  Cambon  dated  22nd  November,  1913. 

'After  this  book  was  finished  a  very  interesting  dissertation  came 
to  my  notice,  entitled  "Der  deutsche  Chauvinismus,"  by  Professor 
Dr.  O.  Nippold,  Stuttgart,  1913.  The  book  contains  a  survey  of  the 
chauvinistic  literature  of  recent  years,  and  earnestly  points  out  the 
dangers  of  this  movement. 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  133 

pie  for  the  war,  which  they,  because  they  wished  it,  de- 
clared to  be  inevitable.  In  addition  to  the  existing  naval 
league  they  founded,  in  1912,  a  "Wehrverein,"  the  ob- 
ject of  which  was  to  combat  the  tendencies  in  favour 
of  peace  to  be  found  in  the  German  nation,  to  create  a 
public  opinion  in  favour  of  an  increase  in  the  land 
forces,  and  gradually  to  accustom  the  nation  to  the 
thought  of  a  European  war.  The  natural  auxiliary 
forces  of  these  gentlemen  were  their  social  and  profes- 
sional companions,  the  territorial  and  the  military  no- 
bility who  from  remote  times  have  controlled  the  Prus- 
sian State,  and  have  regarded  the  King  of  Prussia  as 
their  supreme  head.  The  increasing  democratisation  of 
Germany,  which  had  already  advanced  so  far  as  to  pass 
a  vote  of  no  confidence  in  an  Imperial  Chancellor  and 
a  Prussian  First  Minister,  and  to  extend  protection  to 
the  civil  powers  in  Alsace  against  the  military  authori- 
ties, the  constant  increase  in  the  vote  of  the  social 
democratic  party,  and  of  their  representatives  in  Parlia- 
ment, the  increasing  industrialisation  of  Germany,  which 
threatened  more  and  more  to  repress  the  economic  and 
the  social  importance  of  the  territorial  nobility — all  these 
phenomena  were  an  abomination  to  the  Prussian 
Junkers,  and  had  produced  in  the  circles  which  they 
frequented  a  state  of  mind  which  can  be  expressed  in 
the  thought:  "Things  cannot  go  on  like  this  in  Ger- 
many, and  since  an  amelioration  in  the  sense  we  desire 
cannot  be  achieved  in  peace,  we  must  be  assisted  in  our 
need  by  a  lively  and  jolly  war"  {ein  frischer,  fröhlicher 
Krieg). 

At  all  times  the  Junkers  have  formed  the  kernel  of 
the  Prussian  war-party.  More  recently,  however,  they 
have  been  joined  by  various  auxiliary  forces,  colonial 
enthusiasts  who  pursued  the  foolish  madness  of  terri- 
torial expansion  as  an  outlet  for  our  economic  and  hu- 
man surplus,  ideologists  in  whose  narrow  outlook  Ger- 


134  I    ACCUSE! 

many  marches  at  the  head  of  clvihsation  and  who  there- 
fore consider  that  German  culture  has  a  claim  to  rule 
the  world,  diplomatists  still  grieving  over  their  own 
failures  and  calling  aloud  for  revenge  for  Algeciras  and 
Agadir,  but  chiefly,  as  a  matter  of  course,  the  cannon 
kings  and  the  manufacturers  of  armour  plate,  who  with 
the  wealth  at  their  disposal  can  support  the  venomous 
Press  not  only  at  home  but  abroad.  All  these  elements, 
some  of  them  interested  and  some  deluded,  the  deceivers 
and  the  deceived,  formed  a  compact  force  which,  under 
military  leadership,  fell  into  line  with  true  Prussian  dis- 
cipline on  the  word  of  command,  and  steadfastly  ad- 
vanced to  the  end  in  view.  The  war-party  formed  only 
a  minority  of  the  German  people.  The  great  majority 
was  distinctly  devoted  to  peace.  The  great  mass  of  the 
labouring  population,  the  industrious  middle  classes,  the 
banking  and  manufacturing  circles,  the  national  groups 
of  Poles,  Alsatians,  etc.,  the  South  of  Germany  not 
yet  entirely  Prussianised,  all  these  sections  of  the  Ger- 
man people  without  doubt  desired  peace  and  quiet  prog- 
ress along  the  path  by  which  Germany  had  arrived  at 
her  present  height.  But  these,  fJie  forces  of  peace,  were 
not  organised.  They  were  merely  individuals;  they  did 
not  form  a  compact  body.  They  did  not  consider  it 
necessary  to  organise  themselves  as  a  peace-party  to 
oppose  the  war-party,  because  until  midsummer  of  this 
year  the  latter  were  regarded  as  a  quantite  negligeahle; 
a  European  war  with  all  its  horrors  was  regarded  as 
an  impossibility;  no  one  realised  how  far  the  instigators 
of  war  with  their  powerful  patronage  had  already  un- 
dermined the  ground  of  peace.  In  the  middle  of  July 
any  one  who  had  asserted  in  Germany  that  on  August 
ist  we  would  be  face  to  face  with  a  European  war 
would  have  been  in  danger  of  being  shut  up  in  an  asy- 
lum. The  people  of  rabid  views  were  known,  but  their 
outpourings   were   looked   upon   as   harmless,   and   any 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  135 

counter-organisation    for   the   protection   of   peace  was 
regarded  as  a  superfluity. 

It  is  true  that  disappointment  over  the  Morocco  agree- 
ment had  affected  even  wider  circles.  The  supposed 
diplomatic  defeat  was  regretted,  but  this  was  not  re- 
garded as  a  reason  for  crying  aloud  for  vengeance  in 
blood.  The  diplomatists  were  criticised,  but  Generals 
were  not  demanded.  Criticism  was  naturally  directed 
in  the  first  place  against  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  Herr 
von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  who  bore  the  sole  responsibil- 
ity; it  did  not,  however,  stop  there,  but  ascended  as 
far  as  the  Emperor  himself.  The  policy  of  peace,  which 
the  Emperor  William  had  taken  as  the  guiding  line  of 
his  conduct  after  the  first  stormy  days  of  his  youth, 
had  for  long  ceased  to  find  favour  in  certain  circles. 
He  was  not  merely  criticised,  but  the  attempt  was  made 
— not  without  success — ^to  procure  for  him  what  was 
nothing  short  of  unpopularity. 


A  zealous  and  well-organised  Press  praised  the  son  at 
the  expense  of  the  father  and  increased  the  dissensions 
between  the  two  which  had  found  open  expression  in 
a  number  of  well-known  serious  disputes.  With  diabolic 
dexterity  they  succeeded  in  playing  upon  the  most  sen- 
sitive chords  in  the  Emperor's  soul,  his  personal  vanity, 
his  thirst  for  popularity,  his  ambition  to  be  the  first 
amongst  his  people,  living  in  no  man's  shadow,  the  con- 
sciousness he  had  of  his  authority,  which  had  led  him 
to  adopt  as  his  motto  the  dictum  suprcma  lex  regis  vohin- 
tas.  Like  the  poison  poured  into  the  ear  of  Hamlet's 
father  the  poisonous  thought  was  instilled  into  him  that 
the  times  demanded  deeds,  not  words,  that  only  a  puri- 
fying war  could  drive  away  the  sultry  heat  and  restore 


136  I    ACCUSE! 

to  the  German  Empire  and  to  its  Emperor  the  old  pres- 
tige within  and  without. 

In  the  end  a  continual  dropping  will  wear  out  a  stone. 
It  is  interesting  to  observe  the  gradual  change  in  the 
Emperor's  views  during  the  last  three  years,  from  191 1 
to  1914.  In  1910  the  Emperor  William  could  still  dis- 
cuss with  the  French  Minister,  Pichon,  the  idea  of  a 
union  of  all  civilised  States  and  express  his  approval 
of  the  idea.  In  the  previous  year,  in  1909,  speaking 
at  Cuxhaven,  he  emphasised  that  peace  was  needed  in 
equal  measure  by  all  civilised  nations  "to  enable  them 
to  discharge  undisturbed  the  great  tasks  of  culture  in- 
volved in  their  economic  and  commercial  develop- 
ment." ^  In  191 1  he  emphasised,  in  a  speech  delivered 
in  Hamburg,  that  economic  competition  between  nations 
could  not  be  fought  out  by  one  party  striking  at  the 
other,  but  only  by  each  nation  straining  their  capacity 
to  the  highest  point.  On  New  Year's  Day,  191 1,  in  an 
address  to  the  diplomatists,  he  still  eulogised  the  peace- 
ful understanding  existing  between  the  nations,  which 
was  more  in  accordance  with  their  interests  than  the 
conduct  of  dangerous  wars.  But  in  his  speech  at  Ham- 
burg on  June  i8th,  19 12,  a  different  note  is  already 
sounded:  "Not  inconsiderately  must  we  raise  the 
standard  where  we  are  not  sure  that  we  shall  be  able 
to  defend  it."  This  speech  was  delivered  six  months 
after  the  Morocco  Convention,  and  anyone  who  can 
read  between  the  lines  may  already  detect  the  influence 
which  the  criticism  of  the  Emperor's  peaceful  policy 
had  begun  to  exercise  on  the  thoughts  of  the  Emperor; 
he  no  longer  rejects  war  under  all  circumstances,  but 
if  war  must  come,  it  is  to  be,  according  to  the  saying 
of  Clausewitz,  a  continuation  of  policy  by  other  means 
— that  is,  of  course,  on  the  assumption  that  the  stand- 
ard can  be  defended,  in  other  words,  that  we  are 
^  Fr.  Fried :   Der  Kaiser  und  der  Weltfriede,  Berlin,  1910. 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  137 

stronger  than  the  other  side.  In  the  next  year,  at  the 
boisterous  banquets  in  commemoration  of  the  War  of 
Liberation  of  1813,  this  military  note  more  and  more 
suppressed  the  notes  of  peace.  An  intoxication  ap- 
peared to  have  seized  the  whole  of  Germany — a  new 
intoxication  of  freedom — from  what  bondage  no  one 
knew.  This  drunkenness  was  artificially  produced  by 
the  fiery  beverages  which  an  unscrupulous  patriotic 
Press  had  for  many  a  year  and  day  poured  out  to  the 
German  nation.  Even  those  occupying  the  highest  po- 
sitions were  unable  to  escape  this  condition  of  intoxi- 
cation. A  true  epidemic  of  patriotism  broke  out,  set- 
ting high  and  low,  young  and  old,  in  a  fever  of  ecstasy. 
No  one  any  longer  inquired  as  to  the  grounds  or  the 
object  of  this  popular  movement  prepared  long  in  ad- 
vance and  skilfully  staged  by  the  Nationalist  wire-pull- 
ers, a  movement  in  which  the  Emperor  and  the  Chan- 
cellor were  at  first  victims  carried  away  by  the  stream, 
a  movement  in  which  later  they  were  voluntary  partici- 
pators, and  of  which  in  the  end  they  became  the  con- 
scious directing  leaders. 

Herr  von  Bethmann  certainly  made  a  long  resist- 
ance before  capitulating  to  the  war-party.  But  in  the 
end  he  was  obliged  to  yield,  that  he  might  not  fall  a 
victim  to  the  Camarilla  of  the  Crown  Prince  and  to 
the  company  of  Generals.  Even  in  1910  and  191 1  he 
vigorously  defended  himself  against  his  opponents,  who 
more  and  more  were  digging  the  ground  from  under 
his  feet.  When  he  was  accused  in  the  Mannesmann 
afifair  of  showing  excessive  pliability  towards  foreign 
countries  he  exclaimed  to  his  critics  in  the  Reichstag: 
"I  will  never  make  myself  a  party  to  a  policy  of  break- 
ing treaties."  When  the  great  debate  took  place  in  the 
Reichstag  on  March  30th,  191 1,  on  the  question  of  arm- 
aments, Bethmann  turned  almost  in  supplication  to  tlie 
representatives  of  the  German  people  and  urged  them 


138  I    ACCUSE! 

to  protect  the  German  people  against  Irresponsible  Press 
agitations,  to  which,  unfortunately,  it  often  weakly  suc- 
cumbed. "A  counterpoise  against  all  these  and  similar 
influences,"  exclaimed  the  Chancellor,  "cannot  be  other- 
wise than  desirable,  and  if  international  labour  succeeds 
in  creating  such  a  counterpoise,  I  will  be  the  first  to 
extend  it  a  hearty  welcome."  But,  as  we  have  said, 
the  elements  which  might  have  formed  such  a  counter- 
poise against  the  war-movement  were  too  few.  The 
opposition  of  the  Chancellor,  as  previously  that  of  the 
Emperor,  was  soon  borne  down,  and  the  great  military 
law  of  19 1 3  was  the  first  beacon-signal  of  the  victory 
of  the  enemy  along  the  whole  line. 

That  war  was  not,  in  accordance  with  Austria's  de- 
sires, brought  about  as  early  as  the  summer  of  191 3, 
rested  no  longer  on  grounds  of  principle,  but  merely 
on  motives  of  opportunism.  The  occasion  for  striking 
the  blow  which  Austria  believed,  or  professed,  that  she 
had — a  regulation  of  the  frontier  between  Bulgaria  and 
Serbia,  and  similar  matters — was  too  threadbare  to  jus- 
tify to  the  German  people  a  murder  of  the  European 
nations,  and  too  little  designed  to  enkindle  patriotic 
enthusiasm.  "Wars  which  are  not  supported  by  popular 
sentiment  are  no  longer  possible  in  our  time" — ^to  this 
extent  the  political  thought  even  of  these  reactionaries 
had  already  advanced.  The  question  whether  this  or 
that  place  with  an  unpronounceable  name  situated  some- 
where in  the  south-east  of  Europe  should  be  governed 
by  Serbian  or  Bulgarian  officials  was  of  too  little  im- 
portance for  the  German  people  to  permit  of  it  being 
stamped  as  a  war  for  the  holiest  possession  of  the 
nation.  Thus  the  word  went  from  Berlin  to  Vienna: 
"Not  yet." 

Moreover,  military  considerations  were  clearly  de- 
cisive in  favour  of  this  "Not  yet."  We  were  not  yet 
sufficiently  prepared.     W^e  were,  it  is  true,  considerably 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  139 

superior  to  all  others,  but  this  superiority  had  to  be 
increased  still  further  by  bringing  into  force  the  new 
law  of  defence,  which  had  just  received  preliminary 
approval  from  the  Reichstag.  The  extension  of  the 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  Canal,  which  was  intended  to  provide 
unhampered  movement  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Baltic 
for  even  the  largest  ships  of  war,  was  not  yet  ready. 
The  newest  instruments  of  death  were  probably  still 
awaiting  the  hour  of  their  birth.  Zeppelins  and  sub- 
marines had  still  to  be  built,  and  in  many  other  ways 
our  military  preparations  had  still  to  be  carried  to  the 
stage  of  perfection.  In  a  word,  we  were  not  yet  ripe 
for  striking  the  blow,  which  in  principle  had  even  then 
been  decided  upon.  We  were  only  waiting  for  the  next 
favourable  opportunity,  and  for  a  condition  of  perfect 
preparedness,  to  be  able  to  make  use  of  this  opportunity 
with  success.  Meanwhile,  the  change  in  the  views  of 
the  Emperor  made  further  progress ;  his  entourage,  with 
von  Moltke,  the  head  of  the  General  Staff,  as  their 
leader,  the  Minister  of  War,  the  Crown  Prince,  and  his 
influential  adherents,  all  laboured — although  still  to  a 
certain  extent  in  opposition  to  the  Chancellor,  who  had, 
it  is  true,  taken  part  in  the  whole  development,  and 
covered  it  with  his  responsibility,  but  who  was  now 
still  shrinking  from  the  decisive  step — all  laboured  for 
the  one  end — that  of  bringing  about  the  ''inevitable" 
war  as  speedily  as  possible,  and  of  gaining  the  entire 
support  of  the  Emperor  for  their  efforts.  "We  must  put 
on  one  side,"  said  General  von  Moltke  on  one  occasion, 
"all  commonplaces  as  to  the  responsibility  of  the  ag- 
gressor. When  war  has  become  necessary  it  is  essen- 
tial to  carry  it  on  in  such  a  zvay  as  to  place  all  the 
chances  in  one's  favour.  Success  alone  justifies  war."  ^ 
What  success  had  attended  the  activity  of  the  War 
Party  is  seen  in  Cambon's  report  of  November  22nd. 
^French  Yellow  Book,  No.  3. 


140  I   ACCUSE! 

1913,  to  the  Minister,  Pichon.  Cambon  tells  of  a  con- 
versation which  the  Emperor  William  had  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  with  King  Al- 
bert, an  account  of  which  was  communicated  to  the 
French  Ambassador  "from  an  absolutely  reliable 
source."  King  Albert  found  a  complete  change  in  the 
Emperor,  whom  he  had  formerly  known  as  an  honour- 
able lover  of  peace.  He  had  given  up  his  pacific  ten- 
dencies, and  had  made  the  ideas  of  the  war-party  his 
own.  War  now  appeared  to  him  inevitable,  and  he 
agreed  with  his  Chief  of  the  Staff  when  the  latter  de- 
clared that  this  time  the  matter  must  be  settled,  and 
that  the  Emperor  could  be  sure  that  his  people  would 
follow  him  with  irresistible  enthusiasm.  The  thoughts 
of  the  Emperor  were  directed  chiefly  against  France, 
and  King  Albert  made  fruitless  efforts  to  convince  him 
of  the  peaceful  intentions  of  the  French  Government 
and  of  the  French  people.  Cambon  also  confirmed  from 
his  own  observation  the  altered  train  of  thought  of  the 
Emperor,  which  he  attributed  to  the  increasing  impa- 
tience of  the  soldiers,  to  the  influence  of  the  Pan-Ger- 
man ists,  and  to  a  certain  extent  to  jealousy  at  the  popu- 
larity acquired  by  his  son  in  these  circles.  "The  Em- 
peror is  becoming  used  to  an  order  of  ideas  which  were 
formerly  foreign  to  him";  with  these  words  Cambon 
concludes  his  report.  It  is  impossible  to  deny  that  the 
shrewd  Frenchman  was  a  careful  observer.  Scarcely 
eight  months  later  the  consequences  of  the  change  in 
the  views  of  the  Emperor  were  revealed.  But  even  in 
the  critical  days  which  preceded  the  outbreak  of  the 
European  War,  the  forces  of  good  and  of  evil,  of 
Ormuzd  and  Ahriman,  still  struggled  with  each  other 
in  the  soul  of  the  Emperor.  Now  that  the  portentous 
decision  had  to  be  taken  which  was  to  set  the  world  in 
flames  and  bring  upon  mankind  unprecedented  evils, 
now  that  the  project  which  had  been  so  long  prepared 


HISTORICAL  ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE  CRIME  141 

and  resolved  upon  was  at  last  to  be  transformed  into 
an  act,  the  Imperial  hand  shrank  from  the  decisive  stroke 
of  the  pen,  and  as  in  a  mist  the  old  ideals  of  peace  and 
of  the  happiness  of  nations  once  more  arose  in  the  soul 
of  the  monarch.  To  this  must  be  attributed  the  oscil- 
lations of  the  last  days,  the  continual  change  in  the 
actions  of  the  Emperor,  fluctuating  to  and  fro  between 
the  desire  for  peace  and  the  threat  of  war,  between 
intimidation  and  sincerity,  pursuing  so  long  the  policy 
of  the  mailed  fist,  until  gradually  all  policy  disappeared 
and  only  the  mailed  fist  was  left. 


Ill 

The  Crime 

The  detailed  discussion  in  the  previous  chapter  of  the 
antecedents  of  the  war  was  necessary  in  order  to  un- 
derstand the  rapid  development  of  events  which  in  the 
ten  short  days  from  July  23rd  to  August  ist,  1914,  led 
to  the  greatest  war  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

The  whole  attitude  of  Germany  from  the  first  Hague 
Conference  onwards,  her  consistent  refusal  of  all  restric- 
tions of  naval  or  military  armaments,  her  opposition  to 
the  formation  of  a  court  of  compulsory  arbitration,  her 
constantly  renewed  efforts  to  secure  for  herself  the  neu- 
trality of  England,  without  on  her  part  giving  up  in  any 
way  her  own  freedom  of  action,  the  gigantic  increase 
in  her  land  and  naval  forces,  the  toleration  shown  for 
years  to  a  criminal  chauvinist  movement,  and  the  ap- 
proval extended  to  this  movement  at  a  later  date — these 
all  .indicate  that  for  long  Germany  had  reckoned  on  the 
European  war  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  that  she  had  re- 
solved to  bring  about  the  "inevitable"  in  the  moment 
most  favourable  for  her. 

The  antecedents  of  the  war  down  to  19 14  must  give 
rise  to  what  in  criminal  proceedings  would  be  called  a 
prima  facie  case,  that  Germany,  in  common  with  her 
ally  Austria,  desired  a  European  war  sooner  or  later — 
Germany,  in  order  to  give  effect  to  her  plans  of  world 
power;  Austria,  in  order  to  improve  her  position  in  the 
Balkans. 

Such  a  prima  facie  case,  however,  does  not  amount 
to  a  certainty.     The  probability  which  may  be  inferred 

142 


THE    CRIME  143 

from  the  antecedents  of  the  war  Is  not  in  itself  a  proof 
of  guilt.  This  proof  of  guilt  can  only  be  deduced  from 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  that  is  to  say,  from  the 
diplomatic  documents  which  place  before  us  the  histori- 
cal origins  of  the  war. 

The  indictment  to  be  brought  against  the  Empires  of 
Germany  and  Austria  is  that  in  the  summer  of  1914 
they  intentionally  brought  about  the  war  which  they 
had  long  prepared  and  desired,  because  they  thought 
that  the  moment  was  specially  favourable  for  striking 
the  blow.  This  time  the  occasion  of  the  dispute  was 
not,  as  in  previous  years,  a  paltry  territorial  question 
in  the  Balkans,  a  squabble  about  a  harbour  or  a  stretch 
of  sea-shore,  questions  which  could  neither  arouse  public 
interest  nor  kindle  the  enthusiasm  of  nations.  The  issue 
raised  on  this  occasion  related  to  the  murder  of  an  Arch- 
Duke  and  his  Consort,  a  tragic  event  which  was  bound 
to  awaken  the  indignation  of  the  whole  world,  and,  so 
they  calculated,  could  not  fail  to  enlist  universal  sym- 
pathy on  behalf  of  the  Powers  who  appeared  as  the 
avengers  of  such  a  crime. 

Thus,  in  the  first  place,  the  moral  advantage  was  on 
their  side.  But  they  believed  that  they  could  also  rely 
on  a  similar  military  advantage.  Certain  matters  just 
about  this  time  had  come  to  light  which  were  regarded 
as  proving  the  disorganisation  of  the  French  and  the 
defective  preparation  of  the  Russian  army.  The  revela- 
tions of  Senator  Humbert  had  just  made  public  the  ex- 
istence of  serious  defects  in  the  French  Arniy,  and  it 
was  believed  that  the  Russian  Army,  quite  apart  from  its 
defective  equipment,  was  still  required  to  cope  with  in- 
ternal unrest  and  weakened  by  civil  dissensions.  Eng- 
land's neutrality  was  still  hoped  for,  in  spite  of  previous 
failures  in  this  direction,  and  the  Italians  were  thought 
to  be  foolish  enough  to  draw  the  chestnuts  out  of  the 
fire  in  the  Balkans  for  the  hated  Austrian,  and  to  risk 


144  I   ACCUSE! 

their  whole  national  existence  "pour  le  roi  de  Prusse." 
All  this  was  a  complete  miscalculation.  But  as  the 
art  of  calculation  was  not  understood  in  Berlin  and 
Vienna,  it  was  thought  that  the  moment  was  favour- 
able for  striking — and  they  struck. 

This  is  the  accusation  which  is  now  to  he  proved. 

*       * 

The  events  connected  with  the  assassination  of  the 
Arch-Duke  Franz  Ferdinand  and  his  Consort  are  in 
their  main  features  universally  known,  and  do  not  here 
require  any  detailed  discussion.  For  my  purpose  it  will 
be  sufficient  to  examine  critically  the  diplomatic  trans- 
actions, and  to  emphasise  those  points  which  are  of  de- 
cisive importance  in  considering  the  question  of  the  guilt 
and  the  responsibility  for  this  war.  The  demonstra- 
tion which  I  will  submit  will  rest  only  on  official  docu- 
ments, and  reference  will  chiefly  be  made  to  the  five 
volumes  of  diplomatic  correspondence  which  have  been 
published  in  white,  blue,  yellow,  orange,  and  grey  by 
Germany,  England,  France,  Russia,  and  Belgium  re- 
spectively. A  book  in  red  has  not  yet  appeared;  it  is 
left  to  the  nations  to  write  this  volume  in  blood. 

Other  diplomatic  documents  which  have  appeared 
apart  from  these  books  will  also  be  considered. 

At  the  very  outset  surprise  is  occasioned  by  the  meagre 
contents  of  the  German  White  Book  and  by  the  fact 
that  Austria,  unlike  all  the  other  belligerent  countries, 
has  not  considered  it  advisable  to  publish  a  volume  of 
diplomatic  correspondence.  The  telegrams  exchanged 
between  the  German  and  the  Austrian  Governments  are, 
further,  almost  completely  absent  from  the  German 
White  Book,  whereas  those  between  the  Entente  Powers 
are  reproduced  in  their  publications  with  the  utmost 
detail.  The  German  White  Book  contains  only  36  docu- 
ments; tlie  English  Blue  Book,  on  the  contrary,  contains 


THE    CRIME  145 

i6i;  the  Russian  Orange  Book,  79;  the  French  Yellow 
Book,  161;  and  the  Belgian  Grey  Book,  79.  The  state- 
ments of  our  opponents  are  thus  far  more  detailed  than 
those  of  the  two  allied  Empires,  one  of  which  has  until 
to-day  maintained  a  complete  silence.  This  fact  is  in 
itself  very  illuminating.^ 

The  historical  investigator  is  frequently  obliged  to 
complete  the  gaps  revealed  in  the  German  White  Book 
by  reference  to  the  comprehensive  accounts  of  the  En- 
tente Governments.  There  is,  however,  general  agree- 
ment between  the  various  publications  in  their  reports 
as  to  fact,  and  it  is  only  from  the  spirit  of  the  narrator 
that  they  assume  varying  complexions.  In  my  critical 
discussion  I  will  completely  ignore  these  different  com- 
plexions. It  will  be  sufficient  if  I  restrict  myself  to  the 
bare  facts  reported  by  all  parties  alike,  facts  which 
indeed  are  in  themselves  eloquent  enough.  One  cannot, 
of  course,  assert  that  of  the  various  publications  some 
are  more  deserving  of  credence  than  others.  Diplomatic 
documents  are  merely  documents,  and  they  are  all 
equally  credible.  Moreover,  they  are  mutually  supported 
by  each  other,  and  taken  together  they  form  so  complete 
a  chain,  each  link  so  fits  into  the  other,  that  the  truth 
appears  clear  and  incontestable. 

I  will  deal  in  succession  with  the  various  points  which 
are  decisive  on  the  question  of  guilt,  and  I  will  take 
each  State  separately.  Each  State  will  receive  its  own 
debit  and  credit  account,  and  each  account  will  be  closed 
with  a  balance  which  will  show  the  guilt  or  the  inno- 
cence of  the  State  in  question. 

^An  Austrian  book  has  just  appeared  in  the  beginning  of  Febru- 
ary when  this  work  was  in  the  press,  that  is  to  say,  six  months  after 
the  beginning  of  the  war.  I  will  discuss  this  book  in  a  separate 
appendix. 


146  I   ACCUSE! 

A 

AUSTRIA 

At  6  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  July  23rd  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government  handed  to  the  Serbian  Govern- 
ment a  Note,  in  which  the  Government  presented  a 
series  of  demands,  with  reference  to  the  Great  Serbian 
propaganda  which  it  was  suggested  had  reached  its  high- 
est point  in  the  assassination  of  the  Grand  Ducal  couple, 
intended  to  bring  about  the  suppression  of  these  ef- 
forts which,  as  was  alleged,  were  tolerated  by  the  Ser- 
bian Government.  There  were  contained  among  the 
ten  demands  made  by  Austria  some  (and,  indeed,  a  con- 
siderable number)  of  a  character  such  as  had  never  be- 
fore been  presented  to  an  independent  State,  and  such 
as  hitherto  had  only  been  imposed  on  subject  nationali- 
ties. The  Serbian  Government  were  required  to  pub- 
lish on  a  certain  day  on  the  first  page  of  their  official 
journal  a  declaration,  the  wording  of  which  was  pre- 
scribed. This  declaration  had  in  view  the  most  rigor- 
ous suppression  of  every  form  of  Great  Serbian  prop- 
aganda, and  threatened  with  severe  punishment  the 
whole  population,  but  more  particularly  those  officers 
and  officials  who  should  in  future  take  part  in  this  move- 
ment. This  threat  was  simultaneously  to  be  communi- 
cated by  the  King  to  the  Army  as  an  order  of  the  day, 
and  published  in  the  official  bulletin  of  the  Army.  A 
series  of  detailed  demands  followed :  the  suppression  of 
publications;  dissolution  of  societies  and  the  prevention 
of  the  formation  of  similar  societies;  elimination  from 
school-books  of  all  statements  hostile  to  Austria;  re- 
moval of  all  officers  and  functionaries  guilty  of  the  prop- 
aganda mentioned ;  arrest  of  certain  persons  compro- 
mised by  the  inquiry  into  the  assassination;  prevention 


THE    CRIME  147 

of  illicit  traffic  in  arms  across  the  frontier;  explanation 
regarding  unfriendly  utterances  of  high  Serbian  officials, 
&c.  Under  numbers  5  and  6  of  the  Austrian  Demands 
it  was  exacted  of  the  Serbian  Government  that  they 
should  "accept  the  collaboration  in  Serbia  of  represen- 
tatives of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  for  the 
suppression  of  the  subversive  movement  directed  against 
the  Territorial  integrity  of  the  Monarchy,"  and  further, 
that  they  should  "take  judicial  proceedings  against  ac- 
cessories to  the  plot  of  June  28th  who  are  on  Serbian 
territory."  "Delegates  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment," it  is  further  stated,  "will  take  part  in  the  in- 
vestigation relating  thereto," 

A  memorandum  on  certain  conclusions  of  the  inquiry 
at  Serajewo  on  points  7  and  8  was  added  to  the  Note, 
and  an  answer  was  required  within  forty-eight  hours, 
that  is  to  say,  before  6  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  July 
25th. 

The  Note  was  communicated  to  the  European  Powers 
on  July  24th — ^without  the  addition  of  the  evidence  in 
support  of  the  accusations — and  on  July  25th  it  was 
published  in  the  European  Press.  It  is  well  known  that 
the  unusual  contents  and  the  abrupt  form  of  the  Note 
created  excitement  everywhere,  not  only  in  Govern- 
mental circles,  but  also  among  the  general  public.  Every- 
one expected  an  abrupt  refusal  on  the  part  of  Serbia, 
followed  by  a  war  between  Austria  and  her  neighbour- 
ing kingdom,  the  intervention  of  Russia  in  the  conflict, 
and  in  further  sequence  a  European  war.  Ever  since  a 
Balkan  question  had  existed  the  close  relations  between 
Russia  and  Serbia  were  known  to  everyone.  From  time 
immemorial  community  of  race  and  religion,  political 
traditions  and  interests,  had  united  the  two  countries, 
and  had  created  a  kind  of  relationship  extending  far 
beyond  the  framework  of  the  usual  "spheres  of  in- 
terest."    Russia  had  during  and  after  the  Balkan  War 


148  I    ACCUSE! 

officially  declared  that  any  attack  by  Austria  on  Serbia 
would  lead  to  her  intervention.^  On  this  occasion  also 
it  was  announced  in  the  official  journal  that  Russia 
could  not  remain  indifferent  to  military  action  on  the 
part  of  Austria.^ 

At  the  same  time,  however,  Russia,  England,  and 
France  made  the  most  urgent  endeavours: 

( 1 )  To  induce  Serbia  to  go  as  far  as  possible  in  meet- 
ing the  demands  of  Austria.^ 

(2)  To  obtain  an  extension  of  the  time  limit  from 
Austria,  which  would  enable  the  Powers  to  study  the 
documentary  material  promised  by  Austria,  and  thus  ^to 
exercise  a  moderating  influence  in  Belgrade.'* 

The  extension  of  the  time  limit  was  sharply  refused 
by  Austria,^  although  England  and  Russia  rightly 
pointed  out  that  the  communication  of  the  Note  to  the 
Powers  was  purposeless  and  contradictory  to  interna- 
tional usages  if  they  were  not  allowed  time  and  oppor- 
tunity to  study  the  documents,  and  to  intervene  at  Bel- 
grade. Herr  von  Jagow  had  from  the  beginning  ex- 
pressed "doubts"  as  to  whether  Austria  could  concur 
in  the  extension  of  the  time-limit.^  Count  Berchtold 
was  at  Ischl.    No  grounds  were  given  for  the  refusal 

Nevertheless,  Anglo-Russian  influence  in  Belgrade 
succeeded  in  obtaining  from  the  Serbian  Government  an 
answer  which  caused  throughout  Europe  even  greater 
astonishment  than  the  Austrian  Note  itself.  Serbia  con- 
curred in  nearly  all  the  demands  of  the  neighbouring 
monarchy.     She  declared  herself  ready  to  hand  over  for 

^  Blue  Book,  No.  139,  and  p.  v.  [popular  edition.] 
'Orange  Book,  No.  10. 

•  Blue  Book,  Nos.  12,  15,  22,  30.  Orange  Book,  Nos.  4,  25,  40,  92. 
Yellow  Book,  No.  26. 

*Blue  Book,  Nos.  13,  17,  26.    Orange  Book,  Nos.  4,  16. 
"Orange  Book,  No.  12. 

•  Orange  Book,  No.  14.    Blue  Book,  No.  18. 


THE    CRIME  149 

trial,  without  regard  to  his  situation  or  rank,  anyone 
whose  complicity  in  the  assassination  should  be  proved. 
She  pledged  herself  to  publish  the  desired  declarations 
in  the  official  journal  and  to  the  Army,  to  introduce 
new  criminal  laws  and  an  amendment  of  the  Constitu- 
tion to  facilitate  the  prosecution  and  confiscation  of 
hostile  utterances  in  the  Press.  She  promised  to  dis- 
solve hostile  societies,  to  revise  the  instruction  in  schools 
in  the  sense  desired  by  Austria,  to  punish  guilty  officers 
and  officials,  to  prevent  the  illicit  traffic  of  arms,  &c. 

Only  on  two  points  did  the  Serbian  Government  per- 
mit itself  in  all  submissiveness — the  tone  of  the  whole 
Note  is,  in  fact,  that  of  a  subject  to  his  over-lord,  not 
that  of  one  independent  State  to  another — only  on  two 
points  (5  and  6  of  the  Austrian  Note)  did  the  Serbian 
Government  permit  itself  to  raise  a  few  modest  objec- 
tions.    In  reply  to  point  5  it  observed: 

"The  Royal  Government  must  confess  that  they 
do  not  clearly  grasp  the  meaning  of  the  scope  of 
the  demand  made  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Gov- 
ernment that  Serbia  shall  undertake  to  accept  the 
collaboration  of  the  organs  of  the  Imperial  and 
Royal  Government  upon  their  Territory,  but  they 
declare  that  they  will  admit  such  collaboration  as 
agrees  with  the  principle  of  international  law,  with 
criminal  procedure,  and  with  good  neighbourly  re- 
lations." 

In  reply  to  point  6: 

"It  goes  without  saying  that  the  Royal  Gov- 
ernment consider  it  their  duty  to  open  an  inquiry 
against  all  such  persons  as  are,  or  eventually  may 
be.  implicated  in  the  plot  of  the  15/28  June,  and 
who  happen  to  be  within  the  territory  of  the  king- 
dom.    As  regards  the  participation  in  this  inquiry 


150  I    ACCUSE! 

of  Austro-Hungarian  agents  or  authorities  ap- 
pointed for  this  purpose  by  the  Imperial  and  Royal 
Government,  the  Royal  Government  cannot  accept 
such  an  arrangement,  as  it  would  be  a  violation 
of  the  Constitution  and  of  the  law  of  criminal  pro- 
cedure; nevertheless,  in  concrete  cases,  communi- 
cations as  to  the  results  of  the  investigation  in 
question  might  be  given  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
agents." 

The  conclusion  of  the  Serbian  Note  runs  as  follows : — 

"If  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Government  are  not 
satisfied  with  this  reply,  the  Serbian  Government, 
considering  that  it  is  not  to  the  common  interest 
to  precipitate  the  solution  of  this  question,  are 
ready,  as  always,  to  accept  a  pacific  understanding, 
either  by  referring  this  question  to  the  decision 
of  the  International  Tribunal  of  The  Hague,  or  to 
the  Great  Pozuers  which  took  part  in  the  drawing 
up  of  the  declaration  made  by  the  Serbian  Gov- 
ernment on  the  1 8th  (31st)  March,  1909." 

The  Serbian  Note  was  handed  to  the  Austrian  Am- 
bassador at  Belgrade  on  the  afternoon  of  July  25th. 
Two  hours  later  the  Ambassador  with  his  staff  had  left 
the  Serbian  capital.  The  Serbian  answer  appeared  to 
the  Austrian  Government  to  be  insufficient.  Diplomatic 
relations  with  the  neighbouring  country  were  broken  off 
by  Austria, 

Why?  European  diplomacy — apart,  of  course,  from 
that  of  Germany — was  confronted  with  a  riddle  for 
which  only  one  solution  was  possible,  the  assumption 
that  Austria,  under  all  circumstances,  desired  war  with 
Serbia.  And  as  the  Austrian  Note  was  unique  in  its 
exorbitant  demands,  both  in  form  and  substance,  so  the 
Serbian  Note  also  was  unique  in  its  essential  and  formal 


THE    CRIME  151 

submissiveness.  Never  in  time  of  peace  had  an  inde- 
pendent State  allozved  itself  to  he  dictated  to  in  this  way; 
never  had  an  independent  State  submitted  to  similar 
intrusions  in  its  internal  life.  Education,  the  army,  ad- 
ministration, justice,  the  Press,  the  right  of  association 
— all  were  to  be  trimmed  to  meet  the  wishes  of  Austria, 
and  even  where  it  was  not  possible  to  comply  with  these 
wishes  to  the  last  iota  without  being  debased  to  the 
position  of  a  vassal  State — even  then  Serbia  did  not  re- 
solve on  a  bare  refusal,  but  humbly  asked  for  further 
explanations,  and  professed  herself  ready  to  go  to  the 
limits  permitted  by  international  law,  and  in  these  few 
points  still  in  dispute  she  submitted  herself  to  the  de- 
cision of  the  International  Tribunal  at  the  Hague  or  of 
the  Great  Powers. 

What  more  could  Austria  desire?  Why  did  she  refuse 
to  give  the  explanations  asked  for?  Why  did  she  not 
accept  decision  by  arbitration  in  questions  which,  ac- 
cording to  the  transactions  and  the  resolutions  of  the 
Hague  Conference,  were  in  a  peculiar  sense  suitable  for 
reference  to  the  Court  of  Arbitration — questions, 
namely,   of  law  and  of   interpretation? 

On  July  27th  the  Austrian  Government  published  the 
Serbian  answer  with  observations  in  such  a  form  that 
the  text  of  the  Serbian  Note  is  throughout  broken  up 
by  the  Austrian  observations.  Even  the  Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine  Zeitung  only  published  the  text  broken  up 
in  this  way.  The  intention  of  this  mutilation  was  obvi- 
ously to  preclude  an  appreciation  of  the  submissive  form 
and  the  extremely  conciliatory  contents  of  the  Serbian 
answer  by  the  insertion  of  the  Austrian  observations. 
The  pedantic  nature  of  these  observations  was  described 
by  the  Italian  Minister,  Di  San  Giuliano,  as  "quite  child- 
ish." ^  The  expression  is  indeed  much  too  mild,  when 
one  reflects  that  the  fate  of  Europe,  and  indeed  of  the 
'  Blue  Book,  No.  64. 


152  I    ACCUSE! 

world,  depended  on  these  discussions.  A  hedge-lawyer 
would  be  ashamed  to  produce  in  the  paltriest  case  quib- 
bles such  as  those  to  which  Austria  descended  in  order 
to  find  grounds  to  justify  her  dissatisfaction  with  the 
Serbian  answer.  It  is  not  worth  while  to  discuss  the 
details  of  this  composition,  which  is  miserable  even 
in  style.  In  part,  the  Austrian  observations  amount  to 
an  assertion  that  misunderstandings,  more  or  less  inten- 
tional, existed  on  the  side  of  Serbia.  Point  5,  for  ex- 
ample, was  said  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  international 
law  or  criminal  procedure ;  it  was  rather  "purely  a  mat- 
ter of  State  police  which  must  be  settled  by  way  of  a 
separate  agreement."  Point  6,  it  was  stated,  was  con- 
cerned only  with  the  collaboration  of  Austrian  officials 
at  the  preliminary  police  investigations,  not  in  the  ju- 
dicial proceedings.  In  these  two  points  then,  the  only 
ones  in  which  Serbia  had  made  any  reservations — all 
the  other  points  were  in  essence  agreed  to — in  these, 
the  only  points  still  at  issue,  there  were,  according  to 
the  assertion  of  the  Austrian  Government  itself,  mis- 
understandings (due  to  the  want  of  clearness  in  the 
Austrian  Note),  but  these  misunderstandings  were  of 
such  a  nature  that  they  could  have  been  removed  in 
half-an-hour's  discussion  between  experts,  or,  at  the 
worst,  they  could  have  been  submitted  to  the  decision 
of  a  court  of  arbitration.  Why  did  Austria  not  take 
steps  to  bring  about  such  a  discussion  or  such  a  decision? 
Why  did  she  at  once  have  recourse  to  a  measure  as 
sharp  as  any  that  could  have  been  adopted  in  the  event 
of  a  flat  refusal  of  her  demands — to  a  rupture  of  diplo- 
matic relations? 

This  was  the  third  incomprehensibility  in  the  course 
of  three  days — an  incomprehensibility,  that  is  to  say, 
except  on  the  assumption  that  Austria  intended  under 
all  circumstances  to  begin  a  war  against  Serbia,  even 
at  the  risk  of  a  European  war.    The  Note  itself  was  in 


THE    CRIME  15S 

reality  nothing  but  a  declaration  of  war  in  disguise.  No 
one,  least  of  all  Austria  herself,  could  have  expected 
from  Serbia  that  she  should  give  to  demands  so  humili- 
ating as  those  contained  in  the  Note  more  careful  at- 
tention than  she  did  in  fact  devote  to  them.  That  Ser- 
bia, nevertheless,  considered  these  suggestions,  and,  in- 
deed, concurred  in  most  of  the  Austrian  demands,  was 
a  sign  of  an  extraordinary  devotion  to  peace  on  the 
part  of  this  country,  exhausted  by  two  wars,  and  was  at 
the  same  time  the  effect  of  the  energetic  summons  to 
assume  a  compliant  attitude  issued  by  the  Entente 
Powers  with  Russia  at  their  head.  The  appeal  for  help 
which  Alexander,  the  Prince  Regent  of  Serbia,  addressed 
on  July  24th  to  the  Czar  Nicholas  emphasised  the  readi- 
ness of  Serbia  to  accept  everything  that  was  compatible 
with  her  position  as  an  independent  State,  and  asked 
Russia  for  advice  as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued.^  The 
advice  thus  elicited  led  to  the  Serbian  Note  of  July  25th, 
that  is  to  say,  to  a  humiliation  unprecedented  in  the 
history  of  diplomacy.  This  in  itself  is  enough  to  prove 
beyond  all  doubt  the  desire  for  peace  which  animated 
Serbia  and  Russia.  On  the  other  hand,  the  facts  that 
Austria  regarded  the  Serbian  Note  as  a  negligible  quan- 
tity, and  that  she  did  not  even  consider  it  of  sufficient 
value  to  be  accepted  as  the  basis  of  further  discussion, 
and  flatly  broke  off  diplomatic  relations,  prove  that  Aus- 
tria under  all  circumstances  desired  war.  Her  inten- 
tion to  provoke  a  war  is  manifest  in  the  first  three  acts 
of  the  tragedy:  in  the  Austrian  Note,  in  the  refusal  to 
extend  the  time-limit,  and  in  the  recall  of  the  Ambas- 
sador. 

The   compliance   of   Serbia   which   the   whole   world 
longed   and   hoped    for,    and   which   the   diplomacy   of 
Europe — again,  of  course,  with  the  exception  of  Ger- 
many— had  endeavoured  to  bring  about  by  all  possible 
^  Orange  Book,  No.  6. 


154»  I   ACCUSE! 

means,  was  for  Austria  the  greatest  of  disappointments. 
In  Vienna  they  had  desired  and  hoped  for  a  flat  refusal, 
which  would  have  justified  a  breach  of  diplomatic  re- 
lations and  a  declaration  of  war.  It  was  precisely  for 
this  reason  that  the  Note  had  been  couched  in  such 
sharp  tenns,  in  order  that  it  might  provoke  a  refusal. 
These  expectations  were  disappointed  because  the  love 
of  peace  on  the  part  of  Serbia  and  Russia  was  greater 
than  the  desire  for  war  on  the  part  of  Austria.  The 
authorities  in  Vienna  thus  found  themselves  in  straits, 
since  the  expected  ground  for  war  had  failed,  and  they 
saw  themselves  obliged  to  construct  artificially  a  ground 
for  war  by  seeking  to  transform  the  patent  submission 
into  a  refusal  by  means  of  pettifogging  and  sophistical 
quibbles. 

Until  the  Serbian  Note  was  known  to  the  public, 
everyone  believed  in  a  Serbian  refusal,  which  was  uni- 
versally regarded  as  the  only  possible  answer  to  the 
veiled  declaration  of  war  made  by  Austria.  When,  how- 
ever, the  European  chancellories  and  the  general  public 
became  acquainted  with  the  Serbian  Note  on  the  26th 
and  27th  of  July  everyone  was  amazed  at  the  attitude 
of  Austria,  for  which  no  other  explanation  could  be 
found  than  that  she  intended  unconditionally  to  provoke 
a  war,  and  everyone  looked  with  horror  to  the  approach- 
ing danger  of  a  European  war. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  was  the  first  who  sought  to  meet 
this  danger.  He  proposed  a  conference  of  the  ambassa- 
dors of  Germany,  France,  and  Italy  under  his  presi- 
dency in  London  with  the  object  of  devising  ways  and 
means  of  arriving  at  a  settlement  of  the  differences  be- 
tween Austria  and  Serbia.  France  and  Italy  at  once 
accepted  the  proposal  of  Grey  with  great  alacrity,  and 
Russia  also  declared  without  hesitation  that  she  regarded 
a  conference  of  the  ambassadors  of  the  four  Powers  not 
directly  concerned  as  the  best  method  of  maintaining 


THE    CRIME  155 

peace,  and  that  she  herself  would  accept  the  decision  of 
this  conference.^  In  fact,  the  composition  of  a  confer- 
ence consisting  of  two  representatives  of  the  Alliance 
and  two  of  the  Entente  guaranteed  an  impartial  exami- 
nation of  the  questions  at  issue,  which,  in  view  of  the 
Serbian  answer,  were  reduced  to  a  minimum,  and  were 
easily  capable  of  solution  in  the  shortest  possible  space 
of  time.  If  it  is  borne  in  mind  how  incomparably  more 
difficult  problems  had  been  successfully  solved  by  the 
Conference  of  Ambassadors  at  London  during  the  Bal- 
kan crisis,  it  must  be  admitted  that  a  settlement  be- 
tween the  Austrian  demands  and  the  Serbian  conces- 
sions in  July,  19 14,  was  child's  play  compared  with  the 
previous  achievements  of  the  London  conference,  which, 
apart  from  arriving  at  a  decision  on  many  other  ques- 
tions affecting  land  and  sea,  race  and  nationality,  had 
to  undertake  the  task  of  bringing  into  the  world  nothing 
less  than  a  whole  kingdom. 

But  the  idea  of  a  conference  of  ambassadors  encoun- 
tered the  opposition  of  Germany  and  Austria,  precisely 
because  it  would  have  been  such  an  easy  matter  to  ar- 
rive in  this  way  at  a  solution  of  the  questions  at  issue. 
If  the  representatives  of  the  four  Powers  not  directly 
affected  had  sat  down  round  a  table  in  London  to  com- 
pare the  verbal  differences  of  the  two  Notes  and  to 
explain  the  misunderstandings,  it  was  absolutely  certain 
that  they  would  have  been  successful  in  arriving  at  a 
solution,  and  Austria  could  not  then  have  withdrawn 
from  the  proposals  decided  on  by  the  ambassadors  when 
Russia,  speaking  both  for  herself  and  on  behalf  of  Ser- 
bia, had  in  advance  expressed  her  readiness  to  accept 
these  suggestions.  Such  a  course  would  have  frus- 
trated the  war,   and   for  this  reason  it  was   unaccept- 

^Blue  Book,  Nos.  17,  24,  35,  36,  42,  Si.  53  (Russia  would  be  quite 
ready  to  stand  aside  and  leave  the  question  in  the  hands  of  England, 
France,  Germany,  and  Italy). 


156  I   ACCUSE! 

able  to  Austria.  For  this  reason  Germany  was  in  the 
first  place  entrusted  with  the  task  of  stepping  forward 
with  the  objection  that  they  "could  not  call  Austria 
before  a  European  tribunal."  ^  And  when  this  objection 
was  reduced  by  Grey  to  an  absurdity  with  the  observa- 
tion that  "it  would  not  be  an  arbitration,  but  a  private 
and  informal  discussion  to  ascertain  what  suggestion 
could  be  made  for  a  settlement,"  ^  Austria  came  out 
with  the  flat  declaration  that  she  must  decline  the  Eng- 
lish proposal.^ 

This  was  the  fourth  action  within  five  days  whereby 
Austria,  with  the  support  of  Germany,  had  brought  to 
failure  the  efforts  of  the  other  Powers  to  preserve  peace. 
The  Austrian  refusal  was  all  the  more  glaring  inasmuch 
as  it  was  expressly  intended  that  the  conference  should 
only  discuss  those  points  which  affected  Serbian  sov- 
ereignty and  independence,  and  since  Austria  had  from 
the  very  beginning  given  assurances  that  she  did  not 
desire  to  touch  the  sovereignty  or  the  independence  of 
Serbia.  The  proposal  thus,  in  fact,  related  only  to  an 
investigation  from  the  point  of  view  of  public  law  into 
the  question  of  the  extent  to  which  the  Austrian  de- 
mands, especially  those  in  Articles  5  and  6  of  the  Note, 
were  compatible  with  the  sovereignty  of  the  neighbour- 
ing State.  The  voluntary  acceptance  of  the  result  of 
such  an  inquiry — which  was  not  in  any  way  an  arbitra- 
tion— could  have  done  as  little  damage  to  the  prestige 
of  Austria  as  is  done  to  the  honour  of  a  private  citizen 
when  in  a  civil  action  he  accepts  a  compromise  on  ex- 
pert advice.  But  Austria  did  not  desire  any  settlement, 
and  thus  the  idea  of  a  conference  failed. 

'White  Book,  p.  409  [The  references  to  the  White  Book  are 
adapted  to  the  reprint  in  the  Collected  Diplomatic  Documents  relat- 
ing to  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War], 

'  Blue  Book,  No.  67. 

'  White  Book,  p.  409. 


THE    CRIME  157 

Simultaneously  with  her  objections  to  the  conference 
of  ambassadors,  Germany  had  proposed  direct  discus- 
sions between  Austria  and  Russia  as  the  best  method  of 
preventing  the  Serbian  question  from  developing  ^  to  a 
European  conflict.  This  proposal  was  readily  concurred 
in  by  England,  Russia,  and  France,  and  Grey  was  at 
once  prepared  to  withdraw  his  proposal  for  a  confer- 
ence of  the  four  Powers  until  the  direct  discussions 
between  Vienna  and  Petrograd  had  led  to  a  result, 
whether  positive  or  negative.^  If  the  result  were  posi- 
tive, the  conference  would  then  be  superfluous.  If  it 
were  negative,  the  conference  could  still  seek  to  attain 
what  direct  discussions  had  been  unable  to  achieve. 

So  here  again  there  was  a  new  ray  of  hope!  But 
unfortunately  here  again  they  reckoned  without  Aus- 
tria. It  is  scarcely  credible,  yet  it  is  true — the  docu- 
ments incontrovertibly  prove  it — Austria  declined  the 
direct  discussions  with  Russia,  proposed  by  her  ally 
Germany,  and  Count  Berchtold  declared  to  the  Russian 
ambassador  Schebeko,  who  had  impressed  upon  him 
in  the  most  friendly  manner  the  desirability  of  a  free 
discussion  in  Petrograd,  that  Austria  could  neither  "re- 
cede nor  enter  into  any  discussion  about  the  terms  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Note."  ^ 

Here  there  is  either  a  lack  of  harmony  between  Berlin 
and  Vienna,  or  else  we  have  an  instance  of  preconcerted 
collusion.  Since  a  lack  of  harmony,  for  the  existence  of 
which  there  is  no  evidence,  cannot  be  accepted,  there 
only  remains  the  other  alternative,  that  of  preconcerted 
collusion.  The  matter  is  all  the  more  suspicious  because, 
as  already  observed,  the  correspondence  between  Berlin 
and  Vienna  has  not  so   far  been  published,   and  may 

^Blue  Book,  No.  43.    White  Book,  p.  409. 
'Blue  Book,  No.  45- 

'  Blue  Book,  Nos.  61,  74,  75,  78-  81,  93-  Orange  Book,  Nos.  45,  50. 
White  Book,  p.  409. 


158  I    ACCUSE! 

therefore  be  presumed  to  contain  things  which  it  is  de- 
sired to  keep  silent.  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  who 
every  day  of  his  Hfe  publishes  all  possible  kinds  of  un- 
official documents — extracts  from  the  archives  of  Brus- 
sels, intercepted  letters,  and  so  on — would  certainly  have 
published  long  ere  now  his  correspondence  with  Vienna 
if  it  had  contained  any  confirmation  of  the  truth  of 
his  ever-repeated  but  ever-unproved  assertions,  that  he 
earnestly  pressed  for  moderation  in  Vienna  and  car- 
ried this  labour  to  the  "utmost  point." 

In  any  case  the  fact  remains  that  the  direct  under- 
standing between  Austria  and  Russia,  proposed  by  Ger- 
many, came  to  nothing  in  consequence  of  Austria's  re- 
fusal. On  July  28th,  the  same  day  as  that  on  which 
the  decisive  conversation  between  Berchtold  and 
Schebeko  took  place,  Austria  declared  war  against  Ser- 
bia, and  on  the  next  day  the  bombardment  of  Belgrade 
began. 

This  declaration  of  war  made  the  European  sittiation 
almost  desperate.  Austria's  intention  to  crush  under  all 
circumstances  the  inconvenient  neighbouring  State,  re- 
gardless of  the  European  conflagration  which  must  re- 
sult, had  now  revealed  itself  in  action,  and  it  appeared 
that  all  further  attempts  to  quench  the  fire  or  to  prevent 
its  extension  would  be  void  of  any  prospect  of  success. 
Austria  had  mobilised,  not  only  against  Serbia,  which 
could  be  regarded  as  a  matter  of  course,  but  against 
Russia  as  well.  The  views  vary  as  to  the  extent  of  her 
mobilisation  towards  the  north  and  north-east.  The  Rus- 
sian reports  maintain  that  more  than  half  of  the  Aus- 
trian army  had  been  mobilised,^  whereas  the  Chancellor, 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  in  his  speech  of  August  4th 
admits  the  mobilisation  of  only  tzvo  army  corps  "against 
the  north."  ^    In  any  case  it  is  clear  that  on   July  28th 

*  Orange  Book,  No.  49. 

'The  Collected  Documents,  p.  937. 


THE    CRIME  159 

Austria  was  the  only  great  Power  which  had  mobilised, 
and  that  its  mobilisation  was  directed,  not  only  against 
her  small  neighbour,  but  also  against  the  great  Russian 
Empire. 

This  fact  was  bound  to  compel  Russia  to  take  counter- 
measures,  the  necessity  for  which  was  based  not  merely 
on  the  military  measures  taken  by  Austria,  but  even 
more  on  her  systematic  frustration  of  all  attempts  to 
bring  about  an  understanding.  The  Russian  Govern- 
ment on  the  29th  of  July  officially  communicated  to 
foreign  Governments  that  they  had  ordered  mobilisation 
in  the  army  districts  of  Odessa,  Kieff,  Moscow,  and 
Kasan,  and  that  this  was  designed  as  a  protective  meas- 
ure against  Austria's  mobilisation  and  without  any  ag- 
gressive intentions  against  Austria  or  Germany.^ 

Simultaneously  with  these  events,  renewed  efforts 
were  being  made  by  Russia  and  England  to  find  a  for- 
mula whereby  a  settlement  could  be  arrived  at  between 
the  conflicting  interests  of  Austria  on  the  one  hand 
and  of  Russia  on  the  other.  War  had  now  broken 
out.  The  question  to  be  discussed  was  no  longer  that 
of  inducing  Austria  to  withdraw,  but  only  that  of  bring- 
ing about  a  cessation  of  military  operations,  of  leaving 
to  Austria  as  a  pledge  any  Serbian  territory  which  she 
had  meanwhile  occupied,  and  of  making  an  attempt  on 
this  basis  to  satisfy  as  far  as  possible  the  demands  of 
Austria. 

In  this  direction  Grey  and  Sazonof  showed  indefati- 
gable activity,  and  were  most  energetically  supported  by 
Viviani,  the  French  Prime  Minister.  The  first  formula 
in  this  sense  was  proposed  on  July  29th  by  Grey  to  the 
German  Ambassador,  Prince  Lichnowsky.  It  amounted 
to  the  suggestion  that  Austria  should  express  herself  as 
satisfied  with  the  occupation  of  Belgrade  and  the  neigh- 
bouring Serbian  territory  as  a  pledge  for  a  satisfactory 
~"~*~White  Book,  p.  409.    Orange  Book,  No.  51.    Blue  Book,  No.  78- 


160  I   ACCUSE! 

settlement  of  her  demands,  and  should  allow  the  other 
Powers  thne  and  opportunity  to  mediate  between  Aus- 
tria and  Russia.^ 

This  proposal  of  Grey  was  insistently  urged  on  the 
Emperor  in  the  telegram  despatched  on  July  30th  by 
King  George  to  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia,  and  the  hope 
was  expressed  that  the  Emperor  would  apply: — 

"his  great  influence  in  order  to  induce  Austria  to 
accept  this  proposal.  In  this  way  he  will  prove  that 
Germany  and  England  are  working  together  to 
prevent  what  would  be  an  international  catastrophe. 
Please  assure  William  that  I  am  doing  all  I  can,  and 
will  continue  to  do  all  that  lies  in  my  power,  to 
maintain  the  peace  of  Europe." 

The  Secretary  of  State,  Sir  E.  Grey,  exerted  himself 
with  the  same  zeal  as  the  King  to  move  the  Powers  to 
the  acceptance  of  his  proposal,  which,  in  fact,  offered 
satisfaction  to  all,  and  a  way  of  escape  from  the  dan- 
gerous confusion  which  had   resulted. 

Meanwhile  the  Russian  Minister,  Sazonof,  had  also 
dictated  to  the  German  Ambassador,  Count  Pourtales,  a 
formula  as  the  basis  of  a  settlement,  which  was  directed 
to  the  same  objects  as  Grey's  proposal.  The  formula 
runs : — 

*Tf  Austria,  recognising  that  the  Austro-Serbian 
question  has  assumed  the  character  of  a  question  of 
European  interest,  declares  herself  ready  to  elimi- 
nate from  her  ultimatum  points  which  violate  the 
sovereign  rights  of  Serbia,  Russia  engages  to  stop 
her  military  preparations."  ^ 

This  proposal  of  Sazonof  dates  from  July  30th,  that 
is  to  say,  two  days  after  the  Austrian  declaration  of 

^      *  Blue  Book,  Nos.  76,  88,  90,  98.    White  Book,  410. 
*  Orange  Book,  No.  60. 


THE    CRIME  161 

war  against  Serbia,  and  after  the  bombardment  of  Bel- 
grade and  the  invasion  of  Serbian  territory  had  already 
begun.  The  proposal  contained  no  obligation  on  the  part 
of  Austria  to  cancel  the  military  action  taken  by  her; 
it  merely  imposed  on  Austria  the  requirement  that  she 
should  leave  untouched  the  sovereign  rights  of  Serbia, 
that  is  to  say,  an  obligation  which  could  well  be  accepted 
by  Austria,  if  she  desired  honourably  to  observe  the 
declaration  given  by  her  at  the  beginning  of  the  crisis. 

What,  however,  took  place?  The  Russian  Ambassa- 
dor at  Berlin,  Swerbeiev,  on  July  30th  handed  to  von 
Jagow,  the  Foreign  Secretary,  the  proposal  made  by 
Sazonof,  which  had  simultaneously  been  telegraphed  to 
the  Foreign  Office  through  the  German  Ambassador, 
Count  Pourtales.  The  answer  of  Jagow  was  a  Hat  re- 
fusal: "it  was  impossible  for  Austria  to  accept  the  pro- 
posal." 1  This  refusal,  be  it  noted,  was  given  at  once,' 
without  any  previous  inquiry  in  Vienna.  Herr  von 
Jagow  obviously  regarded  himself  as  the  guardian  or 
man  of  business  of  the  Austrian  Government,  which, 
since  the  declaration  of  war  against  Serbia  and  her 
refusal  of  any  kind  of  discussion,  no  longer  stood  in 
any  direct  relation  with  Petrograd. 

One  more  attempt  thus  ended  in  failure!  But  even 
this  further  failure  did  not  deter  the  English  and  Rus- 
sian Governments  from  making  renewed  attempts  to 
bring  about  an  understanding.  There  were  two  formulae 
in  the  field,  that  of  Grey  of  the  29th  of  July  and  that  of 
Sazonof  of  the  30th  of  July.  The  latter  had  been  re- 
fused by  Jagow  without  any  reasons  being  given, 
whereas  the  former  was  still  awaiting  an  answer.  The 
English  Ambassador  in  Berlin  constantly  pressed  for 
an  answer,  and  was  repeatedly  put  off  with  empty 
phrases.  Owing  to  the  Austrian  refusal  of  all  direct 
discussions,  diplomatic  intercourse  was  rendered  ex- 
^  Orange  Book,  No,  63. 


162  I   ACCUSE! 

traordinarily  difficult.  All  inquiries  had  to  go  via  Ber- 
lin, and  Berlin  was  never  able  to  give  a  positive  answer, 
since,  as  was  professed,  an  answer  had  not  been  received 
from  Vienna.  Whether  the  agent  in  this  case  was  hon- 
est or  dishonest  cannot  be  proved  with  full  certainty. 
But  in  any  case  the  suspicion  in  favour  of  the  second 
alternative  is  overwhelming — a  point  with  which  we 
shall  deal  in  greater  detail  later  in  stating  the  grounds 
for  the  indictment  against  Germany.  The  peacemakers 
were  put  off  from  day  to  day.  On  one  occasion  Jagow 
had  received  no  answer  from  Vienna;  on  another,  Beth- 
mann  regrets  that  he  had  pressed  the  button  so  vigor- 
ously in  Vienna  that  he  had  perhaps  gone  too  far  and 
produced  the  opposite  effect  from  what  was  intended. 
On  a  third  occasion,  when  Goschen  was  still  urging  that 
an  answer  should  be  given  and  was  recommending  that 
an  even  more  violent  pressure  should  be  applied  to  the 
button  in  Vienna,  the  only  answer  which  he  got  from 
Bethmann  was  that  Count  Berchtold  would .  take  the 
wishes  of  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  in  the  matter 
next  morning.^ 

Thus  three  complete  days,  from  the  29th  to  the  31st 
of  July,  glided  unprontably  into  the  past  mithotit  any 
answer  being  received  from  Austria  in  reply  to  Grey's 
proposal  which  the  English  King  had  so  fervently  urged 
on  the  Emperor  William.  Three  days  glided  unprofit- 
ably  into  the  past  while  Europe  in  suspense  and  in  horror 
watched  the  approach  of  the  dreaded  catastrophe.  The 
diplomatists  of  Germany  and  Austria  were  in  no  haste. 
They  knew  what  they  wanted,  and  with  complete  com- 
posure they  prepared  the  drama  behind  the  scenes,  while 
in  front  everyone  was  running  to  and  fro  in  agitation, 
calling  aloud  in  terror  for  the  fire  brigade. 

Grey,  Sazonof,  and  Viviani  persevered,  notwithstand- 
ing all  their  failures,  in  the  earnest  endeavour  to  prevent 
'"Blue  Book,  Nos.  98,  103,  107,  Ii2. 


THE    CRIME  163 

the  outbreak  of  the  conflagration.  Scores  of  telegrams 
flew  backwards  and  forwards  between  London,  Paris, 
and  Petrograd.  Night  and  day  men  laboured  in  the 
Chancellories  of  the  Entente  Powers  to  preserve  peace. 
Since  Sazonof's  proposal  had  been  declined,  and  no 
answer  had  been  sent  in  reply  to  Grey's  proposal — even 
to-day  no  answer  has  been  received — an  attempt  was 
made  to  devise  a  third  formula  which  would  represent 
a  middle  way  between  the  first  two  formuLx.  This  third 
formula — the  result  of  the  zealous  action  taken  by  Vi- 
viani  in  the  cause  of  mediation  ^ — went  even  further  to 
meet  the  wishes  of  Austria  than  the  first  proposal  of 
Sazonof,  and  thus  appeared  to  offer  every  prospect  of 
a  favourable  result.  It  was  communicated  by  Sazonof 
to  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  on  the  31st  of  July, 
and  runs  as  follows : — 

"If  Austria  consents  to  stay  the  march  of  her 
troops  on  Serbian  territory,  and  if,  recognising  that 
the  Austro-Serbian  conflict  has  assumed  the  char- 
acter of  a  question  of  European  interest,  she  admits 
that  the  Great  Powers  may  examine  the  satisfac- 
tion which  Serbia  can  accord  to  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Government  without  injury  to  her  rights 
as  a  sovereign  State  or  her  independence,  Russia 
undertakes  to  maintain  her  waiting  attitude."  ^ 

This  formula,  which  now  represented  the  utmost  ex- 
tent to  which  it  was  possible  to  go  in  meeting  Austria's 
wishes,  and  could  only  have  been  suggested  by  Russia's 
decisive  desire  for  peace,  has  never  received  an  anszver 
from  Austria  or  Germany.  While  Sazonof  in  a  des- 
patch to  London  still  expressed  the  hope  that  a  peaceful 
issue  to  the  situation  had  been  found,^  while  Grey  in 

^Yellow  Book,  No.  112. 
^Orange  Book,  No.  67. 
"Orange  Book,  Nos.  69,  71. 


164  I   ACCUSE! 

his  despatches  to  Berlin  most  urgently  recommended 
the  acceptance  of  the  second  formula  of  Sazonof/  Ger- 
many and  Austria  maintained  an  unbroken  silence.  In 
place  of  the  Serbian  question,  which  was  in  danger  of 
being  amicably  settled,  another  c^uestion  was  put  for- 
ward, which  was  bound  to  lead  inevitably  to  war — the 
question  of  the  Russian  mobilisation.  Germany  ap- 
peared no  longer  as  Austria's  man  of  business,  but  took 
her  place  as  a  party  to  the  case  in  her  own  name.  The 
understudy  assumed  the  leading  role.  Austria's  book  of 
guilt  was  closed,  and  a  new  book  of  guilt  for  Germany 
was  opened. 

The  Russian  general  mobilisation  undoubtedly  took 
place  on  July  31st.  On  this  all  the  diplomatic  publica- 
tions agree. ^  It  was,  however,  occasioned  by  the  previ- 
ous Austrian  general  mobilisation.  This  fact  requires 
to  be  decisively  emphasised,  since  in  Germany  an  in- 
tentional silence  has  been  preserved  on  this  point  of- 
ficially and  unofficially.  This  silence  is  only  natural,  for 
the  guilt  of  Russia  would  hopelessly  collapse  like  a  house 
of  cards  if  it  were  proved  that  the  Russian  mobilisation 
not  only  followed  the  Austrian  in  point  of  time,  but  was 
also  its  necessary  consequence;  not  merely  because  of 
the  military  measures  of  Austria,  but  equally  because 
of  the  whole  diplomatic  attitude  of  the  two  Empires  in 
the  days  between  July  23rd  and  31st, 

I  have  already  shown  that  the  first  of  all  the  mobilisa- 
tions was  the  Austrian  partial  mobilisation  against  Ser- 
bia and  against  the  Russian  frontier.  This  mobilisation, 
according  to  Russian  and  French  reports,  comprised 
against  Russia  more  than  a  half  of  the  entire  Austrian 
army,  and  according  to  Bethmann's  admission  at  least 
two  army  corps.  The  precise  time  of  the  complete 
mobilisation  of  Austria  is  differently  given;  according 

^Blue  Book,  Nos.  in,  120,  121,  131,  132. 
*  White  Book,  p.  412. 


THE    CRIME  165 

to  the  report  of  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Vienna  it 
had  already  taken  place  on  July  28th.i  According  to 
French  and  English  reports  it  took  place  at  i  o'clock 
in  the  morning  on  July  sist.^  To  be  on  the  safe  side,  I 
will  assume  that  the  latter  date  only  is  proved.  Of  the 
correctness  of  this  date  there  can  be  no  doubt  in  view 
of  the  reports  of  Dumaine,  the  French  Ambassador  in 
Vienna,  of  de  Bunsen,  the  English  Ambassador  in  Vi- 
enna, and  Bertie,  the  English  Ambassador  in  Paris. 

The  Russian  general  mobilisation  was  ordered,  at  the 
earliest,  towards  midday  on  July  31st,  that  is  to  say, 
after  the  Austrian  mobilisation. 

On  the  same  day — the  exact  hour  is  unknown — the 
"threatening  danger  of  war"  {drohende  Kriegsgefahr') 
was  proclaimed  in  Germany,  In  the  evening  about  7 
o'clock  the  ultimatum  to  France  was  delivered  in  Paris, 
and  about  midnight  the  ultimatum  to  Russia  was  de- 
livered in  Petrograd. 

An  eventful  day!  But  the  most  remarkable  occur- 
rence was  contributed  by  Austria,  when,  in  the  course  of 
the  same  day,  unperturbed  by  general  mobilisation,  the 
state  of  war  {Krieg  saust  and),  and  ultimata,  she  sud- 
denly gave  simultaneous  expression  in  Paris  and  Petro- 
grad to  her  readiness  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
Russia  and  the  other  Powers  -with  regard  to  the  contents 
of  her  ultimatum  to  Serbia.  Austria  thus  at  last  de- 
clared herself  ready  at  the  eleventh  hour  to  do  some- 
thing which  up  till  then  she  had  most  energetically  re- 
fused to  do,  that  is  to  say,  "to  discuss  the  grounds  of 
her  grievances  against  Serbia  with  the  other  Powers."^ 
In  Paris,  London,  and  Petrograd  this  final  apparent  con- 
version of  Austria  was  received  with  feelings  of  in- 
tensely pleasant  surprise.      Everyone  hailed   what  was 

*  Orange  Book,  No.  44,  47. 

*  Yellow  Book,  No.  115.    Blue  Book,  Nos.  113,  118,  126,  134. 

*  Yellow  Book,  No.  120.    Orange  Book,  No.  73. 


166  I   ACCUSE! 

regarded  as  a  new  ray  of  hope.  Grey  and  Sazonof  at 
once  seized  the  opportunity  of  guiding  the  apparent 
goodwill  of  Austria  into  paths  which  held  out  the  guar- 
antee of  a  happy^  issue. 

As  a  shopkeeper  spreads  out  before  a  fastidious  cus- 
tomer all  his  available  wares  in  the  hope  that  she  will 
in  the  end  find  something  to  suit  her  taste,  so  Grey  and 
Sazonof  submitted  to  Austria,  even  at  the  eleventh  hour, 
every  possible  proposal  in  the  hope  that  at  least  one 
would  gain  the  approval  of  this  fastidious  customer. 
Grey  promised  to  support  in  the  capitals  of  the  other 
Powers  any  reasonable  proposal  of  peace  put  forward 
by  Germany  and  Austria.  He  ofifered  to  support  in 
Petrograd  a  proposal  which  would  satisfy  all  Austrian 
demands  without  exception,  in  so  far  as  the  sovereignty 
and  integrity  of  Serbia  were  not  thereby  impaired.^  In 
answer  to  the  Austrian  overture,  Sazonof  not  only  de- 
clared himself  ready  to  discuss  with  Austria  the  sub- 
stance of  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  but  he  made  the  fur- 
ther proposal — in  order  to  guarantee  as  far  as  possible 
that  the  discussion  would  have  a  chance  of  success — that 
the  proceedings  should  take  place  in  London  under  the 
"participation"  of  the  Great  Powers.  He  added  that 
it  would  be  very  important  if  Austria,  during  the  nego- 
tiations in  London,  were  to  put  a  stop  provisionally  to 
her  military  action  on  Serbian  territory.^  "It  would 
be  very  important,"  be  it  observed;  it  was  not  made  a 
conditio  sine  qua  non.  This  represents  a  further  sub- 
stantial concession  to  Austria  as  compared  with  previous 
proposals  which  had  made  the  cessation  of  military 
action  a  condition. 

But  all  these  proposals  made  in  the  last  hour  re- 
mained without  success.  They  were  bound  to  be  fruit- 
less, because  the  assumption  underlying  them,   namely, 

*Blue  Book,  No.  in. 

*Blue  Book,  No.  133.     Orange  Book,  No.  69. 


THE    CRIME  167 

that  Austria  was  honestly  prepared  to  come  to  an  un- 
derstanding, was  illusory.  Why  did  Austria  in  the  criti- 
cal days  between  the  23rd  and  31st  of  July  refuse  all 
discussions  on  the  facts  of  the  Serbian  dispute?  Why 
did  she  with  unyielding  obstinacy  constantly  declare  only 
what  she  did  not  intend  against  Serbia,  but  never  fur- 
nish any  explanation  as  to  what  she  really  did  intend? 
She  did  not  intend  to  touch  the  integrity  and  inde- 
pendence of  Serbia.  This  negative  declaration  she  con- 
stantly repeated.  But  what  did  she  mean  to  do  posi- 
tively f  Even  to-day  we  have  no  information  on  this 
point.  The  German  Emperor  himself  did  not  know 
when  he  telegraphed  to  the  Tsar  on  July  29th: — 

^'According  to  my  opinion  the  action  of  Austria- 
Hungary  is  to  be  considered  as  an  attempt  to  re- 
ceive full  guaranty  that  the  promises  of  Serbia  are 
effectively  translated  into  deeds." 

Herr  von  Schoen  also,  the  German  Ambassador  at 
Paris,  knew  just  as  little  as  his  Imperial  Master  how  to 
furnish  Viviani  with  a  positive  answer  to  the  question 
as  to  what  Austria  really  did  want.^ 

What  precisely  was  the  nature  of  the  guaranties  of 
which  the  Emperor  William  speaks,  and  of  which  the 
German  White  Book  is  constantly  making  mention? 
Were  they  contained  In  the  Austrian  Note,  or  did  they 
go  beyond  the  Austrian  Note?  If  they  were  contained 
in  it,  then  they  were  conceded,  apart  from  the  demands 
contained  In  Articles  5  and  6,  with  regard  to  which 
Serbia  was  prepared  to  negotiate.  If,  however,  they 
were  not  contained  in  the  Note,  then  they  extend  still 
further  the  scope  of  the  Austrian  demands,  which  apart 
from  this  were  in  all  conscience  sufficiently  far-reaching. 
If  this  extension  of  the  Austrian  demands  were  to  be 

*  Orange  Book,  No.  55. 


168  I   ACCUSE! 

made  the  subject  of  negotiations,  it  should  clearly  have 
been  stated  in  precise  language;  but  until  the  evening 
of  the  31st  of  July  this  had  not  been  done,  and  even 
to-day  we  are  no  further  forward. 

How  then,  I  ask  again,  are  we  to  explain  this  sudden 
cliange  on  the  part  of  Austria?  I  can  find  no  other 
explanation  than  this,  that  the  readiness  of  Austria  to 
negotiate,  which  if  expressed  at  an  earlier  date  would 
without  doubt  have  led  to  a  peaceful  settlement,  was,  in 
the  moment  when  it  was  finally  expressed,  completely 
harmless.  A  peaceful  solution  was  no  longer  to  be 
dreaded;  by  the  independent  lead  assumed  by  the  Cabinet 
of  Berlin  war  was  already  completely  assured. 

Here,  again,  the  question  arises  whether  there  was  a 
divergence  between  Berlin  and  Vienna,  or  whether  the 
events  which  took  place  are  to  be  attributed  to  precon- 
certed duplicity.  The  paths  followed  by  the  two  Cabi- 
nets apparently  led  in  opposite  directions  on  the  evening 
of  July  31st.  Austria,  in  virtue  of  her  readiness  to 
negotiate,  was  moving  in  the  direction  of  peace.  Ger- 
many with  her  "threatening  danger  of  war,"  with  her 
Imperial  speeches,^  and  the  speeches  of  the  Chancellor 
to  the  people  of  Berlin,  advanced  consciously  and  in- 
tentionally in  the  direction  of  war.  It  is  impossible  to 
believe  that  there  was  any  divergence  between  the  two 
Cabinets.  Had  such  a  divergence  existed  it  must  have 
revealed  itself  at  an  earlier  date  than  the  31st  of  July. 
The  coincidence  in  time  between  the  two  apparently 
opposed  actions,  the  sudden  overnight  conversion  of 
Austria  as  though  by  an  illumination — in  individuals 
as  in  States  such  sudden  illuminations  are  highly  sus- 
picious, and  only  slow  conversions  inspire  confidence 
— the  conversion  of  Austria  calculated  to  take  effect  at 
the  moment  when  it  could  no  longer  lead  to  salvation — 
all  these  circumstances  raise  to  a  certainty  the  suspicion 
that  here  there  was  preconcerted  duplicity  between  the 


THE    CRIME  169 

two  Governments  intended  to  shift  the  guilt  of  the  war 
from  themselves  to  Russia. 

It  must  and  had  to  come  to  war.  The  further  discus- 
sion of  the  question  will  completely  convince  anyone 
who  has  so  far  been  able  to  entertain  doubts  of  the  truth 
of  this  assertion.  All  diplomatic  negotiations  were  thus 
bound  to  remain  fruitless  even  if  they  resulted  in  the 
whole  of  Europe  being  forced  to  her  knees  before  Ger- 
many and  Austria.  It  was  not  enough  to  achieve  a 
diplomatic  victory;  a  military  victory  had  to  be  added 
in  order  to  assure  the  supremacy  of  Austria  in  the  Bal- 
kans and  to  pave  for  Germany  a  path  to  the  stars  where 
she  dreamed  that  her  destiny  was  written. 

The  indictment  which  I  bring  against  Austria  may  be 
summarised   in  the   following  sentences : 

(i)  Austria,  after  having  already  planned  an  attack' 
on  Serbia  in  August,  1913,  presented  to  Serbia  in  July, 
1914,  a  Note  containing  demands  of  such  an  exorbitant 
nature  that  a  war  with  Serbia,  and  as  a  further  conse- 
quence a  European  war,  was  to  be  expected. 

(2)  She  refused  the  prolongation  of  the  forty-eight 
hours'  time-limit  which  was  sought  for  by  the  Entente 
Powers. 

(3)  She  recalled  her  Ambassador,  and  declared  war 
against  Serbia,  although  the  Serbian  Government  had 
submissively  conceded  nearly  all  the  Austrian  demands, 
and  so  far  as  the  others  were  concerned  declared  her- 
self ready  to  negotiate  and  to  submit  the  outstanding 
points  to  arbitration. 

(4)  She  flatly  refused  every  discussion  with  Russia 
and  with  the  other  Powers  on  the  contents  of  the  Ser- 
bian Note,  and  only  expressed  her  readiness  to  take 
part  in  such  discussions  on  July  31st  when  it  was  too 
late. 

(5)  She  refused  the  proposal  of  Grey  to  accept  media- 
tion, or  at  least  advice,  from  the  four  Powers  not  di- 


170  I   ACCUSE! 

rectly  concerned,   although   Russia  had  agreed  to  this 
proposal. 

(6)  Notwithstanding  repeated  urgent  requests  from 
England,  she  left  unanswered  the  formula  of  agreemenf 
proposed   by   Grey. 

(7)  She  declined,  through  Herr  von  Jagow,  the  first 
formula  of  agreement  proposed  by  Sazonof. 

(8)  She  gave  no  answer  to  the  second  formula  of 
agreement  proposed  by  Sazpnof. 

(9)  The  last  proposals  for  an  agreement  made  by 
Grey  and  Sazonof  were  also  not  considered  worthy  of 
an  answer  by  Austria. 

(10)  In  so  far  as  she  furnished  any  explanations,  she 
restricted  herself  to  saying  what  she  did  not  wish,  but 
she  never  said  what  she  did  wish. 

(11)  She  was  the  first  of  all  the  Great  Powers  to  be- 
gin mobilisation  and  military  operations;  she  preceded  all 
the  other  Powers,  first  with  her  partial  and  then  with 
her  general  mobilisation. 

These  points  in  the  indictment  are  proved,  and  jus- 
tify the  judgment: 

^'Austria  is  guilty,  either  alone  or  in  common  with 
others,  of  having  provoked  the  European  war." 

We  shall  now  see  who  the  others  are. 


B 


GERMANY 

The  guilt  of  Germany  is  even  easier  to  prove  than  that 
of  Austria,  since  Germany  has  composed  her  own  bill 
of  indictment.  Properly  read,  the  German  White  Book 
contains  almost  the  whole  of  the  accusations  which  can 
be  brought  against  Germany,  and  I  will  undertake  to 


THE    CRIME  171 

'•  produce  overwhelming  proof  of  guilt  bj  means  of  the 
contents  of  the  German  White  Book  taken  along  with 
the  complementary  official  documents,  so  that  it  will  be 
unnecessary  for  me  to  do  more  than  emphasise  her  self- 
accusations. 

These  confessions  are,  of  course,  unintentional.  They 
do  not  have  the  purifying  intention  and  the  force  of 
self-accusations  as  known  to  Christianity,  and  as  repre- 
sented on  the  stage  by  the  most  Christian  of  all  mod- 
ern poets,  Tolstoi.  They  are  confessions  arising  from 
imprudence;  he  who  is  confessing  believes  that  he  is 
justifying  himself,  whereas  he  is  really  accusing  him- 
self. He  believes  that  he  is  defending  himself,  and  he 
delivers  into  the  hands  of  his  accuser  priceless  material 
for   his   condemnation. 

Let  us  begin  at  the  very  opening  passage  in  the  White 
Book.  After  depicting  the  position  of  the  Austrian 
Government  towards  the  Serbian  agitation  and  the 
impossibility  of  "viewing  any  longer  this  agitation  across 
the  border,"  the  White  Book  continues: — 

"With  all  our  heart  we  were  able  to  agree  with 
our  ally's  estimate  of  the  situation,  and  assure  him 
that  any  action  considered  necessary  to  end  the 
movement  in  Serbia  directed  against  the  conserva- 
tion of  the  monarchy  would  meet  with  our  ap- 
proval. We  were  perfectly  aware  that  a  possible 
warlike  attitude  of  Austria-Hungary  against  Serbia 
might  bring  Russia  upon  the  field,  and  that  it  might 
therefore  involve  us  in  a  war,  in  accordance  with 
our  duty  as  allies.  We  could  not,  however,  in  these 
vital  interests  of  Austria-Hungary,  which  were  at 
stake,  advise  our  ally  to  take  a  yielding  attitude 
not  compatible  with  his  dignity,  nor  deny  him  our 
assistance  in  these  trying  days.  .  .  .  We,  therefore, 
permitted  Austria  a  completely  free  hand  in  her 


172  I   ACCUSE! 

action  towards  Serbia,  but  have  not  participated  in 
her  preparations." ' 

What  does  this  amount  to?  It  means: — 
(i)  That  the  German  Government  gave  the  Austrian 
Government  a  completely  free  hand  to  take  against  Ser- 
bia whatever  action  might  appear  to  her  to  be  suitable 
in  the  circumstances,  whether  the  means  adopted  were 
diplomatic  or  military  in  their  nature. 

(2)  That  Germany  intentionally  refrained  from  par- 
ticipating in  the  preparations  for  action  in  either  of 
these  ways;  that  is  to  say,  she  was  prepared,  in  conse- 
quence of  her  duty  as  an  ally,  to  follow  blindly  the 
lead  taken  by  Austria. 

(3)  That  Germany  was  perfectly  well  aware  that  mili- 
tary action  on  the  part  of  Austria  against  Serbia  might 
bring  Russia  into  the  field,  and  might  therefore  involve 
Germany  also  in  the  war,  which,  in  consequence  of  the 
obligations  imposed  by  alliances  on  both  sides,  was 
bound  to  assume  the  character  of  a  European  war. 

Thus  the  German  Government  acknowledges  that  it 
hears  the  responsibility  (dolus)  for  the  European  War, 
the  ultimate  responsibility  {dolus  eventualis)  which,  ac- 
cording to  juridical  and  moral  ideas,  is  placed  on  the 
same  footing  as  the  direct  responsibility  {dolus  purus). 

At  the  same  time  she  further  admits  that  she  herself 
from  the  beginning  regarded  her  effort  to  localise  the 
military  conflict  between  Austria  and  Serbia  as  having 
had  no  prospect  of  success.  It  follows  that,  in  reject- 
ing the  promising  proposals  for  arriving  at  an  under- 
standing put  forward  by  the  other  Powers  and  in  seeking 
to  substitute  for  them  one  for  localisation,  Germany 
was  proposing  an  expedient  which,  in  her  own  view, 
could  not  lead  to  a  successful  issue.  In  other  words, 
her  desire  was  to  produce  the  appearance  that  she  was 
anxious  to  prevent  the  European  conflict,  but  she  re- 


THE    CRIME  173 

fused  every  method  calculated  effectively  to  prevent  it, 
and  in  their  place  proposed  a  method  which  in  her  own 
opinion  was  completely  unfitted  to  achieve  this  end. 

The  view  that  Russia  would  be  brought  into  the  field 
by  an  Austro-Serbian  war,  to  which  free  expression  is 
given  in  the  White  Book,  was  but  too  well   founded. 
One  can  only  be  amazed  that  Germany  did  not  credit, 
or  pretended  not  to  credit,  the  other  Powers  with  the 
foresight  with  which  she  was  herself  endowed.     Had  it 
not  become  a  commonplace  in  European  diplomacy,  and 
indeed    a   commonplace    to    everyone    in    Europe    who 
thought  about  politics,  that  Russia,  in  view  of  the  in- 
timate bonds  of  blood  and  of    faith   and   of  the  two 
hundred  years  of  history  by  which  she  was  linked  with 
Serbia,  could  never  be  a  silent  witness  of  the  establish- 
ment of  an  Austrian  hegemony  over  that  country,  that 
she  could  never  consent  to  it  being  crushed  by  arms, 
but    would    come    to    the    assistance    of    her    weaker 
brother  ?  ^     Russia's  interest  in  the  Balkans  was  known 
to  all,   and  had  been  confirmed  by  the   Russian  Gov- 
ernment in  countless  declarations  and  actions.    After  the 
first  and  the  second  Balkan  War  the  opposition  between 
the  interests  of  Austria  and  Russia  had  once  more,  as 
on  so  many  previous  occasions,  stood  out  in  full  relief. 
Russia's  interest  on  behalf  of  Serbia  and  Austria's  in- 
terest against  Serbia  had  come  into  such  violent  col- 
hsion  that  even  then  they  almost  occasioned  a  European 
war.     The  same  danger  existed  in  August,  19 13,  when 
Austria  planned  the  attack  on  Serbia  which  has  been 
disclosed  by  Giollitti.     Even  at  that  time  the  interven- 
tion of  Russia  was  looked  upon  as  a  matter  of  course; 
otherwise  the  inquiry  addressed  by  Austria  to  her  ally 
Italy  would  have  had  no  meaning.     As  late  as  May, 
1914,  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  Sazonof,  in  a  speech 

^  See  Blue  Book,  p.  v.    Grey  called  this  "a  commonplace  in  Euro- 
pean diplomacy"  in  a  speech  in  Parliament  in  March,  1913. 


IT*  I    ACCUSE! 

in  the  Duma,  professed  his  adhesion  to  a  policy  of  "the 
Balkans  for  the  Balkan  people,"  that  is  to  say,  to  a 
policy  which  opposed  any  intention  on  the  part  of  Aus- 
tria to  establish  a  hegemony,  and  which  promised  the 
support  of  Russia  in  the  maintenance  of  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  Balkan  peoples.  The  question  here  was 
not  a  political  one  pure  and  simple ;  it  was  rather  a  ques- 
tion of  national  sentiment  and  of  blood-relationship. 
This  link  between  Russia  and  Serbia  was  an  ancient  his- 
torical fact,  with  which  European  diplomacy  was  bound 
to  reckon,  and  with  which  it  always  had  reckoned.^  Ger- 
many and  Austria  also  reckoned  with  it,  as  the  White 
Book  testifies, 

Atid  was  it  now  supposed  that  these  bonds  were  sud- 
denly to  be  wrenched  asunder?  Was  it  expected  that 
Russia  would  be  a  placid  spectator  while  Austria  crushed 
the  small  State  connected  with  Russia  by  blood?  Was 
Russia  baldly  to  renounce  her  interests  in  the  Balkans 
and  her  prestige  among  the  Balkan  nations  in  favour 
of  Austria?  This  was  a  strong  suggestion  to  make, 
if  it  were  seriously  meant.  But  the  suggestion  was  in- 
deed so  strong  that  it  cannot  have  been  seriously 
meant. 

Germany  herself  never  believed,  and  never  could  have 
believed,  in  the  possibility  of  localisation  from  the  mo- 
ment the  conflict  assumed  a  military  aspect.  My  little 
brother  annoys  a  strong  man,  who  is  on  the  point  of 
striking  him  dead.  I  interv^ene  to  protect  the  little  one 
against  the  superior  strength  of  the  big  man.  A  third, 
who  is  even  bigger,  bars  my  way,  saying  that  the  conflict 
between  the  small  boy  and  the  big  man  must  remain 
localised.  Would  I  therefore  restrain  myself  from 
protecting  my  brother?    This  was  Russia's  position. 

Certainly  it  would  have  been  a  good  thing  if  the  con- 
flict could  have  remained  localised,  and  this  would  also 
"^———^  1  ggg  gjyg  Book,  p.  V. 


.^  THE    CRIME  175 

have  been  quite  possible  if  it  had  remained  on  a  diplo- 
matic basis.  On  this  basis  the  great  man  had  already 
obtained  a  complete  victory  over  the  small.  But  it  was 
really  too  much  to  ask  that  the  little  one  should  be 
crushed  after  he  had  tendered  copious  apologies,  and 
had  humbly  promised  to  behave  better  in  future.  It 
was  impossible  to  ask  this  of  Russia,  and  if  such  a 
demand  were  made  it  was  known  from  the  outset  that 
it  could  not  be  satisfied. 

Thus  the  only  title  to  glory  which  Germany  claims 
for  herself  in  this  diplomatic  tragi-comedy  falls  to  the 
ground.  No  one  believed  in  the  possibility  of  localisa- 
tion, least  of  all  Germany  herself. 

After  this,  the  only  proposal  made  by  Germany,  a 
proposal  advanced  by  her  in  the  full  knowledge  that  it 
had  no  prospect  of  success,  had,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
failed,  Germany's  whole  attitude  during  the  critical  days 
was  one  of  perpetual  passivity;  if  in  any  way  she  aban- 
doned this  attitude,  she  restricted  herself  to  the  frus- 
tration of  all  attempts  to  arrive  at  an  understanding. 
The  more  the  German  Government  assures  us  that  it 
earnestly  laboured  "shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Eng- 
land" in  the  interests  of  mediation,  the  less  support  do 
these  assurances  find  in  the  facts.  The  impartial  in- 
quirer sees  only  the  one  shoulder,  that  of  England,  press- 
ing in  the  direction  of  peace,  while  the  German  shoulder, 
butting  against  the  English,  is  seen  pushing  in  the 
opposite  direction. 

Why  did  the  German  Government  allow  the  Austrian 
Note  to  be  despatched  without  being  acquainted  with 
its  contents,  without  previously  submitting  these  to  ex- 
amination? Among  foreign  Governments  the  suspicion 
had  made  itself  manifest  that  Germany  had  already 
had  a  hand  in  the  game  when  the  Note  was  drafted. 
In  particular,  the  Italian  Government  adduced  as  one  of 
the  grounds  for  her  resolution  to  remain  neutral  that  she 


176  I   ACCUSE! 

had  not  been  informed  of  Austria's  intentions  and  of 
the  contents  of  the  Note — in  contrast  to  Germany,  the 
other  member  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  The  German 
Government  promptly  denied  this.  It  assured  foreign 
Governments  that  it  had  received  no  information  with 
regard  to  the  Note  before  the  time  of  its  delivery,  and 
this  assurance  is  repeated  in  the  White  Book.^  It  is 
open  to  anyone  to  believe  or  disbelieve  this  assurance. 
If  it  is  true,  it  reveals  an  unprecedented  levity,  for  which 
there  is  no  adjective  in  the  German  language  sufficiently 
severe.  Here  we  have  a  Note  which  in  itself  almost 
amounted  to  a  declaration  of  war,  which  would  almost 
certainly  lead  to  a  Serbian,  and  in  the  sequel  to  a  Eu- 
ropean war;  are  we  to  suppose  that  the  German  Gov- 
ernment did  not  require  such  a  Note  as  this  to  be  laid 
before  it  previous  to  its  delivery  that  it  might  have 
the  opportunity  of  examining  it,  and  of  abating  any  ex- 
cessive harshness  which  it  might  contain?  If,  however, 
Herr  von  Bethmann  had  knowledge  of  the  Note,  and 
notwithstanding  allowed  it  to  be  delivered  without  de- 
mur, this  affords  proof  that  he  saw  clearly  the  possibil- 
ity of  war,  and  intentionally  did  nothing  to  prevent  it. 
Thus  levity,  irresponsible  levity,  or  the  commission  of 
a  crime,  are  the  alternatives  which  must  be  placed  before 
Herr  von  Bethmann.  It  may  be  left  to  him  to  make  the 
choice. 

At  the  other  stages  of  the  negotiations  the  same  alter- 
natives have  to  be  placed  before  him. 

Why  did  the  German  Government  not  support  the  re- 
quest of  England  and  Russia  for  an  extension  of  the 
time-limit?  Why  did  Herr  von  Jagow  content  himself 
here,  as  on  so  many  other  occasions,  with  the  platonic 
promise  that  he  would  transmit  this  request  to  Vienna, 
without  being  able  to  support  it?  Why  did  he  at  once 
express  doubt  whether  Austria  would  be  able  to  meet 
VWhite  Book,  p.  406. 


n 

THE    CRIME  177 

this  request  ?  ^  Was  it  not  entirely  reasonable  that  the 
Powers  concerned  in  the  cause  of  peace,  who  only  re- 
ceived knowledge  of  the  Austrian  Note  on  July  24th, 
should  have  sought  for  a  somewhat  longer  time-limit  in 
order  that  they  might  be  able  successfully  to  exercise 
their  influence  on  Serbia  in  the  direction  of  securing 
compliance?  Was  it  not  reasonable  that  they  should 
first  of  all  desire  to  become  acquainted  with  the  Austrian 
documentary  evidence,  which  was  not  annexed  to  the 
copy  of  the  Note  communicated  to  them,  and  which  was 
only  made  accessible  to  the  English  Government  on 
August  7th,  that  is  to  say,  long  after  the  outbreak  of 
war?  2  What  objection  could  Germany  raise  against 
the  extension  of  the  time-limit,  a  course  which  could 
only  be  serviceable  to  the  interests  of  peace,  if  like  the 
others  she  also  desired  peace? 

If  the  Serbian  answer,  as  up  to  the  evening  of  July 
25th  there  was  reason  to  fear  had  amounted  to  a  re- 
fusal, would  not  Germany  have  had  to  reproach  herself 
with  the  fact  that  her  failure  to  support  the  request  for 
an  extension  of  the  time-limit  had  in  part  to  bear  the 
responsibility  for  the  unfavourable  answer? 

The  Serbian  answer  became  known,  and  the  whole 
world  breathed  more  freely.  No  one  had  expected  that 
Serbia  would  have  so  humiliated  herself.  Whereas  the 
Austrian  Note  is  rightly  characterised  in  the  English 
Blue  Book  in  the  statement  that  "No  independent  na- 
tion had  ever  been  called  upon  to  accept  a  greater  hu- 
miliation," ^  the  Serbian  answer  is  accorded  the  well- 
merited  testimony  that  "The  reply  went  far  beyond  any- 
thing which  any  power,  Germany  not  excepted,  had  ever 
thought  probable."  ^     Russia  and  France  were  equally 

'  Blue  Book,  No.  18. 
'Blue  Book,  p.  v. 
"  Blue  Book,  p.  vi. 
*Blue  Book,  p.   vii. 


178  I    ACCUSE! 

satisfied  with  the  attitude  assumed  by  Serbia.  In  a  cir- 
cular telegram  of  July  27th  Sazonof  describes  the  Ser- 
bian answer  as  follows  : — ' 

"It  exceeds  all  our  expectations  in  its  modera- 
tion and  in  its  desire  to  afford  the  fullest  satisfac- 
tion to  Austria.  We  do  not  see  what  further  de- 
mands could  be  made  by  Austria,  unless  the  Vienna 
Cabinet  is  seeking  for  a  pretext  for  war  with 
Serbia."  ^ 

All  were  agreed  that  just  as  the  Austrian  Note  had 
surpassed  the  limits  of  what  was  permissible  and  had 
violated  all  precedents,  so  the  Serbian  answer  surpassed 
in  its  spirit  of  compliance  and  submissiveness  every- 
thing of  which  there  was  previous  record.  Germany 
alone  was  of  a  different  opinion.  The  Austrian  demands 
appeared  to  her  moderate  and  justifiable;  the  Serbian 
answer,  on  the  contrary,  appeared  insufficient,  as  it 
"showed  in  all  essentials  the  endeavour  through  pro- 
crastination and  new  negotiations  to  escape  from  the 
just  demands  of  the  Monarchy."  ^  The  German  Gov- 
ernment undertook  to  "pass  on"  to  Vienna  the  request  of 
Grey  that  Germany  would  use  her  influence  in  Vienna 
in  support  of  a  favourable  reception  of  the  Serbian  Note, 
but  they  did  not  see  their  way  to  identify  themselves 
with  the  request.^ 

Why  was  it  impossible  to  support  this  request?  Why 
was  it  not  possible  for  Germany  to  exert  her  whole  influ- 
ence in  Vienna  in  order  to  secure  that  negotiations  on  the 
basis  of  the  Serbian  answer  would  at  least  take  place? 
Were  the  few  reservations  made,  in  the  most  conciliatory 
form,  by  Serbia  of  so  great  importance  that  on  their 
account  the  whole  answer  had  to  be  rejected,  diplomatic 

*  Orange  Book,  No.  33. 

'White  Book,  p.  406. 

'  Blue  Book,  p.  viii  and  No.  34. 


THE    CRIME  179 

relations  broken  off,  and  a  war  declared,  the  further  con- 
sequences of  which  were  distinctly  foreseen  by  Germany? 
Did  the  Serbian  answer  really  have  the  appearance  of 
quibbling  and  procrastination?  Was  it  not  full  of  posi- 
tive promises,  the  non-fulfilment  of  which  had  first  to 
be  waited  for  before  the  answer  could  be  rejected  as  in- 
sufficient? What  else  could  Serbia  do  within  forty-eight 
hours  than  promise  everything — everything  with  a  few 
exceptions — asked  of  her?  The  intention  to  procrasti- 
nate could  only  manifest  itself  later,  in  the  event  of  there 
being  an  undue  delay  in  giving  effect  to  the  promises. 
Why,  then,  did  Germany  tolerate  the  recall  of  the  Aus- 
trian Ambassador,  and  later  the  Declaration  of  War? 

If  the  objection  is  raised  that  Germany  could  not  have 
prevented  it,  I  answer  that  she  could,  but  that  she 
was  unwilling  to  do  so.  That  she  was  unwilling  to  do 
this,  or  indeed  anything  else,  in  the  service  of  peace 
may  already  be  inferred  from  the  preceding  events,  and 
is  confirmed  by  all  that  follows.  To  assert,  however, 
that  she  was  unable  to  exercise  a  decisive  influence  on 
Austria's  action  is  so  ridiculous  an  evasion  that  it  does 
not  need  to  be  seriously  contradicted.  With  regard  to 
Austria,  Germany  was  in  a  position  to  give  effect  to 
her  every  wish.  Austria  was  a  cipher  in  the  European 
international  concert,  in  which  Germany  played  the  first 
fiddle.  Only  if  Germany  stood  behind  her  could  Austria 
run  the  risk  of  a  conflict  with  Russia,  which  was  bound 
to  arise  out  of  the  Serbian  conflict.  A  nod  from  Ger- 
many would  have  been  enough,  and  Austria  would  have 
left  her  Ambassador  in  Belgrade,  and  continued  to  dis- 
cuss the  Serbian  Note.  It  was  unnecessary  for  Beth- 
mann  to  say  a  word.  A  frown  would  have  been  enough 
to  restrain  Austria  from  declaring  war  against  Serl^ia, 
an  action  which  no  Austrian  statesman  could  have  taken 
unless  he  had  had  in  his  pocket  the  previous  concurrence 
of  Germany. 


180  I    ACCUSE! 

All  that  England  might  have  prevented  by  a  timely 
declaration  of  neutrality  in  Petrograd  and  in  Paris  is 
constantly  emphasised  in  the  German  Press,  as  also 
in  the  Chancellor's  speech  of  December  2nd.  This  ques- 
tion I  will  deal  with  later  in  discussing  the  attitude  of 
England.  The  other  question,  which  lies  nearer  home, 
is,  however,  never  raised :  What  might  not  Germany 
have  prevented  if  at  the  right  time  she  had  checked  the 
impetuosity  of  her  Austrian  ally,  if  she  had  moderated 
the  terms  of  the  Note,  required  that  negotiations  should 
take  place  on  the  basis  of  the  Serbian  answer,  and  had 
thus  prevented  the  declaration  of  war?  This  is  the 
crucial  point  in  the  whole  question.  Here  lies  the  germ 
of  the  whole  tragedy.  Austria,  blindly  and  without  so 
much  as  the  quiver  of  an  eyelash,  did  whatever  Germany 
wished.  All  the  sugary  phrases  used  by  Bethmann  and 
Jagow,  that  they  could  not  expect  this  or  that  of  Austria; 
that  they  feared  that  they  had  already  gone  too  far  in 
their  suggestions ;  that  they  had  pressed  the  button  too 
violently,  and  that  in  so  doing  the  opposite  from  what 
was  intended  might  be  produced ;  that  they  had  gone  to 
the  utmost  limit  in  Vienna,  and  so  on,  all  these  state- 
ments are  hut  empty  falsehood  and  deceit.  I  repeat,  a 
frown  would  have  been  enough  to  restrain  Vienna  from 
measures  not  desired  in  Berlin.  The  question  again  re- 
duces itself  simply  to  this :  What  was  and  what  was  not 
desired  in  Berlin?  I  have  already  given  the  answer  to 
this  question. 

Thus  with  Berlin's  concurrence  matters  advanced  to 
a  declaration  of  war  for  which,  as  has  been  shown  above, 
not  the  slightest  ground  could  be  advanced;  with  Ber- 
lin's concurrence,  also,  all  the  further  developments  took 
place.  The  attitude  of  Germany  in  the  days  between 
July  28th  and  August  ist  was  in  conformity  with  that 
during  the  preceding  days.  The  English  proposal  for 
a  conference  of  Ambassadors  in  London  was,  as  we  have 


THE    CRIME  181 

already  seen,  rejected  by  Germany  on  formal  grounds 
without  any  inquiry  being  addressed  to  Austria.^  The 
direct  negotiations  between  Austria  and  Russia,  proposed 
by  Germany,  in  which  Sazonof  was  ready  to  participate, 
wero  rejected  by  Austria  with  the  observation  that  the 
suggestion,  ''after  the  opening  of  hostilities  by  Serbia 
and  the  subsequent  declaration  of  war  .  .  .  appears  be- 
lated," ^  Here,  again,  is  another  charming  expression : 
"Serbia  had  opened  hostilities,"  and  not  Austria.  The 
declaration  of  war  against  Serbia  which  had  wantonly 
proceeded  from  Austria  prevents  this  same  Austria  from 
negotiating  with  Russia  in  the  interests  of  the  mainte- 
nance of  European  peace!  All  this  Germany  passively 
endures,  except  in  so  far  as  she  herself  abandons  her 
passivity  in  favour  of  an  attitude  of  active  rejection,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  conference  of  the  four  Powers.  In 
essential  matters  Germany  contents  herself  with  the  role 
of  a  postman,  merely  handing  on  the  English  proposals 
to  Vienna,  and  with  the  muteness  proper  to  a  postman 
takes  no  further  interest  in  the  fate  of  these  proposals. 
"We  further  declared  ourselves  ready  ...  to  transmit 
a  second  proposal  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  to  Vienna."  ^ 
"We  even  as  late  as  July  30th  forwarded  the  English 
proposal  to  Vienna"  * — such  are  the  expressions  we  find 
everywhere  in  the  White  Book.  It  is  indeed  in  general 
maintained  that  the  proposals  which  were  handed  on  re- 
ceived support,  but  nothing  is  adduced  to  prove  the  as- 
sertion. The  correspondence  between  Berlin  and  Vienna 
on  which  the  proof  of  this  rests  is  lacking.  The  luke- 
warm observations  uttered  by  Messrs.  von  Bethmann  and 
von  Jagow  to  Goschen,  the  English  Ambassador,  on  the 
reception  of  each  new  English  proposal  do  not  indicate 

'■"White  Book,  p.  409. 

"White  Book,  p.  409  and  Exhibit  16. 

'White  Book,  p.  409. 

*  White  Book,  p.  410. 


182  I    ACCUSE! 

that  they  felt  any  very  lively  interest  in  these  proposals. 
The  negative  results  achieved  in  Vienna,  however,  in- 
controvertibly  prove  that  they  not  only  did  not  support 
the  English  proposals,  but  that  in  all  probability  they 
thwarted  them.  Any  course  which  they  earnestly  sup- 
ported in  Vienna  was  bound  to  have  been  accepted  there. 
If  it  was  not  accepted,  this  affords  proof  that  they  did 
not  earnestly  support  it. 

The  evil  intention  of  the  German  Government  is  clearly 
shown  by  the  following  occurrence.  When  on  July  27th 
Sir  Edward  Goschen  laid  before  von  Jagow,  the  Foreign 
Secretary,  Grey's  proposal  of  the  conference  of  the  four 
Powers,  Herr  von  Jagow,  as  is  well  known,  at  once  de- 
clined this  "court  of  arbitration,"  and  persisted  in  his 
refusal,  even  when  Goschen  explained  to  him  that  the 
question  was  not  one  of  "arbitration,"  but  that  the  object 
was  merely  "to  discuss  and  suggest  means  for  avoiding 
a  dangerous  situation."  ^  But  Grey  refused  to  be  dis- 
couraged. He  inferred  from  Jagow's  answer  and  from 
a  declaration  made  by  Lichnowsky  that  Germany  did  not 
in  principle  refuse  his  proposal,  but  that  difficulties  were 
being  advanced  only  against  the  form  of  a  Conference. 
He  therefore  commissioned  his  Ambassador  to  request 
Herr  von  Jagow  himself  to  suggest  the  form  which 
would  be  agreeable  to  the  German  Government.^  Viviani 
made  the  same  suggestion  to  Baron  von  Schoen,  and 
Sazonof  to  Count  Pourtales.  All  three  Governments  ex- 
pressed themselves  as  ready  to  accept  any  form  of  medi- 
ation which  Germany  might  propose,  and  Viviani,  as 
well  as  Grey,  emphatically  added  that  the  European  situ- 
ation had  now  become  so  serious  that  they  dared  not 
allow  formalities  or  quibbles  to  wreck  the  peace  of  Eu- 
rope.^ 

^Blue  Book,  No.  43. 

'  Blue  Book,  Nos.  46,  60,  68.    Yellow  Book,  No.  81.    Orange  Book, 
No.  54. 
'Blue  Book,  No.  78.    Orange  Book,  No.  55. 


THE    CRIME  183 

To-day  Europe  is  still  waiting  in  vain  for  Jagozv's 
attswer.  Grey  did  not  desist;  he  reminded  Mr.  von 
Jagow  of  the  matter,  and  returned  to  it  again  and  again, 
urging  on  him  the  desirabihty  of  at  length  suggesting 
the  form  agreeable  to  him,  which  had  already  been  ac- 
cepted by  all  in  advance.  It  was  all  in  vain.  No  answer 
came  from  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  The  White  Book  ex- 
pressly confirms  the  fact  that  the  idea  of  Grey's  proposal 
was  approved.^  It  intentionally  passes  over  in  silence 
the  fact  that  this  idea  could  have  been  realised  in  any 
form  desired  by  Germany,  if  Germany  had  put  forward 
any  proposals  on  the  subject.  These  proposals  were 
never  made.  Is  not  this  an  overwhelming  proof  of 
guilt?  The  fact  is  that  the  diplomatists  of  Germany,  as 
I  have  already  pointed  out,  had  no  wish  to  sit  round 
a  table  in  London  with  the  diplomatists  of  other  coun- 
tries. It  was  known  how  easy  it  would  be  to  find  a  solu- 
tion of  the  Serbian  question,  and  how  much  more  diffi- 
cult questions  had  been  solved  in  London  in  19 12  and 
1913.  It  was  feared  that  a  peaceful  solution  might  again 
be  arrived  at  in  London,  and  for  this  reason,  whatever 
might  happen,  the  London  Conference  had  to  be  pre- 
vented. 

We  now  come  to  the  history  of  the  various  formulae 
proposed  by  Grey  and  Sazonof  which  aimed  at  bring- 
ing about  a  peaceful  understanding  between  Russia  and 
Austria  with  or  without  the  participation  of  the  Powers. 
I  have  already  dealt  with  the  fate  of  these  proposals  in 
the  previous  section  relating  to  Austria,  and  I  have  also 
pointed  out  the  role  played  by  Germany  in  these  nego- 
tiations. In  the  German  White  Book  only  one  of  all 
these  proposals  and  negotiations,  that  of  Grey,  is  men- 
tioned, and  this  is  done  in  such  a  supei"ficial  and  ambigu- 
ous manner  that  without  reference  to  the  telegram  from 
the  English  King  to  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia  one  could 
^  White  Book,  p.  409. 


184  I    ACCUSE! 

scarcely  realise  how  far-reaching  and  how  rich  in  pros- 
pect was  the  peace  proposal  in  question.  Here,  again, 
Germany  restricted  herself  to  the  discharge  of  a  post- 
man's duties.  She  handed  on  the  English  proposal  to 
Vienna.  The  White  Book  contains  not  a  word  of  recom- 
mendation, nor  even  of  criticism.^  It  contents  itself  with 
adding,  "we  had  to  assume  that  Russia  would  accept  this 
basis,"  and  in  another  place  it  speaks  of  a  proposal  of 
mediation  "whose  tendencies  and  basis  must  have  been 
known  in  Petrograd."  ^  That  is  all  that  is  said.  Noth- 
ing is  told  us  with  regard  to  the  fate  of  the  proposal, 
and  it  is  only  from  the  English  Blue  Book  that  we  learn 
that  Grey's  proposal,  like  so  much  else  that  was  calcu- 
lated to  serve  the  cause  of  peace,  was  simply  buried  in 
silence.  In  this  case  also  events  took  exactly  the  same 
course  as  had  previously  been  followed  with  regard  to 
the  question  of  the  form  of  the  conference  of  the  four 
Powers,  the  only  difference  being  that  on  that  occasion 
Germany  alone  was  responsible  for  the  failure  to  give  an 
answer,  whereas  here  the  responsibility  for  the  absence 
of  an  answer  was  pushed  on  to  Vienna.  "He  has  up 
till  now  received  no  reply";  "they  had  not  had  time  to 
send  an  answer  yet" ;  "no  answer  had  yet  been  re- 
turned." ^  Such  were  the  answers  given  by  Jagow  to 
Goschen  in  the  critical  days  in  which  the  fate  of  Europe 
depended  on  hours,  and  indeed  on  minutes. 

The  sentence  in  the  White  Book  which  speaks  of  the 

^  White  Book,  p.  410.  [The  translation  of  the  White  Book  used 
in  the  text  is  that  officially  published  by  the  German  Government, 
reproduced  in  the  Collected  Diplomatic  Documents.  There  is,  how- 
ever, a  slight  difference  in  the  meaning  between  the  official  transla- 
tion of  this  passage:  "We  thought  that  Russia  would  accept  this 
basis,"  and  the  original  German  which  has  here  been  followed  in 
the  text :  "Wir  mussten  annehmen  dass  Russland  diese  Basis  akzep- 
tiren  würde."] 

'White  Book,  p.  411. 

*Blue  Book,  Nos.  28,  107,  112. 


THE    CRIME  186 

consent  of  Russia  to  Grey's  proposal  as  an  indefinite 
assumption  only,  and  which  is  thereby  designed  to  make 
it  appear  as  if  the  fate  of  this  proposal  was  uncertain  on 
the  other  side  also — this  sentence  can  only  rest  on  mala 
ßdes.  The  German  Government  knew  quite  well  that 
Sazonof  also,  as  well  as  Grey,  had  energetically  sought 
for  a  formula  to  serve  as  the  basis  of  agreement,  that  a 
first  formula  of  this  kind,  as  I  have  already  stated,  had 
been  dictated  by  Sazonof  himself  to  Count  Pourtales  on 
July  30th,^  that  Germany  had  refused  this  proposal  on 
the  ground  that  it  was  ''impossible  for  Austria  to  accept 
it,"  ^  and  that  Sazonof,  at  Grey's  suggestion,  had  for- 
warded to  the  German  Government  an  even  more  con- 
ciliatory formula.^  All  this  was,  and  is,  known  to  the 
German  Government.  It  is,  however,  hidden  in  silence 
from  the  German  public.  It  may  be  said  generally  that 
the  German  Government  has,  consciously  and  inten- 
tionally, maintained  silence  with  regard  to  all  the  ef- 
forts for  peace  made  by  Russia  and  France,  because  these 
do  not  suit  their  case  and  would  lead  to  the  collapse 
of  the  whole  of  the  laboriously  constructed  edifice  of  the 
Russian-French  attack.  The  second  formula  of  Sazonof 
experienced  the  same  fate  as  Grey's  proposal.  No  answer 
has  in  fact  been  given.  And  the  last  desperate  efforts  of 
Russia  and  England  on  July  31st  and  August  ist  have 
also  not  been  considered  worthy  of  any  kind  of  an  an- 
swer from  Germany.* 

Germany  acted  according  to  the  principle : 
"Words,  words,  enough  have  now  been  bandied 
At  last  the  time  has  come  for  deeds."  ^ 

'  Orange  Book,  No.  60. 
"  Orange  Book,  No.  63. 
*  Orange  Book,  No.  67. 

*Blue  Book,  Nos.  iii,  120,  121,  131,  132,  135,  137,  138,  139.    Orange 
Book,  Nos.  69,  71,  72- 

'  Der  Worte  sind  genug  gewechselt 
Nun  lasst  uns  endlich  Taten  sehen. 


186  I   ACCUSE! 

The  decision  to  act  had  already  been  taken  on  July 
29th,  on  the  third  day  after  the  return  of  the  Emperor 
from  his  tour  in  the  north.  To  judge  from  the  telegrams 
exchanged  between  the  Emperor  and  the  Tsar  there  ap- 
pears to  me  to  be  no  doubt — justice  requires  that  this 
should  be  placed  on  record — that  the  Emperor  at  the  mo- 
ment of  his  return  had  not  yet  personally  resolved  on 
war.  His  first  telegrams  to  the  Tsar  despatched  on  July 
28th  and  29th,^  and  especially  the  former,  strike  a  tone 
of  friendship  and  of  an  inclination  to  peace  which  scarcely 
leaves  room  for  doubt  that  they  were  honourably  in- 
tended. I  have  already  shown  that  a  large  and  powerful 
party  at  the  Court  and  in  the  country  had  for  long 
striven  for  war.  I  have  also  endeavoured  to  prove  that 
the  Emperor  had  in  principle  been  won  over  to  these 
efforts.  But  there  is  a  long  step  between  entertaining  a 
conviction  on  principle  and  translating  this  conviction 
into  action.  The  step  is  greater  the  more  responsibility 
attaches  to  the  act,  the  more  serious  the  consequences 
to  which  it  may  give  rise.  It  need,  therefore,  cause  no 
surprise  that  days  of  inner  and  of  outer  struggle  had  to 
pass  before  the  resolution  to  act  came  to  fruition.  The 
inner  struggles  are  reflected,  easily  recognisable  by  the 
psychologist,  in  the  telegrams  which  were  sent  by  the 
Emperor  between  July  28th  and  August  ist  to  the  Tsar 
and  the  King  of  England.^ 

At  the  outset  the  Emperor  recognises  the  difficulties 
for  the  Tsar  and  his  Government  of  "stemming  the  tide 
of  public  opinion  in  Russia."  On  the  other  hand,  he 
defends  the  action  taken  by  Austria  against  Serbia,  and 
promises  to  use  all  his  influence  in  bringing  about  a  direct 
understanding  between  Austria  and  Russia.  As  the  ex- 
change of  telegrams  advances  we  see  more  and  more  the 

^  White  Book,  Exhibits  20  and  22. 

*  White  Book,  pp.  412,  413,  pp.  431,  432;  Collected  Documents,  pp. 
539,  540. 


THE    CRIME  187 

original  subject  of  negotiation — the  substantial  difference 
between  Austria  and  Russia — disappear,  and  the  formal 
question  of  the  menace  involved  in  military  prepara- 
tions takes  its  place.  In  the  telegram  sent  by  the  Em- 
peror on  the  afternoon  of  July  29th  there  can  be  heard 
the  first  ominous  notes  of  the  menace  of  military  prepa- 
rations.^ References  to  this  question  constantly  increase 
until  in  the  end  the  only  subject  of  discussion  is  that  of 
military  preparations.    On  July  ßoth  all  discussion  of  the 

^  It  is  surprising  that  in  the  German  White  Book  there  is  no 
answer  from  the  Tsar  to  this  telegram.  The  White  Book  inserts 
immediately  after  the  Emperor  William's  telegram  of  the  29th  July 
(Exhibit  22),  a  further  telegram  of  the  Emperor  of  the  30th  July 
(Exhibit  23).  This  gap  has  now  been  filled  by  an  official  publica- 
tion of  the  Russian  Government.  The  Tsar,  in  fact,  answered  on 
the  29th  of  July,  in  reply  to  the  Emperor's  telegram  of  the  same 
day,  in  the  following  words : — "Thanks  for  your  telegram  which  is 
conciliatory  and  friendly  whereas  the  official  message  presented 
to-day  by  your  ambassador  to  my  Minister  was  conveyed  in  a  very 
different  tone.  I  beg  you  to  explain  this  divergency.  It  would  be 
right  to  give  over  the  Aiistro-Serhian  problem  to  the  Hague  tri- 
bunal, I  trust  in  your  wisdom  and  friendship."  This  telegram  of 
the  Tsar  was  omitted  by  the  German  Government,  obviously  because 
it  contains  the  simplest  and  most  natural  proposal  in  the  world — 
already  made  by  Serbia  in  her  reply — namely,  that  the  question  at 
issue  should  be  submitted  to  the  Hague  Tribunal.  The  excuse  put 
forward  by  the  Norddeutsche  Allgetneine  Zeitung,  that  the  telegram 
had  been  omitted  on  account  of  its  unimportance,  is  adapted  to  the 
present  intellectual  level  of  the  German  newspaper  reader.  It  was 
omitted  because,  along  with  many  other  things,  it  was  of  decisive 
importance  for  the  formation  of  a  judgment  on  the  attitude  of  the 
Tsar.  The  acceptance  of  the  Tsar's  proposal  would  doubtless  have 
led  to  peace,  and  for  this  reason  it  was  declined.  As,  however,  it 
was  impossible  to  give  reasons  for  this  refusal,  the  Emperor  Wil- 
liam was  induced  simply  to  ignore  the  Tsar's  proposal,  and  to  put 
forward  in  place  of  the  Austro-Serbian  problem  the  question  of 
military  preparation  by  means  of  which  war  could  be  brought  about 
at  will.  The  German  Government  is  led  by  evil  conscience  to  omit 
from  the  White  Book  the  Tsar's  telegram  of  the  29th  of  July.  Tlie 
telegram  itself  and  its  suppression  affords  a  new  proof  that  Russia 
desired  peace,  but  that  Germany  desired  war. 


188  I   ACCUSE! 

substantial  Issue  had  already  completely  ceased,  and 
everything  turned  on  the  question  as  to  which  of  the 
three  Emperors  had  been  compelled  to  mobilisation  by 
the  others.  On  July  30th  the  Emperor  William  main- 
tains that  Austria  had  only  mobilised  against  Serbia — in 
opposition  to  the  Chancellor,  who  admits  that  there  had 
also  been  a  mobilisation  against  Russia,  The  Emperor 
Nicholas,  on  the  other  hand,  maintains  that  the  partial 
mobilisation  of  Russia  which  took  place  on  July  29th 
was  only  decided  upon  "for  the  reason  of  defence  against 
the  preparations  of  Austria."  He  promises  to  send 
"Tatisheff  with  instructions  to-night  to  Berlin."  ^  In  his 
telegram  of  July  31st  the  Tsar  announces  that  the  discon- 
tinuance of  military  preparations  "made  necessary  by  the 
Austrian  mobilisation"  was  "technically  impossible,"  but 
he  gives  his  solemn  word  that  no  provocative  action  will 
be  taken  so  long  as  negotiations  continue.  The  Em- 
peror William  again  demands  unconditional  discontinu- 
ance of  the  military  preparations  of  Russia,  whereupon 
the  Tsar  submits  that  he  may  take  the  same  measures 
without  war  necessarily  following.  The  Emperor  Wil- 
liam, however,  mobilises,  and  declares  war. 

This  rapid  development  of  events  can  only  be  ex- 
plained by  the  fact  that  there  must  have  taken  place  in 
the  authoritative  circles  in  Berlin  a  change  of  front  lead- 
ing from  the  oscillation  which  characterised  the  earlier 
days  to  a  firm  resolution  to  embark  on  war.  In  all  prob- 
ability this  change  of  front  took  place  on  the  evening  of 
July  29th,  on  the  occasion  of  the  Interview  which  the 
Chancellor  had  with  the  Emperor  in  Potsdam.  The  in- 
fluences which  drove  the  still-hesitating  Emperor  to  re- 

*  What  happened  to  this  mission  of  Tatisheff?  Did  he  arrive  in 
Berlin?  What  message  did  he  bring?  Why  did  Berlin  not  delay 
her  ultimatum  until  the  arrival  of  the  special  envoy  of  the  Tsar, 
who  could  not  arrive  at  the  earliest  until  the  ist  of  August?  These, 
among  other  questions,  will  suggest  themselves  to  the  reader. 


THE    CRIME  189 

solve  on  war  cannot  be  proved,  but  it  is  possible  to  guess 
at  them.  People  who  are  in  a  position  to  know  say  that 
those  occupying  the  leading  military  positions,  supported 
by  the  Crown  Prince  and  his  retainers,  threatened  the 
Emperor  with  their  resignation  en  bloc  if  war  were  not 
resolved  on.^ 

What  is  certain  is  that  the  Chancellor  on  the  same  eve- 
ning, after  his  return  to  Berlin,  summoned  Sir  Edward 
Goschen,  the  English  Ambassador,  and  fervently  sub- 
mitted to  him  a  proposal  that  England  in  the  event  of 
a  European  conflict  should  under  certain  conditions  re- 
main neutral?  The  conditions  which  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann  offered  were  as  follows  : — 

(i)  Germany  in  the  event  of  a  victorious  war  would 
aim  at  no  territorial  acquisitions  in  Europe  at  the  ex- 
pense of  France.  The  Chancellor  said  he  was  unable 
to  give  a  similar  assurance  with  regard  to  the  French 
Colonies. 

(2)  The  neutrality  of  Holland  would  be  respected  by 
Germany  so  long  as  it  was  respected  by  Germany's  ad- 
versaries. 

(3)  With  reference  to  Belgium  it  would  depend  on 
the  action  of  France  what  operations  Germany  might 
be  forced  to  undertake  against  Belgium,  but  in  any  case, 

^We  have  less  difficulty  in  understanding  these  events  in  Berlin 
when  we  bear  in  mind  an  observation  which  Count  Pourtales  made, 
in  passing,  to  Sazonof :  measures  of  mobilisation  were,  he  said, 
highly  dangerous  nowadays,  "for  in  that  event  the  purely  military 
consideration  of  the  question  by  the  general  staffs  would  find  ex- 
pression, and  if  that  button  were  once  touched  in  Germany  the  situ- 
ation would  get  out  of  control."  The  German  Government  takes 
very  good  care  not  to  include  in  its  White  Book  this  self-confession, 
which  throws  a  very  characteristic  light  on  the  occurrences  in  Berlin 
in  the  last  day  before  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  Austrian  Govern- 
ment, however,  with  less  prudence  reports  the  observation  of  Pour- 
tales  in  No.  28  of  the  Red  Book. 

"Blue  Book,  No.  85. 


190  I    ACCUSE! 

when  the  war  was  over,  Belgium's  integrity  would  be 
respected  if  she  had  not  sided  against  Germany. 

This  proposal  for  neutrality  made  on  July  29th  is  in 
the  highest  degree  surprising,  and  is  very  illuminating. 

What  so  far  had  happened,  we  may  ask,  to  awake  in 
Herr  von  Bethmann  this  urgent  fear  of  a  European  war? 
Austria  had  opened  hostilities  against  Serbia,  and  had 
partially  mobilised  against  Russia.  Russia  had  there- 
upon answered  with  a  mobilisation  of  four  southern 
army  districts.  At  that  time  there  was  absolutely  no 
question  of  a  mobilisation  against  Germany.  The  White 
Book  itself  only  dates  this  from  July  31st.  All  the  diplo- 
matic forces  of  Europe — at  any  rate,  with  the  exception 
of  Germany  and  Austria — were  active  in  endeavouring 
to  relieve  the  tension  between  Austria  and  Russia.  The 
proposal  of  the  conference  of  the  four  Powers  was  still 
hanging  in  the  air.  Grey's  formula  of  agreement  had 
just  been  proposed  to  Lichnowsky,  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor. Russia  was  then,  as  she  had  been  previously,  ready 
to  treat  directly  with  Austria,  and  was  waiting  to  begin 
negotiations.  France  was  supporting  in  the  most  ener- 
getic manner  the  efiforts  for  peace  made  by  Grey  and  Saz- 
onof.  In  short,  all  forces  were  labouring  at  the  task 
of  maintaining  peace,  and  it  only  required  that  Germany 
should  energetically  intervene  to  move  Austria  to  adopt 
the  conciliatory  attitude  demanded  by  the  European  situa- 
tion, and  peace  would  have  been  assured.  And  in  such 
a  moment  as  this,  when  everything  depended  on  the 
peaceful  intentions  of  Germany  alone,  the  Chancellor 
was  thinking  merely  of  how  best  to  make  his  position  se- 
cure in  the  event  of  war!  There  is  only  one  explana- 
tion for  this  bid  for  neutrality  made  at  this  juncture. 
The  Chancellor  regarded  peace  as  in  danger,  and  could 
not  do  otherwise  than  regard  it  as  in  danger,  because 
he  knew,  as  the  other  Governments  could  not  then  know, 
that  war  had  been  decided  on  in  Berlin.     The  war  was 


THE    CRIME  191 

bound  to  come,  since  this  was  the  wish  of  Germany.  And 
since  it  was  bound  to  come,  only  one  thing  gave  Herr 
von  Bethmann  cause  for  anxiety,  the  task,  namely,  of 
fashioning  the  chances  of  war  as  favourably  as  possible 
for  Germany,  and  of  excluding  England  for  the  present 
from  the  ranks  of  her  enemies,  in  order  to  be  in  a  more 
secure  position  to  defeat  her  on  the  next  favourable 
opportunity.  The  "policy  of  the  free  hand  on  the  Con- 
tinent," which  the  Chancellor  had  unsuccessfully  pur- 
sued with  regard  to  England  in  19 12  forms  the  basis  of 
the  bid  for  neutrality  of  July  29th,  19 14. 

The  English  answer  was  as  negative  in  its  nature  as 
that  given  two  years  previously.  The  significant  impor- 
tance of  Bethmann's  overtures  were  at  once  realised  in 
London.  In  return  for  the  prospect  of  a  future  agree- 
ment of  neutrality  with  Germany,  vaguely  held  out,  the 
English  Government  refused  to  allow  itself  to  be  elimi- 
nated for  the  present  from  European  politics  and  to  be 
obliged  to  stand  aside  an  inactive  spectator  while  France 
was  crushed  or  Belgian  neutrality  violated.  In  the  opin- 
ion of  Grey  (and  it  must  be  admitted  that  in  this  he  is 
right)  such  a  bargain  would  be  bound  to  break  the 
friendly  relations  existing  between  England  and  France, 
would  be  inconsistent  with  the  duty  of  protecting  Bel- 
gium imposed  on  every  signatory  of  the  guarantee  of 
neutrality  of  1839,  and  would  imperil,  not  merely  the 
interests,  but  also  the  good  name  of  England.  Grey  in- 
structed his  Ambassador  to  add  most  earnestly  to  this 
refusal  of  the  German  proposal  that  the  one  way  of 
maintaining  the  good  relations  between  England  and 
Germany  was  that  they  should  continue  to  work  to- 
gether to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe;  if  this  were 
successful,  the  relations  between  the  two  countries  would 
be,  ipso  facto,  improved  and  strengthened.  The  English 
Government  in  any  case  was  ready  to  work  in  that  way 
with  all  sincerity  and  goodwill.     It  is  impossible  to  omit 


192  I    ACCUSE! 

reference  to  the  concluding  paragraph  in  Grey's  instruc- 
tions to  his  Ambassador,  a  passage  which  must  be  re- 
garded as  of  the  deepest  significance  in  arriving  at  a 
judgment  with  regard  to  the  attitude  of  England  and 
Germany  in  this  struggle.  The  Ambassador  was  to  com- 
municate with  the  Chancellor  in  the  fellowing  sense: — 

"If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  preserved,  and  the 
present  crisis  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavour  will 
be  to  promote  some  arrangement  to  which  Germany 
could  be  a  party,  by  which  she  could  be  assured 
that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would  be  pur- 
sued against  her  or  her  allies  by  France,  Russia, 
and  ourselves,  jointly  or  separately.  I  have  desired 
this  and  worked  for  it,  as  far  as  I  could,  through 
the  last  Balkan  crisis,  and,  Gennany  having  a  cor- 
responding object,  our  relations  sensibly  improved. 
The  idea  has  hitherto  been  too  Utopian  to  form  the 
subject  of  definite  proposals,  but  if  this  present 
crisis,  so  much  more  acute  than  any  that  Europe 
has  gone  through  for  generations,  be  safely  passed, 
I  am  hopeful  that  the  relief  and  reaction  which  will 
follow  may  make  possible  some  more  deßnite  rap- 
prochement between  the  Powers  than  has  been  pos- 
sible hitherto."^ 

The  significance  of  this  declaration  of  Grey  is  obvious. 
It  contains  a  moving  appeal  to  common  action  in  the 
cause  of  peace,  such  as  had  been  maintained  throughout 
the  Balkan  crisis  to  the  advantage  of  the  world  and  of 
the  two  countries,  who  in  pursuing  the  same  high  aim 
had  without  compulsion  approached  each  other  and  be- 
come more  intimately  connected.  The  vision  of  the 
future  outlined  by  the  English  Minister  nevertheless 
went  far  beyond  anything  attained  in  the  past;  an  agree- 
ment was  to  be  concluded,  with  the  participation  of  Ger- 

^Blue  Book,  No.  loi. 


THE    CRIME  193 

many,  which  would  afford  Germany  and  her  allies  formal 
guarantees  against  any  aggressive  or  even  hostile  policy 
on  the  part  of  the  Entente  Powers — in  other  words, 
a  Treaty  which  would  guarantee  the  peace  of  Europe, 
which  could  draw  together  the  Triple  Entente  and  the 
Triple  Alliance,  and  would  have  substituted  for  the  dan- 
gerous system  of  the  balance  of  power  a  general  alliance 
of  peace. 

How  did  the  Chancellor  receive  this  proposal  ?  When 
Goschen  had  read  to  him  Grey's  words  in  the  form  of  a 
memorandum  he  received  the  communication  "without 
comment,"  and  only  expressed  a  desire  to  receive  a  copy 
in  order  that  he  might  reflect  upon  the  matter  at  leisure. 
The  copy  was  handed  to  him.  No  answer  has  ever  been 
given} 

What  would  Europe  have  looked  like  to-day  if  Herr 
von  Bethmann  had  concurred  in  Grey's  proposal?  It 
is  superfluous,  and  indeed  too  painful,  to  allow  our 
imagination  to  conjure  up  such  a  picture  to-day.  Every- 
thing that  Germany  is  supposed  to  be  struggling  to 
achieve  in  this  war — the  security  of  her  existence,  free- 
dom for  her  development,  unhampered  progress  in  cul- 
ture and  wellbeing — all  these  things  were  magnani- 
mously offered.  In  reality  these  possessions  had  never 
been  in  danger,  but  Grey's  offer  destroyed  every  possi- 
bility of  believing  that  they  were  in  danger  and  every 
pretext  for  persuading  others  to  this  belief.  The  alliance 
of  peace  proposed  by  Grey  was  merely  a  first  step  out  of 
the  atmosphere  of  enmity,  distrust,  and  tension  towards 
that  of  friendship,  confidence,  and  composure.  This 
first  step  would  certainly  have  led  to  other  advances. 
The  feeling  of  confidence  thus  revived  and  strengthened 
would  have  rendered  it  possible  to  diminish  the  costly 
precautionary  measures,  which  based  merely  on  uni- 
versal and  mutual  distrust.  Agreements  on  the  subject 
^Blue  Book,  No.  109. 


194  I    ACCUSE! 

of  the  cessation  and  gradual  diminution  of  armaments 
would  have  become  possible  on  the  basis  of  an  agree- 
ment of  friendship.  In  short,  the  way  was  opened  to  a 
new  and  a  better  Europe,  if  Germany  had  but  grasped 
the  hand  offered  by  England. 

But  Herr  von  Bethmann  thought  otherwise.  Having 
placed  the  memorandum  in  a  pigeon-hole,  he  quietly 
chuckled  to  himself  at  the  stupidity  of  the  Englishman 
who,  with  his  insular  restricted  vision,  still  believed  in 
the  peaceful  intentions  of  Germany.  We  have  over 
again  the  same  performance  as  in  1912.  England  desires 
the  peace  of  Europe;  Germany,  however,  desires  the  neu- 
trality of  England,  in  order  to  be  able  to  disturb  this 
peace  at  her  own  sweet  will.  And  this  same  Chancellor, 
who  knows  this  and  innumerable  other  similar  occur- 
rences of  an  earlier  and  of  a  later  date,  dares  to  burden 
the  English  Government  with  the  "inner  responsibility 
for  the  European  war" !  We  shall  see  later  that  in  mak- 
ing this  statement  he  comes  into  violent  conflict,  not 
merely  with  facts,  but  also  with  his  own  official  publica- 
tions. For  the  present  inquiry  it  is  sufficient  to  make 
it  clear  that  the  resolution  to  go  to  war  had  already  been 
taken  in  Berlin  on  the  evening  of  July  29th.  Only  on 
this  assumption  is  it  possible  to  explain  Bethmann's  bid 
for  English  neutrality  and  his  failure  to  take  any  notice 
of  Grey's  proposal. 

On  the  same  day  on  which  Herr  von  Bethmann  re- 
ceived without  comment  Grey's  proposal  for  a  perma- 
nent European  state  of  peace,  the  "threatening  danger 
of  war"  was  proclaimed  in  Germany,  and  the  Am- 
bassadors in  Petrograd  and  Paris  were  instructed  to 
deliver  ultimata  to  the  Governments  to  which  they  were 
accredited.  From  Russia  it  was  demanded  that  she 
should  "stop  every  measure  of  war  against  us  and 
against  Austria-Hungary  within  twelve  hours,  and  notify 
us  definitely  to  this  effect."    From  France  a  declaration 


THE    CRIME  195 

was  required  within  eighteen  hours  "whether  she  would 
remain  neutral  in  the  event  of  a  Russo-German  war." 
The  ultimatum  was  delivered  in  Petrograd  about  mid- 
night; that  in  Paris  about  7  o'clock  In  the  evening. 

When  the  news  of  these  ultimata  became  known  in 
and  outside  Germany,  the  report  was  at  first  generally 
disbelieved,  since  no  one  could  adduce  any  ground  for 
such  drastic  action  at  that  precise  moment.  The  diplo- 
matists were  even  more  astonished  than  the  public. 
What,  then,  could  have  taken  place  to  drive  Gennany 
to  this  extreme  step,  which  without  doubt  would  inevit- 
ably lead  to  war?  Was  it  not  just  on  July  31st  that  the 
diplomatic  negotiation  between  the  Powers  had  appar- 
ently reached  so  favourable  a  point  that  the  whole  world 
once  more  began  to  entertain  hope,  and  looked  forward 
to  a  peaceful  settlement  at  an  early  date?  On  July  30th 
Count  Berchtold  had  expressed  in  the  most  friendly  tone 
to  the  Russian  Ambassador,  Schebeko,  his  willingness 
to  agree  to  a  resumption  In  Petrograd  of  the  negotia- 
tions which  had  for  some  time  been  discontinued  between 
Austria  and  Russia.^  These  negotiations  had,  in  fact, 
begun  on  July  31st  between  Sazonof  and  the  Austrian 
Ambassador,  Szapary,  and  this  time  they  promised  a 
greater  measure  of  success  than  on  any  previous  occa- 
sion, since  Austria  for  the  first  time  had  professed  her 
readiness  to  submit  for  discussion  the  contents  of  the 
Note  addressed  to  Serbia.  Sazonof  himself,  in  a  com- 
munication addressed  to  London,  expressed  the  hope 
that  a  peaceful  issue  out  of  the  crisis  might  yet  be 
found.  The  French  and  the  English  Governments  were 
agreeably  surprised  at  the  final  change  in  the  attitude 
of  Austria,  and  Grey  expressed  the  hope  that  it  "may 
lead  to  a  satisfactory  result."  -     In  Grey's  despatch  to 

*  Yellow  Book,  No.  104.     Blue  Book,  No.  96. 
'Blue  Book,  No.    in.     Orange  Book,   Nos.  66,  69,  "jz.     Yellow 
Book,  Nos.  114,  120. 


196  I   ACCUSE! 

Goschen  it  is  possible  to  trace  in  every  word  the  sincere 
satisfaction  which  he  felt  in  consequence  of  the  new 
turn  of  events.  He  at  once  redoubled  his  efforts  to 
shorten  the  pains  of  childbirth,  and  to  bring  speedily  into 
the  world  a  healthy  child  of  peace.  Austria  was  to 
receive  "full  satisfaction  of  her  demands  on  Serbia/* 
all  Powers  were  at  once  to  suspend  further  military 
preparations,  Germany  and  Austria  had  only  to  make 
"any  reasonable  proposal,"  and  he  would  support  it. 
If,  however,  Russia  and  France  would  not  accept  such 
a  reasonable  proposal,  the  British  Government  would 
have  nothing  more  to  do  with  the  consequences.  Saz- 
onof  at  once  outlined  a  formula  of  agreement  which 
went  further  to  meet  Austria  than  that  first  fonnu- 
lated.^  He  proposed  a  discussion  in  London,  under  the 
participation  of  the  Powers,  in  which  he  represented 
a  cessation  of  Austrian  operations  in  Serbia,  not  as  a 
condition,  but  merely  as  "very  important."  ^  Every- 
where there  was  activity,  hope,  and  the  zeal  to  save. 
Then  suddenly  the  German  ultimata  exploded  like  a 
bombshell,  and  at  a  stroke  all  hopes  were  annihilated. 

What  induced  Germany  to  take  this  step?  Profes- 
sedly it  was  due  to  the  Russian  mobilisation.  What 
are  the  facts  bearing  on  this  point?  I  have  already 
pointed  out  that  the  Russian  mobilisation  was  merely 
the  consequence  of  two  facts;  firstly,  the  Austrian  mob- 
ilisation which  had  preceded  it,  and  secondly,  the  more 
than  equivocal  attitude  assumed  by  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria throughout  the  crisis. 

Both  grounds  were  completely  sound,  as  I  believe  that 
I  have  proved.  The  Russian  mobilisations  were  in  no 
way  kept  secret;  they  were  carried  out  with  complete 
publicity,  the  partial  mobilisation  in  the  four  southern 

^Orange  Book,  No.  6y.    Blue  Book,  No.  120.    Yellow  Book,  Nos. 
113,  120. 
*  Yellow  Book,  No.  120.    Blue  Book,  No.  133. 


THE    CRIME  197 

Governmental  districts  on  July  29th,  the  general  mobi- 
lisation on  the  morning  of  July  3ist.^  The  Austrian 
partial  mobilisation  had  already  taken  place  before  the 
declaration  of  war  against  Serbia,  that  is  to  say  before 
July  28th.  The  general  mobilisation  was  ordered  at  the 
latest  at  i  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  July  2)^st;  in- 
deed, according  to  the  report  of  the  Russian  Ambas- 
sador at  Vienna,  it  took  place  as  early  as  July  28th. ^ 
The  Russian  partial  mobilisation  was  officially  communi- 
cated to  Berlin  on  July  29th,  and  the  general  mobilisa- 
tion was  publicly  proclaimed  in  Petrograd  on  July  31st. 

The  story  of  the  false  Russian  words  of  honour  is 
itself  a  falsehood.  According  to  the  account  given  in  the 
German  White  Book,  no  fewer  than  two  Russian  gentle- 
men are  assumed  to  have  broken  their  word  of  honour, 
the  Russian  Minister  of  War  and  the  Chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff.  In  addition  to  these,  it  is  known  that  the  Rus- 
sian Emperor,  the  "most  sincere  and  devoted  friend  and 
cousin"  of  the  Emperor  William,  also  broke  his  word 
("betra3'ed  Germany's  confidence,"  as  it  is  expressed  in 
the  official  English  edition  of  the  German  White  Book). 
These  insinuations  of  broken  words  constitute,  along 
with  many  other  features,  a  pleasant  method  of  distin- 
guishing between  the  German  publication  and  those  of 
other  countries.  This  also  provides  for  people  abroad  a 
"culture-barometer"  indicating  a  position  which  is  in 
no  way  specially  favourable  for  Germany. 

But  If  only  the  assertions  were  at  least  true!  They 
are,  however,  untrue.  The  Russian  Minister  of  War 
declared  on  July  27th  to  the  German  Military  Attache 
that  no  order  to  mobilise  had  as  yet  been  issued,  but 
that  preparatory  measures  only  were  being  taken;  if 
Austria  were  to  cross  the  Serbian  frontier  the  four  mili- 
tary districts  directed  towards  Austria  would  be  mobi- 

*  White  Book,  pp.  409,  412. 

^Yellow  Book,  No.  115.     Orange  Book,  Nos.  47,  49. 


198  I   ACCUSE! 

lised,  but  not  those  on  the  German  frontier,  since  "peace 
with  Germany  was  desired  very  much."  ^  This  com- 
munication of  the  Minister  for  War  was  in  full  accord- 
ance with  the  truth.  The  alleged  "declaration  of  the 
state  of  war"  in  Kovno  referred  to  in  the  telegram 
from  the  Imperial  Consulate  on  July  27th, ^  is  not  the 
same  as  mobilisation.  This  should  be  known  in  Ger- 
many at  least,  since  we  also  expressly  distinguish  be- 
tween a  "state  of  war"  and  "mobilisation." 

The  mobilisation  of  Kiev  and  Odessa,  which  is  pre- 
sumed to  have  taken  place  on  July  26th,  is  reported  by 
the  German  military  attache  only  in  a  very  vague  form, 
and  cannot  therefore  be  regarded  as  established.  The 
military  attache  "deems  it  certain  that  mobilisation  has 
been  ordered"  in  the  two  districts.^  His  assumption 
may,  however,  be  false,  and  may  be  based  on  the  re- 
ceipt of  erroneous  information,  not  an  improbable  oc- 
currence in  view  of  the  great  distance  between  these 
two  districts  and  Petrograd.  Nevertheless,  it  is  possi- 
ble (and  indeed  it  would  have  been  more  than  reason- 
able) that  Russia  on  July  26th,  that  is  to  say,  on  the 
day  after  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  between 
Austria  and  Serbia,  should  have  made  preparations  for 
mobilisation.  The  Minister  for  War  expressly  acknowl- 
edges this.  It  is  thus  as  audacious  as  it  is  unjust  to 
reproach  the  Russian  Minister  of  War  with  a  breach  of 
his  word  of  honour  on  the  ground  of  such  evidence. 

The  second  guilty  person  is  the  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  and  the  accuser  is  again  the  military  attache.  In 
this  case  the  conversation  took  place  on  July  29th,  and 
the  statement  made  by  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff 
is  reported  to  have  been  to  the  effect  that  "everything 
had  remained  as  the  Secretary  had  informed  me  two 

nVhite   Book,   Exhibit   ii. 
*  White  Book,  Exhibit  8. 
'White  Book,  Exhibit  7. 


THE    CRIME  199 

days  ago,"  that  nowhere  had  there  been  mobilisation. 
For  this  he  gave  his  word  of  honour  in  the  most  solemn 
manner,  but  he  ''could  not  assume  a  guarantee  for  the 
future."  1 

The  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  did  not  say  this,  and 
cannot  have  said  this,  for  on  the  same  day,  July  29th, 
the  Russian  Government  officially  informed  Berlin  that 
they  had  mobilised  four  army  districts.  It  will  be  seen 
how  much  the  love  of  truth  is  involved  in  the  composi- 
tion of  the  German  White  Book.  On  the  same  page, 
page  10,^  there  is  printed,  at  the  top  the  official  com- 
munication of  the  mobilisation,  and  below  the  official 
denial.  What  purpose  is  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff 
supposed  to  have  had  in  view  when  he  uttered  this  lie, 
seeing  that  at  the  same  moment  the  Russian  Ambassa- 
sador  was  informing  Berlin  of  the  truth?  What,  on  the 
other  hand,  must  we  think  of  a  Government  which  in  a 
matter  of  life  and  death  manifests  such  levity  in  the 
compilation  of  official  documents? 

What  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  really  said  is 
indeed  quite  clear.  He  confirmed  the  mobilisation 
against  Austria,  and  denied  that  against  Germany.  This 
agrees  with  the  official  communication  made  in  Berlin, 
and  also  with  a  report  despatched  on  July  30th  by 
Paleologue,  the  French  Ambassador.^  The  military  at- 
tache had  either  failed  to  understand  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff,  or  else  he  intentionally  reported  what  was 
not  true. 

Notwithstanding  a  diligent  study  of  the  evidence  it  is 
not  clear  to  me  in  what  point  the  Russian  Emperor  is 
supposed  to  have  lied.     The  whole  of  these  cjuestions  of 

'■  White  Book,  p.  410. 

'  [Pages  409  and  410  in  the  collected  English  correspondence.] 

'Yellow  Book,  No.  102:  "gave  him  his  word  of  honour  that  the 

mohilisation  ordered  this  morning  was  exclusively  directed  against 

Austria." 


200  I   ACCUSE! 

mobilisation  and  of  mutual  recrimination  stand  for  the 
most  part  on  such  an  uncertain  foundation  that  it  is 
hazardous  to  utter  censorious  judgments  in  this  matter. 
The  Emperor  William,  for  example,  telegraphs  on  July 
30th  to  the  Tsar:  "Austria  has  mobilised  only  against 
Serbia."  In  opposition  to  this,  the  Imperial  Chancellor 
admits  in  his  speech  of  August  4th  that  Austria  had 
also  mobilised  against  Russia.  It  is  impossible  to  as- 
certain the  truth  with  regard  to  this  or  that  mobilisa- 
tion, since  measures  of  mobilisation  are  different  in  dif- 
ferent countries,  and,  since  further,  even  without  an 
official  mobilisation  it  is  possible  to  carry  out  a  secret 
mobilisation.  In  French  reports,  for  example,  it  is 
maintained,  and  the  assertion  is  supported  by  facts, 
that  Germany  had  begun  to  mobilise  as  far  back  as  the 
recall  of  the  Austrian  Ambassador  from  Belgrade.^  The 
proclamation  of  the  "danger  of  war"  is  a  German  spe- 
cialty, which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  conceals  the  most 
serious  measures  of  mobilisation. 

Where  and  when,  however,  is  the  Russian  Emperor 
supposed  to  have  lied  on  the  subject  of  his  mobilisa- 
tion? In  his  telegram  of  July  30th  he  acknowledges 
"the  military  measures  now  taking  form,"  which  were 
being  carried  out  "for  the  reason  of  defence  against 
the  preparations  of  Austria."  In  his  telegram  of  July 
31st  he  declares  that  a  discontinuance  of  his  military 
preparations  was  "technically  impossible" — an  expres- 
sion which  it  is  remarkable  to  note  occurs  in  almost  the 
same  words  in  the  telegram  of  the  Emperor  William  to 
the  King  of  England  on  August  ist:  "For  technical 
reasons  the  mobilisation  which  I  have  already  ordered 
this  afternoon  on  two  fronts — east  and  west — must  pro- 
ceed according  to  the  arrangement  made."  In  his  last 
telegram  of  August  ist  the  Tsar  in  no  way  denies  the 
mobilisation  on  the  German  frontier,  with  which  he  is 
^  Blue  Book,  No.  105   (Enclosure  3). 


THE    CRIME  gOl 

reproached  by  the  German  Emperor,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, he  leaves  it  open  to  the  latter  to  mobilise  also,  ask- 
ing only  that  the  Emperor  should  give  the  same  guar- 
antee as  he  himself  had  given,  namely,  that  "these  meas- 
ures do  not  mean  war,"  and  that  both  rulers  should 
continue  to  negotiate  in  the  interests  of  peace. 

I  do  not  find  anything  in  these  telegrams  which  can 
even  in  the  slightest  degree  throw  doubt  on  the  honour 
of  the  Russian  Emperor.  On  the  contrary,  I  see  in 
the  whole  exchange  of  telegrams — above  all,  in  the  sup- 
pressed telegram  of  July  29th — the  most  honourable  in- 
clination to  peace  on  the  part  of  the  Tsar,  as  contrasted 
with  the  ultimatum-policy  of  Germany  which,  in  spite 
of  all  the  German  Emperor's  peaceful  assurances,  was 
necessarily  bound  to  lead  to  war. 

The  conclusion  at  which  I  arrive  is,  then,  that  the 
Russian  mobilisation  was  justified,  since  it  was  occa- 
sioned by  the  Austrian  mobilisation.  It  was  not  kept 
secret,  but  was  officially  communicated  to  foreign  coun- 
tries, and  was  publicly  proclaimed  within  the  country. 
There  is  no  manner  of  proof  for  the  assertion  that  it 
was  aggressive  in  character.  With  as  much  reason,  and 
indeed  with  more  reason,  an  aggressive  character  could 
be  ascribed  to  the  previous  Austrian  mobilisation  and 
the  German  mobilisation  concealed  under  the  name  of 
the  "State  of  War,"  The  attitude  of  the  various  Gov- 
ernments up  to  the  moment  of  mobilisation,  and  their 
subsequent  behaviour,  can  alone  show  these  military 
acts  in  their  true  character.  Erom  this  point  of  view 
the  Austro-German  mobilisations  which  were  in  full 
swing  even  before  the  proclamation  of  the  "state  of 
war,"  have  a  much  more  aggressive  character  than  the 
Russian,  because  the  Austro-German  mobilisation  served 
an  aggressive  policy,  whereas  the  policy  which  called 
forth  the  Russian  mobilisation  was  defensive  in  its  na- 
ture. 


202  I    ACCUSE! 

The  aggressive  character  of  the  German  attitude  is 
in  particular  confirmed  by  certain  events  which  took 
place  on  the  western  frontier  against  France,  before  the 
despatch  of  the  two  ultimata.  As  early  as  July  30th 
German  troops  were  concentrated  at  Thionville  and 
Metz.  Garrison  troops  from  Metz  were  pushed  up  to 
the  frontier,  reinforced  by  troops  from  Treves  and 
Cologne.  The  frontier-defences  were  strengthened  and 
fortified.  From  July  25th  railway  stations  were  occu- 
pied by  the  military  classes  of  the  reserve  (1903-1911) 
recalled  by  individual  summons,  roads  on  the  frontier 
were  barricaded,  and  the  circulation  of  motor-cars  for- 
bidden. Most  important  of  all,  as  early  as  July  29th 
German  patrols  had  in  two  instances  penetrated  into 
French  territory.  The  French  Government  had  officially 
announced  that,  in  order  to  avoid  collisions  on  the  fron- 
tier, a  zone  of  territory  extending  to  10  kilometres 
would  be  left  unoccupied.  The  German  Government 
did  not  issue  a  similar  declaration,  but  pushed-  forward 
their  advance-posts  to  the  French  frontier.  We  shall 
later  have  occasion  to  notice  other  occurrences,  even 
more  provocative,  which  took  place  between  the  ist  and 
3rd  of  August. 

From  the  political  and  military  events  previous  to 
the  despatch  of  the  ultimata  one  thing  emerges  with 
certainty,  namely,  that  the  Franco-Russian  military 
preparations  furnished  no  support  for  the  view  that  ag- 
gressive intentions  existed  on  the  part  of  these  States, 
and  that  if  aggressive  intentions  existed  anywhere  it 
can  only  have  been  on  the  side  of  Germany. 

What  right,  then,  had  Germany  to  demand  that  Rus- 
sia should  demobilise?  This  demand  was  in  itself  un- 
justified, and,  when  addressed  to  a  Great  State,  was 
a  departure  from  the  conventions  usually  governing  in- 
ternational relations;  the  situation  was,  however,  ren- 
dered more  difficult  by  the  conditions  imposed  by  Ger- 


THE    CRIME  203 

many,  specifying  the  manner  in  which  it  was  to  be  car- 
ried out.  The  discontinuance  of  Russia's  military 
measures  was  to  take  place : — 

(a)  Within  twelve  hours,  and 

(b)  not  only  against  Germany,  but  also  against  Aus- 
tria. 

The  first  request  was  "technically  impossible/'  since 
a  great  State  covering  an  enormous  superficial  area 
cannot  within  twelve  hours  put  a  stop  to  measures  of 
mobilisation  which  have  been  initiated  (see  the  telegrams 
of  the  Emperor  Nicholas  of  July  30th  and  31st,  and 
that  of  the  Emperor  William  to  the  King  of  England 
of  August  ist). 

The  second  demand,  however,  that  demobilisation 
should  take  place  against  Austria  as  well,  was  so  mon- 
strous that  one  is  almost  tempted  to  doubt  the  sanity 
of  the  people  who  dared  to  propose  it.  Was  Russia 
really  expected  to  cancel  her  mobilisation  against 
Austria,  while  Austria  herself  had  been  partially  mobi- 
lised for  over  eight  days,  and  had  been  completely 
mobilised  against  Russia  and  against  Serbia  since  the 
early  morning  of  July  31st,  perhaps  even  from  July 
28th?  Could  Russia  be  expected  to  lay  down  her  arms 
before  Austria?  This  suggestion  is  all  the  more  remark- 
able inasmuch  as  Austria  herself  had  no  idea  of  ad- 
dressing such  a  suggestion  to  Russia,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, she  renewed  negotiations  with  Russia  on  July 
31st,  the  same  day  on  which  both  States  carried  out  a 
general  mobilisation. 

Germany  thus  was  "more  Austrian  than  the  Aus- 
trians."  Speaking  generally,  what  right  had  she  to 
make  demands  on  behalf  of  Austria f  Did  she  intervene 
as  Austria's  guardian,  was  she  clothed  with  the  powers 
of  a  plenipotentiary,  or  on  what  other  legal  title  did 
she  rely?  In  any  case,  the  situation  which  arose  from 
this  arrogant  tutelage  was — I  can  find  no  other  word 


I   ACCUSE! 

for  it — an  abortion  of  madness.  Austria  found  noth- 
ing to  astonish  or  inconvenience  her  in  carrying  on 
negotiations  with  Russia  under  arms.  And,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  it  was  not  the  first  time  that  negotiations 
had  taken  place  between  the  two  countries  under  these 
circumstances.  During  the  Balkan  crisis  both  Powers 
had  remained  mobilised  for  months  at  a  time,  and  never- 
theless negotiations  had  been  successfully  carried  on. 
Germany,  however,  whose  interests  were  not  involved 
in  the  present  negotiations,  who  participated  in  the 
whole  dispute  merely  as  the  ally  of  Austria,  believed  it 
to  be  her  duty  to  afford  more  protection  to  Austria 
than  Austria  herself  considered  that  she  required,  and 
she  demanded  from  Russia  a  demobilisation  to  which  the 
Double  Monarchy  attached  no  importance  whatever. 

The  complete  madness  of  the  whole  situation  may  be 
gathered  from  the  following  hypothesis.  If  Russia — • 
as,  indeed,  theoretically  might  have  happened — had 
agreed  to  demobilise  so  far  as  Germany  was  concerned, 
but  had  declined  to  do  so  with  regard  to  Austria — what 
would  have  been  the  position?  The  German  ultimatum 
would  then  have  partially  complied  with  and  partially 
declined,  and  Germany  would  have  declared  war  against 
Russia  because  Russia  had  not  demobilised  against 
Austria.  But  Austria  had  in  no  way  asked  her  to  de- 
mobilise ! 

We  see  by  what  kind  of  men  Germany  is  governed. 
How  long  will  the  people  still  submit  to  this  condition 
of  affairs? 

But  to  go  further.  Is  then  mobilisation  in  itself  a 
hostile  or  a  threatening  act  against  which  a  neighbour- 
ing country  is  justified  in  taking  action  by  means  of  an 
ultimatum?  In  no  way.  Mobilisation  in  itself  is  noth- 
ing else  than  the  process  by  which  the  military  forces 
of  a  country  are  prepared  against  the  contingency  of 
a  conflict  arising  with  another  country.     It  is  a  meas- 


THE    CRIME  a05 

ure  of  security  and  foresight,  which  can  only  assume 
a  threatening  character  by  simultaneous  or  antecedent 
political  measures  taken  by  the  Power  mobilising.  What 
political  measures  had  Russia  taken  which  could  attach 
to  her  mobilisation  the  suspicion  of  aggressive  inten- 
tions? None.  The  aggression,  the  general  initiative 
to  the  whole  conflict  had  issued  from  Austria,  with  the 
approval  and  support  of  Germany.  Russia  was  politi- 
cally acting  on  the  defensive  when  she  gave  expression 
to  her  legitimate  interests  in  the  Balkans.  She  was 
bound  to  support  this  political  defensive  by  military 
measures  of  security,  since  the  aggressor  also  had  made 
military  preparations. 

This  is  the  situation  viewed  from  the  abstract  stand- 
point of  international  law.  In  the  concrete  case  before 
us  we  have  seen  that  Russia  up  to  and  even  beyond 
the  day  of  her  general  mobilisation  had,  in  union  with 
England  and  France,  done  everything  to  maintain  peace, 
whereas  Austria  and  Germany  had  done  everything  to 
disturb  it.  Thus  the  concrete  circumstances  of  the  case 
also  prove  that  the  Russian  mobilisation — which  in  the- 
ory was  no  menace  to  Germany — could  also  in  this  prac- 
tical case  contain  no  such  menace.  To  this  must  be 
added  that  Russia,  as  we  have  already  seen,  had  no 
recognisable  interest  in  attacking  Germany  or  Austria. 
Her  interest  was  exclusively  confined  to  guarding  her- 
self against  being  checkmated  by  Austria  in  the  Bal- 
kans; the  cjuestion  was  one  of  defence,   not  defiance. 

That  mobilisation  In  Itself  Is  In  no  way  a  hostile  act 
can  be  proved  even  from  the  testimony  of  an  Austrian 
witness.  Count  Forgach,  the  Austrian  Foreign  Under- 
Secretary,  declared,  on  July  31st,  to  de  Bunsen,  the 
English  Ambassador,  that  "mobilisation  was  not  to  be 
regarded  as  a  necessarily  hostile  act  on  either  side."  ^ 

Nevertheless,  it  suited  Germany  to  represent  the  Rus- 
"■^  'Blue  Book,  No.  118.  " 


Ä06  I  ACCUSE! 

sian  mobilisation  as  a  menace,  and,  indeed,  as  a  menace 
against  Austria  and  Germany  alike.  What  was  an- 
nounced as  the  consequence  which  would  fall  upon  Rus- 
sia if  she  did  not  comply  with  the  demands  contained 
in  the  ultimatum?  Mobilisation  in  Germany  was  also 
to  take  place.  In  the  telegram  sent  by  the  Chancellor 
to  Count  Pourtales  on  July  31st  we  read:  "On  ac- 
count of  these  Russian  measures  we  have  been  forced, 
for  the  safety  of  the  country,  to  proclaim  the  'threat- 
ening state  of  war,'  which  does  not  yet  imply  mobilisa- 
tion. Mobilisation,  however,  is  bound  to  follow  if  Rus- 
sia does  not,"  ^  &c.,  &c.  Up  to  this  point  the  matter 
is  still  quite  logical  if  it  is  admitted  that  the  despatch 
of  the  ultimatum  was  justifiable  or  necessary  (which  is, 
however,  an  erroneous  assumption). 

If  this  is  madness,  there  is,  at  any  rate,  method  in  it. 
Germany  says  to  Russia:  "You  have  mobilised;  if  you 
do  not  draw  back,  I  will  mobilise  also."  This  is,  in- 
deed, the  course  which  the  Tsar  advised  the -Emperor 
William  to  adopt :  that  there  should  be  mobilisation  on 
both  sides,  but  without  war  or  intention  to  make  war, 
and  that  negotiations  with  the  view  of  arriving  at  a 
peaceful  understanding  should  go  quietly  forward.  That 
such  a  course  is  possible  requires  no  proof.  That  it 
has  happened  countless  times  is  a  historical  fact.  What 
reason  was  there  for  supposing  that  it  could  not  hap- 
pen on  this  occasion?  Indeed,  there  were  now  stronger 
reasons  than  ever  before,  since  greater  interests  were 
at  stake,  and  greater  composure  and  prudence  was  there- 
fore required  on  the  part  of  all  concerned.  If  Germany 
had  remained  content  with  the  mobilisation  which  she 
threatened,  and  had  given  full  scope  to  the  apparently 
hopeful  negotiations  taking  place  in  Vienna  and  Petro- 
grad, if  she  had  only  waited  for  a  day  or  two — mobilised 
like  the  others — it  is  certain  that  Europe  would  have 
^  White  Book,  Exhibit  24. 


THE    CRIME  207 

been  preserved  from  the  gravest  of  all  catastrophes. 
As  de  Btinsen,  the  English  Ambassador,  states  in  his 
report  to  the  English  Government  ^ :  ''A  few  days' 
delay  might  in  all  probability  have  saved  Europe  from 
one  of  the  greatest  calamities  in  history." 

The  mobilisation  of  Germany  would  indeed  have  given 
a  new  impulse  to  the  negotiations;  for  everyone  feared 
us.  Up  till  then  there  was  no  one  who  had  seen  us 
in  arms;  no  one  would  have  dared  to  quarrel  with  a 
Germany  ready  for  battle. 

The  fact  that  it  is  possible  to  be  mobilised  and  that 
negotiations  may  nevertheless  be  carried  on  without  war 
resulting  is  confirmed,  quite  apart  from  countless  his- 
torical incidents,  by  the  events  which  took  place  in  the 
beginning  of  August,  1914.  Germany  and  France  mobi- 
lised on  the  afternoon  of  August  ist;  notwithstanding 
this,  the  Emperor  William  and  the  Chancellor  in  their 
telegrams  to  London  on  August  ist  expressed  their 
readiness  to  delay  crossing  the  French  frontier  until  7 
o'clock  in  the  evening  of  August  ßrd.^  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  war  was  only  then  declared  against  France; 
the  two  countries  were  thus  mobilised  for  three  days 
without  being  at  war  with  each  other. 

A  much  more  striking  and  even  humorous  example 
of  this  kind  is  presented  by  the  relations  between 
Austria  and  Russia.  These,  the  two  leading  parties  in 
the  quarrel,  had  been  mobilised  since  July  31st,  and 
war  did  not  break  out  between  them  until  August  6th, 
when  the  state  of  peace  was  ended  by  the  declaration 
made  by  Austria.  For  days  after  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  between  Russia  and  Germany  the  Austrian  and 
Russian  Ambassadors  remained  quietly  in  the  capital 
of  their  enemies,  and,  who  knows,  may  even  have  con- 
tinued negotiations.     In  any  case  the  mobilised  condi- 

'  White  Book,  No.  161. 

*  Collected  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  p.  54a 


208  I    ACCUSE! 

tion  of  their  armies  did  not  disturb  them  in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  the  comforts  of  peace.  Surely  nothing  equally 
insane — I  can  again  find  no  other  expression  which  is 
applicable,  and  there  is  no  reason  why  I  should  refrain 
from  calling  a  spade  a  spade — has  ever  occurred  in 
diplomatic  history.  The  two  chief  duellists  have  not 
yet  crossed  swords,  but  the  second  of  one  party  has 
already  attacked  the  other.  If  in  the  six  days  between 
the  ist  and  the  6th  of  August  Austria  and  Russia  had 
after  all  succeeded  in  arriving  at  an  agreement — a  con- 
summation which  at  the  time  was  still  hoped  for  by  the 
whole  of  Europe,  and  which  could  easily  have  been 
realised  but  for  the  provocative  intervention  of  Gemiany 
— where  in  that  case  would  have  been  the  sense  of 
Germany's  war  against  Russia?  It  would  have  been  a 
sort  of  war  in  the  air,  a  tilting  against  windmills  in  the 
manner  of  Don  Quixote,  a  war  without  any  substantial 
ground.  I  will  again  merely  ask :  How  long  will  the 
nation  continue  to  tolerate  such  a  Government? 

An  answer  to  this  peculiar  ultimatum  does  not  appear 
to  have  been  received  from  the  Russian  Government, 
although  a  reply  was  received  personally  from  the  Tsar 
in  the  telegram  despatched  by  him  about  noon  on 
August  ist,  and  received  in  Berlin  about  2  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon.^  This  is  the  telegram  quoted  above,  in 
which  the  Tsar  states  that  he  regards  the  German  coun- 
ter-mobilisation as  reasonable,  but  expresses  anew  the 
desire  and  the  hope  that  it  will  not  lead  to  war,  but  that 
"with  the  aid  of  God  it  must  be  possible  to  our  long- 
tried  friendship  to  prevent  the  shedding  of  blood." 

Three  hours  later  the  declaration  of  war  was  handed 
over  in  Petrograd  by  the  German  Ambassador,  Count 
Pourtales. 

Never  in  the  history  of  the  world  has  a  greater  crime 
than  this  been  committed.  Never  has  a  crime  after  its 
^  White  Book,  p.  413. 


THE    CRIME  209 

commission  been  denied  with  greater  effrontery  and  hy- 
pocrisy. 

"The  Russian  Government  destroyed  through  its 
mobihsation,  menacing  the  security  of  our  country,  the 
laborious  action  at  mediation  of  the  European  Cabinets, 
just  as  it  was  on  the  point  of  succeeding.  The  Russian 
mobilisation,  in  regard  to  the  seriousness  of  which  the 
Russian  Government  was  never  allowed  by  us  to  enter- 
tain a  doubt,  in  connection  with  its  continued  denial 
shows  clearly  that  Russia  wanted  war"  {see  the  German 
White  Book,  page  412). 

Nothing  of  this  is  true: 

The  Russian  Government  did  not  menace  the  security 
of  the  German  Empire  by  its  mobilisation. 

It  did  not  destroy  the  action  at  mediation  of  the  Euro- 
pean Cabinets  just  as  it  was  on  the  point  of  succeeding. 

It  did  not  deny  its  measures  of  mobilisation. 

It  did  not  want  war. 

Everything  that  is  here  flung  as  a  reproach  at  the 
Russian  Government  was,  in  fact,  committed  by  Ger- 
many. 

Germany  wanted  war,  and  brought  it  about  by  her 
ultimatum  and  by  her  declaration  of  war. 

This  declaration  of  war  is  a  Cabinet  paper  in  a  class 
by  itself,  both  in  substance  and  in  style.  We  have 
already  considered  the  view  that  must  be  taken  of  the 
"part  of  mediator"  played  by  Germany,  and  of  "the 
grave  and  imminent  danger"  threatened  from  the  side 
of  Russia.  The  contents  of  the  document  would  not 
merit  any  special  discussion,  if  it  were  not  necessary  to 
emphasise  a  point  which  is  as  yet  completely  unknown 
in  Germany.  Gennany — it  Is  Incredible,  but  true! — 
delivered  the  declaration  of  war  with  an  alternative  text 
In  the  passage  of  most  importance,  leaving  It  to  Russia, 


210  I    ACCUSE! 

so  to  speak,  to  choose  which  she  preferred,  and  thus 
acknowledging  that  she  herself  did  not  know  why  she 
declared  war  against  Russia.  In  the  German  White 
Book  the  words  in  question  run:  "Russia  having  re- 
fused to  comply  with  this  demand,  and  having  shown  by 
this  refusal,"  &c.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  declara- 
tion of  war  as  delivered  in  Petrograd  the  words  run: 
"Russia  having  refused  to  comply  with  (not  having 
considered  it  necessary  to  answer)  this  demand,  and 
having  shown  by  this  refusal  (this  attitude)  that  her 
action,"  &c.  You  can  see  how  they  must  have  sweated 
in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  in  the  dog  days  to  concoct  a 
formula  for  the  declaration  of  war  which  would  sound 
fairly  well.  As  it  was  not  known  whether  Russia  would 
have  to  be  reproached  with  a  direct  refusal  or  only  with 
having  ignored  the  demands  contained  in  the  ultimatum, 
as  obviously  no  one  knew  very  definitely  by  what  name 
they  were  to  call  the  gorgon  child  with  snakes  for  hair 
and  breath  of  fire,  whom  they  were  bringing  into  the 
world,  they  left  it  to  the  addressee  to  whom  the  monster 
was  despatched  to  make  the  choice  of  his  "name  and 
description." 

Why  was  war  declared  against  Russia  f  According 
to  the  words  used  in  the  declaration  of  war,  it  was  be- 
cause Russia  had  declined  or  ignored  the  demands  con- 
tained in  the  ultimatum.  According  to  the  memorial 
contained  in  the  White  Book  it  was  because  Russia  had 
begun  the  war  against  us}  This  last  point  is  particu- 
larly to  be  noted  because  the  assertion  that  Russia  and 
France  had  attacked  us  forms  the  basis  on  which  has 
been  constructed  the  flimsy  edifice  of  German  popular 
enthusiasm.  "Gentlemen,  we  are  now  in  a  state  of 
defence  {Notwehr),''  exclaimed  the  Chancellor  on 
August  4th,  "and  necessity  {Not)  knows  no  law."  It 
is  not  only  the  war  against  our  real  opponents  that  is 

^  White  Book,  p.  413. 


THE    CRIME  211 

justified  on  the  grounds  of  necessity,  but  also  the  vio- 
lation of  the  neutrality  of  Luxembourg  and  Belgium. 
"He  who  is  menaced  as  we  are,  and  is  fighting  for  his 
highest  possession,  can  only  consider  how  he  is  to  hack 
his  way  through."  ^ 

Menace  and  defence;  these,  then,  arc  the  watchwords. 
It  is  indeed  quite  true  that  even  the  highwayman  is  in 
a  certain  sense  menaced,  and  in  a  state  of  defence,  when 
he  attacks  a  traveller  and  suddenly  becomes  aware  that 
other  well-armed  men  are  hurrying  to  help  the  traveller 
who  had  looked  so  lonely.  In  such  a  case  the  highway- 
man also  is  fighting  a  life  and  death  struggle  for  his 
freedom  and  his  existence.  In  this  sense  Germany  also 
was  in  a  state  of  defence.  She  would  not,  however, 
have  found  herself  in  such  a  position  of  constraint  if 
she  had  not  herself  begun  the  attack.  To  get  rid  of 
this  disagreeable  fact  and  to  construe  for  the  use  of  the 
people  a  real  state  of  defence  other  facts  were  adduced 
which  were  supposed  to  fulfil  this  end,  apart  from  the 
menace  involved  in  mobilisation — which  it  was  realised 
was  insufficient  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  this  purpose. 

It  is  asserted  with  regard  to  Russia  and  France  alike 
that  they  had  begun  the  war,  that  they  had  ''opened 
hostilities."  ^ 

How  did  Russia  begin  the  war?  One  single  fact  is 
cited  in  the  memorandum.  Russian  troops  had  "already 
in  the  afternoon  of  August  ist"  crossed  our  frontier 
and  "marched  into  German  territory."  Be  it  observed; 
already  on  the  afternoon  of  August  ist.  Is  there  any- 
thing remarkable  about  this?  Did  we  not  at  5  o'clock 
on  the  same  afternoon  hand  over  a  declaration  of  war 
in  Petrograd?  Was  there  not  in  consequence  a  state 
of  war  between  Germany  and  Russia  as  from  5  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon f     Were  not  Russian  troops,  therefore, 

'  Collected  Documents,  p.  43S. 
*  White  Book,  p.  413. 


ai2  I   ACCUSE! 

perfectly  entitled  to  cross  our  frontiers  after  5  o'clock? 
If  the  Chancellor  wished  to  construe  an  attack  which 
would  have  been  in  violation  of  international  law  he 
should  at  least  have  been  sufficiently  astute  to  insert 
after  the  words  "in  the  afternoon  of  August  ist"  the 
further  words  "before  5  o'clock."  Only  in  such  a  case 
would  it  have  been  possible  to  speak  of  an  attack,  and 
consequently  of  a  state  of  defence.  If  the  frontier  was 
crossed  only  after  the  declaration  of  war,  it  was  no 
longer  an  attack,  but  a  natural  and  justifiable  conse- 
quence of  the  state  of  war  which  we  had  brought  about. 

On  this  point  also  we  can  again  dispose  of  the  Chan- 
cellor by  means  of  his  own  memorial.  What  he  asserts, 
even  if  it  were  true — which  is  still  to  be  proved — in  no 
way  supports  the  conclusions  which  he  draws,  and  the 
theory  of  defence  collapses  miserably  like  a  house  of 
cards. 

And  in  arriving  at  this  conclusion  I  have  left  com- 
pletely aside  the  question  whether  it  is  in  any  way  pos- 
sible from  such  collisions  on  the  frontier  to  draw  the 
conclusion  that  attacks  have  been  intentionally  made  by 
the  neighbouring  State.  Such  inferences  cannot,  of 
course,  be  drawn.  When  nations  are  opposed  to  each 
other  in  arms,  and,  indeed,  even  in  time  of  peace  without 
mobilisation  when  there  is  merely  a  state  of  tension 
between  neighbouring  States,  experience  shows  that 
crossings  of  the  frontier,  collisions  between  advance- 
posts,  and  similar  incidents  constantly  take  place.  These 
are  occurrences  which  reasonable  men  view  as  they  de- 
serve to  be  viewed,  as  unimportant  incidents  for  which 
neither  of  the  States  concerned  can  be  held  responsible. 
The  supreme  military  command  is,  in  such  a  case,  in 
no  way  responsible,  for  incidents  of  this  nature  invari- 
ably arise  through  the  arbitrary  action  of  subordinate 
officers  without — indeed  in  most  cases  contrary  to — the 
instructions  of  their  superior  officers.     This  is,  indeed. 


THE    CRIME  213 

the  first  occasion  in  the  history  of  war  in  which  such  a 
frontier  incident  has  been  interpreted  as  an  intentional 
attack  by  a  neighbouring  State  and  the  people  have 
been  deluded  into  the  idea  that  they  are  in  a  state  of 
defence.  The  most  remarkable  feature  in  the  whole 
business  is,  however,  as  we  have  said,  that  there  was 
not  even  an  illegitimate  passage  of  the  frontier,  if  this 
only  took  place  after  5  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of 
August  1st. 

Equally  threadbare  are  the  assertions  which  are  ad- 
vanced with  the  object  of  construing  an  attack  from 
the  side  of  France. 

The  declaration  of  war  against  France  took  place  on 
August  3rd  at  6.45  p.m.  The  letter  from  Herr  von 
Schoen,  containing  the  declaration  of  war,  bases  it  on 
the  following  grounds :  "A  certain  number  of  flagrantly 
hostile  acts  committed  on  German  territory  by  French 
military  aviators,  several  of  these  have  openly  violated 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  flying  over  the  territory 
of  that  country;  one  has  attempted  to  destroy  buildings 
near  Wesel;  others  have  been  seen  in  the  district  of  the 
Eifel,  one  has  thrown  bombs  on  the  railway  near  Carls- 
ruhe and  Nuremburg."  ^ 

French  military  aviators  who  had  "openly"  passed 
over  Belgium  are  thus  in  this  case  alleged  to  be  the 
guilty  persons.  In  the  case  of  France  it  was  impossible 
to  suggest  that  the  mobilisation  amounted  to  a  menace, 
since  the  White  Book  itself  is  obliged  to  admit  that 
France  mobilised  at  the  same  time  as  we  did.^  Since 
it  was  then  of  no  avail  to  assert  here,  as  in  the  case  of 
Russia,  the  existence  of  a  menace,  it  was  necessary  for 
the  Government  to  restrict  themselves,  in  the  case  of 
France,  to  saying  that  Germany  had  actually  been  at- 
tacked.   According  to  the  declaration  of  war,  the  actual 

*  Yellow  Book,  No.  147. 
'White  Book,  p.  413. 


'214  I   ACCUSE! 

attack  was  effected  by  military  aviators,  who  were  fur- 
ther perceived  to  have  crossed  over  Belgium.  How 
anyone  can  tell  by  looking  at  an  aviator  who  drops 
bombs  on  Wesel,  Carlsruhe,  or  Nuremburg  that  he  came 
from  Belgium  remains  a  secret  locked  in  the  breasts  of 
the  gentlemen  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  It  is,  however, 
very  interesting  to  observe  how  Herr  von  Schoen's 
bomb-throwing  aviators  are  transfomied  by  Herr  von 
Below-Saleske  into  "dirigibles"  (see  the  memorandum 
of  his  interview  on  August  3rd  with  the  Belgian  Foreign 
Office^),  and  how  further  in  the  Chancellor's  speech 
of  August  4th  they  become  "cavalry  patrols  and  French 
infantry  detachments"  breaking  into  the  territory  of  the 
Empire.^ 

What,  wc  may  ask,  really  took  place?  Did  the  French 
merely  send  across  aviators,  as  Herr  von  Schoen  main- 
tains, or  dirigibles  as  Herr  von  Below-Saleske  says,  or 
companies  and  cavalry  patrols  as  the  Chancellor  asserts  ? 
An  English  proverb  which  the  Empress  Frederick  was 
in  the  habit  of  quoting  tells  us  that  "A  liar  should 
have  a  good  memory."  The  German  diplomatists  lie, 
but  unfortunately  they  have  a  bad  memory.  The  con- 
tradiction between  the  statements  of  these  three  gentle- 
men is  sufficient  to  prove  that  all  these  French  attacks 
are  imaginary.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  Germans  who  were 
the  aggressors,  not  merely  because  they  declared  war 
against  France — which  even  if  a  crime  was,  at  any  rate, 
within  their  rights  under  international  law — ^but  also 
because  they  had  violated  French  territory  days  before 
the  declaration  of  war.  This  fact  is  proved,  not  only 
by  French  assertions,  the  credibility  of  which  might  be 
disputed,  but  also  by  German  confessions,  which  are 
of  course  unintentional.  As  early  as  July  30th  and 
again  on  August  2nd  the  French  Government  lodged 

^  Grey  Book,  No.  21. 

*  Collected  Documents,  p.  438. 


THE    CRIME  215 

complaints  in  Berlin  with  regard  to  quite  definite  oc- 
currences of  this  nature  ^ :  at  Delle,  near  Bel  fort,  the 
French  custom  house  was  twice  fired  upon  by  German 
soldiers;  north  of  this  town  two  patrols  of  mounted 
Jägers  crossed  the  frontier  and  advanced  as  far  as  the 
villages  of  Joncherey  and  Baron;  their  officer  shot  a 
French  soldier  in  the  head,  and  his  men  carried  off  some 
French  horses.  On  the  same  day,  August  2nd,  German 
troops  violated  French  territory  at  Ciry  and  Longwy, 
and  marched  against  Fort  Longwy,  &c. 

These  are  some  of  the  French  complaints.  That  there 
must  be  some  truth  in  all  this  is  clear  from  the  Chan- 
cellor's speech  of  August  4th.  Herr  von  Bethmann  ex- 
pressly admits  one  of  the  French  complaints  (crossing 
of  the  frontier  by  a  patrol,  and  the  occurrence  of  a  con- 
flict) on  the  ground  of  the  report  of  the  German  General 
Staff.^  One  may  reasonably  suspect  that  other  viola- 
tions of  the  frontier  "against  express  orders,"  as  Herr 
von  Bethmann  puts  it,  also  took  place.  This  suspicion 
appears  all  the  more  reasonable,  and  indeed  becomes  a 
certainty,  when  we  read  the  concluding  sentence  of  the 
telegram  sent  on  August  ist  by  the  Emperor  William 
to  King  George :  "I  hope  that  France  will  not  be  nerv- 
ous. The  troops  on  my  frontier  are  at  this  moment 
being  kept  back  by  telegraph  and  by  telephone  from 
crossing  the  French  frontier."  ^  This  telegram  proves 
two  things : — 

(i)  that  France  on  August  ist  had  not  yet  become 
nervous ; 

(2)  that  the  German  troops  on  August  ist,  that  is 
to  say  tzvo  days  before  the  declaration  of  war,  would 
have  crossed  the  French  frontier,  if  they  had  not  been 
kept  back  by  telegraph  and  by  telephone. 

*  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  106,  136,  139. 
"  Collected  Documents,  p.  438. 
"  Collected  Documents,  p.  510. 


216  I    ACCUSE! 

The  fact  that  they  were  thus  kept  back  was  caused 
by  the  negotiations  which  took  place  at  the  last  hour 
with  England.  Thus  had  it  not  been  for  these  negotia- 
tions German  troops  zvould  have  penetrated  into  France 
en  masse  forty-eight  hours  before  the  declaration  of  war. 

What  then  becomes  of  the  assertion  of  the  Chan- 
cellor that  France  broke  the  peace,  and  that,  in  fact, 
she  attacked  us?  The  statement  does  not  deserve 
credence  because  of  the  triple  contradiction  between  the 
various  statements  constituting  the  charge,  and  in  any 
case  it  remains  unproved.  On  the  other  hand,  the  coun- 
ter-assertion of  France,  that  we  were  the  aggressors 
and  the  violators  of  the  frontier,  is  credible  because  it 
is  in  itself  free  from  contradiction,  because  it  specifies 
in  the  most  detailed  manner  the  time,  the  place,  and 
the  circumstances  of  the  cases  cited,  because  the  Ger- 
man General  Staff  itself  admits  one  of  these  frontier 
violations,  and  because  the  telegram  of  the  Emperor 
admits  that  even  violations  of  the  frontier  en  masse  were 
contemplated. 

The  French  Government,  on  the  other  hand,  have 
strictly  denied  the  charges  brought  against  them,  and, 
above  all,  by  fixing  the  ten-kilometre  zone  they  gave 
proof  of  their  sincere  intention  to  avoid  violations  of 
the  frontier. 

In  my  opinion  the  objective  investigation  of  the  facts 
can  lead  only  to  the  acquittal  of  France  and  to  the 
condemnation  of  Germany.  And  this  view  is  strength- 
ened if  the  previous  course  of  diplomatic  negotiations 
and  the  attitude  of  the  two  parties  is  taken  into  con- 
sideration. May  we  not  assume  that  perhaps  the  doc- 
trine of  Bernhardi  was  followed  in  the  measures  taken 
by  Germany,  that  the  cards  had  to  be  so  shuffled  that 
their  opponents  would  be  so  provoked  that  a  declaration 
of  war  was  bound  to  come  from  their  side?  May  it 
not  be  assumed  that  it  was  hoped  in  this  way  to  achieve 


THE    CRIME  217 

the  double  advantage  of  moving  the  odium  on  to  the 
shoulders  of  their  opponents,  and  of  bringing  the  case 
under  the  terms  of  the  alliance  with  Italy? 

One  thing,  at  any  rate,  is  certain  :  the  assertion  that 
we  were  attacked  by  France,  and  were  therefore  in  a 
state  of  defence,  is  an  invention  fit  to  be  placed  along- 
side of  the  corresponding  assertion  made  with  regard 
to  Russia.  No  one  attacked  us.  No  one  placed  us  in 
a  state  of  defence.  This  war  is  hut  a  pseudo-war  of 
liberation. 

What  took  place  now,  after  the  outbreak  of  war  with 
Russia  and  France,  has  no  connection  with  the  central 
question:  "Who  is  responsible  for  the  European^ war?" 
The  European  war  was  there,  as  soon  as  Germany  and 
Austria  on  the  one  side  stood  opposed  to  France  and 
Russia  on  the  other.  No  one  can  become  guilty  of  an 
act  after  it  is  committed.  Guilt  can,  however,  be  in- 
creased in  so  far  as  the  act  committed  may  involve  in 
its  train  the  commission  of  other  acts.  The  more  por- 
tentous these  further  acts  are,  the  greater  and  heavier 
will  be  the  load  of  guilt. 

THE     VIOLATION     OF     BELGIAN     NEUTRALITY     AND     THE 
PARTICIPATION    OF    ENGLAND    IN    THE    WAR 

After  having  presented  to  Belgium  on  the  evening  of 
August  2nd  an  ultimatum  in  which  a  free  passage 
through  this  neutral  country  was  demanded  and  receiv- 
ing a  refusal,  Germany  invaded  Belgian  territory  on  the 
morning  of  August  4th. 

The  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  established  by  the 
Treaty  of  London  of  1839,  and  guaranteed  for  all  time 
by  England,  France,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia. 
Article  7  of  the  Treaty  of  London  provides  that  Belgium 
shall  be  an  independent  and  perpetually  neutral  State, 
and  that  it  shall  maintain  its  neutrality  against  all  other 


gl8  I    ACCUSE! 

States.  The  first  and  most  obvious  duty  of  a  neutral 
State  is  to  refuse  to  belligerent  parties  a  right  of  passage 
through  its  territory.  This  is  one  of  the  fundamental 
principles  of  international  law,  and  it  has  been  again 
formally  confinned,  with  the  concurrence  of  all  the 
Powers,  by  the  Hague  Conference  of  1907.  Article  5 
of  the  Hague  Convention  on  the  rights  and  duties  of 
neutral  States  prescribes  that  "A  neutral  State  ought 
not  to  allow  on  its  territory  any  of  the  acts  referred  to 
in  Articles  2  to  4."  Article  2  provides  that  "Belligerents 
are  forbidden  to  move  across  the  territory  of  a  neutral 
Power  troops  or  convoys,  either  of  munitions  of  war  or 
of  supplies."  Lastly,  Article  10  of  the  same  Convention 
declares  that  the  fact  of  a  neutral  Power  repelling,  even 
by  force,  attacks  on  its  neutrality  cannot  be  regarded 
as  a  hostile  act. 

This  is  the  legal  position.  Herr  von  Bethmann  seeks 
to  avoid  the  consequences  which  flow  from  the  legal 
position  by  constructing  in  this  case  also  the  case  of 
Defence,  which  he  has  already  advanced  against  France 
and  Russia. 

I  believe  that  I  have  proved  that  as  against  France 
and  Russia  the  state  of  defence  did  not  arise,  but  that 
it  is  merely  a  German  invention.  If  this  is  correct,  then 
there  can  also  have  been  no  state  of  defence  against 
Belgium,  for  here  at  least  it  is  not  asserted  that  Belgium 
had  attacked  us  by  military  aviators,  infantry,  and 
cavalry.  The  state  of  defence  against  Belgium  stands 
and  falls  with  the  state  of  defence  against  the  other 
countries  already  mentioned,  and  is  thus  to  be  denied 
on  grounds  of  fact. 

But  even  if  Gennany  had  in  fact  been  in  a  state  of 
defence  against  France  and  Russia,  the  wrong  done  to 
Belgium  would  not  thereby  have  been  diminished.  The 
state  of  defence  {Notwehr)  against  enemies  in  war 
would,  it  is  true,  in  general  justify  an  act  of  defence 


THE    CRIME  219 

(Verteidigung),  but  under  no  circumstances  would  it 
justify  an  act  of  defence  involving  injury  to  a  third 
party,  that  is  to  say,  a  breach  of  neutrality. 

The  criminal  code  defines  a  state  of  defence  as  "that 
defence  (Verteidigung)  which  is  necessary  to  ward  off 
from  oneself  or  from  another  an  actual  attack  in  viola- 
tion of  the  law."  A  transgression  of  the  limits  thus 
indicated  can  only  claim  Immunity  from  punishment  if 
the  actor  "in  consternation,  alami,  or  terror  exceeded 
the  limits  of  defence  (Verteidigung)."  As  this  defi- 
nition of  the  state  of  defence  is  the  only  one  which  we 
possess  in  our  laws,  and  as,  moreover,  it  corresponds  to 
all  logical  requirements,  we  may  be  permitted  to  apply 
the  principles  so  enunciated  to  the  actions  for  which 
the  German  Chancellor  bears  the  responsibility.  Thus 
even  if  we  assume  that  Germany  was  in  a  state  of  de- 
fence, it  was  nevertheless  open  to  her  to  take  only  such 
actions  in  her  defence  as  were  unconditionally  necessary, 
not,  however,  such  actions  as  were  convenient  or  advan- 
tageous for  her.  Under  no  circumstances  can  the  pas- 
sage through  Belgium  be  said  to  have  been  necessary 
for  her,  for  indeed  the  whole  of  the  eastern  frontier 
of  France  from  Verdun  to  Bel  fort  stood  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  German  army.  It  was,  of  course,  more 
advantageous  and  convenient  to  avoid  this  strong  line 
of  fortresses,  and  to  fall  into  France  from  the  north. 
But  advantage  and  convenience  do  not  form  the  stand- 
ard by  which  the  limits  of  the  state  of  defence  are  de- 
termined; on  the  contrary%  the  only  test  is  necessity.  If 
anyone  wishes  to  maintain  that  we  were  in  a  condition 
of  consternation,  alarm,  or  terror,  then  the  transgres- 
sion of  the  limits  of  the  state  of  defence  would  be  for- 
given to  us.  But  I  was  under  the  impression  that 
we  Germans  fear  only  God,  and  not  the  French.  So 
that  even  this  objection  does  not  excuse  us. 

To  this  there  must  be  added  the  further  ground  a)- 


UW  I    ACCUSE! 

ready  pointed  out,  which  must  unconditionally  lead  to 
our  condemnation :  the  state  of  defence  never  excuses 
the  violation  of  the  rights  of  a  third  party.  The  state 
of  defence  against  France  could  not  excuse  the  viola- 
tion of  the  rights  of  Belgium. 

From  every  point  of  view  then  we  are  In  the  wrong, 
on  grounds  both  of  fact  and  of  law.  Viewed  from  the 
political  point  of  view,  the  matter  is  even  worse  for 
us.  What  is  the  meaning  and  the  purpose  of  the  neu- 
tralisation of  a  small  State  which  an  unrighteous  Provi- 
dence has  planted  in  the  middle  of  great  States  and  made 
the  natural  cock-pit  for  their  struggles?  The  purpose 
can  only  be  to  protect  this  State  in  war,  not  in  peace, 
when  it  needs  no  protection.  If,  however,  when  war 
comes  each  of  the  neighbouring  States  is  justified  in 
falling  into  the  neutral  State,  on  the  ground  that  it  is 
in  a  state  of  defence — in  a  general  sense,  although  not 
in  a  juridical  sense,  every  war  is  a  state  of  defence — 
then  the  whole  process  of  neutralisation  has  no  longer 
any  purpose,  and  is,  in  fact,  nothing  but  a  *'scrap  of 
paper,"  as  the  Chancellor  said  to  Sir  E.  Goschen.  The 
dictum  that  "necessity  knows  no  law"  may  he  used  to 
justify  any  crime.  The  precise  purpose  of  a  treaty 
of  neutrality  is,  however,  that  of  making  necessity  sub- 
ject to  the  commands  of  law.  Its  object  is  to  replace 
the  maxim:  "La  force  prime  le  droit"  by  the  contrary 
maxim:    "Le  droit  prime   la   force." 

Now  it  is  true  that  the  attempt  has  been  made  to 
justify  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  on  two 
grounds.     It  is  maintained  : — 

(i)  that  France  would  have  invaded  Belgium  if  we 
had  not  anticipated  her,  and 

(2)  that  Belgium  long  ago  concluded  military  agree- 
ments with  France  and  England  with  the  view  of  tak- 
ing common  action  against  Germany. 

Both  these  arguments  are  entirely  unsupported.   There 


THE    CRIME  221 

is  a  complete  absence  of  any  proof  that  France  intended 
to  invade  Belgium. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  is  known  to  have  addressed  on  July 
31st  an  inquiry  in  identical  terms  to  France  and  to  Ger- 
many with  a  view  to  ascertaining  whether,  in  the  event 
of  a  war,  they  would  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
so  long  as  no  other  Power  violated  it.^  The  answer  of 
France  was  received  without  delay,  and  was  an  uncon- 
ditional affirmative.^  The  answer  of  Herr  von  Jagow, 
on  the  other  hand,  was  one  of  the  many  awkward  ex- 
cuses which  this  child  of  misfortune  had  throughout 
the  whole  affair  to  produce  by  command  from  above. 
He  had  to  consult  the  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor 
before  he  could  possibly  answer.  He  was  very  doubtful 
whether  they  would  return  any  answer  at  all,  since  any 
reply  they  might  give  could  not  but  disclose  a  certain 
amount  of  their  plan  of  campaign  in  the  event  of  war 
ensuing.^  Herr  von  Jagow  did  not  neglect  even  on  this 
occasion  to  draw  attention  to  a  presumed  hostile  act 
of  Belgium,  namely,  an  embargo  on  a  consignment  of 
corn  for  Germany — an  incident  which  is  explained  as 
perfectly  correct  by  the  Belgian  Government  in  their 
Grey  Book.* 

This  early  hint  on  the  part  of  Jagow  of  the  hostility 
of  Belgium  was  merely  the  prelude  to  the  campaign 
which  was  later  systematically  pursued,  and  which 
reached  its  culminating  point  in  the  assertion  of  the 
Chancellor  that  a  violation  of  neutrality  had  not  in  fact 
taken  place,  since  Belgium,  in  consequence  of  military 
conventions  with  England  and  France  had  already  sacri- 
ficed her  neutrality  before  the  German  invasion.  This 
campaign  was  opened  after  the  conquest  of   Belgium, 

'Blue  Book,  No.  114. 
"Blue  Book,  No.  125. 
'  Blue  Book,  No.  122. 
*Grey  Book,  No.  79,  Enclosures. 


222  I    ACCUSE! 

and  even  to-day  it  is  being  continued  with  unabated 
energy. 

On  what  is  this  charge  based?  It  is,  in  the  first 
place,  a  matter  for  surprise  that  the  Chancellor  in  his 
speech  in  the  Reichstag  on  August  4th  had  not  the 
slightest  information  about  the  sale  of  Belgium's  soul. 
In  this  speech  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  was 
explained  exclusively  by  reference  to  the  intended  in- 
vasion on  the  part  of  France,  and  against  Belgium  her- 
self not  the  shadow  of  a  reproach  was  raised.  On  the 
contrary,  Herr  von  Bethmann  declared  that  the  invasion 
of  Belgium  was  a  "wrong"  which  they  would  endeavour 
to  make  good  later  on.  If  the  facts  now  asserted  were 
true,  is  it  not  remarkable  that  they  so  completely  escaped 
the  notice  of  our  Ambassador  in  Brussels?  At  least  a 
suspicion  ought  to  have  arisen,  and  should  have  been 
conveyed  to  Berlin  through  the  Brussels  Embassy.  Had 
this  happened,  the  Chancellor  would  certainly  not  have 
failed  to  bring  forward  as  early  as  August  4th  this 
weighty  argument  in  favour  of  our  violation  of  Bel- 
gian neutrality;  for  in  other  matters  he  was  certainly 
free  enough  with  unproved  assertions. 

We  may  then  assume  as  a  certainty  that  in  Berlin 
nothing  was  known  of  treacherous  agreements  of  this 
character.  It  was  necessary  to  ferret  about  among  the 
Belgian  archives  after  the  capture  of  Brussels  before  it 
was  possible  to  get  on  the  track  of  the  treachery  of  the 
Belgians.  The  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  was 
then  in  a  position  to  publish  some  documents  from  the 
archives  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff  which,  in  the  view 
of  the  German  Government,  were  supposed  to  reveal 
the  fact  that  a  plan  of  war  against  Germany  had  been 
concluded  between  Belgium  and  England.  If  the  docu- 
ments are  authentic  and  complete — which  has  yet  to  be 
proved — it  is  true  that  they  show  that  certain  conver- 
sations took  place  between  Belgian  officers  and  English 


THE    CRIME  223 

military  attaches  on  the  co-operation  which  might  ulti- 
mately take  place  between  England  and  Belgium;  on 
the  other  hand,  they  incontestably  prove  that  this  co- 
operation would  only  take  place  in  the  event  of  Ger- 
many violating  Belgian  neutrality.  The  Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine  Zeitung  does  not  publish  in  extenso  the 
documents  which  were  found,  in  itself  a  suspicious  cir- 
cumstance, but  only  gives  extracts  from  their  contents. 
But  even  these  extracts  cannot  conceal  the  fact  that 
the  disembarkation  of  English  troops  in  Belgium  was 
only  to  take  place  after  the  violation  of  her  neutrality 
by  Germany.  An  official  Note  of  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment issued  from  Le  Havre  on  December  9th,  19 14, 
incontrovertibly  establishes  the  truth  of  this  assertion.^ 
The  same  procedure  is  thus  adopted  in  this  case  as  was 
done  with  reference  to  the  military  discussions  between 
England  and  France;  discussions  to  meet  the  case  of  an 
attack  from  Germany  are  denounced  as  a  conspiracy  for 
a  common  attack,  defensive  intentions  are  falsely  repre- 
sented as  offensive.  Germany,  whose  plans  were  known 
and  feared  by  all,  is  represented  as  the  innocent  victim 
of  the  evil  designs  of  others,  whereas  in  fact  the  others 
were  only  concerned  that  they  themselves  should  not 
fall  a  victim  to  German  plans  of  aggression. ^ 

'  This  note,  which  has  been  passed  over  in  complete  silence  by  the 
German  Press,  has  been  published  everywhere  in  the  press  of  for- 
eign countries.  The  document  of  April  loth,  1906,  published  in  the 
Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  is  entirely  consistent  with  the 
contents  of  this  note.  It  contains  the  express  remark :  "The  entry 
of  the  English  into  Belgium  zvoiild  only  take  place  after  the  viola- 
tion of  our  neutrality  by  Gernmny."  This  in  itself  at  once  con- 
futes all  reproaches  to  the  effect  that  an  offensive  agreement  against 
Germany  existed  between  England  and  Belgium. 

^The  Dutch  "Agence  Van  Diaz"  of  November  17th,  1914,  quotes 
the  words  of  a  speech  which  Broqueville,  the  Belgian  Minister  for 
War,  delivered  in  January,  1913,  in  a  secret  session  of  the  Belgian 
Chamber,  and  in  which  the  German  plans  for  the  invasion  of  Bel- 


2U  I   ACCUSE! 

Why  did  similar  discussions  not  take  place  between 
Belgium  and  Germany  to  provide  for  the  case  of  a 
French  attack?  The  answer  is  quite  simple.  It  was 
confidently  felt  that  there  was  no  need  to  fear  a  French 
attack.  Experience  has  proved  that  the  view  so  formed 
was  correct,  and  that  a  just  estimate  both  of  France 
and  of  Germany  had  been  framed. 

The  English  Foreign  Office  has  published  a  letter  of 
Sir  Edward  Grey's  addressed  to  his  Ambassador  at 
Brussels  on  April  7th,  191 3,  in  which  Grey  dismisses 
every  idea  of  being  the  first  to  violate  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium.  No  British  Government  would  do  so,  and 
public  opinion  in  England  would  never  approve  of  this 
step.  The  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  by  England 
would  be  not  only  a  wrong,  but  a  great  folly,  since  it 
would  afford  Germany  a  motive  and  a  justification  for 
following  the  same  procedure.  So  long  as  the  neutral- 
ity of  Belgium  or  any  other  neutral  countries  was  not 
violated  by  any  other  Power,  England  would  never  send 
troops  into  their  territory.  This  letter  was  written 
fifteen  months  before  the  outbreak  of  war,  and  was 
therefore  not  written  with  the  express  purpose  of  cre- 
ating a  favourable  position  for  England  in  the  present 
controversy.  It  therefore  deserves  credence  in  every 
respect,  and  is,  moreover,  confirmed  by  the  events  of 
the  last  months.^ 

After  the  German  ultimatum  had  been  handed  to 
the  Belgian  Foreign  Minister  at  7  o'clock  in  the  evening 
of  August  2nd,  the  French  Government  on  the  morning 

gium  were  revealed  in  full  detail  and  put  forward  as  the  ground 
for  new  military  requirements. 

*  For  this  and  for  all  other  matters  affecting  the  Belgian  question 
reference  should  be  made  to  the  work  written  by  M.  Emile  Wax- 
weiler,  Member  of  the  Royal  Belgian  Academy,  La  Belgique  neutre 
et  loyale — a  volume  distinguished  both  by  its  detail  and  its  scientific 
objectivity.     (Lausanne.     Payot,  1915.) 


THE    CRIME  225 

of  August  3rd  offered  to  the  Belgian  Government, 
through  her  mihtary  attache,  the  support  of  five  French 
Army  Corps.  Belgium,  nevertheless,  declined  this  offer 
of  support,  although  she  had  already  rejected  the  de- 
mands of  Germany,  and  must  have  been  expecting  every 
moment  the  violent  entry  of  German  forces.  Particular 
interest  attaches  to  one  passage  in  the  answer  of  Belgium 
to  Germany.  The  German  Government  had  explained 
their  demand  for  a  free  passage  by  reference  to  the 
intention  of  France  to  attack  Germany  through  Bel- 
gian territory.  The  Belgian  Government  decisively  re- 
jects the  reasons  thus  assigned,  and  adds  thereto: 

"The  intentions  attributed  to  France  by  Germany 
are  in  contradiction  to  the  formal  declarations  made 
to  us  on  August  ist  in  the  name  of  the  French 
Government. 

"Moreover,  if,  contrary  to  our  expectation,  Bel- 
gian neutrality  should  be  violated  by  France,  Bel- 
gium intends  to  fulfil  her  international  obligations, 
and  the  Belgian  army  would  offer  the  most  vigorous 
resistance  to  the  invader"  (Belgian  Grey  Book,  No. 
22), 

Belgium  thus  declares  that  she  is  prepared  to  defend 
her  neutrality  against  France  zvith  the  same  resolution 
as  against  Germany,  but  that  she  considers  that  the 
possibility  of  a  French  attack  is  excluded  in  view  of  the 
tormal  declaration  given  by  France.  Does  that  sound 
like  a  secret  alliance?  Further,  on  August  3rd  King 
Albert  addressed  to  the  King  of  England  a  telegram  in 
which  he  made  an  appeal  for  diplomatic,  not  for  mili- 
tary, intervention.  Does  that  sound  like  a  secret  mili- 
tary convention  ?  ^  Sir  Francis  Villiers,  the  English 
Ambassador,  handed  on  August  4th  to  Davignon,  the 
Belgian  Minister,  a   Note,   in  which   England   declared 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  25. 


226  I    ACCUSE! 

herself  ready  in  the  event  of  a  German  attack  to  render 
Belgium  joint  assistance  with  France  and  Russia, 
"should  Belgium  so  desire."  ^ 

Should  Belgium  so  desire!  In  making  this  limitation 
^England  indeed  fell  short  of  her  international  rights 
and  duties.  It  is  a  recognised  principle  in  international 
law,  and  is,  moreover,  a  principle  based  on  logic,  that 
in  the  case  of  a  collective  guarantee,  such  as  the  Belgian 
treaty,  each  guarantor,  in  the  event  of  neutrality  being 
violated  by  another  State,  is  at  once  entitled,  in  her 
own  right,  to  assume  protection  of  the  neutral  State, 
and  indeed  has  a  duty  towards  the  other  guaranteeing 
Powers  to  adopt  this  course  (Bluntschli,  Völkerrecht, 
VI.,  Nos.  432  and  440).  Even  without  awaiting  an 
expression  of  the  desire  of  Belgium,  England  was  en- 
titled to  intervene  with  armed  force  for  the  protection 
of  the  violated  neutrality.  In  making  her  intervention 
dependent  on  the  desire  of  Belgium,  England  manifested 
a  measure  of  circumspection  to  which  she  .was  not 
pledged  in  international  law,  and  she  proved  beyond 
dispute  that  there  was  no  kind  of  previous  agreement 
between  England  and  Belgium  directed  against  Germany. 

It  was  not  until  August  5th  that  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment Issued  to  the  Great  Powers  a  fomial  appeal  which 
led  to  their  actual  Intervention.^ 

The  weakness  of  the  Gemian  reproach  that  Belgium 
had  already  sold  her  neutrality  Is  thus  completely  proved. 
But  even  If  the  reproach  were  in  itself  justified,  it  would 
furnish  no  manner  of  excuse  for  Germany.  The  defence 
of  the  German  Government  is  suggestive  of  that  of  a 
thieving  murderer  who  seeks  to  excuse  his  action  by 
asserting  that  the  murdered  man  was  a  bad  lot  who 
had  himself  gained  by  theft  the  property  which  he  had 
stolen.     True,  If  he  was  aware  of  the  depravity  of  his 

'  '  Grey  Book,  No.  28.  " 

'Grey  Book,  No.  42. 


THE    CRIME  g27 

victim  before  he  committed  the  murder  he  might  be 
allowed,  not  immunity,  but  the  benefit  of  mitigating 
circumstances.  But  if  he  only  learns  afterwards  what 
sort  of  a  man  he  has  murdered,  his  act  morally  remains 
the  same,  whether  his  victim  was  a  devil  or  an  angel. 
Germany  invaded  a  neutral  country.  Later,  she  pro- 
fesses to  have  learned  that  this  country  was  no  longer 
entirely  neutral ;  she  cannot  on  these  grounds  be  allowed 
the  advantage  of  mitigating  circumstances. 

This  is  the  moral  aspect  of  the  question.  Let  us  now 
consider  the  practical  side.  Let  us  for  the  moment  as- 
sume that  Belgium,  so  far  as  the  obligations  of  neu- 
trality imposed  upon  her  are  concerned,  had  been  "a 
child,  no  angel  is  so  pure" ;  let  us  assume  that  she  had 
never  entered  into  even  the  slightest  military  defensive 
discussions  with  her  neighbours.  Would  this  in  any 
way  have  prevented  our  inzmsion  of  Belgium f  Would 
this  have  induced  us  to  leave  in  their  despatch-boxes 
the  plans  of  our  General  Staff  which  had  been  ready  for 
years?  Would  we  in  this  case  have  felt  constrained  to 
take  up  our  position  in  front  of  the  impregnable  line 
of  fortresses  from  Verdun  to  Belfort?  No  one  will 
venture  to  maintain  this.  All  the  declamations  and  pub- 
lications on  the  crimes  committed  by  Belgium  thus 
merely  represent  so  much  waste  of  paper  and  printer's 
ink.  We  were  resolved  to  overrun  Belgium,  either  in 
kindness  or  by  force  of  arms,  whether  she  behaved  well 
or  ill  towards  us.  That  is  the  essential  point.  From  this 
reproach  no  rain  will  ever  wash  us  clean,  and  the  more 
we  blacken  our  victim  after  the  event,  the  more  damning 
will  be  the  judgment  which  the  world  will  pass  upon  us. 

It  would  appear  that  the  effect  which  our  behaviour 
towards  Belgium  has  exercised  on  the  public  opinion  of 
the  whole  world,  and  is  still  exercising  in  a  daily  in- 
creased measure,  is  not  yet  properly  realised  in  Ger- 
many.    It  is  necessary  to  live  abroad  in  order  to  see 


228  I    ACCUSE! 

and  grasp  this  effect.  It  shows  itself  even  more  strongly 
in  neutral  foreign  countries  than  in  those  countries 
which  are  at  war  with  us.  In  particular,  the  small  coun- 
tries which  are  adjacent  to  great  States,  Switzerland, 
Holland,  and  Denmark,  feel  that  the  fate  which  befel 
the  unfortunate  Belgium  might  have  been,  or  may  In 
future  be,  theirs.  The  great  neutral  countries,  how- 
ever, throughout  every  rank  of  society,  are  seized  with 
deep  commiseration  when  they  read  of  the  devastations 
brought  upon  this  prosperous  small  country,  on  these 
ancient  and  glorious  homes  of  art,  on  these  diligent  and 
laborious  centres  of  industry,  when  they  see  in  their  illus- 
trated papers  the  fearful  pictures  of  fire  and  destruc- 
tion, of  misery  and  homelessness,  of  smoking  villages 
and  towns,  when  they  see  families  wandering  about  on 
the  streets,  who  in  hunger  and  penury  beg  for  bread 
from  the  German  soldiers.  The  innocent  country  has 
fallen  a  victim  to  the  barbarians.  That  is  how  the  world 
views  the  facts,  and  it  only  becomes  more  incensed 
when  the  authors  of  all  this  horror  seek  to  excuse  their 
actions  by  saying  that  once  upon  a  time  a  Belgian  officer 
had  a  consultation  with  an  English  military  attache 
with  regard  to  the  steps  which  might  ultimately  be  taken 
to  defend  the  country  in  the  event  of  a  German  in- 
vasion. 

And  to  commiseration  there  is  added  admiration — 
admiration  for  this  small,  heroic  nation  who,  with  sword 
in  hand,  courageously  defends  her  independence  and 
her  honour  against  the  superior  forces  of  the  intruder. 
"Belgium,"  we  read  in  the  answer  to  the  German  ulti- 
matum, "has  always  been  faithful  to  her  international 
obligations;  she  has  carried  out  her  duties  in  a  spirit  of 
loyal  impartiality,  and  she  has  left  nothing  undone  to 
maintain  and  enforce  respect  for  her  neutrality. 

"The  attack  upon  her  independence  with  which  the 
German  Government  threaten  her  constitutes  a  flagrant 


THE    CRIME 

violation  of  international  law.  No  strategic  interest  jus- 
tifies such  a  violation  of  law. 

"The  Belgian  Government,  if  they  were  to  accept  the 
proposals  submitted  to  them,  would  sacrifice  the  hon- 
our of  the  nation  and  betray  their  duty  towards  Europe. 

"Conscious  of  the  part  which  Belgium  has  played  for 
more  than  eighty  years  in  the  civilisation  of  the  world, 
they  refuse  to  believe  that  the  independence  of  Belgium 
can  only  be  preserved  at  the  price  of  the  violation  of 
her  neutrality. 

"If  this  hope  is  disappointed,  the  Belgian  Government 
are  firmly  resolved  to  repel,  by  all  the  means  in  their 
power,  every  attack  upon  their  rights"  (Belgian  Grey 
Book,  No.  22). 

These  are  the  proud  words  with  which  a  free  nation 
defends  its  honour  and  its  independence. 

Even  Germany  is  not  without  an  understanding  of 
such  heroism  when  it  shows  itself  against  the  other  side. 
When,  on  the  same  day  as  that  on  which  German  troops 
invaded  Belgium,  the  Swiss  Government  informed  the 
Governments  of  belligerent  countries  of  its  resolution 
to  defend  by  all  possible  means  Its  neutrality  and  the 
inviolability  of  its  territory,  the  German  Government 
in  their  acknowledgment  expressed  their  sincere  satis- 
faction and  their  confidence  that  the  Confederation, 
"thanks  to  its  strong  army  and  the  unconquerable  de- 
termination of  the  whole  Swiss  people,  will  repel  any 
violation  of  Its  neutrality."  ^  What  in  the  case  of  Bel- 
gium was  a  crime  worthy  of  death,  because  it  was  di- 
rected against  Germany,  was  in  the  case  of  Switzerland 
a  highly  meritorious  proposal,  because  if  ever  the  mo- 
ment should  come  to  give  it  effect,  it  could  only  be 
directed  against  France. 

The  attitude  of  the  Belgian  Army  and  the  Belgian 
people  was  in  conformity  with  the  proud  words  in  which 
^  Waxweiler,  p.  52. 


230  I    ACCUSE! 

the  Belgian  Government  had  rejected  the  dishonouring 
suggestion  of  Germany. 

The  Belgians  have  defended  their  country  and  their 
fortresses  with  unconquerable  courage  and  with  gigantic 
sacrifices.  To-day  in  the  extreme  west  corner  of  Flan- 
ders they  still  continue  to  offer  a  desperate  resistance, 
under  the  personal  leadership  of  a  King  of  German 
blood,  married  to  a  German  princess — a  King  who  ex- 
poses himself  to  all  the  dangers  of  the  struggle.  It  is 
not  surprising  that  such  heroism  should  enkindle  the 
admiring  enthusiasm  of  the  whole  world.  This  is  the 
true  struggle  for  freedom  and  independence;  not  the 
counterfeit  struggle  which  is  instilled  into  the  deluded 
German  people. 

To  what  has  this  German  nation  come — a  nation 
which  in  the  past,  before  the  present  corruption,  had 
some  understanding  and  enthusiasm  for  noble  and  heroic 
actions?  Did  not  the  work  of  liberation  achieved  by 
the  Swiss  franc-tireur  William  Tell  inspire  our  greatest 
poet  to  his  noblest  drama?  Were  we  not  brought  up 
in  the  admiration  of  the  courage  of  the  small  against 
the  great,  of  the  struggle  of  the  Spartans  against  the 
Persians,  of  the  struggle  against  the  Spaniards  carried 
on  by  the  Dutch,  whose  rising  Schiller  described  with' 
such  deep  sympathy  and  whom  Goethe  immortalised  in 
Egmont?  And  what  are  we  doing  now,  we  Germans 
of  19 1 4,  who  see  and  experience  the  same  heroic  strug- 
gle of  the  same  people  against  us  the  oppressors?  Not 
a  word  of  sympathy  is  heard,  not  a  word  of  admira- 
tion, not  even  of  understanding.  Instead  of  this  we 
utter  slanders  and  accusations  intended  to  justify  our 
crime.  Let  any  one  read  the  appeal  issued  to  the  civil- 
ised world  signed  by  all  Germans  of  distinction.  Apart 
from  the  falsehood  that  Belgium  had  entered  into  a  con- 
spiracy with  France  and  England,  there  is  nothing  but 
purely   unproved   assertions   about   the   acts   of   franc- 


THE    CRIME  231 

tireurs,  the  mutilation  of  the  wounded,  the  murder  of 
doctors,  and  so  on. 

In  the  eyes  of  those  gentlemen  who,  a  few  years 
ago,  were  stirred  to  enthusiasm — and  rightly  so — at  the 
sight  of  the  heroic  struggle  of  the  small  Boer  nation 
against  the  might  of  England,  those  Belgians  who  are 
now  defending  their  Fatherland,  if  they  do  not  happen 
to  have  uniforms,  are  but  common  criminals,  who  may 
be  shot  like  mad  dogs.^  Have  you  quite  forgotten, 
you  leaders  of  the  German  spirit,  our  heroes  of  1813  in 
whose  honour  you  were  still  holding  banquets  and  de- 
livering enthusiastic  speeches  a  year  ago?  Were  not 
the  men  whom  you  celebrated  like  the  Belgians  of  to- 
day, the  nation  in  arms  throwing  themselves  with  and 
without  uniforms  against  the  intruder?  Who  will  ex- 
plain to  the  man  from  among  the  people  the  difference 
between  a  soldier  and  a  defender  of  the  Fatherland, 
between  civilians  and  men  in  uniform,  when  the  enemy 
is  in  the  land,  devastating  farmyards  and  crops,  driving 
away  cattle  and  provisions,  making  women  and  children 
roofless?  The  man  of  the  people  sees  only  the  enemy, 
the  housebreaker,  and  when  he  seizes  his  rifle  he  does 
not  care  a  brass  farthing  whether  he  is  wearing  a  coat 
with  shining  buttons  or  the  blue  smock  of  a  peasant. 
This  is  a  point  one  ought  to  understand,  and  it  is  a 
point  which  we  did  understand  in  the  past  while  we 
were  still  capable  of  enthusiasm  in  a  good  sense,  so  long 
as  our  enthusiasm  had  not  been  diverted  into  the  cor- 

'  Cardinal  Mercicr,  the  Archbishop  of  Malines,  in  his  pastoral 
letter  addressed  to  the  Belgian  people  on  Christmas,  1914,  states 
after  "careful  investigation"  that  in  his  diocese  13  priests,  and  in 
the  dioceses  of  Namur,  Tournai,  and  Liege,  30  priests  were  shot, 
and  in  all  cases  he  gives  their  names,  and  their  place  of  residence. 
In  Aerschot,  according  to  the  findings  of  Cardinal  Mercicr,  91  civil- 
ians, and  in  Louvain  and  the  surrounding  district,  176  civilians  were 
shot  or  burnt.  These  include  men  and  women,  people  of  advanced 
years,  as  well  as  children. 


232  I    ACCUSE! 

nipt  morass  of  national  pride  and  megalomania,  which 
is  constantly  associated  with  contempt  and  barbarism 
towards  others.  Especially  must  this  point  be  kept  in 
view  in  thinking  of  a  people  like  the  Belgians  who  had 
never  anticipated  a  war,  had  never  believed  themselves 
menaced  by  a  war,  and  for  a  hundred  years  had  never 
witnessed  a  war  within  their  frontiers.  These  facts 
have  to  be  grasped,  bearing  in  mind  that  men  are  men, 
and  that  our  actions  must  be  framed  accordingly. 

The  German  soldiers  were  certainly  free  to  protect 
themselves  against  underhand  attacks,  but  they  should 
have  kept  constantly  before  them  the  fact  that  their  as- 
sailants were  defending  the  highest  things  on  earth, 
their  house  and  their  hearth,  their  home  and  their 
Fatherland.  It  was  on  this  fact  that  they  ought  to  have 
based  their  counter-measures,  not  on  the  so-called  law 
of  war,  which  they  fashioned  for  themselves,  which  is 
nowhere  committed  to  writing,  and  nowhere  recognised. 
If  in  a  village  of  a  few  thousand  inhabitants  and  a  few 
hundred  houses  some  shots  are  fired  from  the  windows, 
perhaps  by  concealed  soldiers  and  not  by  civilians,  by 
what  right  do  we  burn  down  the  whole  village,  and 
place  a  number  of  the  male  inhabitants,  innocent  and 
guilty,  against  the  wall  and  shoot  them  dead?  If  you 
believe  it  necessary  for  your  protection — I  cannot  ad- 
mit in  this  case  a  right  of  punishment — burn  down  if 
you  like  the  individual  houses,  punish  the  individual 
civilians  whom  you  recognise  as  guilty,  but  spare  the 
village  and  spare  the  innocent.  That  is  the  least  de- 
manded by  justice,  if  indeed  we  can  speak  of  justice, 
in  favour  of  the  assailant  and  against  the  defender. 
What  they  are  opposing  to  you  is  the  true  state  of  de- 
fence, the  state  of  defence  of  the  French  and  the  Bel- 
gian citizens  against  the  German,  against  the  German 
intruder — the  state  of  defence  of  Belgium  and  France 
against  Gemiany.     Here  it  may  be  said  with  justice. 


THE    CRIME  Ä3S 

"Necessity  knows  no  law.  He  who  is  fighting  for  his 
highest  possession  can  only  consider  how  he  is  to  hack 
his  way  through."  This  sentence  of  the  Chancellor,  in 
itself  correct,  but  wrongly  applied  to  Germany,  is  ap- 
plicable to  our  opponents.  Only,  when  applied  to  them, 
it  is  unfortunately  inverted :  he  who  is  fighting  for  his 
highest  possession  is  placed  against  the  wall  and  shot 
dead. 

I  was  able  to  observe  in  a  picture  palace  in  Berlin 
shortly  after  the  outbreak  of  war  the  unspeakable  con- 
fusion of  thought  which  has  spread  throughout  Ger- 
many, Since  the  military  censor  allowed  only  patriotic 
subjects,  two  war  dramas  were  thrown  on  the  screen 
one  after  the  other.  The  first  represented  the  rising  of 
the  Tyrolese  in  1809  under  Andreas  Hofer,  and  the 
second  franc-tireur  scenes  from  the  war  of  1870.  In 
the  Tyrolese  drama  the  whole  nation  was  in  arms  against 
the  French  conqueror.  Andreas  Hofer  himself,  the 
leader  and  the  hero  (no  general,  but  an  innkeeper),  and 
all  the  others  were  peasants,  craftsmen,  and  servants,  even 
the  wives  and  daughters  were  armed,  playing  their  part 
in  the  struggle,  the  whole  nation  kindled  to  a  war  of 
liberation.  The  sympathies  of  the  author  of  this  drama 
were,  of  course,  entirely  on  the  side  of  the  Tyrolese. 
The  French  were  shot  down  from  hiding  places,  from 
behind  houses,  trees,  and  blocks  of  rock.  And  it  ended, 
of  course,  with  a  victorious  liberation  of  the  nation. 
Then  there  followed  the  franc-tireur  drama  of  1870, 
and  behold  "the  scene  was  changed !"  The  French  de- 
fenders of  the  Fatherland  have  now  suddenly  become 
knaves  and  criminals.  Their  very  visages  reveal  their 
evil  instincts.  They  also  shoot  from  ambuscades  as  did 
the  Tyrolese  in  1809,  but  what  was  then  a  fight  for  free- 
dom is  now  crime  and  treachery.  Punishment,  conse- 
quently, does  not  fail  to  be  meted  out.  German  re- 
inforcements rush  into  the  village,  fire  is  laid  to  the  walls, 


234  I    ACCUSE! 

and  amidst  the  lamentations  of  the  women  and  children 
a  dozen  men  and  boys  are  placed  against  the  church  wall 
and,  as  it  is  beautifully  expressed,  shot  according  to 
martial  law.  Yes,  indeed,  that  was  cjuite  a  different 
story!  Against  the  French  we  are  shown  a  nation  in 
arms ;  against  the  Germans  they  are  gallow-birds !  The 
same  confusion  of  ideas  is  met  everywhere  from  the 
highest  summits  of  German  intelligence  down  to  the 
last  producer  of  cinema  films. 

The  effect  of  this  intellectual  perversion  abroad  may 
be  imagined;  it  is  the  reverse  of  what  is  intended.  In 
these  six  months  of  war  the  Gennan  professor  has  be- 
come a  comic  figure  abroad,  or  rather  a  figure  of  tragi- 
comedy as  the  Prussian  Junker  and  lieutenant  have  been 
in  the  past.  The  sympathies  which  were  formerly  ours 
have  been  buried  under  ridicule  and  aversion,  and  have 
turned  to  our  opponents,  above  all  to  the  unhappy  Bel- 
gians. Karl  Spitteler,  who  is  certainly  not  anti-German 
in  sentiment,  writes  in  his  pamphlet  Our  Swiss  Stand- 
point ^ :  "Belgium  in  herself  does  not  concern  us,  but 
her  fate  concerns  us  very  intimately.  That  a  wrong 
was  done  to  Belgium  was  originally  openly  confessed  by 
the  perpetrator.  As  an  afterthought,  in  order  to  ap- 
pear whiter,  Cain  blackened  Abel.  In  my  opinion  it 
was  a  spiritual  blunder  to  rummage  for  documents  in 
the  pockets  of  the  quivering  victim.  It  was  amply  suf- 
ficient to  throttle  the  victim.  To  calumniate  her  in  ad- 
dition is  really  too  much."  These  are  the  words  of  a 
Swiss.  And  everyone  abroad,  everyone  without  excep- 
tion, writes  and  thinks  to  the  same  effect.  Belgian  ar- 
tists, poets,  and  politicians  are  received  with  enthusi- 
asm in  Italy  and  America,  in  Switzerland  and  in  Hol- 
land. They  are  acclaimed  in  gigantic  assemblies  such  as 
we  accorded  in  1902  to  Oom  Paul  and  the  Boers  who 
accompanied  him.     Belgium  to-day  is  trump  through- 

*  Published  by  Rasher  &  Co.,  Zürich,  1915. 


THE    CRIME  235 

out  the  world.  And  woe  to  us  if,  after  the  war,  we  so 
much  as  touch  a  hair  of  a  Belgian  head!  This  trump 
card  in  the  hands  of  our  enemies  will  defeat  us  morally, 
even  if  we  gain  the  victory  In  arms. 

A  part  of  the  devastation  we  have  accomplished  in 
Belgium  we  explain  by  reference  to  the  state  of  defence. 
The  state  of  defence  meets  us  everywhere;  there  is  a 
state  of  defence  when  we  invade  Belgium,  a  state  of 
defence  when  we  set  fire  to  the  ancient  cities  of  art.     I 
will  accept  it  as  proven  that  shots  were  fired  on  German 
soldiers  from  the  houses  in  Louvain.    Does  that  justify 
us  in  destroying  whole  districts  of  the  city  by  fire?    Does 
that  justify  us  in  exposing  the  celebrated  Town  Hall 
and  the  Cathedral  to  the  flames,  and  in  doing  them  at 
least  serious  damage?     Where  is  it  written  that  shots 
from  a  rifle  must  be  answered  by  arson?     Where  and 
when  was  such  a  law  of  war  codified?     That  is  the 
Prussian  law  of  war,  but  it  is  not  international  law. 
When  the  Cossacks  act  in  this  way  in  East  Prussia  we 
speak  of  wild  Muscovite  hordes,  but  these  hordes  have 
at  least  this  excuse,  that  in  Stallupönen  and  in  Neiden- 
burg no  centres  of  culture  and  of  art  are  ruined.    What, 
however,  is  the  world  to  say  of  our  handiwork  in  Bel- 
gium, the  ancient  land  of  culture  and  of  art — in  Belgium 
where    every    hamlet    contains    artistic    jewels,    Gothic 
cathedrals  and  town-halls  and  market-places  surrounded 
by  gorgeous  patrician  houses,  with  luxurious  old-Ger- 
man Renaissance  fagades,  adorned  with  gold?    All  these 
flowers  of  the  creative  power  of  man,  which  have  af- 
forded instruction  and  enjoyment  to  unnumbered  gen- 
erations and  which  should  have  served  as  a  glory  and 
as  an  example  to  generations  yet  to  come — these  have 
been  ruined,  destroyed,  burned,  because,  owing  to  a  state 
of  defence^  Germany  was  obliged  to  invade   Belgium, 
and  owing  to  a  state  of  defence  was  obliged  to  apply 
the  torch  to  the  walls. 


236  I    ACCUSE! 

But  let  that  pass.  Let  us  assume  that  these  things 
had  to  be.  But  is  it  also  due  to  the  state  of  defence 
that  we  have  imposed  contributions  amounting  to  more 
than  £25,cxDO,ooo  on  the  State,  the  towns  and  the 
provinces  of  Belgium?  How  are  we  to  excuse  this  act 
of  violence?  How  are  we  to  justify  the  enormous  fines 
recently  imposed  on  Belgian  citizens,  who,  availing  them- 
selves of  their  right  of  free  locomotion,  preferred  resi- 
dence abroad  to  life  under  the  German  occupation? 
What  justification  have  we  for  burdening  the  exhausted, 
impoverished  country  with  further  exorbitant  sacrifices 
in  money?  What  crime  on  the  part  of  Belgium  has 
merited  this  punishment?  Was  it  the  crime  of  having 
defended  themselves  against  us,  or,  so  far  as  I  am  con- 
cerned, even  the  crime  of  having  prepared  this  defence 
with  others?  In  either  case  we  can  allege  only  defence, 
not  attack,  for  that  Belgium  meant  to  attack  us  no  one 
in   Germany   has   yet  maintained. 

I  therefore  ask  again  how  do  you  expiain  and  justify 
the  contributions,  amounting  to  a  sum  which  you  keep 
concealed  in  the  silence  of  shame,  but  which,  when  every- 
thing is  taken  into  account,  considerably  exceeds  half  a 
milliard  marks  (£25,000,000).  Here  your  pretext  of 
the  state  of  defence  no  longer  holds  good.  The  accused 
who  pleads  in  excuse  a  state  of  defence,  but  is  found 
to  be  in  possession  of  his  opponent's  purse,  will  plead 
in  vain  for  immunity.  Give  back  the  contributions! 
That  is  the  least  that  can  be  required  of  you,  and  is 
without  doubt,  when  peace  returns,  the  least  that  will  be 
required  of  you. 

The  objection  will  be  raised,  and  has  in  fact  been 
raised :  Why  did  Belgium  not  allow  us  a  free  passage, 
for  then  she  would  have  been  spared  all  the  horrors  of 
war?  This  is  a  noble  question,  worthy  of  the  new  Ger- 
man national  psychology.  "Why  did  you  not  submit  to 
the   insult?"   exclaims   the   slanderer  to   the   slandered; 


THE    CRIME  237 

''now  you  get  in  addition  a  blow  on  the  head."  Why 
did  not  Germany  submit  to  the  Napoleonic  occupation? 
If  she  had  remained  quiet  she  would  have  been  spared 
much  bloodshed  and  the  horrors  of  war.  Why  did  not 
Leonidas  and  his  Spartans  allow  the  Persians  to  pass 
through  Thermopylae?  If  they  had  done  so  they  would 
all  have  remained  alive.  These  and  similar  qucrstiones 
Domitiancc  might  be  asked  without  number.  They 
are  not  more  foolish  than  the  reproach  which  is  raised 
against  Belgium  in  Germany  to-day.  Belgium  defended 
herself  for  the  quite  simple  reason  that  her  honour, 
her  independence,  and  her  international  obligations  com- 
pelled her  to  offer  a  defence.  In  summoning  Belgium 
to  allow  Germany  a  free  passage,  the  demand  addressed 
to  her  was  that  she  should  sacrifice  her  honour  and 
her  independence,  and  scatter  to  the  wind  her  inter- 
national obligations. 

These  obligations  rested  on  a  basis  not  merely  moral, 
but  also  to  a  very  considerable  extent  practical.  As 
soon  as  Belgium,  by  showing  preference  to  Germany, 
took  sides  on  her  behalf,  she  would  have  destroyed  for 
ever  her  neutral  position,  and  would  never  again  have 
been  in  a  position  to  regain  it.  The  other  Powers  could 
never  again  have  trusted  Belgium  to  remain  neutral  if 
on  this  occasion  she  had  light-heartedly  been  faithless 
to  the  duties  imposed  by  neutrality.  Belgium  would 
thus  have  fallen  into  a  kind  of  dependence  on  her  great 
neighbour  Germany,  who,  it  is  true,  promised  to  respect 
her  independence,  but  certainly  offered  less  security  for 
the  observance  of  this  independence  than  was  furnished 
by  the  guarantee  of  the  collective  Great  Powers.  Ger- 
many's designs  on  Belgium  were  not  unknown  in  the 
world.  Our  politico-military  literature  had  copiously 
contributed  to  the  dissemination  of  this  knowledge.  Gen- 
eral von  Bernhardi  expressed  in  general  terms  the  view 
that  the  "conception  of  permanent  neutrality  is  entirely 


238  I    ACCUSE! 

contrary  to  the  essential  nature  of  the  State,"  and  in 
particular  he  was  of  the  opinion  that  Belgium,  in  adding 
to  her  small  territory  the  vast  Congo  State,  had  al- 
ready violated  her  own  neutrality.^  There  was  therefore 
a  certain  danger  involved  in  trusting  her  voracious  neigh- 
bour, in  confiding  in  her  grace  alone,  and  in  pushing 
aside  all  other  protectors.  The  lamb  can  indeed  feel 
no  great  confidence  when  the  wolf  promises  to  respect 
his  independence. 

Thus  the  attitude  assumed  by  Belgium  is  attributable 
not  merely  to  an  idealistic  point  of  view,  but  to  extremely 
tangible  and  practical  interests,  and  for  these  at  least 
there  should  be  some  understanding  in  Germany,  even 
if  the  nose  is  turned  up  in  scorn  at  the  idealism — of 
other  people. 

Precisely  the  same  considerations  which  were  bound 
to  lead  to  Belgium's  refusal  to  accord  Germany  a  free 
passage  through  her  territory  would  have  caused  her 
to  reject  any  suggestion  made  by  France  or  England 
that  she  should  make  common  cause  with  them  against 
Germany.  No  one  in  Germany  takes  the  trouble  to  re- 
flect for  a  moment  what  could  have  induced  Belgium 
to  give  up  her  neutrality,  and  to  sell  herself  body  and 
soul  to  the  Entente  Powers.  What  advantage  could  she 
expect  from  such  behaviourf  Did  Belgium  entertain 
any  designs  to  conquer  the  Rhine  provinces?  Did  she 
wish  to  round  off  her  territory  towards  Aix-la-Chapelle 
or  Treves  ?  What  in  the  world  could  she  gain  by  assum- 
ing a  hostile  attitude  towards  Germany?  Clearly  she 
could  gain  nothing.  On  the  contrary,  by  siding  with  the 
Entente  Powers  she  would  have  exposed  her  position  in 
Europe  to  the  gravest  danger.  So  long  as  Belgium  con- 
tinued neutral  and  discharged  the  duties  imposed  by  her 
neutrality,  she  would  have  been  quite  independent  of 
the  issue  of  the  war,  and  could  have  awaited  the  result 
^Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the  Next  War,  pp.  no,  in. 


THE    CRIME  239 

with  composure,  indifferent  whether  Germany  or  France 
emerged  as  victor  from  the  struggle.  The  moment  she 
sided  with  one  of  the  parties,  her  whole  future  fate  be- 
came dependent  on  her  ally's  success  in  war,  and  her 
fate  would  have  been  sealed  with  this  ally's  defeat.  Why 
should  Belgium  Imve  run  this  risk?  Why  should  she 
have  exposed  herself  to  the  vengeance  of  her  powerful 
German  neighbour,  and  make  herself  liable  in  the  event 
of  a  defeat  to  be  the  first  to  pay  the  piper?  For  there 
could  be  no  doubt  that  if  Belgium  were  the  ally 
of  France,  with  obligations  imposed  on  her  by  treaty, 
she  would  certainly  have  been  annexed  by  Gemiany 
in  the  event  of  a  defeat — a  fate  which,  even  as  things 
are,  is  held  over  her  head  on  the  ground  of  her  merely 
imaginary  alliance.  I  therefore  again  ask :  What  reason- 
able ground  could  Belgium  have  had  to  expose  herself 
needlessly  to  this  danger,  instead  of  awaiting  the  issue  of 
events  with  a  calm  conscience  under  the  sure  shield  of 
neutrality?  No  one  can  give  a  plausible  answer  to 
this  question.  Thus  by  the  application  of  the  simplest 
logic  it  is  possible  to  demonstrate  how  weak  is  the 
foundation  of  the  German  accusations  against  Bel- 
gium. 

As  against  Germany,  Belgium  has  exercised  her  rights, 
fulfilled  her  duties,  and  protected  her  interests  as  she 
would  have  done  had  a  breach  of  her  neutrality  been 
demanded  from  any  other  quarter.  It  is  Germany  that 
has  acted  wrongly,  contrary  to  her  duty,  and  against 
her  true  interests. 

The  imponderabilia  which  a  Bismarck  kept  in  mind  in 
all  his  political  measures  count  for  naught  with  the  lead- 
ers of  the  Germany  of  to-day,  who  "have  exactly  caught 
his  manner  of  clearing  his  throat  and  spitting,"  ^  but 
have  not  caught  even  a  breath  of  his  spirit.  The  im- 
ponderabilia in  the  case  of  Belgium  were  the  respect  due 
['  Schiller.     Wallenstcin's  Lager.] 


240  I    ACCUSE! 

to  the  rights  of  others  and  regard  for  the  moral  judg- 
ment of  the  world.  The  neglect  of  these  imponderabilia 
will  be  bitterly  avenged  on  Germany.  It  has  already 
been  avenged  in  so  far  as  it  has  influenced  the  atti- 
tude of  England  in  this  war,  and  has  thereby  increased 
the  coalition  of  our  enemies  to  our  disadvantage. 

After  this  section  was  finished  a  manifesto  of  the 
Chancellor,  von  Bethmann  Hollweg,  issued  on  Decem- 
ber 24th,  came  to  my  notice.  This  document,  written 
in  answer  to  a  speech  of  Viviani,  once  more  achieves  the 
utmost  limits  in  perversion  and  in  falsification,  in  order 
to  shift  the  clearly-proven  guilt  of  Germany  on  to  the 
Entente  Powers.^  We  should  be  doing  this  production 
too  much  honour  if  we  were  to  bestow  upon  it  any 
special  consideration.  Everything  contained  in  it  is  con- 
tradicted by  the  diplomatic  correspondence,  by  the  Ger- 
man White  Book  itself,  and  by  the  earlier  speeches  of 
the  Chancellor.  The  great  feat  whereby  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann endeavours  to  wash  himself  clean  consists  in  con- 
fusing the  sequence  of  events  in  time,  in  suppressing 
everything  that  does  not  suit  his  case,  in  advancing  as- 
sertions which  are  in  contradiction  with  the  proved  facts, 
and  in  ascribing  to  the  Entente  Powers  motives  which 
are  inconsistent  with  their  actions. 

A  few  test  examples  may  illustrate  the  love  of  truth 
which  inspires  Herr  von  Bethmann,  and  may  at  the  same 
time  indicate  the  shortness  of  his  memory.  He  now 
maintains  that,  to  begin  with,  Austria  had  only  mobilised 
against  Serbia,  whereas  on  August  4th  he  himself  ad- 
mitted that  a  partial  mobilisation — and  that  before  the 
Russian  partial  mobilisation — had  taken  place  against 
Russia  as  well.  To  take  a  further  instance,  this  time 
of  his  tactics  of  suppression :  he  admits  that  Germany 

^  See  Appendix  III. 


THE    CRIME  241 

raised  objections  only  against  the  form  of  a  conference, 
but  passes  over  in  silence  the  important  fact  that  Ger- 
many, notwithstanding  repeated  pressure  from  the  En- 
tente Powers,  did  not  consent  to  suggest  a  form  in 
which  the  Conference  would  be  agreeable  to  her. 
Amongst  much  more  that  is  ignored,  he  keeps  silence 
with  regard  to  the  fact  that  up  to  the  last  moment  (July 
31st),  when  in  consequence  of  the  German  ultimatum 
it  was  then  too  late,  Austria  declined  the  direct  negotia- 
tions with  Petrograd  which  Germany  herself  had  recom- 
mended in  place  of  the  Conference.  The  whole  of  the 
document  is  thus,  as  is  shown  by  these  examples,  nothing 
more  than  a  continuous  series  of  falsifications  and  sup- 
pressions of  the  truth. 

I  should  only  like  to  draw  attention  to  one  more  asser- 
tion, which  also  deserves  no  other  designation — an  asser- 
tion which  now  appears  for  the  first  time,  and  which,  for 
the  sake  of  variety,  ascribes  to  England  the  guilt  of 
being  the  first  to  mobilise,  a  guilt  which  has  hitherto 
been  supposed  to  fall  on  Russia  alone.  What  is  the 
ground  for  this  terrible  accusation,  which,  even  if  it  were 
true,  would  not  dispose  of  Grey's  continuous  efforts  for 
peace  ?  It  is  based  on  the  fact  that  the  English  Fleet  was 
not  disbanded  on  the  conclusion  of  their  nonnal  ma- 
noeuvres near  Portland,  but  was  kept  together  (July 
27th).  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  had  nothing  to  do  with 
a  "mobilisation,"  a  "collection  of  the  Fleet  at  Portland," 
a  "military  preparation  on  a  great  scale,"  as  Herr  von 
Bethmann  asserts  against  his  better  knowledge;  it  was 
merely  a  kccping-togcthcr,  a  non-dispersal  of  the  ma- 
noeuvre-fleet, caused  by  the  state  of  tension  in  the  Eu- 
ropean situation,  by  the  recall  of  the  Austrian  Ambassa- 
dor from  Belgrade,  and  the  refusal  of  Austria  and  Ger- 
many to  enter  with  the  other  Powers  into  any  negotia- 
tions on  the  Serbian  question.^  Grey  openly  communi- 
^Blue  Book,  p.  xi.     No.  48.     Yellow  Book,  No.  66. 


242  I    ACCUSE! 

cated  to  Count  Mensdorff,  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  the 
reason  for  not  dispersing  the  Fleet,  adding  that  there 
was  no  menace  in  what  had  been  done  but  that  it  was 
merely  a  measure  of  security  owing  to  the  possibility  that 
a  European  conflagration  might  be  brought  about  by  the 
incomprehensible  manner  in  which  Austria  treated  the 
conciliatory  answer  of  Serbia  as  a  blank  negative.  Eng- 
land took  no  other  measure  of  security  on  sea  or  on 
land.  Herr  von  Bethmann,  however,  makes  out  of  this 
a  "mobilisation  on  a  great  scale,"  which  aimed  at  a  "hu- 
miliation of  the  two  Powers  in  the  Triple  Alliance,"  and 
which  produced  a  militant  frame  of  mind  in  France  and 
Russia.  Who  is  deceived  by  this?  No  one,  Herr  von 
Bethmann. 

Turn  over  the  Yellow  Book  and  the  Blue  Book,^  and 
you  will  find  that  from  the  morning  of  July  26th — ^that 
is  to  say,  immediately  after  the  expiration  of  the  Aus- 
trian ultimatum — Germany  had  prepared  her  mobilisa- 
tion, the  garrisons  of  Alsace-Lorraine  were  concentrated, 
the  fortresses  on  the  frontier  were  put  in  a  state  of  de- 
fence, reservists  were  called  in  by  individual  summons, 
German  ships  were  called  back  from  Norway,  officers 
on  leave  were  summoned  from  Switzerland,  and  private 
automobiles  were  reserved  in  Baden  for  military  pur- 
poses, &c.  You  will  there  find  that  Germany  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  in  Strassburg,  and  in  Metz,  and  that  Austria 
in  Hungary  and  Galicia  were  already  fully,  if  secretly, 
engaged  on  mobilisation  as  early  as  July  29th. 

Read  further  on  July  30th — that  is  to  say,  before  the 
official  announcement  of  the  "state  of  war" — the  Gemian 
provinces  on  the  frontier  were  already  in  fact  in  the  last 
stage  before  mobilisation;  how  on  the  previous  day  the 
frontier  had  already  been  crossed  by  German  patrols; 
how  the  whole  i6th  Army  Corps,  reinforced  by  part  of 

'  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  58,  59,  60,  88,  90,  91,  106,  loS.    Blue  Book,  No. 
105  (Enclosure  3). 


THE    CRIME  243 

the  8th  from  Treves  and  Cologne,  had  already  occupied 
the  frontier  from  Metz  to  Luxemburg. 

All  this  took  place  on  July  30th,  although  France  had 
voluntarily  given  an  obligation  to  keep  her  own  troops 
ten  kilometres  from  the  frontier/  and  had  observed  this 
condition  to  the  detriment  of  her  own  strategic  interest. 
Compare  these  German  military  measures  with  the  assur- 
ances of  peace  which  the  hapless  Herr  von  Schoen  had 
daily  to  deliver  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  Read  and  compare 
all  these  things,  and  then  on  the  strength  of  this  soli- 
tary fact  of  the  non-dispersion  of  the  English  Fleet, 
openly  acknowledged  by  the  English  Government,  dare 
if  you  still  can,  to  draw  the  conclusion  that  England  in- 
tended to  break  the  peace.  No,  Herr  von  Bethmann, 
you  would  have  shown  greater  wisdom  if  you  had  kept 
silent :  si  tacuisses,  philosophus  manstsses.  You  would 
have  shown  more  consideration  for  your  reputation  as  a 
"philosopher"  if  you  had  patiently  borne  the  fate  which 
you  have  brought  upon  yourself  and  your  country  in- 
stead of  clutching  nervously  at  straws  which,  after  all, 
will  not  save  you  from  plunging  in  the  depths  of  uni- 
versal damnation.  Keep  silence — for  your  own  sake 
and  for  our  sake — and  rest  content  with  the  well-sound- 
ing testimonial  which  Professor  Lasson  has  bestowed 
upon  you,  that  you  are  "by  far  the  most  eminent  among 
living  men,  knowing  no  motive  other  than  those  of 
truth,  fidelity,  and  right." 

The  points  in  the  indictment  against  Germany  I  sum- 
marise in  the  following  sentences  : — 

I.  Germany  gave  Austria  a  free  hand  against  Serbia, 
although  she  was  well  aware  that  a  European  conflict 
must  arise  out  of  that  between  Serbia  and  Austria. 

'  Yellow  Book,  No.  106.     Chancellor's  Speech,  4th  August.     Blue 
Book,  No.  105. 


244  I   ACCUSE! 

2.  She  allowed  Austria  to  address  to  Serbia  an  ulti- 
matum with  exorbitant  demands  and,  notwithstanding 
an  almost  complete  compliance  with  these  demands,  she 
allowed  her  to  recall  her  Ambassador  and  to  declare 
war. 

3.  By  suggesting  a  localisation  of  the  war  she  sought 
to  create  the  appearance  of  mediating  in  the  interests  of 
peace,  but  that  this  proposal  had  no  prospect  of  success 
must  have  been  known  to  her  from  the  history  of  diplo- 
macy, and  from  the  recent  evidence  of  the  Balkan  crisis ; 
that  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  known  to  her  is  clear 
from  the  confessions  contained  in  the  White  Book. 

4.  She  declined  the  proposal  for  a  conference  of  the 
four  Powers. 

5.  She  herself  then  advanced  the  proposal  for  direct 
discussions  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd,  but  at  the 
same  time  she  suffered  Austria  to  decline  to  take  part  in 
these  discussions,  and  instead  to  declare  war  against 
Serbia. 

6.  She  left  unanswered  the  frequently  repeated  re- 
quest of  the  other  Powers  that  she  should  herself  pro- 
pose an  alternative  method  of  mediation  in  place  of 
the  proposal  of  a  conference  which  she  had  declined. 

7.  She  left  unanswered  and  undiscussed  the  various 
formulae  for  agreement  proposed  by  Grey. 

8.  In  part  she  refused  and  in  part  she  left  unanswered 
the  formulae  of  agreement  proposed  by  Sazonof. 

9.  In  spite  of  all  inquiries,  she  never  said  what  Aus- 
tria wanted,  but  constantly  restricted  herself  to  saying 
what  Austria  did  not  want. 

10.  She  made  to  England  a  bid  for  neutrality,  and 
thus  announced  her  intention  of  making  war  at  a  time 
when  the  Entente  Powers  were  still  zealously  labouring 
in  the  interests  of  peace. 

11.  When  at  last  negotiations  on  the  Serbian  Note 
were  opened  with  a  prospect  of  success  in  Petrograd 


THE    CRIME  ^45 

between  Austria  and  Russia,  she  upset  these  negotia- 
tions by  her  ultimata  to  France  and  Russia,  and  made 
war  inevitable. 

12.  In  the  ultimatum  to  Russia  she  demanded  that 
demobilisation  should  also  be  carried  out  as  against 
Austria,  although  Austria  herself  had  mobilised  the 
whole  of  her  forces. 

13.  In  place  of  the  counter-mobilisation  which  she 
had  threatened  to  carry  out,  she  at  once  declared  war 
without  any  ground,  first  on  Russia  and  then  on 
France. 

14.  As  an  afterthought  she  based  these  declarations 
of  war  on  the  fact  that  the  powers  opposed  to  her  had 
begun  the  war,  whereas,  on  the  contrary,  the  first  acts 
of  war  were  committed  by  Germany. 

15.  She  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  thus 
in  addition  brought  about  war  with  England. 

These  points  in  the  indictment  are  proved,  and  justify 
the  judgment:  Germany  is  guilty,  along  with  Austria, 
of  hamng  brought  about  the  European  war. 


ENGLAND 

The  attitude  of  England,  up  to  the  moment  when  the 
question  of  Belgian  neutrality  arose,  is  so  clear  from 
what  I  have  already  said  that  it  would  be  a  vain  repeti- 
tion to  deal  with  it  again  in  this  connection.  From  the 
beginning  of  the  conflict  Sir  Edward  Grey,  the  English 
Foreign  Minister,  took  the  leading  part  in  all  efforts  to 
preserve  peace,  and  did  everything  within  the  power  of 
man  to  prevent  war: — 

I.      He  urged  the  Serbian  Government  to  assume  an 


246  I    ACCUSE! 

attitude  of  moderation,   and    in  this   succeeded   in  his 
efforts.^ 

2.  He  endeavoured,  although  in  this  case  without 
success,  to  obtain  from  the  Austrian  Government  an 
extension  of  the  time-Hmit.^ 

3.  He  thereupon  put  forward  the  proposal  for  a  con- 
ference of  the  four  Powers,  which  was  accepted  by 
France,  Italy,  and  Russia,  but  was  declined  by  Austria 
and  Germany.^ 

4.  He  repeatedly  called  upon  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  propose,  in  place  of  the  conference  declined  by 
them,  any  other  form  of  co-operation  of  the  four  Powers 
not  directly  concerned.  His  request,  however,  remained 
unanswered.* 

5.  He  endeavoured  to  promote  the  direct  conversa- 
tions between  Vienna  and  Petrograd  which  were  pro- 
posed by  Germany,  but  which,  after  the  declaration  of 
war  against  Serbia,  were  declined  by  Austria.^ 

6.  He  then  proposed  a  formula  of  agreement,  accord- 
ing to  which  Austria  should  occupy  Serbian  territory, 
including  Belgrade,  and  should  from  there  dictate  her 
conditions.  These  conditions  were  to  be  communicated 
to  the  Powers,  and  in  so  far  as  they  did  not  affect  the 
integrity  and  sovereignty  of  Serbia,  they  were  to  be 
recommended  to  Serbia  for  acceptance.  To  this  pro- 
posal no  answer  was  ever  received  either  from  Austria 
or  from  Germany.^ 

7.  He  supported  the  first  proposal  of  agreement  ad- 
vanced by  Sazonof,  and  as  it  was  declined  by  Ger- 
many as  unacceptable,  he  obtained  the  consent  of  Saz- 

^  Blue  Book,  Nos.  12,  15,  16,  22,  27. 

*  Blue  Book,  Nos.  13,  26. 

'Blue  Book,  Nos.  17,  35,  36,  27,  4^,  43,  Si,  53,  m. 

*Blue  Book,  Nos.  60,  68,  80,  84,  88. 

'Blue  Book,  Nos.  45,  74,  75,  78,  93,  106. 

'  Blue  Book,  Nos.  88,  98,  103. 


THE    CRIME  247 

onof  to  a  second  formula  of  agreement,  which  went 
even  further  to  meet  the  views  of  Austria.  This  pro- 
posal remained  unanswered.^ 

8.  On  July  31st  he  promoted  with  the  utmost  energy 
the  negotiations  which  had  begun  between  Austria  and 
Russia,  and  sought  to  guide  them  to  a  successful  issue 
by  further  proposals  which  contained  full  satisfaction 
for  Austria.  All  his  proposals  contained  the  stipulation 
that  further  military  preparation  should  be  stopped  on 
all  sides.^ 

9.  He  ultimately  declared  himself  ready  to  support  in 
Petrograd  and  Paris  any  reasonable  proposal  of  Ger- 
many or  Austria  which  might  serve  to  preserve  peace, 
and,  in  the  event  of  such  a  proposal  not  being  accepted 
by  France  or  Russia,  he  declared  that  he  would  withdraw 
from  the  negotiations.  No  such  proposal  was  made, 
since  in  the  meantime  Germany  had  despatched  her  two 
ultimata  and  declined  further  negotiations  on  the  sub- 
ject.'"^ 

10.  On  August  ist,  the  day  of  the  German  declara- 
tion of  war  against  Russia,  he  despatched  proposals, 
representations,  and  warnings  to  all  the  capitals  in  order 
to  arrive  at  an  agreement  between  the  Powers  even  at 
the  last  moment  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.^  The 
English  Blue  Book  contains  no  fewer  than  seventeen 
telegrams  from  and  to  the  various  capitals  dated  August 
1st,  sixteen  of  July  31st,  and  thirty-three  of  July  29th 
and  30th. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  deserves  more  than  any  other  the 
name  of  the  "peacemaker  of  Europe,"  if  there  is  still 
any  meaning  in  the  saying  in  inagnis  voluisse  sat  est. 

^Blue  Book,  Nos.  97,  103,  120,  13T,  132,  139.    Orange  Book,  Nos. 
60,  63,  67. 

'Blue  Book,  Nos.  no,  in,  131,  133,  135,  137. 

'Blue  Book,  Nos.  in,  112,  121. 

*Blue  Book,  Nos.   126,  130,  131,  132,   133,   135,  137,  138,  139,  141. 


248  I    ACCUSE! 

His  efforts  were  in  vain,  hut  his  merit  in  having  served 
the  cause  of  peace  with  indefatigable  zeal,  with  skill  and 
energy  will  remain  inextinguishable  in  history. 

Even  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg  will  be  unable  to 
contradict  this  judgment  of  history.  I  mean  the  Herr 
von  Bethmann  of  August  4th,  not  him  of  December  2nd. 

What  did  he  of  August  4th  say?  Let  us  hear  the 
White  Book : 

"On  July  26th  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  made  the  pro- 
posal to  submit  the  differences  between  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  Servia  to  a  conference  of  the  Ambassadors  of 
Germany,  France,  and  Italy  under  his  chairmanship" 
(p.  408). 

"We  further  declared  ourselves  ready,  after  failure 
of  the  conference  idea,  to  transmit  a  second  proposal  of 
Sir  Edward  Grey's  to  Vienna  in  which  he  suggested 
Austria-Hungary  should  decide  that  either  the  Serbian 
reply  was  sufficient  or  that  it  be  used  as  a  basis  for 
further  negotiations"  (p.  409). 

"Shoulder  to  shoulder  with  England  we  laboured  in- 
cessantly and  supported  every  proposal,"  &c.   (p.  411). 

"We  even  as  late  as  the  30th  of  July  forwarded  the 
English  proposal  to  Vienna,  as  basis  for  negotiations, 
that  Austria-Hungary  should  dictate  her  conditions  in 
Serbia,  i.  e.,  after  her  march  into  Serbia"  (p.  410). 

"During  the  interval  from  July  29th  to  July  31st 
whilst  these  endeavours  of  ours  for  mediation  were 
being  continued  with  increasing  energy,  supported  by 
English  diplomacy,"  &c.  (p.  411). 

"Nay,  even  before  the  reply  from  Vienna  regarding 
the  Anglo-German  mediation  .  .  .  could  possibly  have 
been  received,"  &c.    (p.  411). 

"In  the  meantime,  Great  Britain  tried  to  mediate  be- 
tween Vienna  and  Petrograd,"  &c.  (Chancellor's  speech 
of  August  4th,  p.  436). 

These  quotations  from  the  German  memorandum  are 


THE    CRIME  249 

in  agreement  with  the  telegrams  annexed  to  it,  and  in 
particular  to  the  exchange  of  telegrams  between  the 
King  of  England  and  Prince  Henry  and  the  Emperor 
William.  The  most  interesting  point,  however,  is  that 
even  the  solemn  declaration  of  war  against  Russia  con- 
tains an  equally  solemn  testimony  to  the  efforts  for  peace 
made  by  England  in  the  following  words : — 

"His  Majesty  the  German  Emperor  had  under- 
taken in  concert  with  Great  Britain  the  part  of 
mediator  between  the  Cabinets  of  Vienna  and  Pet- 
rograd." ^ 

So  spake  and  so  thought  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg 
on  August  4th. 

But  how  did  he  speak  and  what  were  his  thoughts — 
or,  rather,  what  did  he  pretend  that  his  thoughts  were — 
on  December  2nd  ? 

"Where  the  responsibility  rests  for  the  greatest  of  all 
wars  is  to  us  clear.  The  external  responsibility  is  borne 
by  those  men  in  Russia  who  inspired  and  carried  out 
the  mobilisation  of  the  entire  army.  The  inner  responsi- 
bility lies  on  the  Government  of  Great  Britain.  The 
Cabinet  of  London  could  have  made  this  war  impossible 
by  declaring  without  ambiguity  in  Petrograd  that  Eng- 
land was  not  prepared  to  allow  a  continental  war  in 
Europe  to  develop  out  of  the  conflict  between  Austria 
and  Serbia.  .  .  .  England  did  not  do  so.  .  .  .  England 
saw  how  things  were  moving,  but  did  nothing  to  spoke 
the  wheel.  In  spite  of  all  protestations  of  peace  Lon- 
don gave  it  to  be  understood  in  Petrograd  that  she  was 
taking  her  stand  on  the  side  of  France  and   Russia." 

As  many  lies  as  words! 

In  the  first  place  the  Chancellor  is  contradicted  by 
himself.  In  the  case  of  Bethmann  v.  P)ethmann  the 
Chancellor  of  December  2nd  is  knocked  out  by  the  Chan- 
'  White  Book  Exhibit,  6. 


250  1   ACCUSE! 

cellor  of  August  4th.  All  the  events  which  preceded  the 
outbreak  of  war  had  taken  place  before  August  4th,  that 
is  to  say,  before  the  day  on  which  Herr  von  Bethmann 
laid  his  documentary  evidence  before  the  Reichstag.  If 
England  had  in  fact  played  the  role  which  is  ascribed  to 
her  by  the  Bethmann  of  December  2nd,  the  Bethmann 
of  August  4th  was  bound  to  have  known  of  it,  and  he 
could  not  have  delivered  his  eulogies  on  England's  serv- 
ices in  the  cause  of  peace.  He  praised  England  because 
she  was  worthy  of  this  praise.  He  knew  that  she  was 
worthy  of  this  praise,  because  as  the  supreme  conductor 
of  foreign  policy  he  had  personally  taken  part  in  all 
that  had  happened.  The  account  he  gave  on  August  4th 
corresponded  to  the  truth,  and  the  only  reproach,  if  any, 
which  can  be  urged  against  it  is  that  it  does  not  disclose 
the  truth  in  its  full  extent,  and  that  it  expresses  in  too 
moderate  a  form  the  praise  due  to  the  English  Govern- 
ment. 

Is  it  possible  that  the  man  who,  under  specious  pre- 
tences, declined  all  the  proposals  for  agreement  ad- 
vanced by  England,  or  failed  to  answer  them,  or  did  not 
even  send  them  on  to  Austria,  who  on  July  31st  when 
agreement  between  Austria  and  Russia  appeared  to  be 
at  hand,  forced  war  by  despatching  ultimata  to  Russia 
and  France,  who  on  July  29th  had  already  resolved  on 
war,  and  gave  expression  to  this  resolution  in  his  bid 
for  England's  neutrality,  who,  however,  received  from 
Grey  in  reply  that  noble  manifesto  of  peace  which  would 
have  brought  to  the  nations  of  Europe  a  sure  prospect 
of  a  lasting  condition  of  peace — is  it  possible  that  this 
man  had  the  effrontery  in  contradiction  of  his  own 
printed  testimony  to  hold  England  responsible  for  this 
world-catastrophe,  for  which  he  alone  bears  the  fearful 
responsibility?  It  is  possible,  for  it  has  happened.  But 
the  world  knows  what  view  to  take  of  his  statements,  and 
the  lie  goes  home  to  roost. 


THE    CRIME  251 

According  to  the  assertion  of  the  Chancellor  the  Eng- 
lish Blue  Book  itself  proves  the  guilt  of  the  English 
Government.  It  is  supposed  to  show  that  England  sup- 
ported the  war  party  in  Petrograd,  and  that  she  declared 
at  the  outset  that  ''She  was  taking  her  stand  on  the  side 
of  Russia  and  France." 

What,  in  fact,  does  the  Blue  Book  prove?  The  exact 
opposite. 

What  Is  true  is  merely  that  Russia  and  France,  cor- 
rectly recognising  Gennany's  aggressive  intentions,  en- 
deavoured to  induce  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  assume,  in 
the  event  of  the  conflict  becoming  acute,  a  decisive  at- 
titude in  favour  of  her  friends  in  the  Entente.  It  was 
hoped  in  Paris  and  in  Petrograd  that  by  such  an  atti- 
tude on  the  part  of  England  Germany  would  be  re- 
strained from  her  intentions  to  make  war. 

It  was  thus  Intended  that  England,  in  assuming  this 
attitude,  was  to  use  her  influence,  not  in  promoting  war, 
hilt  in  preventing  war.  Sir  Edward  Grey  declined  the 
suggestion,  and  in  reply  to  their  repeated  endeavours  he 
emphasised  afresh  that  England  was,  and  desired  to 
remain,  free  from  obligations.  He  even  went  further; 
he  most  earnestly  warned  his  friends  in  the  Entente 
not  to  rely  on  England  making  a  declaration  of  solid- 
arity with  them. 

As  early  as  July  24th  Sazonof,  along  with  the  French 
Ambassador  in  Petrograd,  had  represented  to  Sir  G. 
Buchanan,^  the  British  Ambassador,  that  in  view  of  the 
provocative  attitude  of  Austria,  which  could  only  be 
explained  by  assuming  that  she  was  supported  by  Ger- 
many, a  declaration  of  solidarity  of  England  with  France 
and  Russia  was  the  best  and  the  only  means  of  prevent- 
ing a  European  conflict ;  the  tone  of  the  Austrian  Note, 
the  exorbitant  demands,  the  short  period  of  time  allowed, 
everything  indicated  that  Austria  desired  war  against 
'Blue  Book,  No.  6. 


«5Ä  I    ACCUSE! 

Serbia,  and  this  in  itself  constituted  a  danger  that  a 
European  conflict  would  arise.  Only  by  England  tak- 
ing common  action  with  France  and  Russia  could  the 
European  war  which  was  threatening  be  prevented.  The 
English  Ambassador  at  once  replied  that,  while  reserving 
until  a  later  date  the  official  declarations  of  his  Govern- 
ment on  the  subject,  he  personally  saw  no  reason  to  ex- 
pect any  declaration  of  solidarity  from  England;  direct 
British  interests  in  the  Serbian  question  were  nil,  and  a 
war  on  account  of  such  a  question  would  never  be  sanc- 
tioned by  British  public  opinion.  The  only  promise  which 
Buchanan  made  was  to  endeavour  to  induce  Austria  to 
extend  the  time-limit. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  In  his  telegram  of  July  25th  sent 
in  reply  to  Buchanan  ^  fully  approved  the  declaration 
of  his  ambassador:  *T  entirely  approve  what  you  said 
as  reported  in  your  telegram  of  yesterday,  and  I  cannot 
promise  more  on  behalf  of  the  Government."  In  place 
of  the  desired  declaration  of  solidarity,  Grey  at  once 
proposed  the  exact  opposite,  namely,  mediation  by  the 
four  Powers  not  directly  concerned — England,  Germany, 
Prance,  and  Italy.  During  the  whole  of  the  further 
negotiations  the  English  Government  emphatically  main- 
tained this  attitude  against  all  wishes  that  they  should 
act  otherwise.  On  July  27th  Buchanan  explained  the 
English  point  of  view  to  M.  Sazonof  as  follows  ^ :  It 
would  be  a  mistake  to  assume  that  the  cause  of  peace 
could  be  promoted  if  England  placed  herself  on  the  side 
of  France  and  Russia  against  Germany.  The  attitude 
of  Germany  would  merely  be  stiffened  by  such  a  menace; 
only  in  the  capacity  of  a  friend  who  was  anxious  to  pre- 
serve peace  could  England  approach  Germany,  and  en- 
deavour to  exercise  a  moderating  influence  in  Vienna 
through  Germany. 

^Blue  Book,  No.  24. 
*Blue  Book,  No.  44. 


THE    CRIME  253 

On  July  27th  Grey  declared  to  Prince  Lichnowsky 
(still  with  reference  to  the  four-Power  proposal)  that  so 
long  as  Germany  would  work  to  keep  the  peace  he  would 
keep  closely  in  touch  with  Germany.^ 

On  July  29th  Grey  had  a  lengthy  discussion  with  the 
French  Ambassador,  Cambon,^  in  which  he  clearly 
pointed  out  the  difference  between  the  Morocco  ques- 
tion and  the  existing  Serbian  difficulty.  In  the  Morocco 
question  the  dispute  was  one  in  which  France  was  pri- 
marily interested,  and  the  dispute  turned  about  mat- 
ters which  were  regulated  by  a  special  treaty  between 
England  and  France.  None  of  this  applied  to  the  con- 
flict between  Austria  and  Serbia,  Even  if  this  conflict 
should  extend  to  one  between  Austria  and  Russia,  Eng- 
land would  not  feel  called  upon  to  take  a  hand  in  it. 
The  question  whether  Teutons  or  Slavs  should  hold  su- 
premacy in  the  Balkans  had  always  been  of  so  little  in- 
terest to  England  that  she  had  never  allowed  herself 
to  be  drawn  into  a  war  on  account  of  it.  But  Grey  went 
still  further  in  refusing  an  expression  of  England's 
solidarity ;  even  if  France  and  Germany  became  involved 
in  the  struggle  the  fact  still  remained  that  it  was  not 
France's  own  interests,  but  in  the  first  place  her  duties 
under  her  alliance  towards  Russia  which  had  been  de- 
cisive in  determining  her  action.  Ez/en  in  this  case  Eng- 
land was  free  from  any  engagement,  and  her  action 
would  only  be  decided  by  what  British  interests  re- 
quired her  to  do. 

As  the  European  situation,  notwithstanding  all  the 
efforts  for  peace  made  by  the  Entente  Powers,  became 
constantly  more  strained.  President  Poincare  himself  in 
a  discussion  with  Bertie,^  the  British  Ambassador,  on 
July  30th,  returned  to  the  proposal  that  England  might 

'  Blue  Book,  No.  46. 
'  Blue  Book,  No.  87. 
"Blue  Book,  No.  99. 


254.  I    ACCUSE! 

avert  the  danger  of  war  by  an  unambiguous  declaration 
to  the  effect  that  she  would  support  France  in  the  event 
of  a  conflict  with  Germany.  France  was  pacific,  and 
did  not  desire  war ;  Germany,  however,  could  only  be  re- 
strained from  her  intention  to  go  to  war  if  England  were 
to  assume  a  decisive  attitude.^  Even  Di  San  Giuliano, 
the  Italian  Minister,  shared  the  opinion  of  Poincare,  and 
also  suggested  the  effectiveness  of  an  intervention  by 
England  on  behalf  of  the  Entente  Powers.^ 

Once  more  Grey  decisively  rejected  every  obligation 
to  intervene  on  behalf  of  Russia  and  France.  In  view  of 
the  importance  of  the  declarations  of  Grey  in  forming  a 
complete  judgment  on  the  attitude  of  England,  I  give 
at  length  a  few  sentences  from  the  telegrams  addressed 
by  Grey  on  July  31st  to  Bertie,  his  Ambassador  in 
Paris : — 

"Nobody  here  feels  that  in  this  dispute,  so  far  as  it 
has  yet  gone,  British  treaties  or  obligations  are  involved. 
Feeling  is  quite  different  from  what  it  was  during  the 
Morocco  question.  That  crisis  involved  a  dispute  di- 
rectly involving  France,  whereas  in  this  case  France  is 
being  drawn  into  a  dispute  which  is  not  hers.  .  .  .  We 
cannot  undertake  a  definite  pledge  to  intervene  in  a  war. 
I  have  so  told  the  French  Ambassador,  who  has  urged 
His  Majesty's  Government  to  reconsider  this  decision."  ^ 

^  Poincare  advanced  the  same  reasons  for  a  declaration  of  solidar- 
ity of  England  with  France  and  Russia  in  a  letter  addressed  directly 
to  the  King  of  England  on  the  31st  July,  and  only  published  in 
February,  1915.  Even  this  step  of  Poincare  was  without  success. 
The  answer  of  King  George  avoided  giving  any  precise  answer  on 
the  chief  point  in  the  French  letter,  and  the  attitude  of  England, 
which  was  still  continuously  striving  for  peace,  was  made  contin- 
gent on  the  development  of  events.  The  most  sincere  pacific  inten- 
tions of  the  two  Powers  appear  in  both  the  letters,  even  if  there 
were  a  divergency  of  opinion  as  to  the  path  by  which  the  goal  could 
be  reached. 

'Blue  Book,  No.  106. 

»Blue  Book,  No.  116. 


THE    CRIME  255 

"Mr.  Cambon  referred  to-day  to  a  telegram  that  had 
been  shown  to  Sir  Arthur  Nicholson  this  morning  from 
the  French  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  saying  that  it  was 
the  uncertainty  with  regard  to  whether  we  would  inter- 
vene which  was  the  encouraging  element  in  Berlin,  and 
that,  if  we  would  only  declare  definitely  on  the  side  of 
Russia  and  France,  it  would  decide  the  German  attitude 
in  favour  of  peace.  ...  I  said  that  we  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  in  the  Cabinet  to-day  that  we  could  not  give 
any  pledge  at  the  present  time.  .  .  .  Up  to  the  present 
moment  we  did  not  feel,  and  public  opinion  did  not  feel, 
that  any  treaties  or  obligations  of  this  country  were  in- 
volved. .  .  .  Mr.  Cambon  repeated  his  question  whether 
we  would  help  France  if  Germany  made  an  attack  on 
her.  I  said  that  I  could  only  adhere  to  the  answer  that, 
as  far  as  things  had  gone  at  present,  we  could  not  take 
any  engagement."  ^ 

On  the  same  day,  July  31st,  Grey,  as  he  had  already 
so  frequently  done  in  the  preceding  days,  directed  to 
Prince  Lichnowsky  an  urgent  request  that  if  Germany 
and  Austria  "could  get  any  reasonable  proposal  put 
forward"  he  would  support  it  at  Petrograd  and  Paris, 
and  if  Russia  and  France  would  not  accept  the  proposal, 
he  would  have  nothing  more  to  do  with  the  conse- 
quences.^ 

This  is  the  documentary  evidence  found  in  the  Eng- 
lish Blue  Book,  which  according  to  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann's  assertion  is  supposed  to  prove  "clearly  and  in- 
controvertibly"  that  London  had  given  it  to  be  under- 
stood that  "she  was  taking  her  stand  on  the  side  of 
France  and  Russia."  The  assertion  of  the  Chancellor  is 
exactly  the  reverse  of  the  truth,  and  we  can  but  admire 
the  courage  of  a  man  who  asserts  in  the  face  of  the 
whole  world   facts  which,  as  is  clear  to  everyone,  are 

*Blue  Book,  No.   119. 
"Blue  Book,  No.   iii. 


256  I    ACCUSE! 

diametrically  opposed  to  the  truth,  and  who  appeals  to 
documents  which  prove  the  reverse  of  his  assertions. 

Everything  contained  in  the  English  Blue  Book  with 
regard  to  the  attitude  of  England  during  the  diplomatic 
negotiations  is  confirmed  by  the  Russian  and  French 
publications.  The  refusals  of  Grey  were  directed,  as 
we  have  seen,  simultaneously  to  France  and  to  Russia. 
The  declarations  made  to  the  one  Power  held  good  as  a 
matter  of  course  for  the  other,  and  through  the  Em- 
bassies were  conveyed  to  the  other  capital. 

Parallel  with  Grey's  line  of  conduct  towards  the  En- 
tente Powers  was  the  attitude  he  assumed  towards  Ger- 
many. It  is  highly  interesting  to  study  this  double  ac- 
tion of  Grey's  which  bears  testimony  to  as  much  skill 
as  integrity  and  true  love  of  peace.  When  I  read  this 
series  of  documents,  so  dramatically  tense,  there  always 
comes  before  me  the  picture  of  the  old  councillor  of  the 
district  court.  F.,  who  thirty  years  ago  used  to  preside 
in  a  court  of  minor  jurisdiction  in  the  Jüdenstrasse,  in 
Berlin.  As  it  was  highly  distasteful  to  him  to  proceed 
to  a  judgment  he  sought  in  every  way,  in  season  and  out 
of  season,  to  effect  compromises,  which  would  reduce 
his  work.  He  used  the  most  diverse  means  to  attain 
this  end.  If  he  did  not  succeed  in  moving  the  parties 
to  a  pliable  attitude  by  keeping  them  waiting  for  hours 
beside  a  baking  fire  in  his  office,  he  had  resort  to  the  fol- 
lowing stratagem:  he  dismissed  the  defendant  for  a  few 
minutes,  and  pointed  out  to  the  plaintiff  the  weakness 
of  his  case,  which  could  only  be  expected  to  lead  to  its 
dismissal.  Then  he  called  the  defendant  before  him  and 
pointed  out  to  him  the  weakness  of  his  reply,  and  im- 
pressed upon  him  that  he  would  almost  certainly  lose 
the  case.  When  he  had  worn  each  of  them  out  in  this 
way  by  separate  advice,  he  called  them  both  before  the 
bench,  and,  presto!  in  nearly  every  case  a  compromise 
was  arrived  at.    Precisely  similar  was  the  course  pursued 


THE    CRIME  257 

by  Sir  Edward  Grey  with  regard  to  the  European  par- 
ties with  the  object  of  moving  them  to  a  peaceful  com- 
promise, and  of  preventing  an  armed  conflict.  He  said 
to  the  French  and  the  Russians :  "Give  way ;  do  not 
count  on  my  help !"  And  he  said  to  the  Germans  and  the 
Austrians :    "Give  way,  do  not  count  on  my  neutrality!" 

As  the  former  expected  his  help — not,  be  it  observed, 
for  war,  but  against  war — so  the  latter  sought  his 
neutrality,  the  consideration  of  which  naturally  postu- 
lated the  outbreak  of  war. 

Grey  never  wearied  in  the  task  of  warning  the  German 
Government  against  the  delusion  that  England  would, 
in  any  circumstances,  remain  neutral  in  a  European  con- 
flict. He  warned  Prince  Lichnowsky;  he  warned  Herr 
von  Bethmann  and  Herr  von  Jagow  through  Sir  E.  Gos- 
chen, the  English  Ambassador.  The  English  Blue  Book 
is  full  of  proofs  for  these  statements.^  The  warnings 
continued  throughout  the  whole  of  the  critical  days  be~ 
tween  July  27th  and  31st,  and  reached  their  culminat- 
ing point  in  the  answer  of  Grey  on  the  30th  of  July, 
already  mentioned  on  several  occasions,  a  distinguished 
document  which  will  always  remain  a  title  to  glory  for 
English  diplomacy  and  an  ignominy  for  German  diplo- 
macy. "We  will  have  nothing  to  do  with  a  neutrality 
which  would  only  increase  your  lust  for  war,  since  it 
would  make  it  more  easy  for  you  to  succeed  in  war! 
Instead  of  this  we  propose  a  joint-labour  in  the  cause  of 
peace,  now  and  for  ever,  a  labour  directed  to  the  protec- 
tion of  Europe  against  all  further  catastrophes.  We  will 
have  nothing  to  do  with  guarantees  such  as  you  offer; 
even  if  these  guarantees  were  more  far-reaching  than 
they  really  are,  England  will  have  nothing  to  do  with 
such  guarantees,  which  would  only  protect  you  in  your 
delight  in  war.  England  zuants  peace  for  all,  and  if 
you,  break  the  peace,  do  not  count  on  our  standing  aside!" 
'Blue  Book,  Nos.  87,  89,  loi,  102,  iii,  116,  119,  123. 


258  I    ACCUSE! 

Such  are  the  thoughts  which  Grey  in  his  Note  of  July 
30th  expressed  so  passionately  and  so  convincingly. 

Even  on  July  31st,  immediately  before  the  outbreak 
of  war,  he  threatened  both  sides ;  he  called  on  both  sides 
to  make  reasonable  proposals,  and  threatened  each  of 
them  that  he  would  leave  them  in  the  lurch  if  they  de- 
clined the  reasonable  proposals  of  the  ojffer.^ 

We  know  that  all  his  efforts  were  in  vain — not  through 
any  blame  attaching  to  France  and  Russia,  but  owing  to 
Germany  and  Austria.  The  European  war  was  there, 
as  soon  as  Germany  had  declared  war  against  Russia. 
All  further  developments  were  bound  to  follow  mechani- 
cally according  to  the  treaties  of  alliance. 

The  assertion  of  the  Chancellor  that  England  bears 
the  responsibility  for  the  European  war  is  not  supported 
by  the  English  publication,  as  Herr  von  Bethmann  be- 
lieves, but  is  flatly  contradicted  by  it.  But  there  is  an- 
other piece  of  evidence  which  the  Chancellor  has  at  his 
disposal:  the  celebrated  letter  from  the  Belgian  charge 
d'affaires  in  Petrograd  to  the  Minister  Davignon,  which 
was  seized  in  Berlin  on  July  31st  and  was  opened  at  a 
later  date.  This  letter  is  supposed  to  contain  incon- 
trovertible proof  of  the  guilt  of  England.  What  does 
it  really  show? 

The  history  of  this  letter  and  of  its  discovery  is  so 
remarkable,  and  there  is  such  an  air  of  Sherlock  Holmes 
about  the  whole  story,  that  some  doubts  as  to  its  au- 
thenticity may  well  be  allowed.  It  is  extraordinary  that 
the  Berlin  Government  has  always  the  luck  to  get  pos- 
session at  the  right  moment  of  documents  which  are 
compromising  for  others !  The  Belgian  charge  d'affaires 
in  Petrograd  writes  to  his  Minister  under  a  covering  ad- 
dress, and  posts  the  letter,  not  in  Petrograd,  but  through 
an  intermediary  in  Berlin.  All  this  is  strange,  passing 
strange!  There  is  no  official  confirmation  of  the  au- 
'Blue  Book,  No.  in.  ^ 


THE    CRIME  259 

thenticity  of  the  letter.  The  signature  of  the  letter- 
writer  has  neither  been  acknowledged  nor  proved  to  be 
genuine.  In  a  civil  action  at  law  this  document  would 
not  be  admitted  to  have  any  force  as  evidence. 

But  let  us  assume  for  the  moment  that  the  letter  is 
genuine;  it  contains  the  observations  of  the  charge  d'af- 
faires of  a  small  State  on  events  in  which  he  played 
no  part,  and  which  he  only  knows  from  hearsay.  The 
fact  that  the  witness  only  reports  de  auditu,  and  not 
from  his  own  direct  observations,  deprives  his  testimony 
of  any  value  as  evidence  as  against  those  witnesses 
who  report  de  facto,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  case  now  under 
consideration,  against  the  official  documents  which  give 
an  account  of  the  diplomatic  events  themselves.  If  the 
man  who  has  been  robbed  testifies  before  the  judge 
to  all  the  details  of  the  theft,  and  confirms  his  evidence 
by  oath,  the  judge  will  from  the  outset  refuse  to  listen 
to  any  witness  who  proposes  to  report  from  hearsay  that 
the  theft  never  took  place  at  all.  He  refuses  to  accept 
his  evidence,  let  alone  give  it  credence. 

From  this  it  follows  in  the  case  we  are  considering 
that  the  facts  proved  by  the  diplomatic  publications  of 
England,  France,  and  Russia,  and  also  by  those  of 
Germany,  cannot  be  disposed  of  by  the  evidence  of  the 
Belgian  cJtarge  d'affaires.  Where  there  is  a  contradic- 
tion between  the  official  publications  and  the  Belgian 
report  we  must  decide  in  favour  of  the  former  and 
against  the  latter. 

Are  there,  however,  contradictions  of  such  importance 
between  the  official  books  and  the  Belgian  report  that 
the  whole  edifice  consistently  constructed  out  of  the  dip- 
lomatic publications  may  thereby  be  at  once  overthrown? 
No  such  contradictions  exist.  The  report  gives  her  due 
to  each  of  the  States  concerned,  like  an  old  gossip  who 
abuses  everyone.  The  writer  himself  ofifers  his  apologies, 
so  to  speak,  in  saying  at  the  very  outset  that  the  most 


360  I   ACCUSE! 

contradictory  reports  were  circulated  without  it  being 
possible  to  distinguish  what  was  true  and  what  was 
false  as  regards  the  intention  of  the  "Imperial  (Rus- 
sian) Government."  He  then  praises  Germany,  which 
has  indubitably  laboured  in  Petrograd  as  in  Vienna  to 
find  some  means  of  avoiding  a  general  conflict.  He 
then  blames  Austria,  which  has  shown  the  firm  deter- 
mination "not  to  draw  back  a  step" ;  he  refers  to  the 
declaration  of  Sazonof  that  the  mobilisation  of  Russia 
was  not  directed  against  Germany;  he  mentions  that 
the  Reservists  have  been  called  to  the  colours  only  in 
certain  governmental  districts,  but  maintains  "quietly" 
as  his  own  personal  impression  that  mobilisation  is  go- 
ing on  everywhere.  England,  he  says,  has  proposed 
arbitration;  Sazonof  has  done  the  same.  Austria,  how- 
ever, has  rejected  both  proposals.  To  the  proposal  for 
a  conference  Germany  had  answered  by  a  counter-pro- 
posal for  a  direct  understanding  between  the  Cabinets. 
With  all  these  proposals  and  counter-proposals  "one 
might  in  truth  ask  whether  the  whole  world  does  not 
wish  for  war,  and  is  not  merely  attempting  to  postpone 
the  declaration  of  war  to  some  extent  in  order  to  win 
time."  England  had  at  first  openly  declared  that  she 
would  not  allow  herself  to  be  drawn  into  a  conflict.  To- 
day, however,  people  in  Petrograd  were  convinced,  in- 
deed they  had  assurances,  that  England  would  stand  by 
France.  "This  support  has  an  extraordinary  influence, 
and  has  done  not  a  little  to  gain  the  upper  hand  for  the 
war-party."  The  Russian  Army  felt  itself  strong,  but 
her  navy  could  hardly  be  counted;  this  was  the  reason 
why  the  assurance  of  English  support  has  acquired  such 
great  importance. 

This  document,  to  which  greater  importance  is  at- 
tached by  the  German  Government  than  to  their  own 
White  Book,  was  published  by  the  Norddeutsche  All- 
gemeine Zeitung  with  particular  passages   emphasised 


THE    CRIME  261 

by  heavy  type.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  appraising  this 
document  the  result  is  entirely  dependent  on  the  pas- 
sages chosen  for  emphasis  in  heavy  type;  according  to 
the  emphasis  attached  to  the  various  phrases,  this  hotch- 
potch of  tittle-tattle,  which  the  writer  must  have  gathered 
in  the  corridors  of  the  various  embassies,  for  he  him- 
self stood  apart  from  all  the  negotiations,  can  be  used 
to  incriminate  any  of  the  great  Powers.  If  we  emphasise 
with  heavy  type  that  the  Cabinet  of  Vienna  had  shown 
the  firm  determination  not  to  draw  hack  a  step,  that 
Austria  and  Germany  had  rejected  all  proposals  for  a 
conference,  arbitration,  &c.,  that  apparently  the  whole 
world  wished  for  war  and  only  sought  to  gain  time  for 
preparation,  Germany  and  Austria  will  be  revealed  as  the 
guilty  parties.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  rely  on  the  ob- 
sei'vation  that  England  had  assured  France  that  she 
would  stand  by  her,  and  had  thereby  strengthened  the 
war-party  in  Petrograd,  the  responsibility  will  fall  at 
least  in  part  upon  England.  The  document  thus  proves 
as  much  against  one  side  as  against  the  other — only  with 
the  great  difference  that  the  observations  directed  against 
Germany  and  Austria  are  confirmed  by  all  the  diplo- 
matic publications,  and,  above  all,  by  the  German  White 
Book  itself,  whereas  the  observations  against  England 
are  contradicted  by  all  the  publications  of  the  European 
Governments,  and  especially  by  the  Gennan  White  Book. 
I  have  already  collected  elsewhere  the  meed  of  praise 
which  the  German  White  Book  accords  to  England's  love 
of  peace,  and  the  efforts  by  her  in  the  cause  of  peace. 
The  White  Book  was  closed  on  August  2nd,  and  contains 
all  the  diplomatic  occurrences  up  to  that  date — only,  of 
course,  in  so  far  as  their  publication  was  considered  ex- 
pedient. If  England  had  comported  herself  in  Paris  and 
in  Petrograd  as  the  Belgian  letter-writer  reports  from 
hearsay  on  July  30th,  Germany  as  the  party  chiefly  con- 
cerned was  bound  to  have  known  this  on  August  2nd, 


262  I   ACCUSE! 

and  could  not  have  maintained  the  contrary  in  the  White 
Book.  If  there  had  been  so  much  as  a  grain  of  truth 
in  these  Belgian  back-stair  stories  the  German  Govern- 
ment would  have  seized  upon  it  with  joy,  and  would  have 
mentioned  the  relevant  facts  in  their  memorandum. 
England's  participation  in  the  war  was  directly  immi- 
nent when  the  Chancellor  on  August  4th  laid  his  White 
Book  before  the  German  Reichstag.  We  were  at  war 
with  England  the  same  evening.  The  Chancellor  had 
every  interest  in  saddling  the  responsibility  in  advance 
as  far  as  possible  on  England,  of  whose  participation  in 
the  war  there  could  no  longer  be  any  doubt  on  the  morn- 
ing of  August  4th  after  the  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality. If  he  did  not  do  so,  but  contrariwise  lavished 
praise  on  England,  and  indeed  even  emphasised  in  the 
declaration  of  war  against  Russia  the  efforts  made  by 
England  in  the  cause  of  peace,  we  may  regard  it  as  fully 
proved  that  he  had  nothing  before  him  which  could  in- 
criminate England.  The  proof  of  this,  as  we  have  seen, 
can  also  be  incontrovertibly  deduced  from  the  diplo- 
matic publications  of  the  Entente  States,  and  it  can  never 
be  disposed  of  by  the  unauthenticated  gossiping  tales  of 
a  charge  d'aif aires  w^ho  took  no  part  in  the  proceedings. 
What  Grey  in  fact  did  to  preserve  peace  before  and  after 
July  30th,  the  date  of  this  Belgian  letter,  is  a  historical 
fact  proved  by  public  documents;  he  promised  support 
neither  to  France  nor  to  Russia,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
in  reply  to  repeated  invitations  from  these  Powers,  he 
definitely  and  decidedly  refused  to  give  any  promise  on 
the  subject.  The  Chancellor  knows  this  as  well  as  we 
do,  and  if,  disregarding  all  authentic  diplomatic  occur- 
rences and  rejecting  his  own  previous  utterances,  he 
cites  a  non-authentic,  highly  suspicious  document  in  order 
unjustly  to  incriminate  England,  he  is  not  acting  like 
a  gentleman,  and  speaks  against  his  better  knowledge. 
The  truth  is  contained  in  the  sentences  in  the  Eng- 


THE    CRIME  263 

lish  Blue  Book  ^ :  "Sir  E.  Grey  had  consistently  de- 
clined to  give  any  promise  of  support  to  either  of  our 
present  allies.  He  maintained  that  the  position  of  Great 
Britain  was  that  of  a  disinterested  party  whose  influence 
for  peace  at  Berlin  and  Vienna  would  be  enhanced  by 
the  knowledge  that  we  were  not  committed  absolutely 
to  either  side  in  the  existing  dispute.  He  refused  to 
believe  that  the  best  road  to  European  peace  lay  through 
a  show  of  force.  .  .  ,  We  gave  no  pledge  to  our  present 
allies,  but  to  Germany  we  gave  three  times — on  the  30th 
July,  the  31st  July,  and  the  ist  August — a  clear  warning 
of  the  effect  which  would  be  produced  on  our  attitude 
and  on  the  sentiment  of  the  British  people  by  a  violation 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium." 

That  England  acted  as  is  here  represented,  and  not  in 
accordance  with  the  knowledge  professed  by  the  \vriter 
of  the  Belgian  letter,  is  proved  by  all  the  diplomatic  docu- 
ments. That,  however,  Germany,  as  is  equally  asserted 
in  the  letter,  exerted  herself  in  Vienna  in  the  cause  of 
peace,  is  not  proved  by  anything  since,  as  I  have  already 
pointed  out,  no  correspondence  between  Vienna  and  Ber- 
lin has  been  published.  We  are  referred  to  the  unproved 
assertions  of  Germany,  which  deserve  no  belief,  if  only 
because  the  sincere  intention  of  Germany  to  move  Vienna 
to  moderation  was  bound  to  have  been  unconditionally 
successful. 

The  Chancellor  in  his  speech  of  December  2nd  stated : 
"The  Cabinet  of  London  could  have  made  this  war  im- 
possible by  declaring  in  Petrograd  without  ambiguity 
that  England  was  not  prepared  to  allow  a  Continental 
war  in  Europe  to  develop  out  of  the  conflict  between 
Austria  and  Serbia.  .  .  .  England  did  not  do  this.  .  .  . 
England  saw  how  things  were  moving,  but  did  nothing 
to  spoke  the  wheel.  In  spite  of  all  protestations  of  peace, 
London  gave  it  to  be  understood  in  Petrograd  that  she 
'  Blue  Book,  p.  xi. 


264.  I    ACCUSE! 

was  taking  her  stand  on  the  side  of  France  and  Russia." 
These  sentences  arc  untrue  from  beginning  to  end. 
They  become  true  if  everywhere  in  place  of  England 
we  read  Germany,  and  in  place  of  Petrograd  we  read 
Vienna.     The  truth  then  runs  as  follows : — 

The  Cabinet  of  Berlin  could  have  made  this  war  im- 
possible by  declaring  in  Vienna  without  ambiguity  that 
Germany  was  not  prepared  to  allow  a  continental  war  in 
Europe  to  develop  out  of  the  conflict  between  Austria 
and  Serbia.  .  .  .  Germany  did  not  do  this.  .  .  .  Ger- 
many saw  how  things  were  moving,  but  did  nothing  to 
spoke  the  wheel.  In  spite  of  all  protestations  of  peace 
Berlin  gave  it  to  be  understood  in  Vienna  that  she  was 
taking  her  stand  on  the  side  of  Austria." 

The  events  between  the  ist  and  4th  August,  between 
the  German  declaration  of  war  against  Russia  and  the 
English  declaration  of  war  against  Germany,  require  a 
special  discussion.  The  question  to  be  answered  in  this 
discussion  is  no  longer  "Who  brought  about  the  Euro- 
pean War?"  For  this  already  had  broken  out  with  the 
German  declaration  of  war  against  Russia,  which  neces- 
sarily entailed  a  war  between  France  and  Germany  and 
a  war  between  Russia  and  Austria.  In  these  cases  there 
were  binding  treaties  of  alliance  which  made  war  inevit- 
able between  the  four  Powers  mentioned. 

I  have  already  indicated  the  attitude  assumed  by 
Italy.  The  obligations  of  this  country  extended  only  to 
participation  in  a  defensive  war,  and  she  declined  to 
take  part  on  the  express  ground  that  this  war  was  on 
the  part  of  Germany  and  Austria  an  aggressive  war — 
a  reason,  be  it  observed,  to  which  special  weight  must  be 
attached  in  the  mouth  of  an  ally,  and  precisely  for  this 
reason  it  appears  to  have  been  taken  very  airily  by  Herr 
von  Bethmann ;  for  in  his  writings  and  speeches  he  glides 
over  it  in  silence. 


THE    CRIME  265 

England  was  the  only  country  which  was  not  con- 
strained by  any  kind  of  treaty  obligations  to  take  part 
in  a  war.  I  have  already  indicated  in  an  earlier  passage 
that  England,  it  is  true,  had  concluded  special  treaties 
with  France  and  Russia  on  definite  questions  affecting 
their  Interests,  but  that  she  had  not  concluded  any  gen- 
eral treaty  of  alliance  with  either  of  these  parties,  and 
that  consequently  she  was  also  not  a  party  to  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance.  On  the  basis  of  these  special  treaties 
which  had  overcome  the  friction  existing  between  Eng- 
land and  the  two  other  States,  a  political  approximation 
had  arisen  which  established  a  relation  of  friendship 
without  treaty  obligations. 

England  was  thus  free,  and  had  to  decide  according 
to  her  own  point  of  view  whether  she  would  or  would 
not  take  part  in  the  European  War.  The  question  of  her 
participation  or  non-participation  had  not  the  slightest 
connection  with  the  other  and  far  more  important  cjues- 
tion,  both  from  a  moral  and  historical  point  of  view, 
the  question  of  the  responsibility  for  this  war.  In  this 
respect,  as  in  so  many  others,  the  logic  of  the  German 
people,  and  especially  of  its  leading  men,  has  completely 
disappeared ;  they  will  not,  or  cannot,  understand  that 
what  England  did  after  the  outbreak  of  war  has  nothing 
to  do  with  what  she  had  done  previously.  The  one  is  en- 
tirely distinct  from  the  other,  and  must  be  measured  by 
an  entirely  different  standard. 

I  will  prove  that,  just  as  England  before  the  outbreak 
of  war  had  done  everything  to  prevent  it,  so  afterwards 
she  did  nothing  to  extend  the  war  by  participation  in  it, 
but  rather  that  she  was  compelled  to  do  so,  owing  to  the 
action  taken  by  Germany.  But  even  supposing,  as  1 
will  assume  for  the  moment,  that  this  could  not  be 
proved,  it  would  not  be  demonstrated  in  the  slightest 
degree  that  England  was  responsible  for  the  outbreak 
of  the  European  War.     It  is  theoretically  quite  possible 


^66  I    ACCUSE! 

that  England  may  have  caused  the  war  and  nevertheless 
later  remained  neutral,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
equally  possible  that  she  did  not  cause  the  war  and  yet 
later  on  took  part  in  it.  There  is  no  logical  connection 
between  the  two  points  involved  in  causing  and  parti- 
cipating in  the  war. 

This  private  lecture  on  logic  is  directed  in  the  first 
place  to  the  Chancellor,  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg, 
who  in  his  speech  of  December  2nd  treats  all  these  things 
as  being  identical.  An  assurance  given  by  England  to 
France  on  August  2nd,  that  is  to  say,  after  the  outbreak 
of  war,  a  reason  advanced  in  explanation  of  the  English 
declaration  of  war  on  August  4th,  these  subsequent 
occurrences  are  for  him  so  many  proofs  that  the  war 
was  intentionally  instigated  by  England.  These  proofs 
are  defective,  if  only  because  they  are  contrary  to  the 
simplest  logic.  Acts  which  prove  guilt  can  never  be 
subsequent  in  time  to  the  decisive  event;  they  must 
precede  it,  or  at  least  happen  contemporaneously 
with  it. 

For  this  reason  it  is  difficult  to  understand  the  purpose 
of  these  interminable  and  constantly  repeated  discus- 
sions in  Germany  on  the  ground  which  moved  England 
to  take  part  in  the  war.  These  grounds  are  exclusively 
England's  own  business.  They  may  be  more  or  less 
tenable,  they  may  be  more  or  less  hypocritical,  but  they 
will  not  because  of  that  remove  one  jot  of  the  guilt  and 
the  responsibility  which  rests  on  Germany  for  having 
provoked  the  war.  The  question  whether  England  should 
take  part  or  should  remain  neutral  in  the  war  only  arose 
in  consequence  of  the  war.  The  party  then  which  bears 
the  blame  for  the  war  is  also  responsible  for  its  conse- 
quences, that  is,  for  the  participation  of  England  in  the 
war,  even  if  he  did  not  directly  provoke  this  participa- 
tion. This  responsibility  is,  however,  doubled  if  it  can 
be  proved  that  in  addition  to  being  the  prime  originator 


THE    CRIME  267 

of  the  war  this  party  is  also  the  originator  of  the  par- 
ticipation of  England  in  the  war. 

I  summarise,  then,  as  follows : — ■ 

(i)  Germany  and  Austria  are  responsible  for  the 
world  war;  their  guilt  has  been  proved. 

(2)  Their  guilt  cannot  be  lessened  by  actions  taken 
by  England  after  the  outbreak  of  war. 

(3)  Their  guilt  will  be  increased  if  they  themselves 
provoked  these  actions. 

Let  us  examine  the  facts  in  the  light  of  these  guiding 
principles. 

England  declared  war  against  Germany  on  the  evening 
of  August  4th  because  Germany  had  furnished  a  negative 
reply  to  her  demand  to  refrain  from  a  further  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality.  On  the  morning  of  August  4th 
German  troops  penetrated  into  Belgian  territory  after 
Belgium  had  refused  to  comply  with  the  German  request 
for  a  free  passage.^  England,  as  one  of  the  guarantors 
of  the  Treaty  of  London  of  1839,  had  the  right  and  the 
duty  to  intervene,  on  the  appeal  made  by  the  Belgian 
King  on  August  3rd,  on  behalf  of  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium, which  it  had  guaranteed  in  common  with  Prussia 
and  other  Powers.  Such  a  step  on  the  part  of  England 
could  surprise  no  one  who  had  even  a  superficial  knowl- 
edge of  the  history  of  Belgian  neutrality.  Herr  von 
Bethmann  was,  however,  so  enraged  at  the  action  of 
England  that  on  the  last  visit  of  the  Ambassador,  Sir  E. 
Goschen,  on  August  4th,  he  was  unable  to  control  his 
agitation,  and  spoke  in  a  contemptuous  manner  of  the 
word  "neutrality,"  which  is  so  often  disregarded,  and  of 
the  "scrap  of  paper"  on  account  of  which  England  was 
about  to  begin  a  war.^ 

Herr  von  Bethmann  appears  to  be  badly  informed  in 
the  history  of  his  own  country.     Was  he  not  aware  of 

^  Grey  Book,  No.  22. 
'Blue  Book,  No.  160. 


268  I   ACCUSE! 

the  fact  that  Belgian  neutrality  had  in  1870  been  the 
subject  of  one  of  the  finest  diplomatic  manoeuvres  of  the 
Bismarckian  statecraft?  Did  he  not  know  that  then 
also  England  intervened  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
as  the  protector  of  Belgian  neutrality,  just  as  on  the 
present  occasion,  only  with  the  different  result  that  Bis- 
marck not  only  promised  that  he  would  respect  Belgian 
neutrality,  but  also  denounced  the  Intended  disregard  of 
it  by  France,  and  thus  brought  England  on  to  his  side? 
Shortly  before  the  beginning  of  the  war,  as  is  well 
known,  he  published  an  outline  of  a  treaty  drawn  up  by 
Benedetti,  the  French  Ambassador,  in  which  France 
claimed  the  annexation  of  Belgium  as  a  return  for  com- 
pensation to  Prussia  in  North  Germany.  The  result  of 
this  astute  move  was  nothing  more  nor  less  than  the  neu- 
trality of  England,  and  the  conclusion  of  identical  trea- 
ties between  England  on  the  one  hand  and  Germany 
and  France  on  the  other  (August,  1870),  in  which  Eng- 
land expressly  declared  that,  if  either  of  the  belligerent 
Powers  violated  Belgian  territory,  she  would  associate 
herself  with  the  other  in  defence  of  Belgium.  The  treaty 
was  so  strictly  observed  and  interpreted  that  Ger- 
many after  the  Battle  of  Sedan  was  obliged  to  give 
up  the  idea  of  transporting  wounded  troops  through 
Belgium. 

Is  Herr  von  Bcthmann  completely  ignorant  of  all  these 
events?.  Or,  if  he  knows  anything  of  them,  does  he 
believe  that  he,  the  dwarf  on  whose  shoulders  the  mantle 
of  the  mighty  has  fallen,  can  scatter  to  the  winds  the 
considerations  to  which  his  great  predecessor,  the  giant 
Bismarck,  willingly  and  profitably  submitted?  Was  he 
not  bound  to  have  said  to  himself,  when  he  allowed  the 
General  Staff  to  include  in  their  plans  the  march  through 
Belgium,  that  there  would  result  from  this  strategic  ad- 
vantage political  and  military  disadvantages  for  Ger- 
many incomparably  greater?     Had  he  learned  nothing 


THE    CRIME  269 

from  the  past?  Did  he  not  know,  as  Bismarck  knew 
quite  well,  that  it  had  been  from  time  immemorial  one 
of  the  elementary  principles  of  English  policy  to  main- 
tain and  to  protect  the  inviolability  of  the  neutral  small 
States  in  Northern  Europe?  Did  no  one  remind  him 
of  the  passionate  words  with  which  Granville  and  Glad- 
stone— Liberal  Ministers  like  those  now  in  power — had 
intervened  in  August,  1870,  for  the  inviolability  of  Bel- 
gium, and  had  described  an  attack  on  this  country  as 
"the  direst  crime  that  ever  stained  the  pages  of  his- 
tory"? 

Herr  von  Bethmann  appears  to  have  been  ignorant 
of  all  this  when,  in  his  speech  in  the  Reichstag  on  De- 
cember 2nd,  he  described  the  violation  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality, as  not  the  ground,  but  the  pretext  for  the  Eng- 
lish declaration  of  war.  It  was,  in  fact,  the  real  ground 
to  such  an  extent  that  England  would  have  declared  war 
against  us  forty-four  years  ago  if  we  had  dared  to  vio- 
late Belgium.  What  is  not  permitted  to  a  Bismarck  is 
certainly  not  allowed  to  a  Bethmann — or  else  we  must 
invert  the  well-known  phrase,  and  say :  ''Quod  licet 
hovi,  lion  licet  Jovi." 

What  purpose  is  served  by  inquiring — as  the  present- 
day  German  professors  love  to  do — whether  the  protec- 
tion of  Belgium  was  for  England  a  moral  question  or  a 
question  of  interests?  Probably  it  is  simultaneously  a 
question  of  morals  and  of  interests;  in  observing  her 
pledged  word  England  is  at  the  same  time  protecting 
her  own  interests,  which,  as  has  always  been  openly  ad- 
mitted, imply  in  the  nature  of  things  that  the  coast  of  the 
North  Sea  lying  opposite  England  should  be  in  the  pos- 
session of  small  neutral  States.  The  man  who  acts  hon- 
estly is  not  obliged  to  render  to  anyone  an  account  of 
the  extent  to  which  his  action  corresponds  to  his  own. in- 
terests. Qui  jure  suo  utitur,  neminem  laedit.  We  can- 
not scrutinise  the  souls  of  men,  much  less  the  souls  of 


270  I   ACCUSE! 

States,  which,  indeed,  as  collective  bodies,  do  not  possess 
souls. 

In  any  case,  having  regard  to  historical  experience  as 
well  as  to  the  earnest  and  repeated  warnings  communi- 
cated to  the  German  Government,  there  could  not  be  the 
slightest  doubt  that  a  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality 
would  so  strongly  affect  the  feelings  of  the  English 
people  and  English  interests  that  England  could  not 
stand  aside  in  silence.  In  the  course  of  his  conversa- 
tions Sir  Edward  Grey  repeatedly  drew  the  attention  of 
Prince  Lichnowsky  to  the  consequences  which  would 
follow  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  which  had 
been  brought  into  ominous  propinquity  by  the  evasive 
answer  which  Herr  von  Jagow  gave  to  the  English  in- 
quiry of  July  31st.  Grey  had  particularly  drawn  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  ''the  neutrality  of  Belgium  affected 
feeling  in  this  coiintry."  ^  The  German  Government 
then  endeavoured  to  assure  the  English  Gpvernment 
that  they  had  in  no  circumstances  any  intention  of  an- 
nexing Belgian  territory  ^ — a  soothing  pill  which,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  England  could  not  swallow;  for  neu- 
trality is  not  the  same  as  "not  being  annexed,"  but  signi- 
fies that  the  country  which  is  neutral  shall  be  spared  the 
effects  of  war  in  every  respect,  and  shall  not  be  used 
even  as  a  passage  for  troops.  The  demand  for  a  right 
of  passage  as  an  innocent  act  was,  in  fact,  more  than 
naive;  the  passage  of  German  troops  would  also  have 
justified  France  in  entering  the  country,  and  Belgium 
would  thus  have  fallen  into  as  evil  a  plight  as  can  be  con- 
ceived; if  she  had  yielded  to  the  German  ultimatum  she 
would  have  run  the  risk  of  being  obliged  to  surrender  her 
country  as  a  battlefield  for  the  combatant  Powers,  and 
she  herself  would  not  have  been  in  a  position  to  do  any- 
thing for  the  protection  of  her  soil.     She  would  have 

^Elue  Book,  No.  loi,  123,  p.  x, 
*Blue  Book,  No.  157. 


THE    CRIME  271 

been  crushed  between  the  two  armies,  and  would  have 
been  lost,  no  matter  which  side  had  been  victorious. 

It  need  therefore  cause  no  surprise  that  England  was 
not  satisfied  with  the  soothing  assurances  of  Germany, 
but  demanded  unconditional  respect  for  Belgian  neutral- 
ity. Germany,  however,  was  not  in  a  position  to  give  an 
assurance  in  this  sense,  since  the  long-prepared  plans 
of  the  General  Staff  made  the  passage  through  Belgium 
an  imperative  requirement. 

As  late  as  August  4th,  when  the  German  troops  had 
already  crossed  the  Belgian  frontier.  Sir  Edward  Gos- 
chen, acting  on  the  instructions  of  his  Government,  in- 
quired of  Herr  von  Jagow  whether  it  was  not  possible 
even  then  to  desist  from  breaking  into  Belgium  and  to 
withdraw  the  troops.  When  this  inquiry  was  answered 
in  the  negative,  the  English  Ambassador  entreated  the 
Secretary  of  State  to  consider  the  matter  further,  and  to 
give  him  a  satisfactory  answer  before  12  o'clock  at  mid- 
night. Herr  von  Jagow  replied  that  his  answer  must 
remain  the  same,  even  if  twenty- four  hours  or  more  were 
given  him  for  reflection;  thereupon  Goschen  asked  for 
his  passports. 

H  we  survey  the  whole  behaviour  of  German  diplo- 
macy in  this  question  of  Belgian  neutrality,  there  is 
only  one  possible  explanation  of  the  inexplicable,  namely, 
that  diplomacy  had  completely  resigned  in  favour  of  the 
chiefs  of  the  army.  The  military  situation  was  without 
doubt  improved  by  marching  through  Belgium;  the  dip- 
lomatic situation,  however,  and  in  consequence  of  this 
the  military  also  in  its  turn,  was  enormously  worsened 
by  the  danger  that  to  the  two  enemies  in  the  field  there 
might  be  added  a  third,  the  most  dangerous.  Taken  al- 
together, the  disadvantages  greatly  outweighed  the  ad- 
vantages. It  was  the  duty  of  the  statesman  who  was 
controlling  the  destinies  of  the  Empire  to  balance  these 
advantages  and  disadvantages  against  each  other,  and  if 


I    ACCUSE! 

the  calculation  yielded  an  unfavourable  result,  he  should 
have  preferred  to  give  up  his  office  rather  than  bring  his 
country  Into  a  deeper  danger. 

In  the  Germany  of  to-day  it  is  not,  however,  possible 
to  find  men  capable  of  decisions  such  as  these  demand- 
ing such  strength  of  character.  The  Chancellor  has 
failed  either  in  character  or  in  insight;  either  he  failed 
to  recognise  the  consequences  which  would  flow  from  the 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  or  he  did  not  possess  the 
energy  to  give  effect  to  the  political  point  of  view  against 
the  view  of  the  military  authorities,  if  need  be  at  the 
sacrifice  of  his  office.  Now  that  the  disaster  has  occurred 
he  endeavours,  supported  by  his  faithful  followers,  to 
excuse  himself  with  many  "ifs"  and  "buts."  "If  we 
had  not  violated  Belgian  neutrality,  France  would  have 
done  so."  I  have  already  shown  that  there  is  nothing 
to  indicate  that  this  is  the  case.  If,  however,  France  in 
fact  also  intended  to  enter  Belgium,  the  best  course 
which  Germany  could  have  adopted  was  to  wait  for  this 
to  happen  and  allow  the  fatal  consequences  to  ensue  for 
France.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  England  would 
have  opposed  an  invasion  of  Belgium  by  France  just  as 
she  did  in  the  case  of  Germany;  this  may  be  definitely 
inferred  from  the  treaties  concluded  in  August,  1870, 
and  from  the  identical  inquiry  addressed  to  France  and 
Germany  on  July  31st.  The  situation  of  France  with  re- 
gard to  England  would  have  been  morally  still  more  un- 
favourable than  ours,  since  France  on  July  31st  had 
given  a  definite  promise,  whereas  Germany  had  declined 
to  do  so.  If  a  few  days  later  France  had  broken  her 
word,  England,  if  she  had  not  sided  with  Germany, 
would,  at  any  rate,  have  remained  neutral. 

If,  further,  it  is  maintained  in  exoneration  of  our 
diplomacy  that  England  would  have  taken  the  field 
against  Germany,  even  apart  from  the  violation  of  Bel- 
gian neutrality,  it  can  only  be  observed  that  this  asser- 


THE    CRIME  875 

tion  is  so  completely  untenable  and  unsupported  that  it 
does  not  even  deserve  consideration.  What  England 
did  to  maintain  peace  is  a  historical  fact.  What  England 
would  have  done  if  this  or  that  had  happened  or  had  not 
happened,  is  a  mere  supposition,  which  is  not  amenable 
to  serious  discussion. 

To  prove  that  it  was  not  on  account  of  the  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  that  England  took  part  in  the  war, 
but  in  order  that  she  might  under  all  circumstances  lend' 
assistance  to  France,  the  Chancellor  invokes  in  his  speech 
of  December  2nd  an  occurrence  which  took  place  in  Lon- 
don on  August  2nd  between  Sir  Edward  Grey  and  Cam- 
bon,  the  French  Ambassador.^  What  is  the  object  of 
this  demonstration?  It  is  supposed,  as  Herr  von  Beth- 
mann  explains,  to  prove  that  England  was  now,  as  al- 
ways, the  perfidious  Albion,  and  under  the  mask  of  moral 
action  was  pursuing  only  her  naked  interests.  These  in- 
terests, however,  were  said  to  be  comprised  in  the  de- 
struction of  the  vital  nerve  of  her  greatest  industrial 
competitor :  'Thus  England  and  Russia  bear  the  respon- 
sibility for  this  world  war." 

A  similar  jumble  of  defective  logic  and  of  the  perver- 
sion of  truth  has  seldom  been  emitted  in  so  pregnant  a 
moment  by  anyone  in  such  an  authoritative  position. 
We  clutch  our  heads  and  seek  in  vain  to  follow  the 
meanderings  of  this  mind.  What  does  it  all  mean? 
England  is  responsible  for  the  world-war  because  she 
adhered  to  one  of  the  two  combatant  parties  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  war,  which  she  did  not  cause,  but  which, 
on  the  contrary,  she  sought  to  prevent  by  all  the  forces 
at  her  disposal.  Even  if  this  adhesion  took  place  with- 
out any  reason,  out  of  mere  caprice  on  the  part  of  Eng- 
land, it  would  be  impossible  to  deduce  any  responsibility 
for  the  war.     To  make  the  antithesis  comprehensible, 

^Blue  Book,  No.  148. 


274  I    ACCUSE! 

even  for  the  dullest  intellect,  I  formulate  it  in  six  Latin 
words : — • 

Culpa — ante  bellum : 

Participatio — post   bellum. 

England  was  in  no  way  obliged  to  adduce  to  anyone 
grounds  for  her  participation  in  the  war.  The  grounds 
which  she  has  adduced  may  be  believed  or  disbelieved; 
in  any  case  they  are,  and  must  remain,  grounds  for  the 
participation  of  England  after  the  war  was  begun;  in 
no  case  can  they  be  reasons  which  lay  on  England's 
shoulders  the  responsibility  for  beginning  the  war. 

Certainly  there  was,  as  the  Chancellor  rightly  empha- 
sised, "no  fraternal  duty,  no  compulsion,  not  even  any 
menace  of  their  own  country."  No  fraternal  duty!  So, 
then,  fraternal  duties  justify  an  intervention  in  the 
struggle !  Why,  then,  Herr  von  Bethmann,  did  you  not 
recognise  the  fraternal  duties  of  Russia  to  intervene  on 
behalf  of  Serbia?  Why  did  you  seek  to  prevent  Russia 
from  fulfilling  such  a  fraternal  duty  by  advancing  your 
proposal  for  localisation?  Now  that  you  recognise  that 
fraternal  duties  may  constrain  to  armed  intervention, 
will  you  still  try  to  persuade  us  that  your  attempt  to  keep 
back  the  big  brother  from  the  protection  of  the  small  was 
intended  to  be  seriously  taken? 

There  is  said  to  have  been  nothing  which  compelled 
England  to  war.  True,  there  was  no  material  compul- 
sion. But  in  what  case  is  there  really  material  com- 
pulsion except  In  a  true,  genuine  war  of  liberation,  not 
the  counterfeit  presentment  of  it?  On  the  other  hand, 
there  was  a  moral  compulsion,  a  solemn  duty  imposed 
by  treaty,  to  which  greater  importance  attached,  inas- 
much as  its  object  was  the  protection  of  the  small  against 
the  great,  a  treaty  signed  by  all  the  Powers,  the  ag- 
gressor included,  and  at  a  later  date  sealed  again  by  a 
new  treaty.     A   duty   imposed  by  treaty — a   scrap   of 


THE    CRIME  275 

paper!  says  Herr  von  Bethmann.  Indeed,  what  has  in- 
duced us  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  Austria  in  a  con- 
flict as  remote  from  our  own  interests  as  any  Albanian 
kingdom?  Only  a  treaty,  a  scrap  of  paper,  which  im- 
posed upon  us  obligations  as  allies.  What  is  right  for 
us  must  surely  be  allowed  in  the  case  of  England.  If 
in  our  case  the  scrap  of  paper  w^as  enough  to  justify 
us  in  setting  the  whole  world  in  flames  with  this  paper- 
lighter,  why  should  it  not  be  enough  in  the  case  of  Eng- 
land to  justify  her  in  bringing  further  combustible  ma- 
terial to  extend  the  fire  which  had  already  broken  out? 

If,  however,  anyone  urges  against  me  the  arguments 
in  the  White  Book :  "Yes,  but  our  interests  also  were 
at  stake — the  Germanic  races  in  Central  Europe.  .  .  . 
(please  don't  laugh!). — ^We  dare  not  allow  Austria  to 
be  weakened,  &c." — I  reply  that  England  also  had  her 
own  interests  to  safeguard,  for  England  also  the  Treaty 
of  London  of  1839  was  not  only  a  moral  tie,  but  also  a 
guarantee  of  her  interests,  a  hundred  times  more  impor- 
tant for  England  than  all  south-eastern  questions  taken 
together  are  for  us. 

We  also  could  have  remained  neutral  in  a  zvar  be- 
tween Austria  and  Russia.  Had  we  remained  neutral 
the  war  would  have  been  really  localised,  localised  be- 
tween Russia  and  Austria,  and  neither  France  nor  Eng- 
land would  have  been  drawn  into  the  struggle. 

We  could  not  remain  neutral,  and  did  not  wish  to  do 
so,  because  we  were  bound  by  a  Treaty  of  Alliance,  and 
the  fulfilment  of  our  duties  under  the  Treaty  was  at 
the  same  time  in  agreement  with  our  interests. 

The  position  was  precisely  the  same  in  the  case  of 
England.  England  could  not  remain  neutral,  and  did 
not  wish  to  do  so  when  confronted  with  a  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality,  because  she  was  by  the  treaty  obliged' 
to  the  protection  of  Belgium,  and  this  protection  was  at 
the  same  time  in  agreement  with  her  interests.    The  roles 


Ä76  I   ACCUSE! 

are  thus  equally  shared.  Germany  and  England  from 
the  standpoints  proper  to  each  adopted  the  same  course 
of  action  for  the  same  reasons.  The  fundamental  dif- 
ference is  to  be  found  merely  in  the  fact  that  England 
interv^ened  on  behalf  of  an  innocent  small  State,  whereas 
Germany  took  under  her  wings  a  guilty  great  State ;  that 
Germany  thus  provoked  the  world-war,  whereas  Eng- 
land sought  to  prevent  it  by  every  possible  means. 

But  let  us  just  make  the  attempt  to  follow  the  logic 
of  Bethmann  and  examine  the  fact  which  is  supposed  to 
prove  that  Belgium  neutrality  was  only  a  mask.  Sir 
Edward  Grey  on  August  2nd  gave  to  Cambon,  the 
French  Ambassador,  the  following  assurance  based  on  a 
resolution  of  the  Cabinet : — 

"If  the  German  Fleet  comes  into  the  Channel  or 
through  the  North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile  operations 
against  French  coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  Fleet  will 
give  all  the  protection  in  its  power. 

"This  assurance  is,  of  course,  subject  to  the  policy 
of  His  Majesty's  Government  receiving  the  support  of 
Parliament,  and  must  not  be  taken  as  binding  His  Maj- 
esty's Government  to  take  any  action  until  the  above 
contingency  of  action  by  the  German  Fleet  takes  place."  ^ 

In  explanation  of  this  declaration  Grey  expressly 
pointed  out  that  even  in  the  event  of  a  war  breaking  out 
between  France  and  Germany  England  could  not  bind 
herself  to  declare  war  upon  Germany.  Only  in  the  case 
expressly  foreseen,  that  is,  if  the  German  Fleet  should 
come  into  the  Channel  or  through  the  North  Sea  and 
undertake  hostile  operations  against  French  coasts  or 
shipping,  only  in  this  case  would  the  British  Fleet  come 
to  the  help  of  France — all  this,  of  course,  being  depen- 
dent on  the  approval  of  Parliament. 

This  is  the  latest  missile  by  means  of  which  Herr  von 
Bethmann  endeavours  to  despatch  English  statesmen 
'Blue  Book,  No.  198. 


THE    CRIME  277 

from  life  to  death  (moral  death,  that  Is  to  say).  He 
attaches  special  hnportance  to  the  fact  that  this  declara- 
tion of  Grey's  was  given  before  the  ultimatum  was  sent 
to  Belgium,  and  he  infers  from  this  that  England,  even 
before  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  had  taken  the 
field  as  a  belligerent,  and  in  consequence  that  this  viola- 
tion was  not  the  true  ground  for  England's  participa- 
tion in  the  war.  To  all  this  I  answer  in  popular  phrase- 
ology:   "I  don't  think." 

Even  if  the  whole  of  this  deduction  were  just,  it  would 
be  entirely  superfluous.  The  decisive  question,  ''Who  is 
to  blame  for  the  European  war?"  is  neither  answered 
nor  influenced  by  the  events  of  August  2nd.  On  August 
2nd  the  war  was  there,  owing  to  the  guilt  of  Germany 
and  Austria  and  against  the  will  of  England.  It  could 
no  longer  be  prevented.  Its  extension  to  France  was  in- 
evitable, and  in  fact  had  already  taken  place,  even  if 
the  declaration  of  war  was  not  delivered  at  Paris  until 
the  following  day.  The  ultimatum  to  France  had  expired 
at  I  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  August  ist,  and  had  been 
answered  by  France  by  a  refusal.  The  declaration  of 
war  between  Austria  and  Russia  was  a  formality  which 
was  bound  to  take  place  at  any  moment,  but  which — ■ 
mirahUe  dictu! — to  increase  the  madness  of  the  whole 
affair,  was  delayed  until  August  6th.  In  short,  the  war 
between  the  four  Powers  had  come,  and  England  was 
free  to  act  as  her  interests  required.  If  her  interests 
required  her  to  support  France  in  general  or  in  certain 
cases,  well  and  good,  she  was  free  to  act  in  accordance 
with  these  interests.  If  her  interests  required  her  to 
take  part  in  the  war  only  in  the  event  of  the  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality,  she  was  free  to  act  in  this  way 
also.  In  either  case  not  the  slightest  reproach  can  be 
made  against  England.  If  we  took  our  stand  beside 
Austria,  England  also  could  stand  by  France. 

The   fact  that  there  existed   between   England  and 


278  I   ACCUSE! 

France  no  alliance  which  imposed  obligations  did  not  pre- 
vent England  from  promising  assistance  to  France  on 
the  ground  of  the  friendly  relations  between  them,  and, 
above  all,  on  the  ground  of  her  own  interests.  We  also 
acted  exclusively  in  accordance  with  our  own  interests, 
which,  when  occasion  required,  following  the  celebrated 
example  of  Austria,  we  designated  as  "questions  of  life 
and  death."  Thus  the  invasion  of  Belgium  was  for  us 
a  question  of  life  and  death  (see  the  despatch  of  Jagow 
to  Lichnowsky  of  August  4th  ^),  or,  more  modestly  ex- 
pressed, a  question  of  our  military  interest.  So  also  the 
neutrality  of  England,  if  not  a  question  of  life  and  death, 
was  at  any  rate  for  us  a  question  of  far-reaching  impor- 
tance, and  for  this  reason  we  endeavoured  in  every  pos- 
sible way  to  secure  this  neutrality  both  before  and  after 
the  outbreak  of  war.  And  earnestly  as  we  desired  peace 
with  England,  with  equal  earnestness  and  persistence 
we  sought  for  war  with  Russia  and  France.  In  the  first 
place,  our  desire  was  to  be  lords  on  the  Continent,  and 
then — everything  else  would  follow. 

What,  then,  I  again  ask,  is  the  object  of  this  entirely 
superfluous  discussion  as  to  this  or  that  reason  which 
may  have  moved  England  to  war  ?  Is  Europe  a  court  of 
moral  jurisdiction  to  pass  condemnation  on  hypocrites 
and  Pharisees?  Woe  to  us,  if  such  a  court  existed! 
How  should  we  stand  before  such  a  tribunal?  We 
should  be  unmasked,  the  conquerors  in  the  mask  of  lib- 
erators, the  aggressors  in  the  mask  of  the  attacked,  the 
wolf  clothed  in  sheepskin! 

Yes,  indeed,  if  we  had  only  enough  honesty  to  con- 
fess the  unspeakable  crime!  If  like  the  great  conquerors 
of  the  past  who  took  the  world  by  storm,  like  Alexander 
the  Great,  or  the  Romans,  or  Napoleon  the  First,  we 
openly  proclaimed  our  right  to  possess  and  to  rule  the 
world,  because  we  were  better,  more  valiant,  and  stronger 
^Blue  Book,  No.  157. 


THE    CRIME  279 

than  the  others!  There  would  be  something  great  in 
that,  something  fascinating,  something  which  would  com- 
pel respect,  for  everything  that  is  great  captures  the 
imagination,  even  if  it  is  in  the  service  of  pernicious  ends. 
A  Rinaldo  Rinaldini,  a  Richard  III.,  a  Cesare  Borgia 
are  monsters,  but  they  are  great  in  their  kind,  and  awake 
admiration  like  every  human  type  which  has  achieved 
perfection.  But  we,  how  petty  we  are!  In  our  writings 
and  our  speeches  at  home  we  preach  a  policy  of  world- 
power,  of  conquest,  and  of  world-dominion — of  course, 
only  among  the  initiated — but  to  the  stupid  people  and 
to  foreign  countries  we  profess  that  it  is  we  who  have 
been  attacked  and  fallen  upon,  that  we  are  the  victims 
of  treacherous  enemies.  We  also  "secretly  preach  wine 
and  publicly  drink  water."  In  the  intimate  circle  of  our 
Junkers,  our  courtiers,  and  our  Generals  we  raise  the 
intoxicating  wine  of  enthusiasm  for  war,  but  in  public 
before  the  people  and  beyond  the  frontier  we  drink 
the  water  of  peace  fulness,  of  meekness,  and  of  inno- 
cence. 

It  therefore  does  not  become  us  to  reproach  the  Eng- 
lish Government  with  double-speaking  and  with  hypoc- 
risy. In  this  case  also  we  seek  the  mote  in  another's 
eye  and  do  not  see  the  beam  in  our  own. 

How  complete  a  master  Germany  is  of  all  the  arts 
of  hypocrisy  is  proved,  apart  from  the  events  of  19 14, 
by  a  series  of  declarations  made  by  German  diplomatists 
between  the  years  191 1  and  1913  on  the  subject  of  Bel- 
gian neutrality.  As  far  back  as  191 1,  in  connection  with 
the  discussion  of  the  Dutch  scheme  for  the  fortification 
of  Flushing,  the  fear  was  frequently  expressed  in  the 
Belgian  Press  that  Germany  would  violate  Belgian  neu- 
trality in  the  event  of  a  Franco-German  war.  In  the 
interests  of  good  neighbourly  relations  with  Germany 
the  Belgian  Minister  gave  expression  in  Berlin  to  the 
desire  that  the  Imperial  Government  might  dispel  these 


280  I    ACCUSE! 

fears  by  a  public  declaration  in  the  Reichstag.  Through 
Herr  von  Flotow,  who  was  then  Ambassador,  Herr  von 
Bethmann  conveyed  his  warm  thanks  for  the  friendly 
sentiment  of  the  Belgian  Government,  but  replied  that  he 
could  not  make  the  desired  public  declaration  for  fear 
of  weakening  the  military  situation  of  Germany  with  re- 
gard to  France.  If  she  were  assured  against  an  attack 
from  the  north,  France  could  concentrate  all  her  energy 
on  the  eastern  frontier,  and  thereby  render  invasion  by 
Germany  a  more  difficult  undertaking.^  This  evasive 
answer  of  Bethmann  is  to-day  comprehensible.  It  is 
clear  that  even  then  the  plans  for  the  invasion  of  Bel- 
gium were  ready,  and  the  Chancellor  had  in  consequence 
scruples  about  declaring  publicly  in  the  Reichstag  that 
he  would  respect  a  neutrality,  the  violation  of  which  had 
already  been  decided  upon. 

Less  prudence  was,  at  any  rate,  shown  by  Herr  von 
Jagow,  who,  in  the  financial  committee  of  the  Reichstag 
on  April  29th,  1913,  did  not  shrink  from  making  the 
untrue  declaration  that  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was 
established  by  treaty,  and  that  Germany  intended  to 
respect  this  treaty.^  The  utmost  limit  in  unscrupulous- 
ness  was,  however,  reached  by  Herr  von  Below-Saleske, 
who,  as  late  as  August  2nd,  some  hours  before  handing 
over  the  German  ultimatum,  gave  to  Davignon,  the  Bel- 
gian Foreign  Minister,  the  most  quietening  assur- 
ances with  regard  to  the  intention  of  her  German  neigh- 
bour. When  M.  Davignon  expressed  his  satisfaction 
on  this  point,  but  notwithstanding  stated  that,  for  the 
purpose  of  reassuring  his  country,  he  would  be  glad  to 
receive  from  the  German  Government  an  official  declara- 
tion such  as  France  had  already  formally  given  on  July 
31st,  Herr  von  Below  contented  himself  with  declaring 
that  he  had  not  yet  received   any  instructions  in  this 

^  Grey  Book,  No.  12. 
^  Grey  Book,  No.  12. 


THE    CRIME  281 

sense.*  On  the  same  evening  about  7  o'clock  he  handed 
over  the  ultimatum.  This  certainly  is  a  model  of  "fair 
play"  which  cannot  be  excelled!  But  it  is  only  in  keep- 
ing with  the  whole. 


In  this  chapter  mention  should  also  be  made  of  a  fact 
which  is  still  quite  unknown  in  Germany.  In  the  sum- 
mer of  1913  the  Belgian  King  and  Queen  with  their 
children  paid  an  official  visit  to  Liege  on  the  occasion  of 
some  celebration  or  other.  The  Emperor  William — ■ 
— made  use  of  this  opportunity  to  send 
a  special  envoy  to  greet  the  royal  couple  and  to  convey 
to  the  Royal  Family  an  assurance  of  his  sincere  friend- 
ship. The  envoy  was  not,  as  is  usual  in  such  cases,  a 
General  attached  to  the  Court,  but  General  von  Emrnichy 
zvho  was  later  the  conqueror  of  Liege. 


Let  us,  however,  return  to  the  reproaches  directed 
against  England.  England,  it  is  suggested,  by  the  assur- 
ance given  on  August  2nd  had  already  abandoned  her 
neutrality,  and  had  placed  herself  on  the  side  of  France. 
The  violation  of  Belgian  territory  is,  in  consequence, 
supposed  to  have  been  a  negligible  factor  in  moulding 
her  decisions.  What,  then,  in  reality  was  the  assurance 
given  to  the  French  Government?  It  did  not  extend  be- 
yond a  conditional  and  restricted  protection.  The  pro- 
tection was  linked  to  the  condition  that  the  German 
Fleet  should  come  into  the  Channel  or  through  the  North 
^Grey  Book,  No.  19. 


282  I   ACCUSE! 

Sea  to  undertake  hostile  operations  against  French 
coasts  or  shipping.  The  protection  was  further  subjected 
to  the  restriction  that  it  should  be  given  only  by  the  Eng- 
lish Fleet.  It  was  expressly  pointed  out  that  this  protec- 
tion was  not  to  be  taken  as  being  equivalent  to  a  declara- 
tion of  war  against  Germany. 

This  conditional  and  restricted  promise  on  the  part  of 
England  did  not  issue  from  the  free  will  of  the  English 
Government,  but  from  a  treaty  obligation  which  she  had 
assumed  with  regard  to  France.  The  two  countries  had 
for  a  long  time  agreed  that  France  should  concentrate 
almost  the  whole  of  her  Fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  for 
the  protection  of  the  common  interests  of  France  and 
England,  and  that  England  in  return  for  this  should  as- 
sume the  protection  of  these  interests  in  northern  waters. 
This  agreement  was  not  based  upon  any  kind  of  military 
designs  against  any  other  Power,  least  of  all  against 
Germany.  Had  any  aggressive  tendency  against  Germany 
been  influential  in  forming  this  naval  agreement,  the  two 
fleets  would  probably  not  have  been  separated,  but  at 
least  the  greater  part  of  their  combined  forces  would 
have  been  united  in  northern  waters.  The  Anglo-French 
agreement  had  as  its  exclusive  object  the  protection  of 
the  commercial  interests  of  the  two  countries. 

The  actual  position,  however,  now  was  that  the  French 
Fleet,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  units,  was  in  the 
Mediterranean,  where  it  was  of  service,  not  only  to 
French  interests,  but  also  to  the  interests  of  England. 
The  north  and  west  coasts  of  France  were  consequently 
unprotected.  In  these  circumstances  it  was  the  duty  of 
England,  in  the  imminent  war  between  France  and  Ger- 
many which  had  already  become  inevitable  on  August 
2nd,  to  take  over  the  protection  of  the  French  coast, 
which  France  with  her  Fleet  tied  to  the  Mediterranean 
could  not  in  fact  assume.  This  was  the  meaning  and 
the  reason  of  Grey's  promise  of  August  2nd. 


THE    CRIME  283 

In  making  this  promise,  England  had  not  in  the  slight- 
est degree  departed  from  her  neutrality,  for  it  depended 
on  the  free  will  of  Germany  to  refrain  from  attacking 
the  coasts  and  the  shipping  of  France,  and  thereby  to 
avoid  any  ground  for  an  intervention  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Fleet.  It  was  open  to  the  German  Government 
to  make  the  English  promise  to  France  ineffective,  and 
Prince  Lichnowsky,  in  fact,  negotiated  in  London  on 
August  3rd  on  the  question  whether  England  would  re- 
main neutral  should  Germany  refrain  from  attacking  the 
northern  coasts  and  the  shipping  of  France.^  Had  this 
been  the  only  question  which  concerned  England  these 
negotiations  might  perhaps  have  been  completely  success- 
ful, but  England  had  other  and  more  important  interests 
to  defend  which  Germany  could  not,  or  would  not,  sat- 
isfy.   These  interests  were  of  two  kinds : — 

1.  the  maintenance  of  France  as  a  great  Power  in 
Europe  and  as  a  Colonial  Power,  and 

2.  the  non-violation  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

On  the  question  whether  these  English  interests  were 
legitimate  or  not,  no  one  apart  from  England  herself 
has  the  right  to  pronounce  judgment.  As  we  made  it 
our  task  to  maintain  Austria-Hungary,  so  it  was  open 
to  England  to  consider  the  maintenance  of  France  and 
her  Colonies  as  serviceable  to  her  interests.  Every  great 
Power  has  the  right  to  form  an  independent  judgment 
as  to  what  course  it  may  or  may  not  be  expedient  for 
her  to  adopt,  and  she  is  entitled  to  reject  any  tutelage 
from  any  other  quarter.  The  interests  of  States  also 
are  in  no  way  static,  but  vary  according  to  time  and 
circumstance.  What  to-day  appears  profitable  may 
appear  to-morrow  to  be  disadvantageous  or  indifferent. 
Until  the  agreement  of  1904  the  maintenance  of  France 
as  a  Colonial  Power  was,  at  any  rate,  not  more  than  a 
matter  of  indifference  to  England.  After  that  agree- 
^  Grey's  speech  of  3rcl  August. 


284. 


I   ACCUSE! 


merit  it  became  an  element  in  English  policy,  and  formed 
the  central  point  in  the  Anglo-French  agreement.  This 
explains  the  question  put  by  Goschen  to  the  Chancellor 
when  the  latter  made,  on  July  29th,  his  well-known  bid 
for  the  neutrality  of  England,  and  offered  in  return  for 
this  to  guarantee  the  integrity  of  French  territory — the 
question  whether  this  guarantee  also  extended  to  the 
French  Colonies.  From  the  negative  answer  of  Beth- 
mann  it  appeared  that  Germany  intended  to  make  Co- 
lonial acquisitions  at  the  expense  of  France.^  But  even 
apart  from  any  such  intention  England  could  not  but 
fear  that  the  crushing  of  France  from  a  military  point 
of  view  would  profoundly  shake  her  position  as  a  great 
Power,  her  well-being,  and  independence. 

If  even  in  this  case  England's  interests  were  imperilled, 
they  were  still  more  deeply  involved  in  the  question  of 
Belgian  neutrality.  From  the  beginning  of  the  negotia- 
tions the  English  Government  had  never  left  room  for 
the  slightest  doubt  that  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality 
would  he  a  casus  bcili  for  England.  This  was  the  only 
ciuestion  which  was  bound  certainly,  unconditionally, 
and  completely,  to  lead  to  a  war  between  Germany 
and  England,  whereas  the  French  question  admitted  of 
accommodation  up  to  a  certain  point.  In  the  Belgian 
question  popular  sentiment  in  England  played  a  decisive 
part,  whereas  in  the  French  question  this  was  not  the 
case.  //  Germany  had  respected  Belgian  neutrality,  and 
had  at  the  same  time  refrained  from  an  attack  on  the 
coasts  and  on  the  shipping  of  France,  peace  between 
Germany  and  England  would  have  been  maintained. 
These  conditions,  however,  Germany  would  not  and 
could  not  fulfil,  since  in  order  to  comply  with  them  she 
would  have  had  to  renounce  a  naval  war  with  France, 
and  would  have  encountered  insuperable  difficulties  by 
land. 

^  Blue  Book,  No.  85. 


THE    CRIME  285 

War  became  inevitable  when  German  troops  crossed 
the  Belgian  frontier,  and  the  German  Government  re- 
jected the  EngHsh  summons  to  withdraw  them.  That 
was  on  the  evening  of  August  4th. 

The  war,  however,  could  still  have  been  avoided  when 
the  English  Government  on  August  2nd  gave  the  well- 
known  assurance  to  the  French  Government.  It  could 
have  been  avoided  by  the  passivity  of  the  German  Fleet 
against  the  coasts  and  the  shipping  of  France,  as  this 
course  would  have  excluded  any  intervention  by  the 
English  Fleet.  It  is  therefore  untrue,  as  is  maintained 
by  the  Chancellor,  that  England  had  already  departed 
from  her  neutrality  on  August  2nd.  England's  res- 
olutions had  at  that  time  not  yet  crystallised,  and 
depended  on  circumstances  which,  it  is  true,  were 
then  Immediately  imminent,  but  which  had  not  yet  oc- 
curred. 

How  prudent  the  English  Government  was,  and  how 
imprudent  the  German,  appears  clearly  from  a  consider- 
ation of  the  situation  on  August  2nd.  England  could 
have  definitely  decided  as  to  her  course  of  action  on 
August  2nd  had  she  not,  up  to  the  very  last  moment, 
cHmg  to  the  hope  that  she  would  not  be  involved  in  the 
war;  for  there  was  then  no  longer  the  slightest  possible 
doubt  that  the  German  Army  would  invade  Belgium. 
The  Chancellor  attaches  special  importance  to  the  fact 
that  the  assurance  of  August  2nd  was  given  on  the 
afternoon  of  that  day,  whereas  the  ultimatum  to  Belgium 
was  only  delivered  in  Brussels  at  7  o'clock  in  the  evening. 
Still  starting  from  the  false  assumption  that  the  English 
assurance  amounted  in  itself  to  a  participation  in  the  war 
— which  is  not  the  case — the  Chancellor  draws  the 
naive  conclusion  that  expression  had  already  been  given 
to  this  participation  in  the  war  at  a  time  when  noth- 
ing was  or  could  be  known  in  London  of  the  intended 
violation   of    Belgian   neutrality.      This    is    indeed    the 


S86  I   ACCUSE! 

height  of  naivete!  Ever  since  July  31st,  when  Jagow 
so  evasively  answered  the  English  inquiry,  indeed  ever 
since  July  29th,  when  Herr  von  Bethmann  made  his 
bid  for  English  neutrality,  ever  since  the  tortuous  decla- 
rations of  German  diplomatists  in  Berlin  and  London, 
a  blind  man  must  have  seen  how  matters  stood  with  re- 
gard to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  In  addition  to  this, 
there  was  the  entrance  of  German  troops  into  Luxem- 
burg early  in  the  morning  of  Sunday,  August  2nd,  which 
put  beyond  all  doubt  the  further  advance  towards  Bel- 
gium. 

When  the  English  Government  gave  its  assurance  to 
France,  it  could  therefore  no  longer  have  any  doubt  that 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  would  be  Infringed  by  Ger- 
many, as  indeed  was  done  a  few  hours  later  by  the  de- 
livery of  the  ultimatum.  If  Germany  regarded  Russian 
mobilisation  as  in  itself  a  casus  belli,  how  much  m.ore 
justification  was  there  for  England  regarding  the  posi- 
tion existing  on  August  2nd  as  a  menace  to  Belgium. 
Had  England  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Germany  as  early  as 
August  2nd  her  behaviour  would  not  have  been  different 
from  that  of  Germany  on  July  31st  with  regard  to 
Russia.  Instead  of  the  sentence  of  Bethmann:  "No 
mention  was  made  of  Belgian  neutrality,"  we  ought,  if 
we  are  to  conform  with  the  truth,  to  say :  "Belgian  neu- 
trality was  even  then  mortally  menaced." 

From  this  it  follows — in  opposition  to  what  is  said 
by  Herr  von  Bethmann — that  even  an  unconditional 
promise  of  English  assistance  by  land  and  by  sea  would 
at  this  moment  have  been  already  justified  by  the  menace 
to  Belgian  neutrality;  much  more  then  was  there  justi- 
fication for  the  conditional  promise  of  assistance  by  sea 
to  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  restricted  himself. 

I  summarise,  then,  as  follows : — 

I.  It  is  untrue  that  England  had  already  departed 
from  her  neutrality  on  August  2nd.     The  promise  given 


THE    CRIME  287 

on  August  2nd  is  not  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war 
against  Germany. 

2.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  true  that  England  only  de- 
parted from  her  neutrality  on  August  4th  after  the  actual 
violation  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

3.  Even  if  the  assurance  given  on  August  2nd  had 
connoted  a  departure  from  English  neutrality,  this  would 
have  been  justified  by  the  certainty  then  existing  that 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  would  be  violated  by  Ger- 
many. 

If  England  then  asserts  that  it  was  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality  which  caused  her  to  take  part  in  the 
war,  she  merely  speaks  the  truth. 

The  truth  of  this  is  in  particular  confirmed  by  the 
fact  that  Sir  E.  Goschen,  the  English  Ambassador,  asked 
on  August  4th  merely  for  the  withdrawal  of  German 
troops  from  Belgium,  and  it  was  only  when  this  was 
refused  that  he  declared  that  England  must  take  those 
steps  imposed  upon  her  by  her  treaty  obligations.  It 
was  thus  possible  for  Germany  as  late  as  the  evening  of 
August  4th  to  avoid  war  zvith  England.  This  is  the  best 
proof  which  can  be  furnished  that  she  cannot  already 
have  been  in  a  state  of  war  with  England  on  August  2nd. 

All  the  conclusions  which  the  Chancellor  believes  that 
he  can  deduce  from  the  incident  of  August  2nd  are  thus 
refuted.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  another  conclusion 
which  is  justified,  and  which  /  will  take  the  liberty  of 
stating:  the  conditional  and  restricted  promise  of  con- 
tingent naval  support  is  a  convincing  argumentum  e 
contrario  in  support  of  the  fact  that  up  to  August  2nd 
more  extensive  promises  of  military  support  had  not  been 
given  to  France  by  England.  For  this  reason  the  Eng- 
lish declaration  was  greeted  with  great  satisfaction  in 
Paris  as  "a  first  assistance  which  is  most  valuable  to 
us."  ^  The  first  promise  of  assistance  was  thus  the  con- 
'  'Yellow  Book,  No.  138. 


288  I    ACCUSE! 

ditional  and  restricted  promise  given  on  August  2nd! 
This  is  a  striking  proof  that  the  assertion  of  the  Chan- 
cellor that  England  had  promised  France  her  assistance 
even  before  the  outbreak  of  war  is  a  lie. 

In  concluding  these  observations  I  again  desire  to  point 
out  with  the  utmost  emphasis  that  all  these  discussions 
on  the  participation  of  England  in  the  war  and  the  causes 
for  her  action  do  not  touch  the  centre  of  the  question, 
which  is:  "Who  is  guilty  of  the  European  warf"  The 
object  of  these  discussions  is  precisely  to  divert  atten- 
tion from  the  central  question.  The  participation  of 
England  is  a  consequence  of  the  war,  with  its  own  spe- 
cial reasons.  It  could  not  have  occurred  if  war  had 
not  broken  out.  He  who  provoked  the  war  is  also  re- 
sponsible for  its  consequences.  We  are  thus  led  back 
to  the  question :  Who  did  provoke  the  war  ?  and  to  this 
question  there  can  only  be  one  answer:  Germany  and 
Austria. 

I  am  unable  to  frame  any  points  in  an  indictment 
against  England,  because  there  are  none.  I  can  only 
summarise  her  defence  in  the  sentences  which  I  formu- 
lated at  the  beginning  of  this  section.  Without  doubt 
history  will  concur  in  the  words  used  by  Mr.  Asquith 
on  August  6th  in  speaking  in  the  British  Parliament  in 
honour  of  his  colleague.  Sir  Edward  Grey:  "I  am 
certain  that  this  House  and  this  country — and  I  will 
add,  posterity  and  history — will  accord  to  him  what  is, 
after  all,  the  best  tribute  that  can  be  paid  to  any 
statesman :  that,  never  derogating  for  an  instant  or  by 
an  inch  from  the  honour  and  interests  of  his  own  coun- 
try, he  has  striven,  as  few  men  have  striven,  to  maintain 
and  preserve  the  greatest  interests  of  all  countries — 
universal  peace." 


THE    CRIME  289 

D 

RUSSIA 

The  attitude  of  Russia  in  the  European  conflict  has 
been  indicated  with  sufficient  clearness  in  the  account 
already  given  to  make  it  possible  to  form  a  judgment 
on  Russia's  guilt  or  innocence. 

What  is  the  reproach  which  Germany  throws  against 
Russia  f 

I.  Russia  is  supposed  to  have  intervened  without  any 
reason  and  without  any  right  in  the  conflict  between 
Austria  and  Serbia,  and  is  supposed  thereby  to  have 
occasioned  the  European  conflagration.  I  have  already 
explained  at  length  that  Russia  acted  reasonably  and 
within  her  rights  in  so  intervening,  and  I  have  nothing 
to  add  to  what  I  have  said.  No  one  in  Europe  could 
have  been  surprised  at  this  intervention,  which  during 
the  Balkan  crisis  had  been  clearly  announced  by  Sazonof 
as  inevitable  in  the  event  of  an  attack  being  made  by 
Austria  upon  Serbia.  The  interest  which  Russia  felt  in 
Serbia  was  a  fact  with  which  European  diplomacy  was 
bound  to  reckon,  and  always  has  reckoned ;  above  all, 
German  diplomacy,  as  the  White  Book  shows.  It  was 
"a  commonplace  in  European  diplomacy."  ^ 

II.  It  is  further  asserted  that  the  Russian  military 
party  from  the  beginning  wished  for  war  and  pressed 
for  it.  If  such  a  party  really  exists  in  Russia,  which  is 
still  to  be  proved,  it  is  at  least  certain  that  it  encoun- 
tered at  the  hands  of  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister  a 
more  successful  resistance  than  the  German  war  party 
met  in  Herr  von  Bethmann.  From  the  beginning  to  the 
end  of  the  crisis  Sazonof  served  the  cause  of  peace  in 
the  most  zealous  manner: — 

^  Blue  Book,  p.  v.     White  Book,  p.  406. 


290  I   ACCUSE! 

1.  He  advised  Serbia  to  assume  an  attitude  of  mod- 
eration, and  his  success  may  be  seen  in  the  submissive 
Serbian  Note.^ 

2.  In  common  with  England  and  France  he  endeav- 
oured to  obtain  an  extension  of  the  time-limit  prescribed 
in  the  Austrian  ultimatum,  but  here  he  was  unsuccess- 
ful.2 

3.  When  the  conflict  began  to  assume  a  more  acute 
form  owing  to  the  recall  of  the  Austrian  Ambassador, 
he  claimed  the  assistance  of  Italy,  in  the  hope  that  by 
refusing  Austria  support  she  might  assist  in  moving  her 
from  her  unaccommodating  attitude.^ 

4.  Notwithstanding  the  rupture  in  the  relations  be- 
tween Austria  and  Serbia,  he  entered  into  friendly  dis- 
cussions with  the  Austrian  Government.  He  pointed 
out  in  detail  to  Szäpäry,  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  the 
points  in  the  Austrian  Note  which  could  be  accepted  by 
Serbia,  but  he  also  indicated  those  which  could  not  be 
accepted  by  any  independent  State,  at  any  rate,  in  the 
form  desired.* 

5.  He  gave  urgent  expression  to  the  desire  to  diminish 
by  further  direct  negotiations  the  tension  existing 
between  Austria  and  Russia,  and  he  pleaded  in  Vienna 
that  the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  Petrograd  should  re- 
ceive the  authority  necessary  for  this  purpose.  This 
was  on  July  26th.  The  answer  to  this  was  the  Austrian 
declaration  of  war  of  July  28th,  and  the  strict  refusal 
of  Count  Berchtold  to  enter  into  any  discussion  what- 
ever on  the  Austrian  Note.^ 

^  Orange  Book,  Nos.  4,  25,  33,  40,  42.     Blue  Book,  No.  55. 

*  Orange  Book,  Nos.  4,  5,  11,  12. 
'Orange  Book,  No.  23. 

*  Orange  Book,  No.  25. 

"Orange  Book,  Nos.  38.  45,  50,  54,  yy.  On  the  28th  July  Berch- 
told declared  to  the  Russian  ambassador  that  he  could  "no  longer 
recede,  nor  enter  into  any  discussion  about  the  terms  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  note." 


THE    CRIME  291 

6.  After  the  failure  of  this  attempt  Sazonof  supported 
in  every  possible  way  Grey's  proposal  for  a  conference 
of  the  four  Powers.^ 

7.  He  expressed  himself  as  ready  to  stand  aside,  and 
submit  to  the  proposals  of  the  Powers.^ 

8.  He  induced  the  Emperor  Nicholas  to  send  to  Prince 
Alexander  of  Serbia  on  July  27th  a  telegram  urging 
upon  him  any  solution  designed  to  avoid  the  horrors 
of  war.^ 

9.  After  the  declaration  of  war  against  Serbia  he 
urgently  asked  the  English  Government  to  use  their 
influence  in  Berlin  so  that  Austria  might  at  least  be 
induced  to  take  part  in  further  negotiations.^ 

10.  He  repeatedly  and  with  increasing  urgency  sought 
the  mediation  of  England  in  the  sense  of  the  proposal 
for  a  conference  of  the  four  Powers,  and  simultaneously 
he  constantly  expressed  his  readiness  to  take  part  in 
direct  negotiations  with  Austria.  The  refusal  of  both 
these  proposals  in  Vienna  and  Berlin  did  not  deter  him 
from  constantly  renewing  them.^  Particularly  urgent 
were  the  attempts  made  by  Sazonof  in  a  conversation 
with  Count  Pourtales  on  July  29th,^  in  which  he  en- 
deavoured to  obtain  the  support  of  Germany  in  one  or 
other  of  these  directions.  He  emphasised  the  expedi- 
ency of  parallel  discussions  on  the  principle  of  having 
two  strings  to  his  bow,  that  is  to  say,  a  conference  in 
London  of  the  four  Powers  not  directly  concerned  and 
simultaneously  direct  conversations  in  Petrograd  be- 
tween Austria  and  Russia.     He  drew  attention  to  the 

*  Orange  Book,  Nos.  ;i2,  49,  55,  77. 

'Blue  Book,  Nos.  55,  78.    Orange  Book,  No.  32. 
"Orange  Book,  No.  40. 

*  Orange  Book,  No.  43. 

'Orange  Book,  Nos.   25,  32,  34,  38,  39,  43,  45,  48    ("that  Great 
Britain  should  take  instant  mediatory  action"),  77. 
°  Orange  Book,  No.  49. 


292  I   ACCUSE! 

favourable  results  which  had  followed  such  a  double 
action  during  the  last  Balkan  crisis,  and  he  added  that 
after  the  concessions  made  by  Serbia  it  should  not  be 
difficult  to  arrange  a  settlement  of  the  other  points  which 
still  remained  outstanding,  if  there  were  only  the  least 
goodmill  on  the  part  of  Austria,  and  if  all  the  Powers 
used  their  influence  in  the  direction  of  conciliation.  In 
reply  to  the  earnest  appeal  of  Sazonof,  Pourtales  could 
only  reply  that  Germany  had  exerted  a  "moderating  in- 
fluence" in  Vienna,  and  that  she  would  continue  to  do 
so.  In  Petrograd,  London,  and  in  Paris  alike  it  was 
impossible  to  obtain  more  from  Germany  than  such 
pretended  efforts  to  exercise  a  moderating  influence  on 
Vienna ;  it  was  impossible  to  elicit  from  her  any  posi- 
tive concurrence  in  the  practicable  proposals  of  peace 
put  forward  by  the  Entente  Powers. 

11.  Sazonof,  along  with  the  other  Entente  Powers, 
repeatedly  urged  the  German  Government,  which  raised 
apparently  only  formal  objections  against  the  confer- 
ence proposal,  that  she  should  herself  propose  a  form 
which  would  be  agreeable  to  her,  and  he  accepted  in 
advance  any  proposal  of  this  nature.^ 

12.  On  July  29th  he  prompted  the  Tsar  to  propose 
in  a  telegram  to  the  Emperor  William  that  the  Austro- 
Serbian  conflict  should  be  submitted  to  the  Hague  court 
of  arbitration. 

13.  On  July  30th  he  dictated  to  the  German  Ambas- 
sador a  formula  of  agreement,  which  aimed  only  at  the 
protection  of  Serbia's  sovereign  rights,  and  which 
pledged  Russia  to  stop  her  military  preparations.'^ 

14.  After  this  formula  had  been  rejected  by  Germany, 
he  outlined,  at  the  request  of  Grey,  a  new  formula  which 
went  even  further  to  meet  Austria.  This  formula,  in- 
deed, permitted  Austrian  troops  to  remain  on   Serbian 

^  Orange  Book,  Nos.  53,   55,   64. 
'  Orange  Book,  No.  60. 


THE    CRIME  Ä93 

territory  during  the   further  negotiations,   and  obliged 
Russia  to  maintain  a  waiting  attitude.^ 

15.  On  July  31st,  when  Austria  at  length  declared 
herself  ready  to  enter  into  discussions  on  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  Serbian  question,  Sazonof  at  once  began 
these  conversations  in  Petrograd,  and  in  a  telegram  to 
London  expressed  the  hope  that  a  peaceful  issue  might 
yet  be  found. ^ 

16.  Even  on  August  ist,  on  the  day  of  the  Gennan 
declaration  of  war,  he  declared  himself  ready  to  conclude 
an  agreement  in  the  sense  of  his  second  formula,  pro- 
vided that  German  troops  had  not  previously  crossed 
the  Russian  frontier.  In  no  case,  he  added,  would  Rus- 
sia begin  hostilities  first.^ 

17.  Even  at  the  last  moment  Sazonof  moved  the  Tsar 
to  give  his  solemn  word  to  the  Emperor  William  that 
the  Russian  troops  would  undertake  no  provocative  ac- 
tion, so  long  as  the  negotiations  on  the  Serbian  question 
(resumed  on  July  31st)   should  continue  with  Austria.* 

18.  Even  on  the  day  of  the  declaration  of  war  he 
moved  his  monarch  to  give  a  renewed  assurance  that  the 
Russian  mobilisation  did  not  mean  war,  and  to  urge 
that  the  negotiations  for  the  welfare  of  both  countries 
and  for  universal  peace  should  be  continued.^ 

These  were  the  exertions  of  the  leader  of  Russian 
policy.  Any  impartial  person  may  judge  whether  these 
exertions  were  directed  to  peace  or  to  war.  That  these 
untiring  efforts  for  peace  had  their  origin  in  Petrograd 
proves  that  the  so-called  Russian  war-party  was  power- 
less as  against  the  responsible  Minister.  It  is  now  a 
common  reproach  of  all  belligerent  States  to  accuse  their 

^  Orange  Book,  No.  6j. 

^Orange  Book,  Nos.  69,  73,  Blue  Book,  Nos.  no,  in. 

'Blue  Book,  No.  139. 

*  White  Book,  p.  ^11. 

"White  Book,  p.  413. 


294.  I   ACCUSE! 

enemies  of  having  been  under  the  influence  of  a  war- 
party;  each  denies  his  own,  and  places  the  responsibility 
on  those  of  foreign  countries.  Here  also  it  is  true  that 
by  their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them.  The  efforts  of  the 
Russian  war-party — if  such  a  party  existed — remained 
fruitless;  it  was  unable  to  influence  the  peace  policy  of 
the  Tsar.  The  efforts  of  the  German  war-party,  on  the 
contrary,  have  yielded  fruit  only  too  abundantly — poison- 
ous fruit — which  they  succeeded  in  concealing  under  a 
charm  of  guile  and  seduction  so  that  the  deluded  peo- 
ple in  their  intoxication  reached  out  their  eager  hands; 
now  they  must  devour  the  fruit  in  all  its  bitterness, 
even  though  it  may  bring  with  it  the  bitterness  of  death. 
III.  A  further  reproach  urged  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment against  Russia  is  in  effect  that  Russia  by  her  mili- 
tary measures  frustrated  the  negotiations  for  peace. 
This  reproach  also  is  without  justification,  for  two  rea- 
sons : — 

1.  because  Russia  concurrently  with  her  military  meas- 
ures of  security,  maintained  uninterruptedly  diplomatic 
efforts  for  peace,^  and 

2.  because  these  measures  were  merely  measures  of 
security,  which,  according  to  the  solemn  assurances  given 
by  the  Tsar  and  his  Government,  had  no  aggressive 
character.  It  was  impossible  that  they  coidd  have  had 
an  aggressive  character,  since,  as  I  have  already  ex- 
plained, they  served  only  to  support  a  defensive  policy, 
and  there  was  no  reason  whatever  for  aggressive  action 
on  the  part  of  Russia.  The  partial  mobilisation  of  July 
29th,  as  well  as  the  general  mobilisation  of  the  31st, 
were  the  answer  to  previous  mobilisations  on  the  part 
of  Austria,  the  dates  of  which  I  have  already  established 
from  the  documentary  evidence.^  Moreover,  Russia 
was  compelled  to  adopt  military  measures  of  security, 

^  Orange  Book,  Nos.  77,  78. 

*  Orange  Book,  Nos.  47,  49,  58,  77,  78. 


THE    CRIME  295 

not  only  on  account  of  Austrian  mobilisation,  but  still 
more  owing  to  the  diplomatic  attitude  assumed  by  Aus- 
tria and  Germany.  The  unaccommodating  behaviour  of 
Austria,  and  the  frustration  by  Germany  of  all  attempts 
at  mediation,  could  not  fail  to  arouse  the  overwhelming 
suspicion — which  was,  in  fact,  later  confirmed — that  Ger- 
many and  Austria  desired  war  under  all  circumstances. 
Against  this  menace  Russia  was  bound  to  provide  for 
her  security,  and  the  reproach,  inferred  from  the  Rus- 
sian mobilisation,  is  also  shown  to  be  baseless. 

The  tales  of  the  broken  words  of  honour  and  of  the 
crossing  of  the  frontier  before  the  declaration  of  war 
I  have  already  characterised  elsewhere  by  their  proper 
terms. 

There  is  thus  no  charge  to  be  brought  against  Russia, 
and  I  can  only  conclude  this  section  with  the  regret, 
which  is  certainly  comprehensible  in  a  German,  that 
Russia  is  ivholly  blameless  of  the  European  war,  and 
that  the  guilt  rests  exclusively  on  Germany  and  Austria. 


E 

FRANCE 

German  utterances,  spoken  and  written,  on  the  re- 
sponsibility of  France  for  the  war  are  surprisingly  re- 
strained, and  are  supported  on  very  scanty  material.  The 
German  White  Book  accuses  France  merely  of  "mili- 
tary preparations"  during  the  diplomatic  negotiations, 
and  asserts  at  the  conclusion  of  the  account  which  it 
contains  that  France  on  the  morning  of  August  2nd, 
that  is  to  say,  before  the  German  declaration  of  war,  had 
"opened  hostilities." 

The  Chancellor  adheres  to  this  reproach  in  his  speech 


296  I    ACCUSE! 

of  August  4th,  and  cites  in  support  of  his  assertion  al- 
leged French  incursions  into  German  territory.  In  his 
speech  of  December  2nd  he  rides  off  on  the  old  revanche 
idea,  but  here  also  he  is  unable  to  produce  anything 
more  substantial  against  France. 

I  have  already  estimated  the  proper  value  of  all  these 
reproaches,  and  pointed  out  their  flimsiness.  In  particu- 
lar I  was  able  to  prove  that  the  most  serious  violations 
of  the  frontier  before  the  German  declaration  of  war 
were  committed  by  German  troops,  that  these  were  of 
frequent  occurrence,  and  resulted  in  bloodshed,  whereas 
the  counter-accusations  of  Germany  against  France  are 
not  only  improbable  but  self -contradictory,  and  are  there- 
fore unworthy  of  credence. 

A  new  accusation  against  France  has  been  given  cur- 
rency for  the  first  time  in  the  recently  published  Note 
of  the  Chancellor  dated  December  24th,  in  which  the 
participation  of  France  in  the  diplomatic  negotiations  is 
subjected  to  criticism.  We  can  only  be  grateful  to  the 
Chancellor  that  he  has  at  length  formulated  a  charge  to 
which  it  is  possible  to  submit  a  defence.  This  accusa- 
tion is  supported  on  the  following  assertions : — 

1.  France  did  not  trust  Gemian  assurances,  and  re- 
ceived all  the  steps  of  the  German  Ambassador  with 
mistrust. 

2.  Germany's  wish  for  mediating  influence  in  Petro- 
grad was  not  regarded. 

3.  The  French  Government  did  not  take  a  single  posi- 
tive step  in  the  interest  of  peace. 

What  is  the  truth  with  regard  to  these  accusations? 

It  is  true  that  the  demarches  of  Herr  von  Schoen  were 
received  in  Paris  with  a  certain  mistrust.  This  mistrust 
was,  however,  only  too  well  founded.  Herr  von  Schoen 
was  called  upon  to  play  in  Paris  the  same  miserable 
role  as  fell  to  the  lot  of  Herr  von  Jagow  in  Berlin.  It 
was  his  task  to  thwart  all  the  attempts  of  the  Entente 


THE    CRIME  297 

Powers  to  arrive  at  a  peaceful  solution  of  the  conflict, 
and  to  put  forward  threadbare  reasons  in  defence  of  the 
astonishing  and  ambiguous  behaviour  of  the  German 
Government.  He  dared  not  associate  himself  with  the 
endeavours  of  France  to  obtain  an  extension  of  the  time- 
limit  allowed  in  the  ultimatum,  but,  on  the  contrary,  he 
had  to  offer  to  the  French  Government  a  blind  defence 
of  the  Austrian  Note,  and  of  all  the  later  actions  taken 
by  Austria.^  Grey's  proposal  for  a  conference  of  the 
four  Powers,  which  had  been  immediately  accepted  by 
France,  and  was  agreeable  to  all  the  other  Powers,  he 
was  bound  to  reject,  and  in  place  of  this  it  was  his  duty 
to  recommend  as  a  panacea  the  impossible  German  pro- 
posal for  localisation.^  He  was  bound  to  assert  the  in- 
sufficiency of  the  Serbian  Note,  which  had  conceded  all 
the  material  demands  of  Austria,  and  he  had  to  repre- 
sent as  justifiable  the  recall  of  the  Austrian  Ambassador; 
indeed,  in  compliance  with  Bethmann's  instructions,  he 
had  to  impress  on  the  French  Goveniment  the  desirabil- 
ity of  common  Franco-German  pressure  on  the  Petro- 
grad Cabinet,  whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  he  was  bound 
to  decline  any  kind  of  pressure  from  Gennany  on  Vi- 
enna. He  had  to  listen  in  silence  or  could  give  only 
inconsequent  answers  during  his  frequent  visits  to  the 
Quai  d'Orsay,  when  M.  Bienvenu-Martin,  the  French 
Acting  Foreign  .Minister,  pointed  out  to  him  the  illogi- 
cal nature  of  this  proposal ;  for,  as  M.  Bienvenu-Martin 
indicated,  Austria,  had  in  nearly  every  point  achieved 
her  will,  but  had  nevertheless  begun  a  military  action 
against  Serbia ;  a  cessation  might  therefore  be  asked  for 
from  Austria,  but  not  from  Russia;  pressure  might  be 
exercised  on  Vienna,  not  on  Petrograd.^  Russia  was 
indeed  ready  to  negotiate,  either  directly  with  Austria 

'  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  28,  36. 
'Yellow  Book,  Nos.  56,  57,  61. 
'Yellow   Book,  Nos.  61,  62,   77,  78. 


298  I    ACCUSE! 

or  by  the  mediation  of  the  four  Powers  not  directly 
concerned.  Russia  was  ready  to  accept  any  proposal' 
made  by  the  conference  of  the  four  Powers.  What  fur- 
ther pressure  did  he  suggest  shoidd  still  be  exercised 
on  Russia f  Austria,  however,  was  not  ready  either  for 
direct  negotiations  or  to  accept  proposals  made  by  the 
four  Powers.  If,  therefore,  pressure  had  to  be  exercised 
in  any  quarter  It  must  be  in  Vienna,  and  Berlin  alone 
was  in  a  position  to  accomplish  this.  An  Ambassador, 
charged  with  the  task  of  upholding  the  opposite  view, 
is  an  object  calculated  rather  to  inspire  compassion  than 
to  evoke  condemnation.^ 

But  he  had  to  go  even  further  in  revealing  his  naked- 
ness. When  in  place  of  mediation  he  proposed  direct 
negotiations  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd,  and  was 
asked  by  the  French  Ambassador  what  was  really  the 
aim  of  the  Austrian  operations  in  Serbia  (July  29th), 
he  had  to  give  the  mortifying  answer  that  the  German 
Government  did  not  know,  but  that  it  hoped  to  learn 
from  Austria.^  This  answer  also,  as  is  known,  must  be 
laid  at  the  door,  not  of  the  wretched  Paris  Ambassador, 
but  of  his  Government,  which  up  to  the  present  day 
has  not  explained  to  the  world  what  Austria  really 
wanted  from  Serbia.  Meanwhile  the  Serbians  have  given 
the  answer  which  Austria  was  asked  in  vain  to  furnish : 
they  have  driven  the  Austrians  out  of  their  country,  and 
presumably  this  was  what  the  Austrians  wanted. 

Thus  the  whole  action  of  Herr  von  Schoen  in  Paris 
is  nothing  but  a  continuous  series  of  discomfitures  which 
he  personally  had  not  merited.  The  constantly  repeated 
request  that  he  should  indicate  the  form  of  conference 
agreeable  to  the  German  Government,  which  in  principle 
had  apparently  been  approved,  he  was  obliged  to  leave 
unanswered,  since  no  instructions  in  this  sense  had  been 

'Yellow  Book,  No.  85. 
^Yellow  Book,   Nos.  94,  97. 


THE    CRIME  299 

sent  to  him  from  Berlin.^  He  had  to  maintain  a  passive 
attitude  towards  all  Anglo-French  attempts  to  arrive 
at  a  settlement  between  the  conflicting  standpoints  of 
Austria  and  Russia  by  devising  a  formula  of  agree- 
ment, since  his  Government  did  not  consider  that  such 
attempts  were  even  worthy  of  a  discussion.^ 

The  worst  role,  however,  did  not  fall  to  him  until 
after  the  fruitless  expiration  of  the  ultimata;  he  had 
then  to  submit  to  further  discomfiture  at  the  hands  of 
M.  Viviani,  who  held  up  to  him  the  criminal  madness  of 
the  action  taken  by  Germany,  which  shortly  before  the 
solution  of  the  dispute  had,  without  any  reason,  driven 
Europe  into  the  most  fearful  of  wars.  Herr  von  Schoen 
was  obliged  to  limit  his  answer  to  saying  that  he  had 
received  no  official  communication  with  regard  to  the 
favourable  position  of  the  negotiations,  but  that  he  was 
going  to  get  information.^  Two  days  later  he  had  to 
hand  to  M.  Viviani  a  declaration  of  war  based  on  the 
fact  that  France  had  begun  hostilities  and  also  that  she 
had  violated  Belgian  neutrality  * — assertions  which  he, 
more  than  anyone,  knew  to  be  false :  had  he  not  himself 
witnessed  the  sincere  efforts  made  by  France  for  peace? 
Wretched  Ambassador!  The  mistrust  with  which  he 
was  received  in  France  was  certainly  excelled  by  the 
mistrust  which  he  felt  towards  his  own  actions. 

The  further  reproach  put  forward  by  Bethmann  that 
the  French  Government  had  disregarded  Germany's  de- 
sire for  mediating  influence  in  Petrograd  has  already 
been  deprived  of  all  force  by  the  previous  discussion. 
Germany  refused  to  exercise  any  influence  on  Austria, 
presumptuous  beyond  all  measure  and  scoffing  all  con- 
siderations of  European  peace,  and  she  demanded,  on 

*  Orange  Book,  No.  55. 

*  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  loi,  114. 
"Yellow  Book,  No.  125. 

*  Yellow  Book,  No.  147. 


300  I    ACCUSE! 

the  other  side,  that  pressure  should  be  exercised  by 
France  on  Russia,  which  had  already  shown  in  the  good 
advice  proffered  to  Serbia  an  extraordinary  conciliatory 
attitude,  and  which  was  ready  to  take  any  further  step 
necessary  to  meet  her  opponent.^ 

The  demands  addressed  by  Germany  to  France,  and 
thus  indirectly  to  Russia,  were  thus  somewhat  stiff,  but 
nevertheless  they  were  complied  with  by  France  up  to  a 
certain  point.  The  French  Yellow  Book  and  the  English 
Blue  Book  both  bear  witness  to  this.  In  a  despatch 
of  July  29th  ^  Bienvenu-Martin  declared  it  to  be  essen- 
tial that  the  Cabinet  of  Petrograd,  whose  peace  inten- 
tions were  manifest,  should  immediately  give  their  ad- 
herence to  the  English  proposal  for  a  conference  of  the 
four  Powers.  This  French  initiative  was  at  once  at- 
tended by  success.  The  French  Ambassador  in  Petro- 
grad telegraphed  on  the  same  day  to  his  Minister  that 
Sazonof  accepted  the  proposal  for  a  conference  of  the 
four  Powers  without  attaching  any  importance  to  the 
title  officially  given  to  the  discussions,  and  that  he  would 
acquiesce  in  any  measures  taken  by  England  in  order 
to  maintain  peace.^ 

Another  and  much  more  striking  instance  of  French 
influence  on  Russian  decisions  in  the  sense  of  modera- 
tion may  be  given.  On  July  30th,  when  the  Russian 
partial  mobilisation  against  Austria  had  taken  place,  and 
Germany  was  already  threatening  to  carry  out  a  counter- 
mobilisation,  Viviani  emphatically  pressed  for  prudence 
in  Petrograd;  it  would  be  well,  he  said,  even  in  taking 
measures  for  security  and  defence,  that  Russia  should 
take  no  step  which  might  offer  Germany  a  pretext  for 
a    counter-mobilisation.*      Here    also    his    efforts    were 

^Yellow   Book,  Nos.  yy,  78. 
=  Yellow  Book,  No.  85. 
^Yellow  Book,  Nos.  86,  gi. 
*  Yellow  Book,  No.  loi. 


THE    CRIME  301 

crowned  with  success :  Russia  suspended  further  meas- 
ures  of  mobilisation  ^  until  she  was  compelled  to  act  by 
Austria's  general  mobilisation. 

A  further  instance  of  the  success  of  French  influence 
in  Petrograd  was  seen  on  July  31st,  when  the  efforts  of 
the  Entente  Powers  were  directed  to  finding  a  middle 
path  between  the  formuLie  of  Grey  and  Sazonof,  in 
order  to  gain  Austria's  consent  even  at  the  last  moment. 
In  a  Note,^  distinguished  by  its  penetration  and  inspired 
by  a  sincere  desire  for  peace,  Viviani  proposed  such  a 
middle  path,  which  could  not  fail  to  be  equally  accept- 
able to  Austria  and  Russia,  and  authorised  his  Ambassa- 
dor at  Petrograd  to  make  the  following  communication 
to  Sazonof : 

"Please  infomi  M.  Sazonof  urgently  that  the  sugges- 
tion of  Sir  E.  Grey  appears  to  me  to  furnish  a  useful 
basis  for  conversation  between  the  Powers,  who  are 
equally  desirous  of  working  for  an  honourable  arrange- 
ment of  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict,  and  of  averting  In 
this  manner  the  dangers  which  threaten  general  peace." 

There  then  follows  a  more  detailed  explanation  of  the 
modifications  In  the  proposal  of  Grey  and  Sazonof,  and 
he  adds  In  conclusion : — 

"I  would  ask  you  carefully  to  be  guided  by  the  fore- 
going considerations  in  earnestly  pressing  M.  Sazonof 
to  give  his  adherence  without  delay  to  the  proposal  of 
Sir  E.  Grey,  of  which  he  will  have  been  himself  In- 
formed." 

The  French  Ambassador,  Paleologue,  was  able  to  re- 
port on  the  same  day  that  Sazonof  had  accepted  the  pro- 
posals of  VivianI,  and  that  he  had  modified  his  original 
fonnula  In  the  manner  suggested  by  Grey.^  This  new 
proof  of  French  intervention  for  peace  and  of  Russia's 

^  Yellow  Book,  No.  104. 
^Yellow  Book,  No.  112. 
'Yellow  Book,  No.  113. 


302  I    ACCUSE! 

conciliatory  disposition  was  furnished,  although  during 
the  preceding  night  and  day  Belgrade  had  been  bom- 
barded by  Austria  and  the  whole  of  Russia  had  been 
brought  to  a  high  pitch  of  excitement  by  Austria's  pro- 
vocative and  unaccommodating  action. 

Even  after  the  Gemian  ultimatum  was  delivered  in 
Paris  on  July  31st  Viviani  directed  an  urgent  appeal 
to  the  Imperial  Government  in  Petrograd  that  in  the 
highest  interests  of  peace  they  would  do  everything  on 
their  part  to  avoid  anything  that  might  render  inevit- 
able or  precipitate  the  crisis  (Je  ne  doute  pas  que  le 
Gouvernement  Imperial  dans  I'interet  superieur  de  la 
paix  n'evite  pour  sa  part  tout  ce  qui  pourrait  rendre  in- 
evitable ou  precipiter  la  crise  ^). 

Many  similar  examples  could  be  cited  from  the  diplo- 
matic correspondence.  But  Herr  von  Bethmann  says 
that  France  did  not  exert  her  influence  in  Petrograd  for 
peace,  and  that  in  fact  she  did  nothing  in  the  interests 
of  peace,  and — Bethmann  is  an  honourable  man. 

When  we  survey  the  activity  of  French  diplomatists 
during  these  critical  days  and  compare  them  with  those 
of  other  European  Governments,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid 
the  conclusion  that  their  utterances,  as  given  in  the  Yel- 
low Book,  excel  the  achievements  of  all  other  diplo- 
matists in  elegance  of  form  and  in  plastic  strength  of 
representation.  To  English  diplomacy  fell  the  leadership 
in  the  negotiations,  and  it  discharged  this  task  with  the 
sober  quietness  and  clarity  which  is  peculiar  to  the  Eng- 
lishman in  all  situations.  Russian  diplomacy  also  kept 
itself  within  the  limits  of  fact,  and  expressed  itself  with 
moderation  up  to  the  last  moment  until  the  morning  of 
August  ist,  immediately  before  the  German  declaration 
of  war.  In  this  critical  moment,  however,  Sazonof  could 
not  refrain  from  pouring  out  his  heart  to  his  French 
and  English  colleagues,  and  characterising  in  Its  true 
^Yellow  Book,  No.   117. 


THE    CRIME  303 

light,  without  any  varnish,  the  policy  of  Austria  and 
Germany;^  the  policy  of  Austria  had  been  both  tor- 
tuous and  immoral,  that  of  Germany  had  been  equivocal 
and  double-faced,  and  she  had  been  specially  unfortunate 
in  her  representatives  in  Vienna  and  Petrograd.  The 
former  was  a  violent  Russophobe,  who  constantly  poured 
oil  on  the  flame;  the  latter  an  ignorant  person,  who  al- 
lowed his  Government  to  believe  that  Russia  would  never 
go  to  war,  no  matter  how  much  they  trod  on  her  feet. 

In  contrast  to  these  diplomatists  of  Russia  and  Eng- 
land, who,  with  few  exceptions,  remain  sober  in  their 
views  and  confine  themselves  within  the  limits  of  fact, 
the  genius  of  the  French,  their  grace  in  form,  their 
adaptability  in  ideas,  their  resource  in  devising  new  ways 
out  of  difficult  situations,  appears  all  the  more  brilliant. 
It  is  a  pure  pleasure  for  the  literary  connoisseur  to  read 
the  French  Yellow  Book.  What  a  brilliant  type  is  repre- 
sented by  the  two  Cambons!  How  dexterous  and  fas- 
cinating is  the  Prime  Minister  Viviani!  And  even 
Bienvenu-Martin,  who  appears  less  in  the  foreground, 
how  precise  are  his  antitheses,  how  effective  his  refuta- 
tion of  German  sophisms,  how  penetrating  is  his  vision 
in  framing  a  judgment  on  the  tendencies  of  Austria  and 
Germany ! 

And  the  diplomatists  of  Germany?  O  du  lieber  Gott! 
This  is  not  a  subject  to  speak  about.  Herr  von  Schoen 
was  not  the  only  one  who  was  condemned  to  a  tragic 
role.  Herr  von  Tschirschky  in  Vienna,  the  Russophobe, 
Count  Pourtales  in  Petrograd,  Herr  von  Flotow  in  Rome 
— what  a  miserable  part  they  all  had  to  play !  There  was 
Herr  von  Flotow,  who  knew  so  litde  of  the  mind  of  the 
Italian  people  and  of  the  views  of  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment that  he  considered  it  possible  that  Italy  might  par- 
ticipate in  an  offensive  war  against  Serbia  and  share 
in  its  further  consequences — a  view  which  one  dared  not 
^Blue  Book,   No.   139. 


804  I   ACCUSE! 

have  attributed  to  the  most  inexperienced  German  com- 
mercial traveller  in  Italy  without  running  the  risk  of 
an  action  for  personal  libel.  There  was  Count  Pourtales, 
who  thought  that  a  few  manifestations  of  labour  unrest 
in  Russia  was  sufficient  to  cause  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment to  give  way  to  Austrian  efforts  to  establish  a 
hegemony  on  the  Balkans,  and  who  had  the  thankless 
task  of  defending  in  Petrograd  the  ingenious  theory  of 
Bethmann  that  the  conference  of  four  Powers  "required 
of  the  Austrian  Empire  just  what  they  had  not  been 
willing  to  suggest  to  Serbia,  namely,  that  she  should 
give  way  under  military  pressure."  This  is  a  theory 
which  affords  Herr  von  Bethmann  so  much  pleasure  that 
he  exhibits  it  once  more  in  his  most  recent  circular  note, 
which,  however,  unfortunately,  forgets  two  things: 
firstly,  that  Serbia  had  already  given  way  beforehand, 
so  that  military  pressure  was  an  irresponsible  piece  of 
presumption,  and  secondly,  that  the  conference  of  four 
Powers  did  not  aim  at  any  kind  of  pressure  or  any 
military  measures,  but  that — as  even  the  thickest  head 
must  have  begun  to  realise  after  the  countless  explana- 
tions which  were  given — its  intention  was  merely  to  ob- 
tain the  friendly  advice  of  the  four  Powers  unconcerned. 
Herr  von  Tschirschky-Bogendorf  in  Vienna  had  also 
a  truly  thankless  role  to  play,  in  that  he  had  in  appear- 
ance and  outwardly  to  press  for  moderation  at  the  Ball- 
platz;  inwardly,  however,  in  the  room  where  Count 
Berchtold  laboured,  he  could  give  free  reins  to  the  se- 
cret instructions  of  Herr  von  Bethmann,  which  at  the 
same  time  corresponded  to  his  own  personal  inclinations, 
and  could  there  press  for  war.  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen 
was  right  when  he  saw  through  this  double  play  of  our 
Ambassador  at  Vienna,  and  from  all  the  acts  of  omission 
and  commission  of  Herr  von  Tschirschky — especially 
from  his  industrious  and  suspicious  refusal  of  all  com- 
mon action  for  peace  with  the  Ambassadors  of  the  En- 


THE    CRIME  805 

tente  Powers — drew  the  certain  conclusion  that  our  Am- 
bassador at  Vienna  had  from  the  beginning  worked  for 
war.^ 

Of  Prince  LIchnowsky  in  Lx)ndon — the  only  one 
among  our  Ambassadors — ^we  must  say  this  in  his  hon- 
our, that  he  earnestly  desired  peace,  and  that  he  was 
only  the  innocent  victim  of  those  above  him.  He  also 
had  to  resort  to  a  hundred  evasions  in  order  to  con- 
ceal the  intentions  of  Germany  on  Belgium,  and  so  keep 
England  neutral,  if  this  could  in  any  way  be  achieved; 
he  had  to  discuss  with  Sir  Edward  Grey  the  hypothesis 
that  we  might  respect  Belgian  neutrality,^  although  he 
knew  that  our  troops  were  already  almost  at  the  Bel- 
gian frontier,  and  that  there  was  no  longer  any  possi- 
bility of  Belgian  neutrality  being  respected.  Again,  two 
days  later,  after  the  ultimatum  had  been  presented  to 
Belgium,  he  had  to  run  after  Sir  E.  Grey — just  as  the 
latter  was  on  the  point  of  going  to  the  decisive  meeting 
of  the  Cabinet  on  the  morning  of  August  3rd — and  had 
to  plead  with  him  insistently  to  be  so  good  as  to  be  willing 
to  remain  neutral  even  if  we  should  violate  Belgian 
neutrality.^  Even  at  the  very  last  moment  he  attempted 
to  make  an  impression  on  public  opinion  in  England 
by  an  article  in  the  Press,  in  which  he  emphasised  Ger- 
many's readiness  to  refrain  from  making  the  Belgian 
coast  a  point  d'appiii  for  naval  operations.*  In  all  these 
desperate  efforts  at  the  eleventh  hour  the  good  will  of 
our  London  Ambassador  may  indeed  be  observed,  but 
even  his  best  intentions  could  not  prevent  the  representa- 
tive of  a  bad  policy  from  necessarily  appearing  in  a  bad 
light. 

And  now  to  come  to  the  highest  of  all,  to  Plerr  von 

'  Blue  Book,  Nos.  141,  161. 
^Blue  Book,  No.  123. 

*  Grey's  speech  of  3rd  August,  Yellow  Book,  No.  144. 

*  Yellow  Book,  No.  144. 


306  I   ACCUSE! 

Jagow!  From  this  portrait  gallery  I  omit  the  Chan- 
cellor, whom  I  have  already  sufficiently  characterised. 
But  Herr  von  Jagow!  What  a  lamentable  picture  of 
pitiable  helplessness!  It  is  sufficient  to  observe  how 
miserable  he  appears  against  his  two  chief  opponents, 
the  Englishman  Goschen  and  the  Frenchman  Cambon; 
how  he  was  constantly  reduced  to  straits  by  their  su- 
periority, like  a  mouse  in  a  trap  seeking  in  vain  for  a 
way  of  escape.  It  is  true  that  in  his  case,  as  in  that  of 
his  German  colleagues,  we  must  make  allowance  for  the 
fact  that  they  had  to  defend  a  bad  cause,  and  their 
opponents  a  good  one.  They  had  to  resort  to  loopholes 
and  ambiguities,  whereas  the  others  could  advance  openly 
and  honourably  to  the  end  in  view.  But  the  worse 
their  cause  was,  the  more  skill  and  efficiency  was  needed 
to  defend  it.  Anyone  who  defends  a  bad  cause  with  dex- 
terity can  at  least,  as  they  say  in  the  East,  "save  his 
face."  He,  however,  who  by  his  inefficiency  draws  spe- 
cial attention  to  the  weaknesses  of  his  position  makes 
his  bad  cause  even  worse,  and  forfeits  all  claim  to  per- 
sonal respect.  On  a  big  merchant  being  asked  why  he 
retained  two  barristers  for  his  cases,  and  why  he  paid 
one  better  than  the  other,  he  answered  with  a  sly  smile, 
"The  good  one  is  for  the  bad  cases,  and  the  bad  one 
for  the  good,"  The  badness  of  our  case  demanded 
that  we  should  have  the  best  diplomatists,  not  to  win, 
but  at  least  to  avoid  revealing  it  publicly  to  the  whole 
world  in  all  its  hideousness. 

In  order  not  to  appear  unjust,  I  must  support  my 
judgment  by  a  few  examples  from  the  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence, although  the  whole  course  of  the  negotia- 
tions in  its  main  features  justifies  in  the  fullest  measure 
the  most  unfavourable  judgment  being  passed  upon  our 
diplomacy.  The  present  diplomatic  publications  give 
us  for  the  first  time  an  accurate  insight  into  the  activity 
of  our  Chancellories,  which  for  the  profanum  vulgus 


THE    CRIME  307 

has  hitherto  been  a  book  with  seven  seals.  Now  for 
the  first  time  we  reahse  why  we  have  suffered  diplomatic 
discomfitures,  when  the  rattling  sabre  did  not  make 
good  what  the  pen  had  corrupted.  Formerly  we  saw 
only  the  effects;  now  we  see  the  causes.  Foniierly  we 
saw  the  gentlemen  only  in  their  gold-laced  uniforms; 
now  they  stand  naked  before  us,  and  their  failures  and 
weaknesses  are  seen  with  appalling  clarity. 

Let  us  take  at  random  one  of  the  conversations  be- 
tween Herr  von  Jagow  and  M.  Cambon.  On  July  27th 
Cambon  supported,  in  the  presence  of  Herr  von  Jagow, 
Grey's  proposal  for  a  conference  of  the  four  Powers. 
Jagow  gave  expression  to  the  well-known  view,  which 
is  even  yet  disseminated  by  Herr  von  Bethmann,  that  it 
was  impossible  to  subject  Austria  against  her  will  to  the 
decisions  of  a  conference.  M.  Cambon  replied  that  the 
matter  was  too  serious  to  allow  it  to  be  wrecked  on  any 
question  of  form.  The  question  here  was  of  a  work  of 
peace,  which  could  be  restricted  to  common  demarches 
by  the  four  Powers  at  Petrograd  and  Vienna.  Herr  von 
Jagow  had  often  expressed  to  him  his  regret  at  seeing 
the  two  allied  groups  always  opposed  to  one  other.  Here 
there  was  an  opportunity  of  proving  that  there  was  a 
European  spirit  (esprit  europccn),  if  the  four  Powers 
belonging  to  the  two  groups  succeeded  in  preventing  a 
European  conflict.  Herr  von  Jagow,  who  was  unable 
to  make  any  reply  to  this  illuminating  explanation,  took 
refuge  in  the  vapid  assertion  that  Gennany  had  engage- 
ments with  Austria.  To  this  Cambon  promptly  replied 
that  these  obligations  were  no  closer  than  those  existing 
between  France  and  Russia.  Jagow  attempted  a  new 
line  of  retreat:  He  was  not  refusing  to  act  in  keeping 
off  an  Austro-Russian  dispute,  but  he  could  not  inter- 
vene in  the  Serbian  dispute.  Whereupon  Cambon  ob- 
served :  "The  one  is  the  consequence  of  the  other,  and 
it  is  a  question  of  preventing  the  appearance  of  a  new 


308  I    ACCUSE! 

factor  of  such  a  nature  as  to  lead  to  intervention  by 
Russia."  Jagow  emphasised  anew  his  engagements 
towards  Austria.  Thereupon  Cambon  asked  him  if  these 
engagements  were  so  far-reaching  that  he  was  bound  to 
follow  Austria  everywhere  with  his  eyes  blindfolded? 
Had  he,  he  asked,  taken  note  of  the  reply  of  Serbia? 
"I  have  not  yet  had  time  to  read  it,"  replied  Jagow  on 
July  27th.  (The  answer  had  been  handed  to  the  Aus- 
trian Ambassador  in  Belgrade  as  early  as  July  25th.) 
"I  regret  it,"  said  Cambon.  ''You  would  see  that,  ex- 
cept on  some  points  of  detail,  Serbia  has  yielded  entirely. 
It  appears,  then,  that  since  Austria  has  obtained  the  satis- 
faction which  your  support  has  procured  for  her,  you 
might  to-day  advise  her  to  be  content,  or  to  examine 
with  Serbia  the  terms  of  her  reply."  Jagow,  driven 
more  and  more  into  difficulties,  was  unable  to  give  any 
clear  reply.  Whereupon  Cambon  asked  him  point  blank 
zvhcther  Germany  wished  for  war.  On  Jagow  pro- 
testing energetically,  Cambon  answered:  "You  must 
then  act  consistently.  When  you  read  the  Serbian  reply, 
/  entreat  you,  in  the  name  of  humanity,  to  weigh  the 
terms  in  your  conscience,  and  do  not  personally  assume 
a  part  of  the  responsibility  for  the  catastrophe  which 
you  are  allowing  to  be  prepared."  In  the  end  the  Ger- 
man Secretary  of  State  condescended  to  return  to  the 
original  subject  of  the  conversation,  the  proposal  of 
Grey;  he  considered,  however,  that  it  was  necessary  to 
find  another  "form"  which  he  could  accept.  He  based 
his  hopes  more  on  the  "direct  conversations  between 
Vienna  and  Petrograd,"  which  Cambon  urged  on  him  to 
further  accelerate  by  appropriate  pressure  in  Vienna. 

The  direct  negotiations  between  Vienna  and  Petro- 
grad proposed  by  Jagow  were,  as  is  well  known,  de- 
clined by  Austria.  It  is,  as  I  have  already  pointed  out, 
open  to  serious  doubt  whether  Berlin  exercised  any  pres- 
sure on  Vienna  in  the  sense  of  these  negotiations.     The 


THE    CRIME  309 

conference  thus  remained  as  the  only  expedient.  Cam- 
bon  put  forward  this  proposal  again  on  July  28th/  with 
the  support  of  the  English  and  Italian  Ambassadors. 
Jagow,  however,  was  even  more  inaccessible  than  on 
the  previous  day,  and  even  the  representations  of  his 
Italian  ally  could  not  prevent  him  from  absolutely  re- 
fusing the  conference,  although,  as  will  have  been  gath- 
ered from  what  I  have  already  said,  he  had  meanwhile 
been  clearly  informed  by  Goschen  (as  had  also  Prince 
Lichnowsky  by  Grey)  as  to  the  true  meaning  and  in- 
tention of  the  conference.  M.  Cambon  was  so  much 
disconcerted  by  the  passivity  of  Herr  von  Jagow  that  he 
again  asked  him  if  by  any  chance  he  wished  for  war. 
Renewed  protest  by  Jagow,  but  also  renewed  passivity. 
After  this  ineffective  conversation  Cambon  proposed  an 
ingenious  method  of  drawing  Herr  von  Jagow  out  of 
his  reserve  by  "putting  him  in  a  dilemma  by  asking  him 
to  state  himself  precisely  how  diplomatic  action  by  the 
Powers  to  avoid  war  could  be  brought  about."  This 
proposal  was,  as  is  known,  taken  up  by  Grey,  and  was 
zealously  pushed  by  the  Entente  Powers  as  well  as  by 
Italy,  but  it  came  to  nothing,  since  the  proposal  which  it 
was  expected  that  Jagow  would  make,  notwithstanding 
all  the  pressure  put  upon  him,  zuas  never  put  forward. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  how  Herr  von  Jagow  had 
recourse  to  all  possible  subterfuges  in  the  endeavour  to 
avoid  the  moral  obligation  of  making  such  a  proposal. 
In  most  cases  he  took  refuge  behind  inquiries  in  Vienna 
to  which  an  answer  had  not  yet  been  received.^  This 
performance  was  constantly  repeated  like  a  musical 
theme  with  variations.  Above  all,  Herr  von  Jagow  was 
never  in  a  position  to  answer  any  question  as  to  what 
Austria  really  wanted  after  the  opening  of  hostilities 
against  Serbia.     Until  that  was  known  it  was,  however, 

*  Yellow  Book,  No.  81. 
'Yellow  Book,  Nos.  92,  109. 


310  I    ACCUSE! 

in  his  opinion  impossible  to  think  of  a  "mediation"  in 
any  form.^  Every  time  when  he  was  closely  pressed  on 
the  question  he  took  refuge  behind  the  Austrian  screen, 
or  to  express  the  matter  in  what  is  perhaps  a  more 
appropriate  metaphor,  he  withdrew  from  one  trench  to 
another,  until  finally  he  disappeared  behind  the  fortress 
of  the  "Russian  mobilisation,"  never  to  be  seen  again. 
For  the  quintessence  of  Berlin  tactics  consisted  in  post- 
poning as  long  as  possible  all  proposals  for  peace  until 
they  could  come  out  with  the  bogey  of  Russian  mobili- 
sation, and  were  thus  saved  the  trouble  of  giving  any 
reason  or  answer  to  proposals  for  peace. 

The  conversation  between  Jagow  and  Cambon  on 
July  30th  is  characteristic  of  these  tactics.-  Cambon 
again  inquired  how  the  matter  stood  with  regard  to  the 
formula  of  mediation  which  Germany  desired  to  pro- 
pose. Jagow's  answer  was  that  "to  gain  time"  he  had 
acted  directly,  and  "had  asked  Austria  to  tell  him  the 
ground  on  which  conversations  might  be  opened  with 
her"  (de  dire  sur  quel  terrain  on  ponrrait  causer  avec 
eile).  In  other  words,  under  the  pretence  of  gaining 
time  he  pushed  aside  the  Powers  which  were  striving  for 
peace,  and  commissioned  the  instigator  of  war,  Herr  von 
Tschirschky,  to  ask  the  Austrian  Government  on  what 
grounds  she  could  be  treated  with.  Can  anyone  believe, 
can  anyone  regard  it  as  possible,  that  the  German  Secre- 
tary of  State  on  July  ^oth  did  not  even  then  know  what 
Austria  really  wanted?  Is  it  not  sJiameful  to  see  the 
diplomatic  representatives  of  the  German  Empire  play- 
ing such  a  part  in  an  event  which  concerned  the  life 
and  death  of  European  civilisation,  and  indeed  the  fate 
of  mankind? 

But  to  go  further;  scarcely  had  the  proposal   for  a 
conference  come  to  nought  when  Herr  von  Jagow,  in  the 
^Yellow  Book,  Nos.  94,  109.     Blue  Book,  Nos.  98,  107,  112. 
*  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  94,  109. 


THE    CRIME  311 

course  of  the  same  conversation  of  July  30th,  trotted 
out  the  Russian  mobilisation,  stating  that  it  would  lead 
as  a  consequence  to  German  mobilisation,  and  in  answer 
to  an  objection  advanced  by  Cambon  that  the  Russians 
had  mobilised  only  against  Austria,  he  replied  that  this 
was  indeed  quite  true,  but  that  the  heads  of  the  Army 
were  insisting  on  German  mobilisation,  for  every  delay 
was  a  loss  of  strength.  This  last  observation  is  very 
significant,  although  in  the  mouth  of  the  Secretary  of 
State,  at  any  rate,  it  was  highly  imprudent.  It  certainly 
proves,  as  is  indeed  apparent  from  many  other  facts, 
that  the  resolution  to  mobilise,  which  in  the  case  of 
Germany  was  known  to  be  "equivalent  to  war,"  had 
already  been  taken  on  July  29th  in  the  meeting  of  the 
Council  held  at  Potsdam  under  the  presidency  of  the 
Emperor,  in  which  the  Generals  had  taken  part.*  The 
General  Staff  was  indeed  in  a  hurry.  This  also  explains 
the  special  edition  of  the  Lokalan:;eiger,  which  an- 
nounced the  mobilisation  as  early  as  July  30th,  but  was 
seized  because  it  was  not  considered  expedient  that  the 
mobilisation  should  be  made  known  on  that  day.-  Hinc 
ilia  lacrimcu.  Hence  the  subterfuges  and  the  retreats 
of  Herr  von  Jagow,  who  in  a  spirit  of  self-sacrifice  threw 
himself,  like  a  second  Curtius,  into  the  abyss  which  the 
military  party  had  dug  for  him. 

Mention  must  still  be  made  of  an  earlier  episode, 
because  it  illustrates  in  an  interesting  way  the  intellec- 
tual and  moral  qualities  of  the  diplomatists  concerned. 
On  July  29th  3  Cambon  ventured  to  allow  himself  to 
make  a  modest  inquiry  as  to  the  position  of  affairs  with 
regard  to  direct  conversations  between  Vienna  and  Petro- 
grad on  which  Herr  von  Jagow  had  built  so  great  hopes. 

'Yellow  Book,  No.  105.    Cf.  the  remark  quoted  above  of  Count 
Pourtales  to  Sazonof.     Red  Book,  No.  28. 
'Yellow  Book,  No.  105.     Orange  Book,  No.  62. 
'Yellow  Book,  No.  92. 


312  I    ACCUSE! 

Jagow  was  in  a  position  to  give  confirmation  of  the 
gratifying  fact  that  Petrograd  seemed  well  disposed, 
but  that  from  Vienna  "he  was  awaiting  the  reply." 
Meanwhile  he  had  at  least  read  the  Serbian  Note,  and 
saw  in  it  a  basis  for  possible  negotiation.  Why,  then, 
did  Austria  not  negotiate,  but  break  off  relations  in  an 
incomprehensible  manner?  asked  M.  Cambon.  "Be- 
cause, with  Eastern  nations,"  such  was  the  view  ex- 
pressed by  Jagow,  "one  could  never  obtain  sufficient 
guarantees  for  carrying  out  their  promises."  (This  was, 
as  is  known,  the  only  important  point  at  issue  between 
Austria  and  Serbia:  the  co-operation  of  Austrian  or- 
gans in  Serbian  police  and  judicial  investigations.)  M. 
Cambon  at  once  dexterously  suggested  the  establish- 
ment of  an  International  Commission — such  as  fre- 
quently exists  in  Balkan  countries — charged  with  the 
duty  of  controlling  the  Serbian  police  inquiry.  The 
Serbian  answer,  as  he  rightly  held,  was  on  this  point 
also  a  suitable  basis  for  negotiation.  Herr  von  Jagow 
was  unable  to  make  any  reply  to  this  proposal  of  Cam- 
bon's,  which  was  certainly  ingenious  and  practicable. 
Had  he  accepted  this  proposal  and  followed  it  up — 
there  was  no  room  to  doubt  but  that  Russia  and  Serbia 
would  concur — we  would  not  to-day  have  been  involved 
in  a  European  war. 

Like  master,  like  man!  On  the  day  on  which  the 
above  conversation  took  place  between  Jagow  and  Cam- 
bon the  same  performance  was  being  transacted  between 
Herr  von  Bethmann  and  Sir  E.  Goschen.^  There  were 
peaceful  assurances  in  abundance,  but  the  idea  of  a  con- 
ference was  declined ;  no  declaration  was  given  with  re- 
gard to  the  intentions  of  Austria ;  "efforts"  to  induce 
the  Government  of  Vienna  to  direct  conversations  with 
Russia  were  mentioned — be  it  observed  it  is  never  more 
than  efforts  with  ineffective  means  which  Herr  von 
^Blue  Book,  No.  75.     Yellow  Book,  No.  92. 


THE    CRIME  313 

Bethmann  "poussait  aiitant  qu'il  pouvait" — but  above 
everything  else  there  is  a  threatening  reference  to  the 
Russian  mobiHsation. 

Even  as  late  as  the  night  between  July  31st  and 
August  ist  ^  Goschen,  the  English  Ambassador,  made  a 
pressing  appeal  to  Herr  von  Jagow's  feelings  of  hu- 
manity, to  which  the  latter  coldly  replied  that  the  mat- 
ter had  then  gone  too  far,  and  that  they  must  now  wait 
for  the  Russian  answer  to  the  German  ultimatum.  In 
reply  to  Goschen,  who  asked  in  astonishment  why  they 
had  made  their  ultimatum  completely  impossible  of  ac- 
ceptance by  asking  that  they  should  demobilise  against 
Austria  as  well,  Herr  von  Jagow  gave  the  memorable 
answer  "that  it  was  in  order  to  prevent  Russia  from 
saying  all  her  mobilisation  was  only  directed  against 
Austria."  Thus  in  order  to  bar  the  possibility  of  Rus- 
sia advancing  an  impossible  objection — impossible  be- 
cause the  general  mobilisation  had  been  publicly  an- 
nounced and  admitted  by  the  Tsar  himself  in  his 
telegrams — they  demanded  the  impossible,  that  is  to  say, 
demobilisation  against  a  State  which  had  itself  already 
mobilised. 

On  August  1st  Goschen  had  again  a  long  and  pressing 
conversation  with  Jagow. ^  He  pointed  out  to  him,  in 
concert  with  Cambon,  the  incomprehensible  fact  that 
Germany,  a  Power  not  directly  interested  in  the  whole 
dispute,  had  made  war  inevitable  by  despatching  an  ulti- 
matum, although  Austria  and  Russia,  the  parties  to  the 
dispute,  had  just  entered  into  negotiations  with  a  view 
to  effecting  a  settlement.  In  reply  to  this  Jagow  merely 
let  it  be  seen  that  he  considered  that  that  was  all  very 
fine,  but  that  since  Russia  had  mobilised,  war  must 
come  if  the  demand  contained  in  the  German  ultimatum 
was  not  complied  with. 

^Blue  Book,  No.  121.     Yellow  Book,  No.  121. 
^Blue  Book,  No.  138.     Yellow  Book,  No.  121. 


314  I    ACCUSE! 

Thus  we  find  the  mohilisation  as  such  put  forward  as 
the  ground  for  war!  We  have  already  seen  elsewhere 
how  matters  really  stood  with  regard  to  the  Russian 
mobilisation,  by  what  it  was  occasioned  and  justified. 
In  France  and  Russia,  at  any  rate,  a  view  different  from 
that  current  in  Germany  prevailed  with  regard  to  the 
significance  of  the  mobilisation  on  both  sides.  Neither 
of  these  countries  would  ever  have  declared  war  on 
account  of  German  mobilisation,  as  they  had  not,  in 
fact,  done  on  account  of  Austrian  mobilisation.  ^'Mobi- 
lisation is  not  war"  we  find  in  a  communication  of  Vivi- 
ani  to  Paul  Cambon  (Yellow  Book,  No.  127).  "In 
the  present  state  of  affairs  it  is  the  best  means  for 
France  of  safeguarding  peace,  and  .  .  .  the  Government 
of  the  Republic  will  redouble  their  efforts  to  bring  the 
negotiations  to  a  conclusion.  .  .  .  We  shall  not  cease  to 
work  towards  an  agreement.  .  .  .  We  will,  in  co-opera- 
tion with  England,  continue  to  work  for  the  success  of 
these  pourparlers."  These  words  we  find  elsewhere  in 
the  writings  of  Viviani  on  August  ist,  that  is  to  say, 
after  the  ultimatum,  and  after  the  French  mobilisation.^ 

This  is  but  a  brief  epitome  of  the  history  of  French 
efforts  for  peace.  All  the  diplomatic  books  are  full  of 
them,  only  Herr  von  Bethmann  remains  in  ignorance. 
He  has — if  we  may  use  his  own  words — "had  the  cour- 
age as  the  responsible  statesman"  to  accuse  the  French 
Government  of  not  having  taken  a  single  positive  step 
in  the  interests  of  peace.  We,  however,  and  impartial 
history  will  concur,  throw  this  reproach  back  on  Ger- 
many, on  the  shoulders  of  the  statesman  who,  whether 
driving  or  driven — the  guilt  remains  the  same — did  noth- 
ing for  peace,  and  did  everything  that  was  bound  to 
make  this  war  inevitable.     While  others  hastened  to  the 

^  Yellow  Book,  Nos.  125,  127.  I  have  already  elsewhere  pointed 
out  that  Austrian  diplomatists  also  did  not  regard  mobilisation  as 
equivalent  to  war  (Blue  Book,  No.  118). 


THE  CRIME  315 

spot  with  fire  engines  and  water-buckets  to  extinguish 
the  beginnings  of  the  conflagration,  he  poured  oil  on  the 
flames  and  collected  brushwood  so  that  the  smouldering 
spark  might  develop  into  a  holocaust.  And  now  that 
the  fire  of  hell  has  broken  loose,  and  the  author  of  it 
all  sees  horror-struck  the  consequences  of  his  fearful 
deed,  he  writes  and  talks  and  he  talks  and  writes  in 
order  to  charge  others  with  his  misdeed,  like  the  burglar 
who  runs  down  the  street  shouting  out  "Stop,  thief." 
Fortunately  no  one  in  the  whole  world  believes  him, 
and  the  more  excuses  he  offers  the  more  does  he  in  fact 
accuse  himself.  With  all  his  sophisms  and  perversions 
he  cannot  abolish  the  facts  which  lie  patent  to  all  eyes. 
And  the  eyes  of  even  the  German  people,  who  now  de- 
ceived and  deluded  patiently  submit  to  the  unspeakable 
horrors  of  war,  will  gradually  be  opened.  Over  the 
trenches  and  across  the  frontiers  it  will  reach  out  its 
hand  to  the  neighbouring  nation  whose  president  said 
with  truth:  "The  German  Empire  will  bear  before 
history  the  crushing  responsibility  for  the  war." 


E 

APPENDIX 

The  Austrian  Red  Book 

In  the  beginning  of  February,  after  the  pages  of  this 
book  were  completed,  there  appeared  an  Austrian  Red 
Book,  which,  consisting  of  an  introduction  and  sixty-nine 
documents,  gives  an  account  of  events  from  the  murder 
of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand  down  to  the  outbreak 
of  the  European  war.  This  book  offers  no  surprises,  but 
only  a  confirmation  of  the  conclusions  which  could  not 


316  I   ACCUSE! 

but  be  drawn  from  the  previously  published  diplomatic 
correspondence.  It  is  a  meritorious  work,  in  so  far  as  it 
unveils,  by  open  self-confessions  and  with  an  appalling 
lucidity,  the  Austrian  attitude,  which  hitherto  could  only 
be  inferred  indirectly  from  foreign  publications. 

What  the  Austrian  book  yields  in  the  way  of  positive 
facts  confirms  the  conclusion  that  Austria-Hungary  was 
guilty  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  a  way  which  must 
leave  even  for  the  well-disposed  no  further  room  for 
doubt.  What  it  conceals  in  silence  proves  that  the  Aus- 
trian Government  is  completely  aware  of  its  guilt,  but 
that  it  still  endeavours — though  vainly — ^to  conceal  it 
from  the  eyes  of  the  world. 

As  before  the  publication  of  this  book,  there  is  still 
a  complete  absence  of  any  kind  of  evidence  that  the 
German  Government,  as  is  constantly  emphasised  in  the 
White  Book,  pressed  the  Viennese  Government  to  as- 
sume an  attitude  of  moderation  and  conciliation.  In 
the  interval  between  July  28th  and  30th,  when  all  rela- 
tions between  Vienna  and  Petrograd  were  completely 
broken  off,  the  German  Government,  as  I  have  already 
indicated,  "handed  on"  to  Vienna  individual  proposals 
of  the  Entente  Powers ;  they  even  got  so  far  as  to  bring 
them  before  the  Vienna  Cabinet  "for  their  considera- 
tion," ^  but  they  never  defended  them,  or  gave  them 
energetic  support.  The  German  Government,  in  the 
name  of  Austria  and  without  any  previous  consultation 
with  her  ally,  straightway  declined  certain  other  propo- 
sals. Others  again  she  simply  kept  to  herself  without 
deigning  an  answer,  and  without  transmitting  them  to 
Vienna. 

The  proposals  which  did  arrive  at  Austria  were  col- 
lectively so  long  refused  by  the  Government  in  Vienna 
that  in  the  end  it  was  too  late,  and  thus  all  the  efforts 

'  Red  Book,  No.  43. 


THE  CRIME  317 

of  the  Entente   Powers  to  keep  the  peace  of  Europe 
failed. 

I  will  now  take  up  the  various  points  in  the  Red  Book 
which  deserve  discussion,  and  first  I  will  deal  with  what 
the  Red  Book  contains,  and  then  with  what  it  does  not 
contain. 


What  the  Red  Book  contains 

I.  It  is  now  demonstrated  by  the  Red  Book  itself 
that  Austria  under  all  circumstances  desired  war  against 
Serbia — a  fact  already  proved  by  the  revelations  of 
Giolitti,  and  by  many  other  circumstances  which  have 
already  been  indicated.  In  the  report  from  the  Austrian 
Ambassador  in  Belgrade,  Freiherr  von  Giesl,  dated  July 
2ist,^  that  is  to  say,  before  the  presentation  of  the  Aus- 
trian Note,  the  Ambassador  expresses  his  conviction : 

"that  a  reckoning  with  Serbia,  a  war  for  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Monarchy  as  a  Great  Power,  even  for 
its  existence  as  such,  cannot  he  permanently  avoided. 
If  we  delay  in  clearing  up  our  relations  with  Serbia 
we  shall  share  the  responsibility  for  the  difficulties 
and  the  unfavourable  situation  in  any  future  war, 
which  must,  however,  sooner  or  later  be  carried 
through.  .  .  .  Half-measures,  the  presentation  of 
demands,  followed  by  long  discussions  and  ending 
only  in  an  unsound  compromise,  would  be  the  hard- 
est blow  which  could  be  directed  against  Austria- 
Hungary's  reputation  in  Serbia  and  her  position  in 
Europe." 

'Red    Book,    No.   6. 


318  I    ACCUSE! 

This  embodies  the  programme  which  governed  all  fur- 
ther developments. 

2.  As  early  as  July  23rd,  simultaneously  with  the  de- 
livery of  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia,  Count  Berchtold  ex- 
plains in  instructions  sent  to  Count  Mensdorff,  his  Am- 
bassador in  London,  that  the  short  time-limit  allowed  in 
the  ultimatum  was  necessary  in  order  to  make  impos- 
sible the  "dilatory  arts"  of  Serbia,  and  that  the  Aus- 
trian demands  ''could  not  be  made  the  subject  of  negO' 
tiations  and  compromise."^ 

The  Entente  Powers  only  received  information  of  the 
Austrian  Note  on  July  24th,  and  then  without  the  addi- 
tion of  the  documentary  evidence.  Their  representa- 
tions that  the  period  of  time  allowed  in  the  ultimatum 
might  at  least  be  lengthened,  to  afford  them  an  oppor- 
tunity of  studying  the  evidence  and  of  bringing  influence 
to  bear  on  the  Serbian  Government,  were  flatly  refused. 
It  was  indicated  that  an  examination  of  the  data  was 
superfluous,  and  that  the  Austrian  communication 
"merely  bore  the  character  of  a  statement  for  informa- 
tion" which  was  regarded  "as  a  duty  laid  upon  them 
by  international  courtesy,"  and  that  the  Austrian  action 
was  one  which  concerned  the  monarchy  and  Serbia  alone, 
on  which  the  Powers  were  not  invited  "to  make  known 
their  own  views  on  the  subject."  Count  Berchtold  dis- 
appeared from  Vienna  in  the  critical  days  between  July 
23rd  and  25th,  and  issued  his  unaccommodating  decla- 
rations from  Lambach  and  Ischl.^ 

3.  In  an  instruction  despatched  on  July  25th  to  Count 
Szapary,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  at  Petrograd,  Berch- 
told already  counted  on  the  refusal  of  his  demands  by 
Serbia,  and  on  the  settlement  of  the  conflict  by  force 
of  arms  at  a  time  when  the  Serbian  Note  had  not  even 

'Red  Book,  No.  9. 

'  Red  Book,  Nos.  20,  21. 


THE  CRIME  319 

been  received.*  In  another  Note  of  the  same  day  to 
Szapary  he  explains  Point  5  of  the  Serbian  Note  in  the 
sense  that  the  collaboration  in  Serbia  of  Austrian  of- 
ficials in  the  suppression  of  the  subversive  movement 
was  intended  to  mean  the  "collaboration"  of  a  "bureau 
de  sürete"  in  Belgrade,^  but  he  omits  to  give  any  ex- 
planations on  Point  6,  which  was  much  more  important 
(participation  of  Austrian  officials  in  judicial  proceed- 
ings against  accessories  to  the  plot).  Explanations  on 
the  latter  point  were  only  given  on  July  27th  in  the 
declaration  published  by  the  Austrian  Government  after 
the  recall  of  the  Austrian  Ambassador;  it  was  then  stated 
that  the  intention  was  that  Austrian  officials  should  take 
part,  not  in  the  Serbian  judicial  proceedings,  but  in 
the  preliminary  police  investigations  leading  up  to  such 
proceedings  (recherche  as  opposed  to  enquete  judici- 
air e). 

This  raises  the  question  why  these  explanations  which 
were  transmitted  on  July  25th  to  Petrograd,  and  were 
published  on  July  27th,  could  not  have  been  included 
in  the  ultimatum,  or  at  least  communicated  to  Serbia, 
after  the  reception  of  the  Serbian  answer.  It  would 
certainly  have  been  possible,  and  in  view  of  the  sub- 
missive attitude  assumed  by  Serbia  it  was  more  than 
probable,  that  the  Serbian  Government,  on  the  ground 
of  these  explanations,  might  have  gone  still  further  to 
meet  the  Austrian  demands;  since  Points  5  and  6  were 
almost  the  only  reservations  made  by  Serbia,  Austria 
might  have  received  full  satisfaction  in  the  further  nego- 
tiations, and  the  peace  of  Europe  might  have  been  main- 
tained. Explanations  were,  however,  omitted  because 
war  with  Serbia  was  regarded  as  necessary,  as  so  neces- 
sary, in  fact,  that  they  were  resolved,  if  need  be,  to  ac- 
cept a  European  war  into  the  bargain.     Austria  acted 

'Red  Book,  No.  26. 
'Red  Book,  No.  27. 


S20  I   ACCUSE! 

according  to  the  prescription  of  the  man  who,  to  get 
rid  of  bugs,  burnt  down  his  house. 

4.  The  answer  of  Serbia  produced,  as  is  well  known, 
the  greatest  disappointment  in  Vienna.  It  had  not  been 
expected  that  the  influence  of  the  Entente  Powers  in 
Belgrade  could  induce  an  independent  State  to  accept 
such  a  humiliation.  At  a  stroke  all  hopes  of  the  desired 
war  appeared  to  have  vanished.  A  Government  which 
can  condescend  to  a  public  apology  in  its  official  gazette 
inserted  in  a  prescribed  phraseology^  at  a  prescribed 
place  on  a  prescribed  day — a  King  who  allows  an  order 
of  the  day  to  his  army  to  be  dictated  by  a  neighbour- 
ing State — a  Sovereign  State  which  subjects  its  public 
education  to  the  control  of  another  State,  which  dis- 
misses and  even  arrests  officers  and  officials  at  the  com- 
mand of  its  neighbour,  which  dissolves  national  unions, 
and  suppresses  the  liberty  of  the  Press,  &c.,  &c. — such 
a  State  and  such  a  Government  had  never  before  been 
seen  in  the  history  of  the  world.  Truly  it  required 
great  dexterity  (such  as  Austrian  statesmen  did  not  have 
at  command)  or  an  extraordinary  evil  will  (such  as  they 
certainly  did  have  at  command)  to  deduce  a  reason  for 
war  from  such  an  attitude  on  the  part  of  their  small 
neighbour. 

On  July  27th,  before  he  knew  the  Serbian  answer, 
Sazonof  himself  in  the  course  of  a  conversation  with 
Count  Szäpäry,  held  that  at  least  three  of  the  ten  points 
in  the  Austrian  Note  could  not  be  accepted,  namely, 
points  4,  5,  and  6,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  he 
was  much  surprised  when  he  learned  later  that  point  4 
(removal  of  officers  and  officials)  had  been  accepted  by 
Serbia,  and  also  that  the  two  other  points  had  not  been 
flatly  refused,  but  that  it  was  suggested  that  they  should 
be  submitted  for  decision  to  arbitration.^ 

5.  I  have  already  dealt  in  an  earlier  passage  with  the 
*        '  '  Red  Book,  No.  31. 


THE  CRIME  321 

process  whereby  the  submissive  Serbian  reply  was  arti- 
ficially transformed  by  means  of  miserable  quibbles  into 
a  Note  of  refusal.  In  Berchtold's  Note  of  July  28th 
intended  for  the  English  Government  the  Serbian  sub- 
mission was  represented  as  being  worthless,  and  as  in- 
tended to  deceive:  "Serbia  accepted  a  number  of  our 
demands,  with  all  sorts  of  reservations,  in  order  to  im- 
press public  opinion  in  Europe,  trusting  that  she  would 
not  be  required  to  fulfil  her  promises."  ^  This  is  sup- 
posed to  justify  the  action  of  Austria  in  ignoring  the 
Serbian  answer.  I  have  already  suggested  the  question: 
What  else,  beyond  making  promises,  could  Serbia  do  in 
forty-eight  hours?  Was  it  expected  that  the  fulfilment 
of  the  promises  should  also  be  carried  out  in  forty-eight 
hours?  After  all,  the  Austrian  Government  had  only 
demanded  from  the  Serbian  Government  an  obligation 
that  she  would  perform  certain  actions.  This  obliga- 
tion was  given  in  eight  points,  and  in  two  points  was 
made  subject  to  further  discussion.  Clearly,  in  the 
first  place,  it  was  necessary  to  wait  and  see  whether 
Serbia  would  fulfil  her  promises. 

Guarantees  in  the  form  that  Austria  should  herself  col- 
laborate in  the  fulfilment  of  the  Serbian  promises  were 
asked  for  only  in  points  5  and  6.  If  Austria  could  have 
brought  herself  to  discuss  these  points,  these  guarantees 
would  presumably  have  been  provided  for  in  one  form 
or  another ;  they  could,  for  example,  have  been  provided, 
as  proposed  by  Jules  Cambon,  in  the  form  of  an  Inter- 
national Commission  of  investigation  and  control,^  and 
guarantees  in  this  form  would  have  been  much  more 
practicable  and  far  more  effective  than  in  the  form  de- 
manded by  Austria.  The  whole  of  this  idea  of  collab- 
oration of  Austrian  officials  in  Serbian  investigations 
was,  in  view  of  the  strained  relations  between  Austria 

*Red  Book,  No.  39. 
*  Yellow  Book,  No.  92. 


322  I    ACCUSE! 

and  Serbia,  an  intellectual  efflorescence,  such  as  could 
only  spring  from  the  soil  of  Austrian  diplomacy.  Was 
it  supposed  that  in  this  way  peace  could  be  established 
between  Austria  and  Serbia?  A  perpetual  daily  state 
of  feud  would  have  arisen  between  Austrian  and  Serbian 
officials,  numberless  irritating  incidents,  perhaps  involv- 
ing bloodshed,  would  have  taken  place;  in  short,  there 
would  have  been  a  situation  which  would  indubitably 
have  led  in  the  sequel  to  war  (this  was  also  the  view  of 
Sazonof,  Red  Book,  No.  14). 

But  notwithstanding  all  this,  the  alleged  untrust- 
worthiness  of  Serbia  had  to  suffice  to  make  valueless  the 
answer  which  in  fact  had  conceded  nearly  all  the  de- 
mands. This  untrustworthiness,  in  the  opinion  of  Aus- 
tria, was  supposed  to  be  particularly  confirmed  by  the 
fact  that  Serbia,  as  early  as  3  o'clock  on  the  afternoon 
of  July  25th,  had  ordered  a  general  mobilisation,  that 
is  to  say,  three  hours  before  the  answer  was  handed 
over  to  the  Austrian  Ambassador.^  We  find  here  that 
Austria,  in  connection  with  the  question  of  mobilisation, 
plays  the  same  game  so  successfully  put  into  operation 
by  Germany.  Austria  presented  to  Serbia  demands 
which  could  not  be  complied  with,  and  thereby  gavi 
expression  to  her  indubitable  intention  to  make  war.  Ser~ 
bia  concurred  in  the  greatest  part  of  these  demands,  but 
feared,  not  without  reason,  that  the  few  reservations 
made  by  her  would  furnish  the  Austrian  Government 
with  a  pretext  for  war,  and  took  steps  to  protect  her- 
self against  this  possibility  by  timeous  mobilisation, 
which  had  been  carried  out  by  Austria  also,  simultane- 
ously with  the  presentation  of  the  ultimatum.  This  de- 
fensive mobilisation  on  the  part  of  Serbia  was  then 
treated  by  Austria  as  trickery  and  as  an  offensive  action, 
whereby  Serbia  "publicly  proclaimed  her  hostility,"  and 
showed  that  she  had  "no  inclination  for  a  peaceful  so- 
'Red  Book,  No.  39-  "* 


THE  CRIME  323 

lution,"  and  thus  Austria  construed  the  desired  ground 
for  war.^ 

6.  But  the  Austrian  Government  did  not  rest  satisfied 
with  this;  she  even  raised  the  further  reproach  against 
Serbia — again  in  imitation  of  a  celebrated  example — ■ 
that  her  opponent  had  been  the  first  to  begin  hostihties. 
In  the  telegram  sent  by  Berchtold  on  July  28th  to  his 
Ambassadors  in  Petrograd  and  London  it  is  expressly 
asserted  that  Serbia  had  opened  hostilities  on  the  Hun- 
garian frontier  as  early  as  July  27th,  that  is  to  say, 
before  the  Austrian  declaration  of  war.-  This  assertion 
is,  of  course,  unsupported  by  any  facts  or  by  any  kind 
of  evidence,  and  it  is  further  much  more  incredible  than 
the  similar  assertion  which  was  later  advanced  by  Ger- 
many against  Russia  and  France.  Why,  indeed,  should 
a  small  and  weak  country  like  Serbia  intentionally  pro- 
voke a  war  with  Austria?  The  facts  reported  by  Giesl, 
the  Austrian  Ambassador  (removal  of  gold  from  the 
National  Bank,  withdrawal  of  troops  from  Belgrade, 
removal  of  official  papers  from  the  Foreign  Office,  &c.) 
prove — as,  indeed,  is  in  accordance  with  logic  and  rea- 
son, and  requires  no  proof — that  there  was  nothing 
which  Serbia  had  less  in  her  mind  than  an  attack  upon 
Austria;  on  the  contrary,  that  it  would  have  been  glad 
if  only  her  great  neighbour  would  leave  her  in  peace. ^ 
But  it  appears  to  be  the  recognised  custom  in  this  war 
for  the  aggressor  to  accuse  his  victim  of  having  fallen 
upon  him. 

All  these  pretexts  furnished  the  Austrian  Government 
with  priceless  material  to  justify  the  negative  position 
which  they  assumed  with  regard  to  .the  peaceful  pro- 
posals of  the  Entente  Powers.  The  grounds  of  these 
refusals  may  be  summarised  as   follows : — 

*  Red  Book,  Introduction  p.  444,   No.  29. 
'  Red  Book,  Nos.  39,  40. 
•Red  Book,  No.  22. 


I   ACCUSE! 

(a)  Our  dispute  with  Serbia  concerns  no  one,  and 
must  remain  localised. 

(b)  Serbia,  by  her  unsatisfactory  answer,  by  her 
mobilisation,  and  by  opening  hostilities  has  herself 
provoked  the  war. 

7.  I  have  already  dealt  in  the  previous  sections  of  this 
book  with  the  question  of  localisation.  This  subject, 
however,  reappears  in  the  Austrian  Red  Book  with  such 
definiteness  and  at  the  same  time  with  so  much  naivete 
that  a  further  short  discussion  appears  necessary. 
Austria  simply  took  as  her  starting  point  the  thoii*ght 
which  Count  Mensdorff  had  openly  expressed  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  on  July  29th  that  Serbia  belonged  to  the  Aus- 
trian sphere  of  interest  (Blue  Book,  No.  91).  The  fact 
that  Russia,  by  a  hundred  years  of  history,  by  links  of 
blood  and  religion,  and  also  by  her  own  interests  was 
connected  with  Serbia  by  bonds  more  intimate  than  those 
between  any  other  two  allies,  such,  for  example,  as  Ger- 
many and  Austria,  was  intentionally  ignored  by  the  two 
Empires,  and  the  ingenious  distinction  was  constantly 
drawn  that  while  they  were  quite  prepared  to  negoti- 
ate with  Russia  on  questions  arising  between  Russia  and 
Austria,  they  must  be  allowed  to  regulate  the  Austro- 
Serbian  dispute  as  they  thought  fit.  This  artificial  and 
meaningless  interpretation  is  as  if  one  party  to  a  law- 
suit were  to  say  to  the  other:  "I  am  quite  prepared 
to  come  to  an  understanding  with  you  and  have  no  evil 
intentions  whatever  against  you,  but  we  must  absolutely 
refrain  from  speaking  to  each  other  about  the  subject 
in  dispute;  let  us,  therefore,  talk  about  something  else. 
What  do  you  think  about  Russia  ?  Fine  weather  to-day ; 
very  fine  day  to-day,  indeed."  The  Serbian  question 
was  precisely  the  question  at  issue  between  Austria  and 
Russia,  and  not,  indeed,  for  the  first  time;  it  had  been 
so  for  many  years.     Russia  regarded  her  interests  as 


THE  CRIME  325 

being  identical  with  those  of  Serbia,  and  declared  that, 
in  the  interests  of  Serbia  as  well  as  of  her  own  prestige, 
she  could  not  tolerate  that  the  Slavonic  brother  State, 
after  the  deep  diplomatic  humiliation  she  had  under- 
gone, should  also  be  crushed  by  Austria  by  force  of 
arms  and  should  be  degraded  into  a  kind  of  vassal 
State. -^  On  this  occasion  the  conflict  had  broken  out 
more  violently  than  ever,  and  threatened  not  merely  to 
divide  Austria  from  Russia,  but  also  to  set  the  whole  of 
Europe  in  flame.  Only  this  question  was  at  stake — no 
other.  If  they  were  prepared  to  negotiate  at  all,  it  had 
to  be  on  the  Serbian  question;  if  they  were  not  prepared 
to  discuss  this  question,  it  was  superfluous  and  purpose- 
less to  suggest  further  negotiations.  In  reality  the  Aus- 
trian proposal  that  they  were  willing  to  negotiate  with 
Russia  on  Russian  interests  was  nothing  but  a  pretext 
in  order  to  avoid  negotiations  which  could  serve  any 
purpose. 

It  was  in  vain  that  Grey  and  Sazonof  endeavoured 
to  convince  the  Austrian  Government  of  their  sophisms 
— sophisms  which  might  be  attended  by  the  gravest  con- 
sequences. Even  Count  Szapfiry,  the  Austrian  Ambas- 
sador in  Petrograd,  could  not  refrain  from  observing 
that  the  instructions  of  Berchtold  moved  in  a  vicious 
circle.^  All  representations  were  in  vain.  Austria,  sup- 
ported by  Germany,  stood  firm  in  her  refusal  until  it 
was  too  late  and  war  had  become  inevitable. 

8.  Proceeding  from  the  fundamental  principle  that  no 
one  had  any  right  to  be  heard  in  the  Austro-Serbian 
dispute,  Austria,  in  the  first  place,  declined  to  permit 
any  discussion  of  the  contents  of  her  ultimatum  or  of 
the  Serbian  answer.  On  July  27th  a  conversation,  main- 
tained in  a  friendly  tone,  took  place  between  Sazonof 
and  Szapary,  in  which  the  former  gave  expression  to  the 

*  Red  Book,  No.  47.     Blue  Book,  Nos.  48,  91. 
*Red  Book,  No.  47- 


326  I   ACCUSE! 

desire  to  discuss  the  Serbian  Note  with  the  Ambassador. 
Szapary  explained  that  he  was  ready  to  receive  the  ob- 
serv'ations  of  Sazonof,  but  pointed  out  that  he  was  not 
authorised  either  to  discuss  the  text  of  the  Note  or  to 
interpret  it.^  On  July  28th  Schebeko,  the  Russian  Am- 
bassador, made  a  formal  proposition  to  Count  Berchtold 
asking  him  to  furnish  Count  Szapary  with  instructions 
to  continue  with  Sazonof  the  exchange  of  thought,  and 
thus,  if  it  were  possible,  to  arrive  at  a  direct  under- 
standing with  the  Russian  Government ;  the  latter  would 
gladly  meet  them  half-way  with  this  object  in  view. 
Count  Berchtold  emphatically  declined  the  proposal  of 
the  Russian  Ambassador:  No  one  in  Austria  could  un- 
derstand negotiations  with  reference  to  the  Serbian  an- 
swer, which  had  been  designated  as  unsatisfactory,  and, 
moreover,  war  had  already  been  declared  against  Serbia 
on  the  same  day.  By  way  of  providing  a  further  ground 
for  the  declaration  of  war,  Berchtold  did  not  fail  to 
refer  to  the  Serbian  mobilisation  and  to  the  hostilities 
alleged  to  have  been  begun  by  Serbia.^ 

Thus,  all  connections  between  Austria  and  Russia  were 
broken  off  until  further  notice.  All  attempts  to  effect 
an  understanding  could  reach  Austria  only  indirectly 
by  the  mediation  of  the  Entente  Powers  and  of  Ger- 
many. 

9.  On  the  same  day  on  which  Berchtold  declined 
Sazonof's  proposal  for  a  direct  understanding,  he  also 
rejected  Grey's  proposal  for  a  conference  of  the  four 
Powers.  As  is  known,  this  proposal  had  already  been 
declined  by  Germany,  without  previous  consultation  with 
Austria,  under  the  threadbare  pretext  that  she  could  not 
summon  her  ally  before  a  "European  Tribunal."  Aus- 
tria declined  this  proposal,  which  was  simultaneously 
submitted  by  Grey  to  Count  Mensdorff  and  by  Bunsen 

'■  Red  Book,  No.  31. 

*Red  Book,  No.  40.     Orange  Book,  No.  45. 


THE  CRIME  327 

to  Count  Berchtold  (July  28th)  on  quite  different 
grounds,  namely,  that  the  proposal  came  too  late,  and 
that  in  view  of  the  state  of  war  which  had  arisen  it 
had  been  "outstripped"  by  events.^  This  certainly  is  a 
remarkable  procedure !  Germany,  as  Austria's  guardian, 
considers  that  Grey's  proposal  is,  so  to  speak,  incon- 
sistent with  her  dignity.  Austria,  however,  the  party 
chiefly  concerned,  is  not  sensible  of  this  violation  of 
her  dignity,  but  only  objects  that  the  proposal  was  re- 
ceived too  late,  and  apparently,  therefore,  she  would 
not  have  been  disinclined  to  consider  it  had  it  been  sub- 
mitted earlier.  This,  again,  furnishes  an  indication  of 
the  incredible  confusion  which  reigned  in  the  minds  of 
German  and  Austrian  diplomatists  and  in  the  Chancel- 
lories of  the  Empires.  Both  the  reasons  urged  against 
the  conference,  that  expressed  by  Berlin  and  that  by 
Vienna,  were,  of  course,  merely  pretexts.  But  it  would, 
at  any  rate,  have  been  more  astute,  in  the  first  place,  to 
have  come  to  an  agreement  as  to  the  reasons  which 
they  were  to  put  forward  to  bring  to  naught  one  after 
the  other  the  proposals  of  the  Entente  Powers  for  peace. 
It  would  then  have  been  less  easy  to  see  through  the 
game,  and  more  difficult  to  establish  guilt. 

10.  In  an  earlier  passage  I  have  already  pointed  out 
how  Germany  answered  Grey's  proposal  for  a  conference 
with  the  counter-proposal  of  a  direct  discussion  between 
Vienna  and  Petrograd — ^a  discussion  which  was  then  de- 
clined by  Vienna.  The  German  White  Book  naturally 
endeavours  to  conceal  this  position  of  affairs,  which  in 
itself  offers  a  complete  proof  of  the  guilt  of  the  two 
Empires;  it  was,  however,  possible  to  establish  this  fact 
beyond  all  doubt  by  reference  to  the  other  diplomatic 
books.  The  Red  Book  now  presents  us  with  the  self- 
confession  of  Austria  on  this  question  in  the  crassest 
form,  and,  moreover,  the  statement  contains  highly  ag- 
"  "■  Red  Book,  Nos.  38,  41.  ~ 


328  I   ACCUSE! 

gravating  amplifications.  Not  only  did  the  Government 
of  Vienna  decline  on  July  28th  to  discuss  the  Serbian 
question  directly  with  Russia  as  proposed  by  Germany, 
but  they  had  already  given  expression  to  this  refusal 
with  the  utmost  definiteness  as  early  as  July  2'^rd  (Red 
Book,  No.  9).  This  fact  must  have  been,  and  was, 
known  to  the  German  Government.  The  Government 
of  Berlin  thus  declined,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  facts, 
a  promising  proposal  put  forward  by  the  English  Gov- 
ernment in  order  to  set  in  its  place  another,  which,  in 
view  of  the  declaration  made  by  Austria  as  far  back 
as  July  23rd,  was  known  to  them  to  be  futile.  Up  till 
now  it  was  possible  only  to  show  that  the  Berlin  counter- 
proposal was,  in  fact,  futile,  and  to  infer  that  there 
was  criminal  collusion  between  the  two  Empires.  Now 
— thanks  to  the  Austrian  publication — this  collusion  is 
proved,  and  the  guilty  are  unmasked.  //  of  the  hundred 
proofs  of  guilt  only  this  one  existed,  it  would  suMce  to 
lay  upon  Germany  and  Austria  alone  the  responsibility 
for  the  war. 

II.  On  July  30th  Count  Berchtold,  as  we  know,  at 
last  resolved,  in  view  of  the  increasingly  dangerous 
aspect  of  the  dispute,  to  discuss  with  Sazonof  the  details 
of  the  Austrian  Note.  With  this  object  he  sent  on  July 
30th  two  instructions  to  his  Ambassador  at  Petrograd 
(Red  Book,  Nos.  49  and  50),  and  thereupon  on  July  31st 
negotiations  in  fact  began  oiUcially  for  the  first  time  in 
Petrograd  on  the  contents  of  the  Note.  The  conversa- 
tion of  July  27th  between  Sazonof  and  Szapary  was,  as 
explained  above,  only  an  unoMcial  acceptance  of  Sazo- 
nof's   observations. 

Even  in  this  critical  moment  Berchtold  could  not  re- 
frain from  speaking  of  the  Note  as  having  been  already 
"outstripped"  by  the  outbreak  of  war,  from  describing 
the  conversations  in  Petrograd  as  "subsequent  explana- 
tions," and   from  emphasising  that  it  had  never  been 


THE  CRIME  329 

Austria's  intention  "to  depart  in  any  way  from  th*^  points 
contained  in  the  Note." 

The  phrase  about  being  "outstripped  by  the  outbreak 
of  war,"  which  is  ridden  to  death  in  the  Red  Book,  de- 
serves special  consideration.  What  is  it  really  supposed 
to  mean?  A  insults  B;  A  offers  humble  and  plaintive 
apologies ;  nevertheless,  B  raises  his  sword  to  run  A 
through.  A  third,  C,  a  near  relation  of  A,  intervenes 
to  restrain  the  lethal  blow,  and  points  out  in  A's  favour 
that  he  has  already  offered  apologies.  B,  however,  depre- 
cates this  intervention  with  the  observation  that  the 
discussion  of  the  insult  has  been  outstripped  by  events, 
and  that  the  state  of  war  which  was  produced  by  raising 
his  sword  must  now  pursue  its  course. 

This  is  the  point  of  view  of  the  Austrian  Government. 
It  is  incredible,  but  true!  But  even  if  this  point  of  view 
were  as  logical  and  reasonable  as  it  is  illogical  and  un- 
reasonable, it  would  not  lead  to  the  conclusion  drawn 
by  the  Government  of  Vienna,  that  all  attempts  at  medi- 
ation by  third  parties — which  were  promoted  in  the  in- 
terest, not  of  Serbia,  but  of  European  peace — must  give 
way.  The  state  of  war  had  been  brought  about  by  Aus- 
tria alone  (the  Serbian  hostilities  are,  of  course,  an  in- 
vention). This  state  of  war,  however,  like  every  war, 
could  and  must  sooner  or  later  come  to  an  end.  The 
Entente  Powers  desired  to  bring  about  this  end  sooner 
rather  than  later,  in  order  to  prevent  an  extension  of 
the  conflagration  throughout  Europe.  How,  then,  was 
it  possible  to  urge  as  an  objection  against  these  efforts 
for  peace  that  war  had  already  broken  out?  It  was 
precisely  because  war  had  broken  out  that  efforts  were 
made  in  the  cause  of  peace.  One  is  almost  ashamed  to 
have  to  devote  so  much  space  to  matters  which  are  so 
obvious,  but  when  we  find  constantly  repeated  in  all  the 
Notes  contained  in  the  Red  Book  from  July  28th  on- 
wards the  same  idiotic  ideas  that  all  the  efforts  for  peace 


330  I    ACCUSE! 

made  by  the  Powers  had  been  outstripped  by  the  Serbian 
war,  needlessly  and  criminally  brought  about  by  Austria 
— as  may  be  expected  the  German  White  Book  also  (page 
9)^  is  guilty  of  this  idiocy — it  is  impossible  to  shirk 
the  task  of  characterising  such  senselessness  by  its  true 
name,  as  a  criminal  gamble  with  the  highest  interests 
of  the  unhappy  nations  whose  destiny  is  entrusted  to  such 
men  as  these. 

The  worst  feature  in  the  whole  business  is,  however, 
that  the  assertion  that  the  peace  proposals  were  out- 
stripped by  the  outbreak  of  war  is  not  even  in  fact  true. 
The  peace  proposals — the  Russian  request  for  a  direct 
understanding  as  well  as  Grey's  proposal  for  a  confer- 
ence of  the  four  Powers — were  in  reality  made  and  com- 
municated to  the  Government  at  Vienna  before  the  out- 
break of  the  Austro-Serbian  war.  As  early  as  July  24th, 
immediately  after  being  informed  of  the  Austrian  Note, 
Sazonof  expressed  the  wish  that  the  period  of  time  al- 
lowed in  the  ultimatum  should  be  extended,  and  that 
he  should  receive  the  Austrian  evidence  in  support  of 
their  charges  in  order  that  the  Austrian  complaints 
might  be  examined,  pressure  brought  to  bear  on  Serbia, 
and  negotiations  opened  with  Vienna  with  a  view  to 
arriving  at  an  understanding.  In  the  following  days 
this  desire  was  constantly  repeated  by  the  Russian  Min- 
ister to  Count  Szapary,  on  the  final  occasion  as  late  as 
July  27th.^  As  war  was  only  declared  against  Serbia 
on  July  28th,  the  assertion  that  the  Russian  proposal 
for  an  understanding  was  "outstripped"  by  the  declara- 
tion of  war  is  stamped  as  a  lie. 

The  same  holds  true  of  Grey's  proposal  for  a  confer- 
ence. The  conference  of  the  four  Powers  was  recom- 
mended by  Grey  from  the  beginning  of  the  crisis,  as 
early  as  July  24th,   and    from  that  time  the  proposal 

[^  Collected  Documents,  p.  409.] 
'Red  Book,  No.  31- 


THE  CRIME  331 

was  constantly  renewed.^  As  early  as  July  26th  the 
proposal  was  submitted  to  the  German  Government, 
and  was  rejected  under  the  well-known  pretext  that  she 
could  not  call  Austria  before  a  European  tribunal.^  On 
July  27th  Count  Mensdorff  reported  at  length  on  this 
proposal  made  and  urgently  pressed  upon  him  by  Grey.^ 
How,  then,  does  Count  Berchtold  arrive  at  the  conclusion 
that  the  proposal  for  a  conference,  which  dated  from 
July  24th,  and  which  had  since  then  been  constantly  re- 
newed, was  "outstripped"  by  the  declaration  of  war, 
which  took  place  on  July  28th?  This  assertion  also  is 
a  conscious  lie,  intended  to  hush  up  Austria's  unswerv- 
ing intention  to  make  war.     I  resume  as  follows : — 

(a)  even  if  the  Austrian  assertion  that  the  pro- 
posals for  peace  only  arrived  after  the  declaration 
of  war  were  correct,  this  would  not,  in  logic  or  in 
reason,  constitute  any  ground  for  rejecting  these 
proposals ; 

{h)  it  is,  however,  proved  that  these  proposals 
reached  Austria  before  the  declaration  of  war;  there 
is  thus  no  support  in  fact  for  the  premises  on  which 
is  based  the  conclusion — in  itself  false — drawn  by 
the  Vienna  Government. 

12.  On  July  29th  Sazonof  rightly  complained  to 
Szapary  that  Austria  had  flatly  refused  any  further  ex- 
change of  thought.  This,  however,  did  not  prevent 
Count  Berchtold  from  assuming  a  "stupid"  air  in  con- 
versation with  M.  Schebeko  on  July  30th,  and  from 
speaking  of  a  "misunderstanding"  on  the  part  of  Sazo- 
nof, as  he  and  Schebeko  "had  discussed  the  practical 
questions  two  days  before,"  and  Schebeko  had  reported 
this  to  Petrograd  (Red  Book,  No.  50).     The  exchange 

^Blue  Book,  Nos.   10,  n,  24,  25,  36,  42,  43,  etc. 

'White  Book,  p.  409. 

•Red  Book,  No.  38.    Blue  Book,  No.  48. 


332  I   ACCUSE! 

of  thought  of  which  Berchtold  speaks  consisted  in  the 
fact  that  Schebeko,  in  the  name  of  Sazonof,  desired  the 
official  continuation  of  the  negotiations  in  Petrograd, 
whereas  Berchtold  ßatly  declined  to  concur  in  these. 
This  is  what  Berchtold  calls  ''discussing  the  practical 
question" ! 

13.  The  question  of  mobilisation  was  naturally  also 
among  the  subjects  discussed  in  the  conversation  on 
July  30th.  Berchtold  complained  about  the  mobilisa- 
tion of  the  four  southern  Russian  army-districts,  which 
had  taken  place  on  the  previous  day,  and  repeated  again 
the  false  assertion  that  Austria  had  only  mobilised 
against  Serbia  (three  army  corps),  but  against  Russia 
"not  a  single  man."  M.  Schebeko  could  have  answered 
to  this :  "Not  a  man,  it  is  true,  but  a  'Beth-mann.'  " 
For  Bethmann  in  his  simplicity  had  chattered  in  the 
Reichstag  on  August  4th  to  the  effect  that  Austria  had 
mobilised,  not  only  against  Serbia,  hut  also  two  army- 
corps  against  Russia  at  a  time  when  Russian  mobilisa- 
tion was  not  even  spoken  of. 

Noteworthy  is  the  admission  made  by  Berchtold  in  the 
conversation  in  question  that  Austria  was  now  obliged 
"to  extend  her  mobilisation  too" — an  admission  which 
confirms  the  Austrian  general  mobilisation  reported  by 
the  Ambassadors  of  the  Entente  Powers  as  taking  place 
on  the  night  from  the  30th  to  the  31st  July.  That  the 
Austrian  mobilisation  against  Russia  was,  in  fact,  car- 
ried out  during  this  night  is  also  expressly  admitted 
in  the  telegram  sent  by  Count  Berchtold  on  July  31st 
to  his  diplomatic  representatives  abroad  (Red  Book, 
No.  53). 

Both  States — Austria  and  Russia — were,  however,  as 
I  have  pointed  out  elsewhere,  at  one  in  the  view  that 
inohilisation  was  in  no  way  equivalent  to  war.  Although 
both  States  had  ordered  general  mobilisation  on  July 
31st,  Berchtold  telegraphed  as  follows  to  his  diplomatic 


THE  CRIME  333 

representatives :  "Pourparlers  between  the  Cabinets  at 
Vienna  and  Petrograd  appropriate  to  the  situation  are 
meanwhile  being  continued,  and  from  these  we  hope 
that  things  will  quieten  down  all  round."  They  did,  in 
fact,  continue,  or  rather  they  only  began  at  the  moment 
when  mobilisation  on  both  sides  had  already  taken  place. 
They  took  place  in  Petrograd  on  July  31st  and  August 
1st,  even  after  the  German  ultimatum,  and  were  only 
finally  broken  off  in  consequence  of  the  German  declara- 
tion of  war.^  On  an  earlier  occasion  also,  in  a  telegram 
of  July  24th  to  Count  Mensdorff,  Berchtold  expressly 
pointed  out  that  Austria  had  already  mobilised  twice 
(1908  and  1912)  because  of  Serbia.^  Russia  also  had 
mobilised  on  each  of  these  instances,  and,  nevertheless, 
peace  had  been  maintained  on  both  occasions  by  diplo- 
matic negotiations.  This  is  a  confession  on  the  part 
of  her  own  ally  which  is  damaging  to  Germany!  In 
spite  of  all  mobilisations,  peace  could  have  been  main- 
tained on  this  occasion  also  if  Germany  had  desired  to 
maintain  it. 

14.  In  connection  with  the  question  of  mobilisation 
there  is  one  charming  episode  which  I  should  not  like 
to  keep  from  the  reader  as  it  throws  a  ray  of  comedy 
into  the  dark  tragedy;  I  refer  to  the  history  of  Sazonof's 
broken  word  of  honour  which  is  dished  up  for  us  by 
Austrian  diplomacy.  Hitherto  we  have  had  knowledge 
of  only  three  broken  words  of  honour:  the  Russian 
Minister  of  War,  the  Russian  Chief  of  the  General  Staff, 
and  the  Russian  Emperor  were  the  breakers  of  their 
word  (see  the  German  White  Book).  That  was  not 
enough  for  the  Austrian  gentlemen ;  they  felt  constrained 
to  add  a  fourth  breaker  of  his  word,  M.  Sazonof.  Count 
Szögyeny,  who  appears  in  part  to  misunderstand  all  im- 
portant  occurrences,    and   in   part  to    slumber   through 

'Red  Book,  Nos.  55,  56. 
''Red   Book,   No.   17. 


334  I    ACCUSE! 

them,  as  we  shall  see  later,  reported  from  Berlin  on 
July  27th  that  Sazonof  had  given  the  German  Ambassa- 
dor a  "guarantee"  that  as  yet  no  mobilisation  had  taken 
place,  but  only  certain  necessary  military  precautions 
(Red  Book,  No.  33).  I  have  already  shown  that  this 
declaration  was  in  conformity  with  the  truth.  The 
declaration,  however,  was  given,  not  by  Sazonof,  but 
by  the  Russian  Minister  of  War,  Suchomlinof  (White 
Book,  page  8).^  It  is  amusing  to  obsei*ve  how  the 
imaginary  declaration  of  Sazonof  (of  July  27th)  de- 
velops in  the  Note  of  Berchtold  (of  July  28th)  into  a 
broken  word  of  honour  on  the  part  of  Sazonof,  and  in 
the  Note  of  July  29th  it  is  generously  recognised  that  M. 
Sazonof  "now  no  longer  denies"  what,  in  fact,  he  never 
had  denied  (Red  Book,  Nos.  42  and  48).  Who  can  tell 
how  many  broken  Russian  words  of  honour  might  have 
been  constructed  had  not  the  outbreak  of  war  put  an  end 
to  this  criminal  activity! 

15.  The  telegram  sent  by  Berchtold  to  his  Ambassa- 
dors at  London  and  Petrograd  on  July  31st  deserves 
special  consideration  (Red  Book,  No.  51).  As  the  two 
telegrams  of  July  30th  to  Count  Szapary  (Nos.  49  and 
50)  appeared  at  last  to  pave  the  way  for  the  acceptance 
of  direct  negotiations  with  Russia,  so  the  telegram  of 
July  31st  appeared  at  last  to  reveal  a  certain  readiness 
to  accept  Grey's  mediation.  The  superficial  observer 
who  does  not  keep  sufficiently  in  view  the  secret  connec- 
tions between  Berlin  and  Vienna — and  even  the  Entente 
Powers  were  such  superficial  observers  until  the  be- 
haviour of  Berlin  opened  their  eyes — is,  in  fact,  com- 
pelled to  assume  that  Austria  had  at  last,  with  the  terror 
of  a  European  war  in  her  heart,  repented,  and  was  en- 
deavouring to  maintain  peace  in  both  the  ways  proposed 
by  the  Entente  Powers,  by  means  of  direct  negotiations 

[^  Collected  Documents,  p.  408.] 


THE  CRIME  336 

with  Russia  and  simultaneously  by  the  mediatory  action 
of  the  Powers. 

Accurately  viewed,  the  position  is  quite  different. 
Austria  was  bound  to  know,  and  in  fact  did  know,  that 
in  consequence  of  the  question  of  mobilisation  intention- 
ally pushed  into  the  foreground  by  Germany  the  tension 
between  Berlin  and  Petrograd  had  meanwhile  become 
greater  than  that  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd,  and 
in  consequence  that  even  an  apparent  concurrence  by 
Austria  in  the  peace  proposals  of  the  Entente  Powers 
could  no  longer  prevent  the  coming  of  war. 

This  was  one  reason  for  Austria's  sudden  change  of 
front.  It  was  harmless;  Berlin  had  already  provided 
for  all  further  developments. 

The  other  reason,  however — and  this  explanation  is 
given  us  for  the  first  time  by  the  Red  Book — was  that 
the  Austrian  declarations  themselves  were  so  restricted 
and  limited  that  even  without  the  ultimatum-policy  of 
Berlin  they  could  not  lead  to  a  peaceful  settlement. 
From  this  side  of  the  question  Vienna  herself  provided 
for  all  further  developments.  I  have  already  pointed 
out  the  reservations  which  the  Government  at  Vienna 
made  in  resuming  negotiations  with  Petrograd.  When 
a  negotiating  party  declares  from  the  outset  that  she  is 
only  prepared  to  give  "subsequent  explanations,"  and 
that  she  had  no  "intention  to  depart"  from  her  position, 
negotiations  are  superfluous  and  futile. 

Similar  reserv^ations  were  made  by  the  Government 
of  Vienna  with  regard  to  the  English  proposal  of  media- 
tion. This  proposal  had  its  origin  in  Sazonof's  tele- 
gram of  July  29th,  which,  having  regard  to  the  cate- 
gorical refusal  of  the  Vienna  Cabinet  on  the  previous 
day  to  take  part  in  further  negotiations,  asked  the  Eng- 
lish Government  for  mediation  in  the  interests  of  peace 
in  any  form  that  appeared  advisable.^  In  the  Note  from 
^Orange  Book,  No.  50.     Blue  Book,  No.  84. 


336  I    ACCUSE! 

Vienna  of  July  31st  we  find  the  following  surprising 
passage:  "Sazonof  has  informed  the  British  Govern- 
ment that  after  the  declaration  of  war  by  Austria-Hun- 
gary against  Serbia  he  is  no  longer  in  a  position  to  deal 
directly  with  Austria-Hungary."  Is  the  phraseology 
here  used  in  any  way  intended  to  indicate  that  Sazonof, 
for  his  part,  had  refused  to  enter  into  further  negotia- 
tions? Such  an  implication  would  have  been  a  gross 
falsification,  refuted  by  the  Austrian  Red  Book  itself, 
as  well  as  by  all  the  other  diplomatic  publications. 
Sazonof  was,  in  fact,  no  longer  in  a  position  to  negotiate 
with  Vienna,  not  through  any  fault  of  his^  but  because 
Vienna  had  since  July  28th  refused  to  take  part  in  any 
further  negotiations.  Whom  did  they  really  expect  to 
deceive  by  this  ambiguous  phraseology? 

Grey  at  once  communicated  Sazonof's  request  to 
Prince  Lichnowsky,  and  again  put  forward  the  proposal 
of  a  conversation  ä  quatre  in  London,  the  form  of  which 
he  left  entirely  to  the  German  Government.  The  ob- 
vious presupposition  of  this,  and  of  all  other  proposals 
for  mediation,  was  naturally  the  preliminary  suspension 
of  hostilities  against  Serbia;  it  should,  however,  be  ob- 
sen^ed  that  what  was  asked  was  only  a  cessation  of  op- 
erations, and  not  a  withdrawal  of  Austrian  troops  from 
Serbia. 

What  attitude  did  Count  Berchtold  assume  with  re- 
gard to  this  proposal?  Now  on  July  31st  he  for  the 
first  time  declared  himself  "quite  prepared  to  entertain 
the  proposal  of  Sir  E.  Grey  to  negotiate  between  us  and 
Serbia,"  only,  however,  under  the  following  condi- 
tions : — 

(a)  the  military  action  against  Serbia  should  mean- 
while continue  to  take  its  course; 

(b)  the  Russian  mobilisation  must  be  brought  to  a 
standstill,  whereupon  the  Austrian  counter-measures  in 
Galicia  would  also  be  cancelled. 


THE  CRIME  337 

Was  this  an  acceptance  or  a  refusal  of  Grey's  media- 
tion? It  was  a  refusal  in  the  form  of  an  acceptance. 
Could  it  be  seriously  asked  of  the  Russian  Government 
that  it  was  for  them  to  begin  demobilisation  while  Aus- 
tria was  prepared  to  cancel  partially  in  Galicia  the  gen- 
eral mobilisation  which  she  had  ordered  in  the  previous 
night,  only  after  the  Russian  mobilisation  had  been 
brought  to  a  standstill?  Could  it  be  seriously  asked  of 
Russia  that,  during  the  proposed  conference  of  Am- 
bassadors in  London,  of  which  neither  the  beginning 
nor  the  term  could  yet  be  determined,  she  should  allow 
Austria  to  proceed  with  her  measures  against  Serbia, 
and  thus  in  the  meantime  crush  the  tiny  State?  In 
addition  to  this,  Austria  had  merely  expressed  in  gen- 
eral terms  her  readiness  to  "entertain"  {näherzutreten) 
Grey's  mediatory  action,  but  had  not  accepted  a  confer- 
ence in  this  form  or  in  that.  Events  might  thus  follow 
the  same  course  as  in  Berlin  during  the  preceding  six 
days,  that  is  to  say,  the  Government  of  Vienna,  on  go- 
ing more  closely  into  the  question,  might  raise  on  their 
side  all  manner  of  difficulties  as  to  the  form,  while  neg- 
lecting, just  as  Berlin  had  done,  to  propose  any  practical 
or  acceptable  form.  In  short,  the  Austrian  answer  to  the 
proposal  of  Grey  which  Herr  von  Tschirschky  "com- 
municated in  accordance  with  instructions,"  without  in 
any  way  supporting  it — this  answer  was  so  ambiguous 
and  restricted  that  it  was  equivalent  to  a  refusal  of  the 
proposal. 

The  Allied  Governments  could  thus  feel  sure  on  both 
sides  that  the  desired  war  could  not  escape  them.  There 
was  as  little  hope  of  a  peaceful  issue  of  the  negotiations 
with  Russia  as  of  the  success  of  the  English  mediatory 
action,  in  consequence  of  the  clauses  and  reservations 
attached  by  the  Government  of  Vienna  to  their  accept- 
ance of  both  proposals.  If,  however,  there  was  any 
danger  of  a  peaceful  issue,  Berlin,  by  its  ultimatum- 


338  I    ACCUSE! 

policy,  was  taking  the  necessary  measures  to  secure  that 
under  all  circumstances  war  was  bound  to  come.  The 
cards  were,  in  fact,  shuffled  with  such  dexterity  that  the 
game  could  not  be  lost — the  game  of  war  which  had  so 
often  been  played  in  peace,  and  which  now  they  wished 
to  carry  through  in  earnest. 

So  far  our  discussions  have  had  reference  to  what  is 
contained  in  the  Austrian  Red  Book,  and  these  have 
confirmed  anew  the  points  in  the  indictment  framed 
against  Austria. 

Austria  criminally  provoked  the  Serbian  war,  and,  as 
a  consequence  of  that,  the  European  war: — 

by  addressing  to  Serbia  demands  which  were  im- 
possible of  fulfilment, 

by  refusing  an  answer  which  accorded  her  almost 
complete  satisfaction, 

by  the  recall  of  her  Ambassador,  and  by  the  decla- 
ration of  war  against  Serbia, 

by  concealing  her  real  objects  in  making  war, 

by  categorically  declining  all  negotiations  and  all 
actions  of  mediation  up  to  the  last  moment,  when 
it  was  too  late, 

by  imposing  conditions  on  her  final  consent  which 
were  necessarily  bound  to  exclude  from  the  out- 
set the  possibility  of  success. 


II 

What  the  Red  Book  does  not  contain 

The  above  accusations  may  be  inferred  from  the  con- 
tents of  the  Red  Book  itself. 

Much    more    serious,    however,    are   the    accusations 


THE  CRIME  339 

which  may  be  inferred  from  what  is  not  contained  in 
the  Red  Book,  accusations  against  Austria  and  Germany 
alike.  The  Red  Book  contains  nothing,  not  so  much  as 
a  syllable: 

(a)  of  the  alleged  pressure  which  Berlin  is  sup- 
posed to  have  exercised  on  Vienna  in  the  sense  of 
peace ; 

(b)  of  all  the  proposals  for  mediation  which  were 
made  by  the  Entente  Powers,  apart  from  the  con- 
ference of  the  four  Powers. 

I.  The  White  Book  and  the  Blue  Book  are,  as  I  have 
elsewhere  shown,  full  of  the  emphatic  assurances  of  the 
German  Imperial  Government  that  it  had  made  every 
efifort  to  exert  a  moderating  influence  on  Vienna  in  the 
sense  of  arriving  at  a  peaceful  understanding.  "Faithful 
to  our  principle  that  mediation  should  not  extend  to  the 
Austro-Serbian  conflict,  which  is  to  be  considered  as  a 
purely  Austro-Hungarian  affair,  but  merely  to  the  rela- 
tions between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia  (this  is  the 
famous  distinction  dealt  with  above),  we  continued  our 
endeavours  to  bring  about  an  understanding  between 
these  two  Powers.  We  further  declared  ourselves  ready, 
after  failure  of  the  conference  idea,  to  transmit  a  second 
proposal  of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  to  Vienna.  .  .  ."  &c.  *Tn 
spite  of  this  we  continued  our  attempts  to  the  utmost, 
and  we  advised  Vienna  to  show  every  possible  advance 
compatible  with  the  dignity  of  the  monarchy.  .  .  ." 
"Shoulder  to  shoulder  with  England  we  laboured  inces- 
santly, and  supported  every  proposal  in  Vienna,"  &c. 
"During  the  interval  from  July  29th  to  July  31st,  whilst 
these  endeavours  of  ours  for  mediation  were  being  con- 
tinued with  increasing  energy,  supported  by  English 
diplomacy,"  &c. — passages  such  as  these  are  to  be  found 
everywhere  in  the  White  Book.  In  his  speech  of  August 
4th  the  Chancellor  assured  his  hearers  that  he  had  car- 


840  I   ACCUSE! 

ried  his  task  of  mediation  at  Vienna  "to  the  utmost 
point  which  was  compatible  with  our  position  as  an  ally." 

Similar  assurances  were  given  in  unfaltering  succes- 
sion to  the  English  diplomatists  in  Berlin  and  London. 
It  is  everywhere  said,  especially  by  the  Chancellor  him- 
.  self,  that  he  had  pressed  the  button  in  Vienna  as  hard 
as  he  could,  that  he  had  energetically  preached  peace 
and  moderation,  and  that  perhaps  he  had  already  gone 
too  far.^  Herr  von  Jagow  even  gives  expression  to  the 
fear  that  the  strong  pressure  which  he  had  exercised  on 
Vienna  in  favour  of  negotiations  on  the  Serbian  answer 
might  have  produced  a  contraiy  effect  and  hastened  the 
Austrian  declaration  of  war.^  In  short,  Herr  von  Jagow 
and  Herr  Bethmann-Hollweg  bubbled  over  with  peace- 
ful assurances  and  alleged  efforts  in  the  cause  of  peace  in 
Vienna,  and  posed  before  the  German  people  and  the 
English  Government  as  angels  of  peace  constantly  flut- 
tering to  and  fro  between  Vienna  and  Berlin  bearing 
the  palm  in  their  hand. 

Even  in  reading  the  German  White  Book  one  cannot 
fail  to  be  surprised  that  these  efforts  for  peace  remained 
always  and  everywhere  completely  unsuccessful.  It  is 
everywhere  the  same  story :  Vienna  had  refused  on  this 
or  that  ground.  Either  Vienna  was  not  prepared  to 
negotiate,  or  it  was  too  late  to  do  so,  or  the  Russian 
mobilisation  had  intervened,  and  so  on.  Everywhere 
the  total  result  was  nil. 

I  have  already  pointed  out  that  this  negative  result 
has  in  the  highest  degree  a  suspicious  appearance;  if 
Berlin  had  seriously  wished,  Vienna  was  bound  to  give 
way  in  everything  without  demur,  for  Vienna  by  herself 
was  powerless  in  Europe.  There  was  here  a  mysterious 
point  in  the  relations  between  Vienna  and  Berlin  which 
urgently  called  for  an  explanation.     The  assurances  that 

*  Blue  Book,    Nos.    107,   108. 
'Blue  Book,  No.  76. 


THE  CRIME  341 

efforts  were  made  for  peace  must  be  clearly  proved  if 
they  are  to  command  credence.  The  failure  of  the  ef- 
forts alleged  to  have  been  made  by  Berlin  was  so  sur- 
prising that  the  efforts  themselves  became  in  a  high 
measure  unworthy  of  belief. 

The  matter  assumed  a  more  suspicious  air  in  view  of 
the  personality  of  our  Ambassador  in  Vienna,  Herr  von 
Tschirschky-Bögendorf.  He  had  the  reputation  of  being 
an  outspoken  enemy  of  Russia  and  Serbia,  who,  instead 
of  advising  moderation  at  the  Ballplatz,  goaded  on  to 
war.  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  the  English  Ambassador, 
openly  expressed  the  view  that  Herr  von  Tschirschky 
desired  war  from  the  first,  and  that  he  allowed  his  strong 
personal  bias  to  colour  his  actions,  that  he  was  constantly 
dealing  in  secret  with  the  Austrian  Government,  and  that 
he  never  invited  the  co-operation  of  the  Ambassadors 
of  the  Entente  Powers.  Sazonof  also  emphasised  the 
strongly  marked  attitude  of  hostility  towards  Russia 
shown  by  the  German  Ambassador,  who  was  suspected 
of  having  known  the  Austrian  Note  before  it  was  de- 
spatched, and  who  openly  declared  to  anyone  who  cared 
to  listen  that  he  endorsed  every  word  of  the  Note,  and 
regarded  the  Serbian  answer  as  a  sham.^  When  an 
Ambassador  of  this  character  receives  instructions  which 
in  more  than  platonic  form  "transmit"  English  proposals, 
but  neither  support  these  proposals  nor  counsel  energetic 
pressure,  we  can  understand  how  matters  stood  with  re- 
gard to  the  urgent  efforts  for  peace  of  the  Berlin  Govern- 
ment in  Vienna,  and  what  the  action  of  mediation  looked 
like  "which  was  carried  to  the  utmost  point  which  was 
compatible  with  our  position  as  an  ally." 

All  these  indications  and,  above  all,  the  unconditional 
failure  of  the  alleged  efforts  of  Berlin,  compel  us  to 
entertain  doubts  as  to  the  veracity  of  the  Berlin  assur- 
ances.     The   certainty,   however,   that  these  assurances 
^Blue  Book,  Nos.  32,  95,  139,  141,  161. 


342  I   ACCUSE! 

are  untrue,  and  consciously  untrue,  has  for  the  first  time 
been  furnished  by  the  Austrian  Red  Book.  It  contains 
nothing,  not  so  much  as  a  syllable,  about  all  that  Beth- 
mann  and  Jagow  so  volubly  claim  to  have  done ;  it  con- 
tains in  all  only  a  few  communications  from  Herr  von 
Tschirschky  to  Count  Berchtold  which  took  place  "in 
accordance  with  instructions,"  and  which  only  rise  on 
one  occasion  to  the  observation  that  a  British  proposal 
"was  brought  before  the  Vienna  Cabinet  for  their  con- 
sideration." ^  The  question  at  issue  here  was  the  im- 
portant and  urgent  proposal  put  forward  by  Grey  on 
July  27th  (Blue  Book,  No.  46)  to  the  effect  that  after 
Russia,  by  the  exercise  of  her  conciliatory  influence  in 
Belgrade,  had  obtained  so  favourable  an  answer  from 
Serbia,  Austria  should  at  least  accept  the  Serbian  an- 
swer as  a  basis  for  discussion,  seeing  that  it  went  far 
beyond  all  expectation  in  meeting  the  Austrian  demands. 
Let  anyone  read  this  urgent  request  addressed  by  Grey 
to  Prince  Lichnowsky  on  such  firm  grounds,  his  wann 
appeal  to  Germany's  love  of  peace,  his  desire  to  keep 
closely  in  touch  with  Germany,  his  emphasis  on  the  fact 
that  after  the  success  which  had  attended  Russia's  ad- 
vice and  the  concessions  made  by  Serbia  it  was  now  the 
turn  of  Vienna  to  show  some  spirit  of  accommodation, 
and  that  Berlin,  in  the  first  instance,  could,  and  must,  act 
in  this  direction.  Let  anyone  read  this,  and  compare  it 
with  the  completely  frigid  manner  in  which  Herr  von 
Tschirschky  brings  Grey's  proposal  "before  the  Vienna 
Government  for  their  consideration."  No  one  will  then 
be  surprised  that  the  proposal  was  declined  with  equal 
frigidity  by  the  Government  of  Vienna  on  the  ground 
that  "after  the  opening  of  hostilities  by  Serbia  and  the 
subsequent  declaration  of  war  the  step  appears  belated."  - 
Such  is  the  appearance  of  the  efforts  wJiich  Berlin 

^  Red  Book,  Nos.  43,  44,  51. 
''White  Book,  p.  409;  Exhibit  16. 


THE  CRIME  343 

made  in  Vienna  in  the  interests  of  peace.  Until  to-day 
no  instruction,  no  telegram,  no  note  has  been  printed 
which  offers  the  slightest  proof  that:  any  such  efforts 
were  made  in  the  cause  of  peace.  The  expectation  that 
evidence  on  this  point  would  be  contained  in  the  Austrian 
Red  Book  has  been  disappointed.  Where  are  the  proofs 
— we  have  the  right  to  ask  Herr  von  Bethmann — what 
evidence  is  there  for  your  assertion  that  you  earnestly 
used  your  influence  in  Vienna  in  the  direction  of  peace? 
The  German  and  the  Austrian  publications  are  silent  on 
the  question,  if,  indeed,  they  do  not  support  a  view  di- 
rectly opposed  to  your  assertions.  A  communication  is 
no  recommendation.  To  bring  forward  a  matter  for 
consideration  is  not  the  same  as  giving  it  support.  Where 
is  the  pressure  which  you  say  you  asserted  at  Vienna? 
When  your  printing  press  gives  us  a  proof  of  the  pres- 
sure yon  imprinted  at  Vienna  we  will  believe  you.  Until 
then  we  will  give  to  these  assertions,  as  to  so  many 
others  for  which  you  are  responsible,  the  name  which  is 
properly  theirs,  and  declare  them  to  be  falsifications  of 
the  truth  which  have  sprung  from  your  guilty  conscience 
in  the  hope  of  concealing  your  crime. 

2.  I  now  come  to  a  much  more  serious  point.  Where 
are  the  proposals  for  arriving  at  an  agreement  put  for- 
ward by  Grey  and  Sazonof  which  ought  to  have  reached 
Vienna  by  way  of  London  and  Berlin,  but  which  never 
elicited  an  answer  from  Vienna? 

Let  us  recapitulate  briefly  the  position  of  affairs  before 
we  formulate  the  charge  on  this  point.  On  July  29th, 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  Austro-Serbian  war  and  the 
rupture  of  direct  negotiations  between  Vienna  and  Petro- 
grad, Grey  proposed  to  Prince  Lichnowsky,  the  German 
Ambassador,  the  well-known  formula  for  agreement, 
which  was  to  allow  Austria  to  retain  possession  of  Bel- 
grade and  the  neighbouring  territory  as  a  pledge  for  a 
satisfactory  settlement  of  her  demands,  and  from  there 


344  I    ACCUSE! 

announce  to  the  four  Powers  not  directly  concerned  the 
conditions  under  which  she  was  prepared  to  arrive  at  an 
understanding.^  This  proposal  of  Grey's  was  forwarded 
to  Berlin  by  Prince  Lichnowsky,  and  from  there  it  was 
alleged  to  have  been  transmitted  to  Vienna.^  To  this 
proposal,  however,  no  answer  was  ever  made  either  by 
Germany  or  by  Austria.  The  Berlin  Government  was 
repeatedly  urged  for  an  answer  by  Grey  and  Goschen, 
but  it  was  constantly  asserted  that  no  reply  had  yet  been 
received  from  Vienna.^  The  most  varied  reasons,  or 
rather  evasions,  were  produced  to  explain  the  absence  of 
an  answer,  although  the  time  was  pressing  and  the  fate 
of  Europe  hung  on  every  hour.  Grey's  proposal,  which 
represented  the  utmost  conceivable  point  to  which  it  was 
possible  to  go  to  meet  Austria,  which  secured  for  her  in 
the  fullest  measure  her  diplomatic  and  her  military- 
prestige — this  proposal  received  no  answer,  and  is  not 
so  much  as  mentioned  in  the  Red  Book.  The  actual  ne- 
gotiations, so  far  as  they  are  mentioned  in  the  Red  Book, 
come  to  an  end  with  the  conversation  between  Grey  and 
Prince  Lichnowsky  on  the  morning  of  July  29th  (Blue 
Book,  No.  84),  to  which  Berchtold's  telegram  of  July 
31st  (Red  Book,  No.  51)  has  reference.  Later  events 
are  not  mentioned  in  the  Red  Book,  apart  from  the  two 
conversations  which  Count  Szapary  had  with  Sazonof 
on  July  31st  and  August  ist. 

Now  there  were  two  conversations  between  Grey  and 
Lichnowsky  on  July  29th,  the  first  in  the  morning — to 
which  Berchtold's  telegram  of  July  31st  relates — ^and 
the  second  on  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  (Blue  Book, 
No.  88).  The  Red  Book  comes  to  an  end  with  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  first  conversation  (Blue  Book,  No.  84), 

^  Blue  Book,  No.  88.     Telegram  of  King  George,  30  July    [Col- 
lected Documents,  p.  538]. 
^  White  Book,  p.  411. 
*Blue  Book,  Nos.  98,  103,  107,  108,  112. 


THE  CRIME  345 

and  not  even  a  word  is  said  of  the  second,  or,  for  that 
matter,  of  any  later  events.  The  significance  of  this  may 
be  gathered  in  figures  from  the  fact  that  the  Enghsh 
Blue  Book  contains  i6i  documents,  of  which  only  about 
a  half,  that  is  to  say  84,  are  considered  by  the  Austrian 
Government  to  be  worthy  of  consideration  or  even  of 
mention.  All  the  events  of  decisive  importance  which 
took  place  between  England,  Russia,  and  Germany  be- 
tween the  afternoon  of  July  29th  and  August  ist,  that 
is  to  say,  during  the  four  critical  days  of  the  Euro- 
pean conflict,  have  no  existence  for  the  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment— apart  from  the  two  repeatedly  mentioned  con- 
versations between  Szapary  and  Sazonof  on  July  31st 
and  August  ist.  The  interchange  of  diplomatic  tele- 
grams between  the  European  capitals  in  these  exciting 
days  does  not  appear  to  have  disturbed  the  composure 
of  the  gentlemen  in  the  Ballplatz.  They  know  nothing, 
or  at  least  they  wish  to  know  nothing,  of  the  untiring 
efforts  of  Grey,  Sazonof,  and  Viviani  to  marshal  whole 
series  of  formulae,  each  going  further  than  its  predeces- 
sor in  the  direction  of  meeting  the  wishes  of  Austria, 
and  all  intended  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe  even  at 
the  last  moment.  The  gentlemen  in  Vienna  continue 
their  slumbers,  or  at  least  affect  a  slumbering  posture, 
and  this  drowsiness  is  so  infectious,  even  on  their  for- 
eign representatives,  that  it  is  possible  for  Count 
Szögyeny,  the  Austrian  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  to  report 
to  Vienna  on  August  2nd  that  "the  Secretary  of  State 
has  just  informed  me  that  no  answer  has  been  received 
from  Russia  to  the  German  demand ;  Russian  troops 
have  crossed  the  German  frontier;  Russia  has  thus  at- 
tacked Germany.  Germany,  therefore,  regards  herself 
as  at  war  with  Russia."  ^  This  communication,  remark- 
able both  for  its  logic  and  style,  was  sent  by  the  Aus- 
trian Ambassador  to  Vienna  on  August  2nd  as  the  latest 
'Red  Book,  No.  57. 


346  I   ACCUSE! 

sensational  news,  twenty- four  hours  after  the  delivery  in 
Petrograd  of  the  German  declaration  of  war,  which,  how- 
ever, was  not  in  any  way  based  on  an  attack  by  Russia, 
but  on  her  failure  to  give  an  answer  to  the  ultimatum. 
This  is  the  only  sign  of  life  manifested  by  Berlin  since 
the  communication  of  the  conversation  between  Grey  and 
Lichnowsky  on  the  morning  of  July  29th — ^this  comedy 
of  buffoonery  lagging  twenty-four  hours  behind  the 
tragedy.  This  is  the  only  proof  of  the  superhuman  ef- 
forts of  the  Imperial  Chancellor  to  move  Vienna  to  an 
attitude  of  compliance — the  only  proof  of  the  strong 
pressure  on  the  button  which  went  to  the  utmost  point 
compatible  with  an  ally's  position,  which  was,  however, 
unfortunately  insufficient  to  awaken  the  Austrian  Am- 
bassador in  Berlin  from  his  righteous  slumbers. 

3.  Grey's  formula  of  agreement  was  thus  allowed  to 
slip  under  the  table  undiscussed.  But  where  are  the 
formulce  of  agreement  put  forward  by  Sazonof?  Were 
they  buried  in  Berlin,  or  transmitted  to  Vienna?  If 
the  second  of  these  courses  was  taken,  what  attitude 
did  Vienna  adopt  towards  them?  Were  they  ignored, 
refused,  or  amended?  Nothing  whatever  is  known  on 
this  point.  Neither  the  German  White  Book  nor  the 
Austrian  Red  Book  contains  one  iota  about  them.  We 
are  obliged  to  refer  to  the  publications  of  the  Entente 
Powers  to  trace  the  history  of  these  formulae.  This 
history  always  leads  as  far  as  Berlin;  of  the  further  path 
from  Berlin  to  Vienna  we  know  nothing. 

With  regard  to  Grey's  proposal,  there  is  at  least  this 
much  reported  in  the  White  Book,  that  it  had  been 
"forwarded  to  Vienna,"  and  that  Russia,  as  they  "as- 
sumed," had  accepted  the  proposal.^  We  are  not  told 
what  attitude  was  assumed  by  Vienna  towards  this  pro- 
posal; we  only  know  from  the  publications  of  the  En- 
tente Powers  that  up  to  the  last  moment  Berlin  main- 
^  White  Book,  p.  411   [See  footnote  on  p.        .] 


THE  CRIME  347 

talned  that  no  answer  had  yet  been  received  from 
Vienna. 

The  White  Book  and  the  Red  Book,  however,  make 
no  mention  whatever  of  the  proposals  of  Sasonof;  they 
simply  do  not  exist  for  them.  The  first  proposal  of 
Sazonof  (Orange  Book,  No.  60)  was,  as  is  known, 
verbally  dictated  to  the  German  Ambassador  on  July 
30th ;  it  was  transmitted  to  the  Berlin  Government  by 
their  own  and  the  Russian  Ambassador;  it  was  sup- 
ported by  England  and  France,  but  was  declined  by 
Jagow  without  consulting  Vienna  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  unacceptable  to  Austria.  Among  other  points 
raised,  we  have  a  right  to  ask  for  a  definite  answer. 
Yes  or  No,  to  the  question  whether  the  Government  of 
Vienna  were  informed  of  this  formula  of  Sazonof  which 
satisfied  all  their  wishes.  If  so,  what  attitude  did  it 
assume?  Why  did  not  Austria  accept  the  proposal, 
which  required  of  her  only  what  she  had  herself  already 
promised,  namely,  that  she  should  respect  the  sovereign 
rights  of  Serbia,  and  which,  on  the  other  hand,  granted 
to  her  everything  that  she  could  in  any  way  desire  of 
Russia,  namely,  that  Russia  should  stop  her  military 
preparations  (La  Russie  s'engage  ä  cesser  ses  preparatifs 
militaires). 

If,  however,  the  Government  of  Vienna  received  no 
communication  with  regard  to  the  proposal  of  Sazonof, 
how  is  the  German  Government  to  justify  this,  their 
omission  f  By  what  right  does  Herr  von  Jagow  take  it 
upon  him  to  keep  to  himself  and  to  decline  in  the  name 
of  Austria,  without  giving  any  reasons,  a  proposal  which 
would  assuredly  have  guaranteed  peace?  What  reasons 
had  he  for  this  refusal,  what  inner  grounds,  if  the  rea- 
sons he  had  were  not  such  as  could  be  admitted  to  the 
world  ?  Out  with  them !  This  is  a  serious,  a  desperately 
serious  business.  We  are  no  longer  dealing  with  a  diplo- 
matic puppet  play,  but  with  the  fatal  game  of  dice  in 


348  I   ACCUSE! 

which  the  stakes  are  the  destinies  of  nations.  The  White 
Book  and  the  Red  Book  are  silent,  but  the  public  con- 
science cries  aloud,  and  calls  on  the  guilty  to  give  an 
account  of  their  actions. 

4.  The  fate  of  the  second  proposal  of  Sazonof's  was 
even  worse  than  that  of  the  first.  We  have  seen  that, 
after  unending  trouble  and  the  despatch  of  countless 
telegrams,  the  diplomacy  of  the  Entente  Powers  suc- 
ceeded in  approximating  to  each  other  Grey's  formula  of 
July  29th  and  that  of  Sazonof  of  July  30th.  The  result 
was  a  second  formula  outlined  by  Sazonof  on  July  31st 
which,  "in  accordance  with  the  English  suggestion," 
expressly  permitted  Austria  to  leave  her  forces  on  Ser- 
bian territory,  and  only  required  her  to  stay  the  march 
of  her  troops  (arrctcr  la  marche).  In  return  for  this, 
Russia  undertook  to  maintain  her  waiting  attitude  {con- 
server  son  attitude  expectante),  and  the  Great  Powers 
would  examine  the  satisfaction  which  Serbia  could  ac- 
cord to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  without  in- 
jury to  her  rights  as  a  Sovereign  State  or  her  inde- 
pendence.-^ This  formula  was  at  once  telegraphed  to 
the  Russian  Ambassadors  accredited  to  all  the  Great 
States,  including  the  Ambassador  at  Vienna,  and  re- 
ceived the  most  energetic  support  both  from  Grey  and 
from  Viviani. 

I  have  already  pointed  out  that  this  proposal  for 
agreement  safeguarded  in  every  way  the  military  pres- 
tige of  Austria,  inasmuch  as  it  allowed  her,  during  the 
whole  further  course  of  negotiation  with  the  Great 
Powers,  to  leave  her  troops  in  Serbia,  and  thus  to  retain 
the  occupied  territory  as  a  pledge  for  the  fulfilment  of 
her  demands.  The  proposal,  in  fact,  contains  precisely 
what  the  Austria/i  Government  ask  of  the  Entente 
Powers  in  the  introduction  to  the  Red  Book  (page  4),^ 

'Orange  Book,  No.  67.     Blue  Book,  Nos.  120,  132. 
*  [Collected  Documents,  p.  445.] 


THE  CRIME  349 

namely,  that  they  should  assume  a  ''waiting  attitude." 
This  waiting  attitude  was  expressly  provided  for  in  the 
various  formulae  of  agreement;  indeed,  it  represented  the 
essential  foundation  of  these  proposals. 

Between  the  second  formula  of  Sazonof  and  the  form 
in  which  Austria  on  July  31st  declared  her  readiness  to 
negotiate  (Red  Book,  No.  51),  there  was  only  one  dif- 
ference, namely,  that  Austria  desired  to  continue  her 
military  action  against  Serbia,  whereas  Sazonof  desired 
that  it  should  be  brought  to  a  standstill — a  desire  which, 
as  is  known,  he  later  expressed  in  even  more  moderate 
form  in  stating  that  he  regarded  it  only  as  "very  im- 
portant that  Austria  should  meanwhile  put  a  stop  pro- 
visionally to  her  military  action."  ^  Thanks  to  the  Rus- 
sian spirit  of  compliance,  the  difference  between  the  two 
points  of  view  had  been  reduced  to  so  trifling  dimen- 
sions that  with  the  least  good  will  a  settlement  could 
not  fail  to  be  brought  about  if — and  that  is  the  question 
— if  this  good  will  in  fact  existed.  In  this,  however, 
Germany  and  Austria  were  defective.  We  know  noth- 
ing of  the  fate  of  the  Russian  proposal  in  Berlin  and 
Vienna.  The  White  Book  and  the  Red  Book  again  main- 
tain an  attitude  of  silence  on  this  point.  Without  doubt, 
the  proposal  got  as  far  as  Vienna  and  Berlin,  but  there 
is  equally  no  doubt  that  in  both  places  it  remained  un- 
answered. Only  in  one  way  can  this  silence  be  ex- 
plained ;  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  accept  the  pro- 
posal, or  even  to  discuss  it,  without  bringing  about  the 
peace  which  they  did  not  desire.  It  was,  however,  equally 
impossible  to  refuse  the  proposal,  since  it  was  much  too 
conciliatory  to  make  it  possible  to  justify  a  refusal. 
And  so  it  was  decided  that  the  proposal  should  simply 
be  ignored,  both  then  and  now — then  because  peace 
was  not  desired,  and  to-day  because  they  do  not  wish  it 
to  be  recognised  how  criminally  they  avoided  peace. 
^Blue  Book,   Nos.   133,   139. 


350  I    ACCUSE! 

•  •••••• 

These  are  the  facts  revealed  by  the  Austrian  publica- 
tion, the  acts  of  commission  and  omission  which  are 
chargeable  to  the  allied  Empires. 

The  Red  Book  and  the  White  Book  taken  together 
constitute  the  gravest  indictment  which  could  be  written 
against  Germany  and  Austria;  they  confirm  anew  the 
judgment  pronounced  on  the  ground  of  the  earlier  pub- 
lications :  that  Germany  and  Austria  are  alone  and  ex- 
clusively guilty  of  having  consciously  and  intentionally 
brought  about  the  European  war. 


These  things  being  so,  it  ill  becomes  the  Austrian 
Government  to  take  the  field  with  the  heavy  artillery 
of  their  moral  indignation  against  the  "self-seeking 
policy  of  Great  Britain"  and  the  "desire  for  a  revanche 
of  the  French  Republic,"  and  the  unscrupulousness  of 
Russia,  and  to  reproach  the  Entente  Powers  with  the  fact 
that  they  provoked  the  European  war  by  "ranging  them- 
selves beside  the   (Serbian)   Kingdom  with  its  load  of 

guilt;; 

It  is  untrue  that  the  Triple  Entente  intervened  exclu- 
sively on  the  side  of  Serbia.  The  opposite  is  the  case, 
and  this  fact  is  confirmed,  not  only  by  the  publications 
of  the  Entente  Powers,  but  also  by  the  Red  Book  itself. 
From  the  very  beginning  the  Governments  of  England, 
France,  and  Russia  did  not  restrain  their  sympathy  for 
Austria's  justifiable  demand  for  satisfaction,  nor  did 
they  fail  to  express  their  deep  horror  at  the  assassination 
of  Serajevo.  At  the  same  time,  after  the  unprecedented 
humiliation  of  Serbia  they  could  not,  and  dared  not,  omit 
to  urge  on  the  Government  of  Vienna  precepts  of  modera- 
tion, and  to  warn  them  of  the  consequences  which  would 
ensue  from  the  continuance  of  an  unaccommodating  at- 
titude.    The  Entente  Powers,  by  their  moderating  in- 


I 


THE  CRIME  351 

fluence  in  Belgrade,  had  already  elicited  the  submissive 
Serbian  answer.  They  were  ready  at  the  conference 
proposed  by  Grey  to  do  everything  in  their  power  to 
accord  satisfaction,  even  to  those  wishes  of  Austria 
which  were  of  a  more  far-reaching  character.  Bimsen 
and  Grey,  Sazonof  and  Schebeko  repeatedly  assured  the 
Government  of  Vienna  of  their  readiness  to  give  effect 
at  the  conference  to  the  justifiable  wishes  of  Austria 
by  every  means  in  their  power.^  Where,  then,  is  the 
political  selfishness  of  the  Entente  Powers?  Where 
is  the  one-sided  participation  on  behalf  of  Serbia? 
Where  Is  the  effort  to  humiliate  the  Austrian  monarchy? 
The  history  and  the  antecedents  of  the  European  con- 
flict clearly  reveal  which  side  was  guilty  of  political 
selfishness,  who  it  was  who  for  her  own  interests  gam- 
bled with  the  well-being  of  all  civilised  nations.  Did  not 
Austria  annex  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  in  violation  of 
the  solemn  obligations  contained  in  the  Treaty  of  Ber- 
lin, and  thereby  stir  into  full  flame  the  Great  Serbian 
national  movement?  Did  not  Austria,  in  pursuit  of  her 
selfish  interests,  push  to  such  an  extreme  length  the  ques- 
tion of  Skutari,  the  question  of  the  Serbian  harbour, 
the  Albanian  question,  that  on  two  or  three  occasions 
in  the  last  ten  years  a  European  war,  on  account  of 
Austria,  was  imminent?  In  August,  1913,  was  not  Aus- 
tria prepared  to  begin  a  war  against  Serbia,  without 
any  regard  for  the  European  consequences,  and  would 
have  done  so  had  not  Italy  refused  to  give  her  support? 
Austria,  the  accomplice  and  the  tool  of  Germany  in  the 
present  world-war,  has  indeed  no  reason  to  reproach  the 
Entente  Powers  with  the  violation  of  "public  morality 
and  humanity."  The  accusation  which  the  Austrian  Gov- 
ernment brings  against  the  Entente  Powers :  "It  is  they 
who  must  be  made  answerable  before  history  for  the 

^  See  Blue  Book,  Nos.  5,  12.     Orange  Book,  Nos.  4,  40,  42,  43. 
Yellow  Book,  Nos.  26,  27,  30.    Red  Book,  Nos.  41,  47,  50. 


352  I   ACCUSE! 

immeasurable  suffering  which  has  come  upon  the  human 
race" — the  full  weight  of  this  accusation  falls  back  on 
Austria  and  Germany.  To  bring  about  a  European  war 
in  order  to  rid  herself  of  an  inconvenient  neighbour  was 
at  once  a  crime  and  a  folly.  The  war  against  Serbia, 
whatever  its  issue,  could  only  worsen  Austria's  position 
in  the  Balkans;  it  could  in  no  way  improve  it.  The 
European  war,  however,  which  Austria,  at  Germany's 
instigation  and  with  her  support,  conjured  up  along  with 
the  Serbian  war,  could  only  be  for  Austria  a  case  of 
driving  out  the  Devil  by  Beelzebub,  of  decapitation  as 
a  cure  for  toothache ;  c'etait  plus  qu'un  crime,  c'etait  line 
faiite. 

Like  a  bull  with  lowered  horns,  the  Austrian  Govern- 
ment plunged  on  against  the  red  cloth  of  Serbia,  with- 
out looking  to  the  right  or  the  left,  without  troubling 
about  the  consequences,  which  a  blind  man  could  not 
avoid  foreseeing. 

And  now  the  consequences  have  come — ^npw  already, 
before  the  war  is  decided.  With  the  blood  oozing  from 
her  heavy  wounds  the  double  eagle  is  lying  on  the 
ground.  Serbia  is  free.  But  Galicia  and  part  of  Buko- 
wina are  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  On  all  the  fron- 
tiers of  the  many-tongued  empire  the  neighbouring  peo- 
ples are  stirring  to  draw  over  to  them  their  oppressed 
kindred  by  peaceful  pressure,  or,  if  need  be,  by  force  of 
arms.  In  every  joint  the  decayed  building  of  the  Haps- 
burg  Monarchy  is  creaking,  and  already  the  process  of 
decomposition  is  beginning,  which,  but  for  the  suicidal 
policy  of  the  Government  of  Vienna,  might  have  been 
deferred  for  generations  to  come.  With  the  cry  of  war: 
"Vivat  Austria,  pereat  miindiis,"  the  struggle  began; 
with  the  cry  of  peace,  "Vivat  mimdus,  pereat  Austria," 
it  will  come  to  an  end. 


IV 

THE   CONSEQUENCES   OF   THE   DEED 

I  HAVE  arrived  at  the  end  of  my  task.  The  terrible 
thing,  which  for  long  hovered  before  the  eyes  of  the 
nations  of  Europe,  but  which  was  never  regarded  as 
possible,  has  come  to  pass.  Prosperous  seats  of  the  old 
civilisation  of  Europe  have  been  transformed  into  heaps 
of  rubbish  and  ruin.  The  earth,  covered  with  the  snow 
of  winter,  has  drained  the  blood  of  millions  of  the  chil- 
dren of  men  in  the  prime  of  life.  In  common  graves, 
far  from  their  wives,  their  children,  and  their  mothers, 
hundreds  of  thousands  are  laid  to  rest  together  without 
cross  and  without  memorial — friend  and  foe  united  in 
death.  Unending  trains,  filled  with  wounded,  traverse 
the  country  from  east  to  west  and  from  west  to  east, 
and  inside  there  they  lie,  the  poor  men  with  mangled 
limbs,  with  bruised  bodies,  with  disfigured  countenances, 
moaning  and  sighing  in  their  pains,  many  disfigured 
beyond  recognition,  with  arms  or  limbs  wrenched 
off;  those  denied  the  light  of  truth  have  lost  the  light 
of  day;  they  still  live  whom  death  has  claimed. 
They  form  one  vast  bleeding  wound  in  the  body  of  hu- 
manity. 

Millions  of  women  and  children  weep  out  their  eyes 
day  and  night  for  the  dear  ones  whom  they  have  lost, 
for  the  dear  ones  whom  they  receive  back  helpless  and 
crippled  for  life.  Countless  dwelling-places  of  peaceful 
men,  countless  centres  of  industrial  activity,  countless 
memorials  of  the  art  of  man  have  been  burned  down 

353 


354.  I   ACCUSE! 

and  destroyed !  The  labour  of  generations,  of  centuries, 
is  transformed  into  dust  and  ashes.  The  fields  are  tram- 
pled, the  corps  annihilated,  the  castles  of  the  great  and 
the  cottages  of  peasants  are  levelled  with  the  earth;  the 
unfortunate  inhabitants,  women  and  children,  grey- 
headed men  and  women,  wander  along  the  country- 
roads  without  shelter,  without  a  home,  in  rain  and  in 
wind,  in  snow  and  in  hail,  onward  anywhere  in  the  hope 
that  somewhere  there  may  be  a  corner  where  they  may 
still  their  hunger  and  obtain  a  wretched  shelter  in  their 
misery. 

And  still  onward  goes  the  struggle  and  the  task  of 
murder.  Like  the  ebb  and  the  flow  of  the  tide,  the 
armies  of  millions  move  backwards  and  forwards,  and 
every  step  forward  and  every  step  backward  costs  new 
hecatombs  of  human  lives,  inflicts  new  wounds  and  new 
pains,  creates  new  widows  and  new  orphans. 

And  what  sort  of  a  life  do  they  lead  who  are  still 
living?  They  are  buried  in  holes  in  the  ground,  day 
and  night,  weeks  and  months,  like  cave-dwellers  of  pre- 
historic times ;  indeed,  their  lot  is  worse  than  theirs ! 
The  water  is  up  to  their  knees,  often  they  are  days  on 
end  without  food,  crouching  down  before  the  bullets  of' 
the  enemy,  overwhelmed  by  shrapnel  and  shells,  which 
at  a  stroke  destroy  their  earth-dwellings  reared  with  so 
much  labour,  and  cast  them  down  in  the  trenches  dead 
and  wounded.  And  then  from  time  to  time  there  is  the 
signal  to  attack!  Out  of  the  trenches!  Fix  bayonets! 
Then  there  is  the  rush  across  the  open  field,  while  ex- 
posed to  the  blattering  machine-guns,  which,  the  scythe- 
man  of  these  days,  mow  down  those  who  are  advancing 
to  the  attack.  And  then  comes  the  struggle  of  man  to 
man!  Then  they  throw  themselves  at  each  other  with 
blows,  with  kicks,  and  thrusts  with  their  sabres  or  with 
the  butt-end  of  their  guns,  one  peaceful  man  against 
another — peaceful,  that  is,  until  they  have  been  turned 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     355 

to  beasts  under  the  influence  and  the  incitement  of  their 
leaders, 

under  the  roll  of  the  drums,  the  fanfare  of  trumpets, 
under  the  encouraging  summons 

"How  beautiful  to  die  the  death  of  a  hero  for  the  Father- 
land." 

And  they  die  like  flies.  Hundreds,  thousands  of 
bodies  fill  up  the  trenches,  and  furnish  a  support  across 
which  those  who  are  following  may  advance  to  the  at- 
tack. And  there  are  wounded  lying  among  the  dead. 
And  the  battle  rolls  past  over  their  heads.  And  the 
horsemen  tramp  on  them.  And  the  cannons  tear  them 
to  pieces.  And  there  is  no  help.  Often  for  hours  and 
for  days  they  must  lie  in  the  mud,  exposed  to  the  fire 
of  the  shrapnel,  poor  men  who  cannot  move,  to  whom 
no  help  can  be  brought.  How  many  bleed  to  death 
there!  How  many  are  there  who  are  only  lightly 
wounded,  but  who,  in  their  helplessness,  are  delivered 
over  to  death! 

All  reports  agree  that  it  is  impossible  to  picture  in 
words  the  horrors  of  modern  battles.  I  have  spoken  to 
doctors,  to  people,  that  is,  who  are  certainly,  by  their 
profession,  accustomed  to  what  is  horrible,  and  they 
told  me  that  the  impression  made  by  a  battlefield  and 
by  a  hospital  behind  the  Front  is  enough  to  drive  any- 
one mad.  It  can  only  be  compared  with  a  gigantic 
slaughter-house,  many  thousand  times  larger  than  the 
largest  slaughter-houses  in  the  world.  It  is  impossible 
to  give  correct  treatment  to  each  of  the  thousands  of 
wounded  who  are  brought  in  at  the  same  time,  impos- 
sible on  account  of  their  gigantic  number,  impossible 
also  on  account  of  the  interruption  caused  by  the  shells 
which  constantly  imperil  those  hospitals  situated  in  the 


356  I    ACCUSE! 

neighbourhood  of  the  battlefield.  What  descriptions  I 
received  from  other  doctors  who  have  received  the 
wounded  at  the  base  hospitals  or  on  their  return  home! 
How  many  wounds,  in  themselves  slight,  end  fatally  or 
at  least  involve  amputation  because  they  cannot  in  time 
receive  aseptic  treatment! 

In  a  report  of  Surgeon-General  Körte  we  find : — 

"In  the  recent  fights  on  the  Yser,  on  the  canals  as  well 
as  round  about  Ypres,  the  most  of  the  wounds,  often  even 
those  wounds  caused  by  rifle-fire,  are  infected.  The  sol- 
diers lie  in  wet  trenches,  and  in  consequence  of  the  violent 
artillery  fire  they  can  in  many  cases  be  picked  up  only  after 
days  have  elapsed  ;  some  have  lain  five  or  six  days  in  turnip- 
fields  or  in  deserted  trenches  before  it  was  possible  to  bring 
them  to  the  field  hospital.  Serious  infections  are  then  not 
uncommon,  such  as  phlegmon  and  tetanus.  ...  I  have 
seen  some  recover  who  have  been  lying  for  days  (6-8)  in 
stables,  barns,  or  hay  sheds  in  the  most  wretched  external 
conditions.  There  was  one  who  had  been  lying  helplessly 
for  five  days  in  a  turnip  field  and  had  kept  himself  alive  by 
eating  turnips.  .  .  .  The  roads  are  broken  up,  and  the 
villages  have  been  so  knocked  to  pieces  in  the  battles  which 
have  been  going  on  for  weeks  that  we  have  difficulty  in 
finding  suitable  rooms  for  hospital  purposes."  {Berliner 
Tageblatt,   13th  December.) 

Another  report,  also  from  a  doctor,  says: — 

"It  is  a  depressing  rainy  morning;  in  the  bottom  of  the 
oozy  bed  of  the  canal  there  is  the  dirty  water-channel  and  in 
the  slime  and  the  gurgling  water  lie  our  brave  men,  who 
died  the  death  of  heroes  for  the  Fatherland.  This  picture 
has  imprinted  itself  too  deeply  in  our  souls  for  it  ever  to 
be  obliterated.  I  have  them  constantly  before  my  eyes  as 
they  lay  down  below  us  in  their  neat  uniform,  stiff  and  pale 
with  their  bodies  in  the  attitude  in  which  death  surprised 
them,  down  below  in  the  muddy  canal-bed  with  its  miry 
clay."     {Berliner  Tageblatt,  24th  December.) 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     35T 

Life  in  the  trenches  is  described  in  one  report  as  fol- 
lows : — ■ 

"One  has  to  be  listening  all  the  time  until  at  last  we 
reach  our  own  section  of  the  trenches ;  on  the  left  and  the 
right,  before  and  behind,  there  is  the  terrible  roar  of  artil- 
lery. Lucky  for  you  if  none  of  the  shells  burst  in  the 
trenches.  Quite  close  to  me  two  of  my  chums  were  lying 
quietly  together  under  a  blanket  in  the  shelter.  One  was 
hit  in  the  stomach  by  shrapnel : — dead !  The  explosion  was 
very  defective;  the  other  was  only  burned  in  the  face  and 
the  hands,  .  .  .  Some  days  ago  we  stormed  and  took  a 
village ;  in  the  fields  around  about  many  of  my  chums  are 
still  lying  unburied.  They  are  within  reach  of  the  enemies' 
fire  and  we  cannot  get  to  them  by  day  or  by  night.  .  .  . 
Among  our  fallen  chums  there  are  heaps  of  dead  cattle 
which  are  now  swollen.  In  the  farmyard  the  sows  are  eat- 
ing their  own  young;  two  children  are  lying  among  them, 
a  boy  and  a  girl.  Everywhere  the  holes  caused  by  the 
shells  are  gaping  in  the  ground,  some  are  so  big  that  30  to 
40  men  could  find  room  in  them."  {Berliner  Tageblatt, 
23rd   December.) 

A  member  of  the  Landwehr  writes  from  Russian  Po- 
land : — 

"Necessity  knows  no  law,  and  our  provisions  could  not 
always  be  got  after  us  quick  enough  in  the  country.  But 
it  was  not  only  their  victuals,  etc.,  but  often  also  the  pro- 
tection of  their  roof  and  their  cattle  as  well  that  the  in- 
habitants lost  when  we  advanced.  The  military  flooded  into 
the  needy  houses  and  into  barns  and  lofts  like  a  wild 
stream,  and  took  possession  of  their  rooms  and  their  fire- 
sides, and  often  the  population  with  all  their  youngsters 
wandered  about  outside  in  the  pouring  rain.  ...  I  never 
learned  what  the  family  did  that  night,  but  for  long  I  have 
been  unable  to  forget  that  impression,  for  I  have  myself 
got  children  at  home  and  I  thought  with  horror  that  they 
also  might  some  day  be  in  the  same  position,  unless  we  sue- 


358  I    ACCUSE! 

ceeded  in  protecting  the  frontier.  As  though  by  chance  the 
words  turn  up  in  my  brain  with  an  ironic  sound :  'War  is 
glorious,  war  is  beautiful.'  If  I  could  only  catch  a  sight  of 
the  writer  of  these  lines,  I  would  soon  drive  his  theory  out 
of  him."     {Vorwärts,  8th  December.) 

A  First  Lieutenant  in  the  Resen^e  describes  what  hap- 
pened in  the  beautiful  church  at  Becelaere,  in  Belgium: — 

"On  the  evening  of  the  same  day  I  was  lying  in  this  beau- 
tiful Church  along  with  hundreds  of  other  wounded  men. 
A  bullet  fired  by  English  Infantry  had  gone  through  my 
breast  and  my  lungs,  broken  some  ribs,  and  pierced  the 
pelvic  bone.  Mattresses  were  ranged  alongside  of  each 
other  on  the  stone  floor  of  the  Church,  and  on  each  there 
lay  a  wounded  soldier.  The  doctors  were  binding  up  and 
examining  the  wounded.  More  and  more  came  in,  and  by 
nightfall  the  Church  was  quite  full.  All  night  long  there 
could  be  heard  a  subdued  groaning  and  moaning  and  quiet 
prayers  and  supplication  to  God  from  every  corner  and 
from  every  shady  nook.  ..."  A  wounded  man  has  just 
been  bandaged  by  a  doctor  when  a  shell  finds  its  way 
through  the  open  Church  door.  The  head  of  the  wounded 
man  sinks  back,  the  shot  has  penetrated  his  forehead  and 
killed  him.  "Two  severely  wounded  soldiers  are  lying  to- 
gether ;  both  have  wounds  in  their  stomach  and  neither  will 
come  through  with  his  life;  the  shadow  of  death  already 
flits  over  their  faces."  The  chaplain  gives  them  the  Holy 
Communion.  The  setting  sun  breaks  with  gentle  radiance 
through  the  stained  church  windows  and  illumines  the  fea- 
tures of  both  the  soldiers  dying  of  their  wounds.  Then 
suddenly  there  is  a  deafening  uproar.  The  walls  fall  down 
upon  the  wounded  men.  "Fragments  of  shells  come  whis- 
tling down.  .  .  .  Shrieking  and  groaning  is  heard.  ,  .  . 
There  is  a  hopeless  tangle  of  men,  debris  and  mattresses 
.  .  .  those  who  are  slightly  wounded  creep  out  of  the 
chaos  on  all  fours ;  those  who  are  severely  wounded  are 
brought  into  the  open  air  by  people  belonging  to  the  Med- 
ical Corps.     Some  of  the  dead  are  recovered.  .    .    .  The 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     359 

Church  of  Becelaere  is  left  standing,  lonely  and  deserted, 
a  picture  of  desolation."  (Berliner  Tageblatt,  of  the  19th 
of  December.) 

From  a  letter  from  the  front  written  by  an  infantry 
officer : — 

"We  suffered  very  serious  losses  in  men,  but  also  in  offi- 
cers and  in  non-commissioned  officers.  It  tugs  at  one's 
heart  to  remember  all  our  dear  comrades  with  whom  we 
have  so  often  been  happy  together.  Often  the  bodies  of 
those  who  fell  could  be  buried  only  after  many  days,  on  one 
occasion  not  until  12  days  after  being  hit.  You  can  im- 
agine the  condition  in  which  they  were  then.  But  the  enemy 
gave  us  no  time  and  no  peace  to  collect  the  bodies.  Lieu- 
tenant S.,  with  whom  in  our  careless  days  we  drank  together 
in  beautiful  K. — you  remember  him, — and  Lieutenant  W. 
fell  two  weeks  ago.  They  were  found  only  a  few  days  ago 
in  a  little  wood,  and  their  bodies  were  already  completely 
decayed.  .  .  .  The  harvest  which  death  has  reaped  here 
from  us  and  from  our  enemies  reminds  one  of  the  fearful 
time  which  Ypres  and  the  surrounding  country  experienced 
five  hundred  years  ago,  when  the  plague  reduced  the  popu- 
lation from  200,000  to  a  tenth  of  that  number."  {Berliner 
Tageblatt,  14th  December.) 

A  soldier  of  the  Landwehr  from  Charlottenburg  re- 
ports as  follows  with  regard  to  a  fight  at  close  quarters 
on  the  Yser  Canal : — 

"The  horrible  groans  of  the  zvounded  resounded  through 
the  night.  In  hunger  and  in  cold  we  awaited  the  morning. 
One  detachment  lay  in  the  trenches ;  the  rest  of  us  were 
standing  in  the  entrance  hall.  In  the  grey  of  the  morning 
a  Belgian  Major  came  out  of  the  house  with  his  bicycle. 
.  .  .  He  had  just  gracefully  lit  his  cigarette,  when  a  shot 
from  the  trenches  put  an  end  to  his  life.  This  was  the 
signal  for  the  fight  in  the  streets.  .  .  .  We  were  only  four 
metres  distant  from  the  enemy.  The  enemy  wanted  to  press 
us  back  into  the  canal.    The  leaders  of  our  company  and  the 


860  I   ACCUSE! 

other  officers  soon  fell.  The  command  passes  from  one  of 
us  to  the  other.  The  enemy  threw  sulphur  bombs,  which  lit 
up  the  whole  canal,  and  poisoned  the  air  for  us.  Our  men 
fell  one  after  the  other.  It  was  an  unending  struggle  of 
man  against  man.  The  enemy  pressed  us  more  and  more 
closely.  It  zvas  no  longer  a  Ught,  it  was  a  mutual  butcher- 
ing. .  .  .  With  the  butt-end  of  the  rifles  we  beat  the 
enemy  out  of  the  trenches,  and  made  the  dust  fly.  The  rage 
was  indescribable.  Every  centimetre  of  ground  was  here 
bought  with  blood.  .  .  .  The  dead  and  the  wounded  lay 
together  in  heaps ;  those  who  could  still  walk  sought  to  get 
back  to  the  hospital  over  the  bridge,  but  it  was  a  sorrowful 
business  for  the  poor  fellows  who  had  been  shot  in  the  legs, 
and  who  could  not  go  with  them.  They  had  to  put  up 
with  the  heavy  shrapnel  fire  of  the  enemy."  (Vorwärts, 
24th  December.) 

Here  is  a  little  genre  picture  from  the  Wiener 
Arbeiterzeitung : — 

A  Reservist  born  in  Warnsdorf  had  had  both  his  feet 
frostbitten  in  the  Carpathians ;  he  was  brought  back,  and  he 
asked  his  wife  to  meet  him  at  the  station  at  Reichenberg. 
As  his  wife  was  about  to  go  up  the  stairs  at  the  station  she 
saw  "an  old,  broken-down  man  with  white  hair  painfully 
coming  along  the  platform,  supported  on  two  sticks  with  a 
bundle  in  his  arm.  Out  of  pity  she  was  going  to  take  the 
bundle  from  the  man  and  help  him  to  walk."  In  this  mo- 
ment she  recognised  him:  "it  was  her  own  husband;  the 
woman  collapsed  unconscious." 

A  very  interesting  contribution  to  the  solution  of  the 
question  Avhether  war  "develops  the  noblest  virtues  of 
man"  (Field-Marshal  Moltke)  or  whether  conversely, 
"it  makes  more  bad  people  than  it  takes  away" 
(Kant),  is  furnished  by  a  report  of  a  battle  published 
in  the  Jaucr'sche  Tageblatt  of  October  i8th,  1914.  The 
writer  of  this  report  is  the  subordinate  officer  Klemt,  of 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     361 

the  First  Company  of  the  154th  Regiment,  and  his  state- 
ment is  expressly  confirmed  at  the  conclusion  by  his 
Lieutenant  and  the  leader  of  the  Company,  von  Niem. 
The  heading  of  the  article  is  "A  Day  of  Honour  for  Our 
Regiment,  September  24th,  19 14."  As  a  human,  or 
rather  as  a  bestial,  document  the  report  deserves  to  be 
reproduced  in  extenso;  I  regret  that  for  reasons  of  space 
I  must  content  myself  with  an  extract : — 

"The  first  Frenchmen  were  already  discovered;  we 
brought  them  down  like  squirrels,  and  gave  them  a  waim 
reception  with  blows  of  the  butt  and  bayonet :  they  no 
longer  needed  doctors ;  we  are  no  longer  fighting  loyal  ene- 
mies, but  treacherous  brigands.  By  leaps  and  bounds  we 
got  across  the  clearing.  They  were  here,  there,  and  every- 
where hidden  in  the  thicket.  Now  it  is  down  with  the 
enemy!  And  we  will  give  them  no  quarter.  Every  one 
shoots  standing,  a  few,  a  very  few,  fire  kneeling.  No  one 
tries  to  take  shelter.  We  reach  a  little  depression  in  the 
ground :  here  the  red  trousers  dead  or  wounded  lie  in  a 
heap  on  the  ground.  We  knock  dozvn  or  bayonet  the 
wounded,  for  we  know  that  those  scoundrels  fire  at  our 
backs  when  we  have  gone  by.  There  was  a  Frenchman 
there  stretched  out,  full  length,  face  down,  pretending  to 
be  dead.  A  kick  from  a  strong  fusilier  soon  taught  him  that 
we  were  there.  Turning  round,  he  asked  for  quarter,  but 
we  answered:  "Is  that  the  way  your  tools  work,  you — ," 
and  he  was  nailed  to  the  ground.  Close  to  me  I  heard  odd 
cracking  sounds.  They  were  blows  from  a  gun  on  the  bald 
head  of  a  Frenchman,  which  a  private  of  the  154th  was 
dealing  out  vigorously ;  he  was  wisely  using  a  French  gun 
so  as  not  to  break  his  own.  Tender-hearted  souls  are  so 
kind  to  the  French  wounded  that  they  finish  them  with  a 
bullet,  but  others  give  them  as  many  thrusts  and  blows  as 
they  can.  Our  adversaries  had  fought  bravely,  we  had  to 
contend  with  picked  men ;  they  let  us  get  within  thirty,  even 
ten  metres  of  them — too  near.  ...  At  the  entry  into  the 
screen  of  branches  they  lay  groaning  and  crying  for  quarter, 


862  I    ACCUSE! 

but  whether  wounded  slightly  or  severely  the  brave  fusiliers 
spare  their  country  the  cost  of  caring  for  many  enemies."  ^ 

The  report  concludes  with  a  description  of  how  the 
tired  troops,  after  their  labour  of  blood,  lay  down  in 
slumber.  "The  god  of  dreams  paints  for  one  or  the 
other  a  pleasing  vision.  With  a  prayer  of  thanks  on 
our  lips  we  slumbered  on  to  the  coming  day." 

What  makes  this  report  so  horrible  is  not  so  much  the 
occurrences  which  it  narrates  as  the  brutal  naivete  wüth 
which  they  are  represented  as  glorious  actions  of  hero- 
ism, specially  attested  by  their  leader,  and  published  in 
the  most  prominent  place  of  the  official  newspaper  of 
the  district.  It  may  be  that  brutalities  have  also  been 
committed  by  the  other  side — when  the  beast  is  let  loose 
in  man  it  need  cause  no  wonder  if  bestialities  occur — 
but  I  have  looked  in  vain  for  the  publication  of  such 
"heroic"  deeds  in  the  foreign  Press.  That  anyone  should 
sit  down  in  cold  blood  after  his  work  of  murder  is 
over  and  vaingloriously  narrate  in  glowing  colours  hor- 
rors of  this  sort  to  his  townsmen  at  home,  his  friends, 
his  own  wife  and  children,  makes  the  matter  much  more 
pitiful  even  than  it  is  in  itself.  The  "prayer  of  thanks" 
to  God  could  not,  of  course,  be  wanting  in  a  German 
report  of  battle.  His  Royal  Highness  Prince  Oscar  of 
Prussia  is  also  quoted  by  the  under-officer  Klemt  as  an 
admirer  of  the  heroic  deeds  narrated :  "With  these 
Grenadiers  and  with  the  154th  we  could  take  hell  by 
storm,"  exclaimed  the  Prince,  and  he  assured  both  the 
regiments  that  they  were  worthy  of  the  name  of  "Royal 
Brigade." 

The  report  in  the  Jauer  newspaper  unites  in  itself — 
like  the  horse  afflicted  with  every  conceivable  malady 
of  which  a  picture  appears  in  veterinaiy  schools — all  the 

^  [As  translated  in  the  English  edition  of  M.  Bedier's  German 
Atrocities.] 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     363 

"noblest  virtues"  which  war  can  and  must  produce : 
bestiahty,  boastfulness,  false  piety,  and  so  on.  Whether 
the  world  "would  stagnate  and  lose  itself  in  Material- 
ism," if  these  qualities  remained  undeveloped,  I  leave 
to  be  decided  by  people  who  are  cleverer  than  I  am. 

The  Russian  poet  Valerij  Brjussow  describes  as  fol- 
lows his  impressions  of  the  battlefield  at  Lowitz : — 

"The  trenches  are  empty,  but  near  them  lie  here  and  there 
the  bodies  of  German  soldiers  on  their  backs,  face  down- 
wards, or  on  their  side,  their  arms  stretched  out  or  held 
tight  to  their  breasts,  with  strangely  peaceful  faces.  The 
most  of  them  are  wearing  their  dark-grey  uniforms,  some, 
however,  are  in  their  soldiers'  cloaks,  which  have  clearly 
been  used  to  protect  them  against  the  cold.  Among  the  dead 
I  see  young  men  with  soft  faces,  with  the  first  down  on 
their  cheeks,  but  I  also  see  older,  graver  men  who  have 
entered  the  forties,  who  have  probably  long  ago  established 
their  life  on  a  firm  basis,  and  certainly  never  thought  that 
it  would  be  their  fate  to  close  their  life  on  a  snow-covered 
field  in  foreign  lands,  in  far-off  distant  Russia.  .  .  .  Our 
soldiers  accompany  us  in  our  walk  along  the  side  of  the 
trenches,  and  look  at  the  faces  of  the  dead  in  solemn  thought 
and  contemplation.  In  war  one  becomes  accustomed  to  the 
appearance  of  death.  Death  is  so  constantly  before  one's 
vision  that  it  ceases  to  awake  a  feeling  of  terror."  (Vor- 
wärts, 1 6th  December.) 

An  infantry  soldier  thus  describes  the  fearful  battles 
in  Flanders  in  which  he  took  part: — 

"The  soldiers  were  standing  up  to  their  ankles  in  water 
in  their  protected  positions  when  they  received  the  order  to 
attack.  The  enemy  belched  against  us  their  destructive 
shells  from  20  mouths  of  fire.  Many  were  literally  torn 
to  pieces.  .  .  .  All  the  time  our  rage  grows  more  terrible. 
.  .  .  There  was  a  thick  black  powder  smoke ;  we  thought 
we  should  choke;  scarcely  anything  could  be  seen  of  the 


364  I    ACCUSE! 

men.  These  were  the  shells  from  the  English  Navy,  which 
was  taking  part  in  the  battle.  .  .  .  Across  the  middle  of 
the  field  eight  horses  were  galloping,  still  attached  to  the 
gun-carriage,  when  a  shell  burst  in  the  middle  of  them.  A 
heartrending  shriek  followed  from  the  animals,  and  then 
there  was  nothing  to  be  seen  but  a  quivering,  tangled  mass 
weltering  in  a  puddle  of  blood.  .  .  .  Listen,  what  is  that? 
A  trumpet  signal.  The  sound  quivers,  as  if  it  also  felt  the 
pain.  'Fix  bayonets.'  The  clean  steel  now  shines  on  the 
barrels  of  the  gun  which  spits  out  fire.  ...  A  shell  burst 
beside  the  third  man  on  my  right ;  he  was  killed,  my  neigh- 
bour was  thrown  out  and  severely  wounded.  The  same 
thing  happened  on  my  left.  The  drummer  beat  his  drum. — 
Up !  Charge !  Hurrah  !  I  believe  that  our  cheer  drowned 
the  thunder  of  the  artillery.  Then  we  went  for  the  enemy 
with  the  bayonet.  I  will  not  describe  to  you  the  bayonet 
charge.  //  was  a  butchery.  Twice  we  had  to  retreat ;  on 
the  third  attack  we  won.  When  you  at  home  hear  of  the 
victory:  'Fall  of  Dixmuiden!'  will  you  shout  hurrah?  We 
thought  of  the  sacrifices ;  many,  many  were  lying  on  the 
field  bleeding."     (Vorwärts,  nth  December.) 


How  Beautiful  to  Die  for  the  Fatherland 

That  is  what  war  looks  like,  as  it  is,  and  as  it  is  felt 
by  those  who  are  taking  part  in  it.  I  seek  in  vain  in 
all  the  hundreds  of  letters  from  the  front,  and  in  the 
war  correspondence  which  daily  fills  the  columns  of  the 
newspapers,  for  any  expression  of  the  sentiment:  "How 
beautiful  it  is  to  die  for  the  Fatherland."  I  find  repre- 
sented everywhere  merely  the  unspeakable  horror  and 
the  barbarity  of  the  struggle  between  men,  who  nourish 
against  each  other  no  sentiment  of  hostility,  who  have 
all  left  mothers  at  home;  many,  very  many,  wives  and 
children ;  and  who  are  all  filled  with  the  one  thought : 
"Oh,  that  it  were  peace  again!  Oh,  that  you  were  but 
home  among  your  dear  ones,  caressed  and  nourished  by 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     365 

your  children,  in  the  arms  of  your  wife  and  mother,  free 
for  ever  from  this  horrible  task  of  murder." 

The  great  men  behind  the  front  have,  of  course,  dif- 
ferent views  on  the  subject.  Their  bones  are  not  broken. 
Their  houses  are  not  burnt  down.  Their  wives  and 
children  are  not  driven  out  of  house  and  home.  Their 
castles  and  their  domains  are  not  destroyed.  They  hun- 
ger not,  neither  do  they  thirst.  They  sleep  in  their  beds, 
not  in  holes  in  the  earth  like  wild  beasts.  When  they 
have  a  pain  in  their  heart  or  their  liver  they  can  go 
home  and  get  cured  by  a  course  at  the  springs  or  the 
baths;  their  wives  and  fathers  and  children  can  hasten 
to  them,  tenderly  embrace  and  care  for  them,  until  after 
weeks  and  months  they  can  return  once  more  with  re- 
newed vigour  to  their  posts  of  security  behind  the  battle- 
front. 

While  in  front  of  the  enemy  death  and  destruction  are 
sweeping  away  the  flower  of  the  youth  of  all  countries, 
the  prosperity  of  many  generations,  the  great  men  sit 
far  behind 


*  Kant  in  Perpetual  Peace  (p.  145)  censures  as  illogical  and 
blasphemous  the  common  conception  of  a  co-operation  or  a  con- 
currence (concursns)  on  the  part  of  the  Deity,  as,  for  example, 
when  we  say  that  the  physician  has  restored  the  sick  with  the  help 
of  God.  "God  created  the  physician  as  well  as  his  means  of  heal- 
ing, and  we  must  ascribe  the  result  wholly  to  him."  [This  foot- 
note appears  to  refer  to  the  censored  passage.] 


366  I   ACCUSE! 

"Forward!  forward!  Up  and  at  them!"  is  the  call 
.  And  those  at  the  front  answer  with 
moaning  and  groaning,  with  pains  and  torments,  with 
longing  thoughts  of  peace  and  home,  which  still  illumine 
their  last  faltering  look.  "Gee  up!  gee  up!"  calls  the 
driver,  and  lashes  the  poor  horses  who  are  straining  to 
move  the  heavy  wagons  forward  on  the  clammy  roads. 
They  sink  in  the  mud,  but  he  knows  no  pity.  Only 
forward,  forward!  Hold  on!  No  slackening!  And  he 
would  drive  the  poor  brutes  to  death  if  there  were  not 
a  league  for  the  protection  of  animals  which  shields  the 
wretched  beasts  against  their  tormentors.  But  where  is 
the  league  for  the  protection  of  men?  It  is  high  time 
that  such  a  league  were  founded. 

Prestige 

What  does  a  war  mean  to  the  great  men  of  the  earth? 
A  new  emotion  added  to  countless  others.  A  drama  of 
chivalry  played  out  in  earnest,  a  question  of  ambition 
and  of  vanity,  which  they  designate  by  the  word  "pres- 
tige"; a  "great  event  in  their  life,"  ^  like  the  victory 
of  their  colours  at  the  Hoppegarten  or  of  their  yachts 
at  the  Kiel  Regatta.  "The  glory  of  the  ruler  consists  in 
this,  that,  without  his  requiring  to  expose  himself  to 
danger,  thousands  stand  at  his  command  ready  to  let 
themselves  be  sacrificed  for  a  matter  of  no  concern  to 
them.  The  difference  between  the  savages  of  Europe 
and  those  of  America  lies  chiefly  in  this,  that,  while 
many  tribes  of  the  latter  have  been  entirely  devoured 

^  See  the  telegram  of  the  Crown  Princess  Cecilia  to  the  Govern- 
mental President  in  Danzig  after  the  battle  of  Longwy:  "Please 
tell  all  our  dear  people  in  Danzig  and  West  Prussia  of  my  hus- 
band's victory  north  of  Metz,  knowing  how  much  interest  the 
Province  which  is  so  near  to  us  will  take  in  this  great  event  in 
his  life.    God  protect  you  all." 


I 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     367 

by  their  enemies,  Europeans  know  a  better  way  of  using 
the  vanquished  than  by  eating  them;  and  they  prefer  to 
increase  through  them  the  number  of  their  subjects, 
and  so  the  number  of  instruments  at  their  command 
for  still  more  widely  spread  war} 

To  sacrifice  many  thousands  for  a  matter  of  no  con- 
cern to  them!  That  is  the  true  meaning  of  this  and  of 
most  other  wars.  What  does  prestige  mean  to  these  mil- 
lions of  poor  devils  who  are  to-day  called  upon  to  lay 
down  their  lives  on  the  battlefield  of  Europe?  They  do 
not  even  know  the  word,  let  alone  the  idea.  Prestige  is 
a  luxury  for  him  who  is  already  surfeited  with  all  the 
other  gifts  of  life.  It  is  the  obstinacy  which  refuses 
to  give  way  even  when  one  feels  oneself  in  the  wrong, 
because  one  is  strong  enough  not  to  need  to  give  way. 
For  the  common  citizen,  however,  for  the  peasant  and 
the  labourer,  prestige  is  the  daily  bread  which  he  must 
bitterly  earn  in  the  sweat  of  his  face,  his  health  which 
renders  it  possible  for  him  to  achieve  his  labour,  his 
family  which  brings  sweetness  and  light  into  his  hours 
of  his  leisure.  That  is  his  prestige,  and  for  it  he  would 
fight  voluntarily  and  with  enthusiasm  if  these  blessings 
were  imperilled. 

It  is  for  this  reason  that  they  try  to  persuade  him  that 
they  are  in  danger.  The  "cunning  of  a  policy  that  shuns 
the  light"  exercises  the  arts  of  Probabilismus:  it  "at- 
tributes evil  intentions  to  others,  or  even  the  probability 
of  their  possible  superiority." 

"It  will  be  well  to  put  an  end  to  this  sophistry,  and 
to  bring  the  false  advocates  of  the  might  of  the  earth 
to  confess  that  it  is  not  right  but  might  in  whose  in- 
terest they  speak.  ...  In  order  to  do  this,  we  must 
first  expose  the  delusion  by  which  they  deceive  them- 
selves  and  others"  (Kant,  Perpetual  Peace,  p.  174,  175). 

Does  that  not  read  as  if  it  had  been  written  to-day? 

^Kant:  Perpetual  Peace,  p.  130. 


368  I   ACCUSE! 

Is  not  every  word  applicable  to  our  position  to-da)''  and 
to  our  present-day  leaders?  And  if  the  gentlemen  who 
signed  the  "Appeal  to  the  civilised  world"  do,  in  fact, 
"hold  the  inheritance  of  Kant  as  sacred  as  their  hearth 
and  their  soil,"  then  they  should  read  this  wonderful 
essay  on  Perpetiml  Peace,  which,  amid  all  the  storms  of 
the  French  revolutionary  wars  and  under  the  dominance 
of  a  Prussian  military  autocracy,  dared  to  utter  revo- 
lutionary truths  which  to-day  would  be  suppressed  as 
seditious,  and  exposed  to  the  persecution  of  blood  at  the 
hands  of  the  supreme  commanders  in  the  Mark  of  Bran- 
denburg. 

It  is  for  a  phantom  that  millions  to-day  are  bleeding, 
that  millions  are  hungering,  and  that  inestimable  wealth 
is  being  destroyed.  It  is  for  the  phantom  of  prestige, 
of  world-power,  which  has  been  tricked  out  in  the  guise 
of  the  deliverer  of  the  Fatherland.  The  gesta  Dei  per 
Francos  are  from  now  to  be  transformed  into  the  gesta 
Dei  per  Teiitones.  The  "worshipful"  German  people — 
as  a  privatdocent  writes  (how  will  he  express  himself 
when  he  becomes  a  professor?) — is,  in  fact,  to  be  wor- 
shipped by  all  others  as  the  super-nation.  The  Germans 
are  to  advance  "to  the  front  of  the  world,"  and  all 
these  hallucinations  of  an  endemic  swollen-headedness 
are  then  designated  "defence  against  the  enemy's  attack," 
in  order  thereby  to  make  them  palatable  to  the  sound 
sense  of  the  simple  people. 

Proletarians  of  All   Countries,   Massacre  Each 

Other! 

To  beguile  the  labouring  classes  to  change  their  peace- 
ful battle-cry,  "Proletarians  of  all  countries,  combine 
with  each  other!"  into  the  bloody  battle-cry,  ''Prole- 
tarians of  all  countries,  massacre  each  other!"  is  a  po- 
litical tour  de  force  which  demands  careful  preparation, 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     369 

great  dexterity,  and  a  fabulously  brazen  forehead.  I 
must  admit  that  our  leading  men  possess  these  qualities 
in  the  fullest  measure.  Here,  indeed,  their  achievement 
is  brilliant,  unsurpassable. 

The  attitude  of  the  Social  Democratic  party  on  August 
4th  in  approving  the  first  war  credit  of  £250,000,000  has 
rightly  been  subjected  to  sharp   criticism  abroad,  and 
especially  by  allied  international  parties.     It  ought  to 
be  emphasised  that  in  the  meeting  of  the  party,  which 
decided  on  concurring  in  the  war-credit,   there  was  a 
minority  distinguished,  not  in  numbers,  but  by  the  im- 
portance of  its  members.     The  attitude  of  the  majority 
is  explicable  by  reference  to  those  reasons  which  have 
been  active  in  drawing  the  whole  of  the  German  people 
into  this  war,  to  the  false  illusion  produced  by  the  Gov- 
ernment that  this  is  a  war  of  defence,  and  not  of  of- 
fence.    Ever  since  July  31st  Germany  has  been  barred 
from  all   communication   with    foreign  countries.      No 
one  knew  what  took  place  in  the  world,  and  especially 
in  Germany,  in  the  four  days  between  July  31st  and 
August  4th.     The  German  White  Book  which  was  laid 
before  the  members  of  the  House  maintained  that  the 
Russians  and  French  had  fallen  upon  us  from  the  east 
and  the  west,  and  that  they  had  already  penetrated  into 
Germany.     The  same  assertion  recurred  in  the  speeches 
of  the  Emperor  and  the  Chancellor.     No  one  was  in  a 
position  to  establish  what  was  true  and  what  was  false. 
Under  the  impression  that  Germany  was  compelled  to 
fight  for  her  security  and  her  independence,  the  major- 
ity of  the  Social  Democratic  Party  supported  the  war- 
credit,  and,  according  to  the  statutory  regulations  of  the 
party,    compelled   the   minority   to   adhere    to   this   de- 
cision. 

The  second  approval,  given  on  December  2nd,  was 
merely  the  consequence  of  the  first,  and  since  "it  is  the 
curse  of  evil  deeds,  That  to  all  time  they  still  engender 


370  I   ACCUSE! 

evil,"  the  group  in  the  party  which  had  approved  the 
first  credit  again  secured  a  majority.  Nevertheless,  the 
struggle  within  the  party  was  more  violent,  and  the 
minority  had  grown  stronger.  As  is  well  known,  Lieb- 
knecht alone  had  the  courage  and  the  strength  of  char- 
acter to  refuse  to  subject  himself  to  Party-discipline  and 
to  record  his  dissentient  vote  in  the  sitting  of  the 
Reichstag. 

This  action  has  very  properly  met  with  the  approval 
of  all  comrades  in  the  whole  world,  with  the  unfortunate 
exception  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party  in  the  Reich- 
stag. I  regard  as  extremely  regrettable  the  vote  of  cen- 
sure passed  by  the  Party  on  February  2nd.  It  is  uni- 
versally regarded  abroad,  not  as  a  disciplinary  measure 
due  to  an  offence  against  the  internal  order  of  the  party, 
but  as  a  condemnation  of  the  substantial  point  involved 
in  the  dissension  of  Liebknecht,  and  therefore  as  an 
emphatic  approval  of  the  war-credit  and  of  the  whole 
war  policy  of  the  Government.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  it 
would  have  been  more  expedient,  having  regard  to  the 
future  reconstruction  of  the  international  party,  if  in 
this  fundamental  question  party  discipline  had  been  ig- 
nored ;  such  a  course  would  have  avoided  the  appearance 
that  it  was  unworthy  of  a  member  of  the  German  So- 
cial Democratic  Party  to  vote  against  the  war-credit. 

It  would  appear  that  in  Berlin  no  account  was  taken 
of  the  effect  which  such  a  party  resolution  was  bound  to 
exercise  on  their  comrades  abroad.  Above  all,  they  do 
not  appear  to  realise  that  the  sympathy  of  all  foreign 
comrades  are  on  Liebknccht's  side,  and  not  on  the  side 
of  the  nationalist  majority  of  the  Social  Democratic 
Party.  By  his  action  on  December  2nd  Liebknecht  has 
become  the  most  popular  German  socialist  abroad,  and 
in  saying  this  I  have  in  mind  neutral  countries  rather 
than  enemy  countries,  whose  approval  might  appear  sus- 
pect.     The   reconstruction   of   the   International   Party 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED    371 

will  be  built  on  the  attitude  of  Liebknecht,  not  on  the 
attitude  of  those  members  of  the  house  who,  once  de- 
ceived, were  not  possessed  of  the  insight  or  the  courage 
to  acknowledge  or  confess  their  error,  and  who  have 
gradually  rolled  down  the  slippery  slope  of  opportunism 
into  the  camp  of  the  Nationalists  and  the  Imperialists. 
They  have  entangled  themselves  so  strongly  with  the 
"National,"  that  they  will  not  again  find  their  way  back 
to  the  "International,"  and  the  International  Party  her- 
self will  not,  as  I  hope  and  trust,  later  on  spread  out 
her  motherly  arms  and  exclaim :  "Bring  back  my  bonny 
to  me."  The  prodigal  sons — and  it  is  better  so — ^vill 
hereafter  also  remain  in  a  far  country. 

It  is,  however,  necessary  to  compliment  the  German 
Government  on  the  fact  that  they  have  understood  in 
a  masterly  manner — at  least  for  the  present,  the  conse- 
quences will  be  revealed  later — how  to  put  in  operation 
the  policy  of  "divide  et  impera."  "That  is  to  say,  if 
there  are  certain  privileged  persons  among  the  people 
.  .  .  bring  about  a  quarrel  among  them,  and  make  mis- 
chief between  them  and  the  people"  (Kant,  p.  171). 
They  have  succeeded  in  bringing  about  a  quarrel  among 
these  leaders,  but  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  people  will 
be  one  when  the  day  of  the  great  reckoning  comes,  the 
"day  of  judgment,"  when  all  guilt  will  be  uncovered, 
and  every  crime  will  find  its  expiation. 

Political    Morality — Moral    Politics 

As  in  matters  of  foreign  policy  the  German  Govern- 
ment appears  to  have  taken  the  instructions  of  Bern- 
hardi  as  their  guiding  principle,  so,  in  internal  affairs, 
they  have  chosen  as  their  model  Kant's  description  of 
what  a  politician  should  not  he.  Where  moral  politics 
cease,  says  the  sage  of  Königsberg,  political  morality 
begins.     Political  morality,  however,  which  is  equivalent 


37«  I   ACCUSE! 

to  non-morality,  acts  according  to  the  following  "So- 
phistical maxims" : — 

"i.  Fac  et  excusa.  Seize  the  most  favourable  oppor- 
tunity for  arbitrary  usurpation — either  of  the  authority 
of  the  State  over  its  own  people  or  over  a  neighbouring 
people;  the  justification  of  the  act  and  extenuation  of 
the  use  of  force  ^N\\\  come  much  more  easily  and  grace- 
fully when  the  deed  is  done  than  if  one  has  to  think  out 
convincing  reasons  for  taking  this  step,  and  first  hear 
through  all  the  objections  which  can  be  made  against 
it.  .  .  .  Besides,  this  show  of  audacity  in  a  statesman 
even  lends  him  a  certain  semblance  of  inward  conviction 
of  the  justice  of  his  action;  and  once  he  has  got  so  far 
the  god  of  success  {bonus  eventns)  is  his  best  advocate." 

"2.  Si  fecisti,  nega.  As  for  any  crime  you  have  com- 
mitted, such  as  has,  for  instance,  brought  your  people 
to  despair  and  thence  to  insurrection,  deny  that  it  has 
happened  owing  to  any  fault  of  yours.  Say,  rather, 
...  in  the  case  of  your  having  usurped  a  neighbouring 
State,  that  human  nature  is  to  blame;  for  if  a  man  is 
not  ready  to  use  force  and  steal  a  march  upon  his  neigh- 
bour, he  may  certainly  count  on  the  latter  forestalling 
him  and  taking  him  prisoner."  ^ 

Is  that  not  a  photographically  true,  almost  prophetic, 
picture  of  Bethmann's  method  of  action,  which,  more- 
over, has  been  characterised,  not  merely  by  the  philos- 
opher in  his  chair,  but  also  by  the  philosopher  on  the 
throne?  "When  Princes  desire  war  they  begin  it,  and 
then  summon  an  industrious  lawyer  to  prove  that  they 
were  right"  (Frederick  II).  You  begin  a  war  and  then 
prove  that  the  other  side  began  it,  or  at  least  that  he 
was  on  the  point  of  beginning  it,  and  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  anticipate  him.  In  adopting  such  a  course  your 
external  honour  can  never  be  injured — that  is,  if  you 
are  believed — for  either  you  are  compelled  to  be  the 
^Kant,  p.    170. 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     378 

defender  of  the  Fatherland  or  else  you  are  the  prudent 
guardian  of  the  peace,  who  anticipated  the  certain  at- 
tack. Morality,  however,  which  ought  to  govern  the 
actions  of  States  as  well  as  of  individuals,  thereby  comes 
to  grief,  and  no  words  appear  to  the  philosopher  of 
Königsberg  to  be  sufficiently  strong  to  characterise  the 
perniciousness  of  such  politicians.  "But  it  seems  that 
by  no  theodicy  or  vindication  of  the  justice  of  God  can 
we  justify  Creation  in  putting  such  a  race  of  corrupt 
creatures  into  the  world  at  all.  .  .  .  Politics  in  the  real 
sense  cannot  take  a  step  forward  without  first  paying 
homage  to  the  principles  of  morals.  And,  although 
politics,  per  se,  is  a  difficult  art,  in  its  union  with  morals 
no  art  is  required."  He  who  subordinates  moral  poli- 
tics to  political  morals,  that  is  to  say,  the  principles  to 
the  end,  puts  the  cart  before  the  horse,  and  acts  against 
the  categorical  Imperative.^ 

That  is  the  "inheritance"  of  Kant,  and  anyone  who 
exalts  this  inheritance  thereby  utters  a  condemnation  of 
the  policy  which  has  led  to  this,  the  most  horrible  of 
all  wars,  a  policy  which  has  perhaps  acted  according  to 
"political  morality,"  but  which  certainly  has  not  been 
an  instance  of  moral  politics. 

Meanwhile,  however,  the  work  of  blood,  the  hated 
task,  goes  on,  and  the  life  blood  of  our  nation  is  being 
sucked  dry  as  though  by  gigantic  leeches,  and  drained 
in  the  insatiable  vengeance  of  the  moloch  of  war.  "To 
visit  a  battlefield  is  a  horrible  business,"  wrote  the  Em- 
peror Frederick  HI.  "It  is  impossible  to  describe  the 
fearful  wounds  presented  to  the  eye.  War  is,  in  spite 
of  everything,  a  terrible  affair,  and  those  who,  sitting 
round  a  council  table,  conjure  it  up  by  a  stroke  of  the 
pen,  do  not  know  what  they  are  doing."  "The  most 
horrible  side  of  war  should,  however,  be  seen  by  those 
who  have  frivolously  brought  it  about,  by  those  diplo- 
^Kaut,  pp.   182,  175. 


374  I   ACCUSE! 

matists  who  regard  it  as  a  factor  in  their  calculations, 
with  the  same  lightness  of  heart  with  which  a  merchant 
allows  in  his  calculations  for  the  possibility  of  a  chance 
of  gain ;  these  men  should  themselves  help  to  storm  such 
a  canal-bridge  exposed  to  the  enemy's  shell  fire";  these 
are  the  words  of  a  doctor  writing  from  the  scene  of 
operations.^ 

How  do  you  feel,  Herr  von  Bethmann,  when  you  read 
such  things  as  these?  How  did  you  express  it  in  your 
last  circular  note?^  The  "idea  of  a  conference,"  you 
say,  was  not  "sympathetic"  to  you;  the  "form"  of  a 
conference  was  "disagreeable."  And  now — are  the  fear- 
ful consequences  which  have  sprung  from  your  refusal 
more  sympathetic  to  you?  Do  you  find  them  less  dis- 
agreeable? Do  you  still  dare,  even  to-day,  to  speak 
of  your  sympathies  and  your  antipathies,  of  your  scruples 
as  to  this  or  that  form,  when  your  antipathies  and  your 
scruples  have  plunged  Europe  in  a  sea  of  blood,  and 
have  made  our  famous  European  civilisation  the  laughter 
of  savage  nations?  "We  savages  are,  after  all,  the  better 
men!"  may  be  the  rightful  boast  of  the  Red  Indian  to- 
day. And  if,  as  I  recently  saw  in  an  allegorical  picture, 
all  the  yellow,  black,  and  brown  primitive  nations  were 
to  assemble  on  the  edge  of  Europe,  and,  seeing  the 
scenes  of  murder  and  destruction,  the  smoking  villages 
and  towns,  were  to  exclaim  in  derision:  "Voila  voire 
celebre  civilisation/'  Europe  could  only  hide  her  head 
in  shame,  and  in  justice  admit  the  higher  culture  of 
savage  peoples.  Have  we,  the  nations  of  Europe,  still 
any  legal  title — such  a  title  has,  indeed,  never  been  recog- 
nised by  morally  thinking  men — to  embark  on  colonial 
conquests  when  the  only  pretence  that  we  can  advance 
for  our  predatory  excursions,  that  we  are  the  bearers 

^Berliner  Tageblatt,  24th  Sept. 

^^See  Circular  Note  of  the  Chancellor  of  24th  December  (Ap- 
pendix III). 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     375 

of  culture  and  civilisation,   has  so  miserably  come  to 
nought  ? 

It  is  to  you,  Herr  von  Bethmann,  that  we  owe  all 
this.  Partiiriunt  montes,  nascetur  ridiculus  mus.  The 
mountains  are  in  travail,  and  a  little  mouse  is  born. 
Here  it  is  the  other  way  about;  from  the  little  mouse 
of  your  antipathies  and  scruples  there  have  arisen  gi- 
gantic mountains  of  human  unhappiness.  Go  to  the 
battlefields,  go  to  the  hospitals;  see  the  wounded,  the 
dead,  and  the  dying;  go  into  the  wasted  cities,  and  pray 
before  the  ruined  altars,  entreating  your  Saviour  for 
forgiveness,  that  you,  in  place  of  the  words  "Peace  on 
earth,  goodwill  to  men,"  have  brought  about  "Murder 
on  earth,  and  for  men  fire  and  destruction."  Then  beat 
your  breast  and  confess  aloud  and  in  public,  so  that  all 
the  world  may  hear  it :  "I  am  the  guilty,  I  alone!"  This 
would  not  bring  you  righteousness,  but  it  would  be  the 
first  step  towards  it — the  penitence  which  in  itself  is 
half  atonement. 


H  the  Emperor  had  not  found  a  Chancellor  to  make 
this  "war  of  liberation,"  Germany  would  have 

remained  unliberated,  that  is  to  say,  peaceful,  molested 
by  none,  developing  her  culture  and  her  well-being  in 
the  labour  of  peace.     And  what  is  now  our  position? 

still  happy  if  we  can  keep 
from  our  frontiers  the  enemy,  whom  we  ourselves  called 
into  being;  we  should  be  fortunate  if  we  could  to-day 
occupy  the  position  we  held  half  a  year  ago,  possessed 
of  our  colonies,  our  wealth,  and  the  youth  of  our  coun- 
try, now  murdered,  and  daily  wasting  away. 


376  I   ACCUSE! 

QUIDQUID    DELIRANT    REGES,    PLECTUNTUR    ACHIVI 

But  just  for  this  purpose  men  are  needed, 
not  courtiers;  men  full  of  character,  who  can  oppose 
the  royal  will,  who  can  take  the  side  of  the  Achaeans 
against  the  King,  "Immunity  from  punishment  is  a 
special  privilege  of  the  kingly  dignity,  but  it  in  no  way 
excludes  the  possibility  of  deserving  punishment."  The 
task  of  men  who  stand  beside  kings  as  their  responsible 
advisers  is  to  keep  them  from  deserving  punishment. 
"Nor  can  there  be  a  worse  service  either  to  the  prince 
or  his  people  than  enabling  a  monarch  to  rule  in  his 
own  person,  dictating  the  commands  of  his  own  violence 
or  caprice  through  servants  who  disapprove  of  his  meas- 
ures, and  yet  suffer  themselves  to  be  made  instruments 
for  carrying  them  into  execution."  ^ 

What  in  the  case  of  a  prince  is,  at  any  rate,  explic- 
able becomes  in  the 
case  of  a  responsible  statesman  an  unpardonable  crime. 
The  prince  who  from  his  early  youth  is  brought  up  in 
the  mystery  of  statecraft  by  the  grace  of  God  is  sur- 
rounded by  flatterers  and  panderers,  by  courtiers  and 
parasites,  who  are  apparently  his  servants,  but  are  in 
reality  his  masters,  a  prince  who  seldom  hears  the  truth, 
and  who  never  desires  to  hear  it,  notwithstanding  the 
words  of  Mirza  Schaffy : — 

"The  sage  needs  not  the  smile  of  those  in  high  estate, 
The  wise  man's  sage  advice  is  needed  by  the  great."* 

— a  prince  who  regards  the  constrained  silence  of  the 
people  as  a  token  of  unprecedented  harmony,  because 
no  one  tells  him  what  is  living  and  stirring  in  the  depths 
of  the  nation's  soul — such  a  prince  is  more  easily  ex- 

*  Brougham.     Statesmen    [Essay  on  Lord  North]. 
'  "Der  Weise  kann  des  Mächtigen  Gunst  entbehren, 
Doch  nicht  der  Mächtige  des  Weisen  Lehren." 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     377 

cused  than  a  Chancellor,  if  he  confuses  his  ambition  for 
wider  fields  of  conquest  for  fame  and  glory  with  the 
well-being  and  the  happiness  of  his  people.  The  coun- 
sellors of  a  prince  exist,  however,  for  the  express  purpose 
of  protecting  bim  against  the  consequences  of  his  own 
passions,  and  of  reminding  him  in  the  words  of  Junius: 
"Before  your  Majesty  subdues  the  hearts  of  your  sub- 
jects, you  must  gain  a  noble  victory  over  your  own."'^ 

They  must  be,  not  the  servants  of  their  lord,  but 
the  first  servants  of  the  State.  A  personal  attachment 
to  the  monarch  can  furnish  no  reason  or  defence  for  the 
public  behaviour  of  a  minister;  for  the  former  rests  on 
sentiment,  but  the  latter  on  duty,  on  the  categorical 
imperative.  In  the  choice  between  sentiment  and  duty 
the  latter  only  must  be  decisive.  The  alternative,  "se 
soumettre  ou  se  demettre/'  can  only  be  decided  in  favour 
of  the  latter  resolution. 

Worst  of  all,  however,  is  when  a  minister,  not  only 
covers  with  his  shield  the 

actions  of  his  monarch,  but  endeavours  to  justify  them 
by  Machiavellian  manoeuvres.  We  have  become  almost 
more  Machiavellian  than  Machiavelli  himself,  and  we 
have  quite  forgotten  that  our  great  ancestor  Frederick 
II.  wrote  the  Antimachiavel.  "The  promise  given  was 
a  necessity  of  the  past;  the  broken  word  is  a  necessity 
of  the  present."  Does  it  not  sound  as  if  the  clever 
Florentine  had  expressly  coined  this  phrase  for  the  Bel- 
gian question?  "A  Prince  must  have  no  other  object, 
and  no  other  thought,  and  he  must  make  nothing  else 
his  study  than  war,  its  preparation  and  conduct."  Has 
this  not  been  from  time  immemorial  the  policy  of  the 
Kings  of  Prussia?  "Let  the  Prince  take  care  to  con- 
quer and  to  maintain  his  domination;  the  means  will 
always  be  declared  honourable,  and  praised  by  every- 
one." Is  that  not  the  thread  of  Ariadne,  by  which  we 
^  [Letter  35.     19th  December,  1769.] 


378  I   ACCUSE! 

hope  to  escape  out  of  the  labyrinth  of  our  present  situa- 
tion, that  we  may  not  fall  victims  to  the  Minotaur  of 
universal  condemnation?  Machiavelli  has  usurped  the 
place  of  Kant,  and  in  our  case  also  the  end  justifies  the 
means. 

Dreams  of  World  Power 

What  is  the  object  and  the  aim  of  this  war?  I  have 
already  repeatedly  pointed  out  that  the  object  of  our 
rulers  is  the  establishment  of  a  new  dominium  mundi. 


The  Prussian  Eagle  is  to  spread  his  pinions  over  every 
sea;  a  new  age  in  history  is  to  dawn;  the  Roman,  the 
Spanish,  and  the  English  world-empires  are  now  to  be 
followed  by  the  German.^  The  saying  of  Virgil  is 
adapted  for  German  use:  ''T^i  regere  imperio  populos 
Germane  memento."     As   Aristotle   expected   a   trans- 

*  Now,  of  course,  when  the  grapes  have  become  sour,  everyone 
denies  the  existence  of  these  plans  of  world  power;  here  again 
"it  was  nobody."  On  the  same  day,  however,  on  which  it  was 
declared  from  a  high  quarter  that  the  supposed  intention  to  found 
a  world-empire  was  "nonsense,"  an  "Imperial  Journal  of  the  East- 
ern Army"  was  issued  by  the  Press  Authorities  of  the  German 
Military  Government  in  Lodz,  in  celebration  of  the  Emperor's 
birthday.     In  this  we  find  the  following: — 

A  victorious  war — and  God  be  thanked,  no  one  in  our  Ger- 
man Fatherland,  from  the  oldest  Field  Marshal  down  to  the 
youngest  cobbler's  apprentice,  has  any  doubt  that  such  will 
be  the  issue — will  create  for  us  a  German  Colonial  Empire  by 
the  annexation  of  Belgian  and  French  Congo,  and  if  Portugal 
should  transform  into  action  her  hostile  attitude  towards  us, 
the  Portuguese  Colonies  on  the  East  and  West  Coasts  of 
Africa  as  well.  This  will  be  an  empire  such  as  our  fathers 
who  sneered  in  laughter  at  our  first  colonial  beginnings  could 
never  have  imagined.  .  .  .  The  most  important  point,  however, 
in  this  not  improbable  division  of  the  African   Continent   is 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     379 

formation  of  the  Eastern  world,  a  domination  of  Hel- 
lenic culture,  as  a  result  of  the  expedition  of  Alexander 
the  Great,  so  we  expect  from  this  war  the  transforma- 
tion of  the  Western  world,  a  domination  of  German 
culture.  What  a  childish,  unhistoric  view!  If  wars  in 
long  forgotten  ages,  wars  between  civilised  nations  and 
barbarians,  may  at  times  have  been  the  means  of  bring- 
ing culture,  their  effect  to-day  among  peoples  of  equal 
culture  is  precisely  the  opposite;  they  are  destroyers  of 
culture,  promoters  of  atavistic  barbarism.  The  future 
of  the  human  race  to-day  can  lie  only  in  the  nations 
of  the  world  living  peacefully  together.  All  plans  of 
world-domination,  which  even  in  earlier  times  bore 
within  them  the  seeds  of  their  own  destruction,  must 
to-day,  even  before  they  achieve  realisation,  be  wrecked 
on  the  feeling  of  equality  among  all  nations,  on  the 
common  consciousness  that  all  are  striving  after  the 
same  ends  in  culture  and  well-being,  on  the  intimate  re- 
lations which  bind  corresponding  classes  of  different 
nations  with  each  other.  As  geological  strata  and  veins 
of  iron  and  mineral  are  not  directed  to  the  surface  ac- 
cording to  the  dividing  lines  between  properties,  but  un- 

that  we  shall  thereby  have  given  the  final  stroke  to  English 
efforts  to  establish  a  sole  dominion  in  Africa,  from  the  Cape 
to  Cairo ;  for  between  Egypt  and  East  Africa  and  the  Anglo- 
Boer  South  Africa  (which  to-day  are  still  English),  there  will 
then  lie  the  unending  girdle  of  our  gigantic  colonial  positions 
from  the  Indian  Ocean  to  the  Central  African  Lakes,  and  from 
the  Congo  to  the  Atlantic.  Of  North-East  and  South  Africa 
we  say  that  to-day  these  are  still  English ;  but  who  knows 
what  will  happen  if  the  word  of  the  poet  is  fulfilled :  "For 
the  world  will  one  day  find  Healing  in  the  German  niind." 
(Denn  es  muss  am  deutschen  Wesen,  einmal  noch  die  Welt 
genesen.) 

The  Newspaper  which  contains  the  foregoing  remark  is  oMcially 
published  by  the  military  authorities  as  a  birthday-present  for  the 
Emperor:  sapienti  sat. 


380  I    ACCUSE! 

derneath  these  boundaries  pass  from  one  property  to 
another,  so  the  strata  of  modern  human  society  are  not 
broken  up  by  territorial  frontiers,  but  pass  from  one 
country  to  another.  Horizontal  interdependence  has 
taken  the  place  of  the  vertical  line  of  division.  And  \i 
there  is  only  one  truly  organised  International,  there 
exist  beside  it  a  hundred  others  unorganised,  held  to- 
gether by  equally  firm  internal  bonds.  Of  such  are  the 
Internationals  of  trade,  of  industry,  of  the  technical 
and  moral  sciences,  and  of  literature  and  art,  all  of 
which  constitute  the  indestructible  spiritual  bond  con- 
necting the  nations;  we  may  say  that  even  crime  has 
become  international.  Wars  may  loosen,  but  they  can- 
not destroy  these  bonds.  Nature  itself,  as  Kant  once 
said,  "through  the  natural  course  of  human  propensi- 
ties guarantees  the  coming  of  perpetual  peace,  the  future 
of  which  we  are  not,  indeed,  enabled  to  prophesy,  but 
for  which  it  is  the  duty  of  mankind  to  labour."  The 
path  to  perpetual  peace  lies,  not  in  the  domination  of 
one  over  others,  but  in  a  life  lived  together  with  equal 
rights. 

The  dreams  of  our  world-dominion  will  thus  remain 
dreams,  even  if  we  had  the  power  to  subject  other 
nations  to  our  will.  The  aims  which  a  Bismarck  kept 
in  view  were  reasonable  and  attainable,  because  they 
lay  within  the  limits  of  the  historical  development  of 
our  age.  The  formation  of  national  States  must  first 
be  achieved  before  humanity  is  ripe  for  other  more 
comprehensive  formations.  The  effort  of  the  German 
people  to  attain  unity  was  a  logical  historical  develop- 
ment, and  was  therefore  successful.  The  effort  of  recent 
Germany,  however,  to  attain  world-dominion  represents 
historical  retrogression,  a  falling  away  from  the  aims 
set  before  civilised  nations,  and  is,  therefore,  neces- 
sarily bound  to  end  in  failure. 

Our  aim  is   therefore  unattainable,   and   the   means 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     381 

adopted  to  attain  it  are  criminal.  Military  success  alone, 
even  if  it  were  probable  (which  it  is  not),  would  not 
bring  us  nearer  to  our  aim  by  so  much  as  a  hairbreadth. 
In  the  twentieth  century  there  can  no  longer  he  a  world- 
dominion,  and  if  one  were  possible  we  would  be  the  last 
to  be  recognised  as  rulers  of  the  world.  Any  peace 
which  might  more  or  less  accord  to  us  such  a  dominion 
would  be  but  an  armed  truce,  and,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
treaties  of  peace  between  Greeks  and  Persians,  would 
be  concluded  only  with  the  clause  "for  the  time  being." 
One  war  would  continuously  give  birth  to  another,  and 
Europe  unrestrainably  and  inevitably  would  be  driven 
into  the  abyss. 

There  is  still  time  to  avoid  the  worst  fate;  it  is  still 
possible  to 

"Bind  up  the  wounds  inflicted  on  your  country, 

Rebuild  the  devastated  homes  of  men. 

And  raise  once  more  the  pride  of  lofty  towns 

From  smoky  ruins.      Spring  will  return  again 

And  clothe  the  wasted  fields  with  lushy  green. 

But  they  who  fell  the  victims  of  your  quarrel. 

The  dead,  rise  up  no  more ;  the  bitter  tears 

Shed  in  the  issue  of  your  controversy 

Will  be  for  ever  shed.     Another  race 

In  God's  own  time  will  prosper,  but  the  past 

Will  still  remain  the  prey  of  misery. 

The  joys  of  generations  still  unborn 

Cannot  recall  to  life  the  long-gone  dead."* 

*  "Des  Landes  tiefe  Wunden  heilen 
Die  Dörfer,  die  verwüsteten,  die  Städte 
Aus  ihrem  Schutt  sich  prangender  erheben, 
Die  Felder  decken  sich  mit  neuem  Grün — 
Doch  die  das  Opfer  eures  Zwist's  gefallen 
Die  Toten  stehen  nicht  mehr  auf ;  die  Thränen 
Die  eurem  Streit  geflossen  sind,  sie  bleiben 
Geweint !     Das  kommende  Geschlecht  wird  blühen 
Doch  das  Vergangene  war  des  Elends  Raub, 
Der  Enkel  Glück  erweckt  nicht  mehr  die  Väter." 


I    ACCUSE! 

The  dead  rise  up  no  more.  But  even  the  wounds 
which  have  been  inflicted  on  the  economic  Hfe  of  all 
nations  will  only  be  slowly  healed  in  many  decades. 

Who   Will   Pay   the   Cost   of  the  War? 

The  cost  and  the  damage  caused  by  the  war  during 
the  first  six  months  have  been  estimated  by  authorita- 
tive writers  at  more  than  four  thousand  million  pounds, 
apart  from  all  private  expenditure  and  losses,  apart 
from  the  value  to  the  nation  of  the  dead  and  the  muti- 
lated, and  apart  from  the  labour  lost  to  the  State  repre- 
sented by  the  soldiers  who  are  under  arms.  There 
can  be  no  question  of  compensation  being  paid  for  these 
costs  and  losses  of  war  by  the  defeated  party  to  the 
conqueror — if,  indeed,  a  victory  of  one  side  or  the  other 
is  conceivable.  In  Germany,  apart  from  the  Empire, 
the  individual  States  and  communes  have  also  incurred 
millions  of  debts.  Who  is  to  pay  these  gigantic  sums? 
Who  is  to  labour  and  pay  even  the  interest  on  them? 
"When  I  see  Princes  and  States  fighting  and  quarrel- 
ling, it  always  brings  to  my  mind  a  match  of  cudgel- 
playing  fought  in  a  china-shop"  (Hume).^  The  fellows 
with  the  cudgels  are  the  belligerent  nations;  the  china- 
shop  is  the  economic  organisation  of  the  world,  and  it 
will  not  be  long  before  all  the  china  in  the  world  is 
broken  into  fragments. 

QuousQUE   Tandem  ? 
How  is  it  to  go  on?    How  is  it  to  end? 


'  [In  the  Essay  Of  Public  Credit.] 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     383 

Every  victory  is  a  Pyrrhic  victory.  "One  more  such 
victory  and  I  am  lost."  Among  the  sixty-seven  millions 
of  Germans  is  there  not  a  single  soul  who  will  dare 
to  brave  the  thunderbolts  of  Jupiter  and  exclaim,  as 
Themistocles  did  to  Eurybiades :  "Strike,  but  listen !" 
Must  subservient  newspaper  writers  continue  to  let  their 
scandalous  reports  run  through  the  Press, 


— while  outside  on  the  snow-covered  fields,  in  the  damp 
earth-huts,  the  children  of  their  country  perish  and 
bleed  to  death,  while  the  widow  and  the  fatherless  pour 
forth  a  rising  flood  of  tears? 

How  long  will  all  this  still  go  on?  How  is  it  to  end?' 
The  nations  are  not  advantaged  if  after  peace  the  "right 
trusty  cousins"  fall  into  each  other's  arms  in  emotion, 
embrace  each  other,  and  once  more  assume  each  other's 
uniforms  which  they  have  discarded  in  the  interval. 
The  nation  is  not  advantaged  by  solemn  entrances 
through  the  Brandenburger  Tor, 


with  crowns  of  laurel  and  the  blare  of  trumpets. 

It  is  peace  the  people  want ;  peace  they  are  craving 
for,  peace  for  which  they  hunger  and  thirst.  There 
are  enough  dead  and  mutilated;  there  is  enough  mis- 
ery and  ruin.  The  conscience  of  the  world  is  stirring; 
the  words  now  being  raised  in  accusation  will  find  the 
sword  of  fulfilment  if  the  stern  accents  of  the  voice  of 
the  people  remains  unheard.  Vivos  voco,  mortiios 
plango,  fidgura  frango;  I  call  the  living,  I  lament  the 


384  I   ACCUSE! 

dead,  I  defy  the  lightning — such  is  the  call  of  the  bell 
of  the  world's  conscience  to  the  mighty  ones. 

And  on  your  head 
Turns  he  the  widows'  tears,  the  orphans'  cries, 
The  dead  men's  blood,  the  pining  maidens'  groans 
For  husbands,  fathers  and  betrothed  lovers, 
That  shall  be  swallow'd  in  this  controversy.^ 

They  have  suffered  enough,  the  Achaeans 

The  nations  have  never  been 
enemies.  From  all  letters  written  at  the  front  it  is 
clear  that  the  feelings  of  hatred  and  of  revenge  are 
unknown  in  the  trenches.  These  are  the  dragon's  eggs 
which  are  hatched  at  home  at  the  writing-tables  in  the 
coziness  of  editors'  rooms.  From  trench  to  trench 
friendship  and  brotherhood  are  concluded.  They  visit 
each  other,  make  each  other  small  presents,  and  shake 
hands  in  friendship.  And  then  they  return  to  the 
trenches,  and  shoot  at  each  other  on  commands  from 
above.     Is  that  not  unspeakable,  incredible? 

If  we  had  not  known  long  ago  that  none  of  the  bellig- 
erent nations  desired  war,  that  a  few  hundred,  at  the 
most  a  few  thousand,  criminal  men  had  desired  and 
engineered  this  murder  of  the  nations,  the  fraternisa- 
tion between  the  trenches  would  prove  that  between  the 
nations  no  enmity  exists.  But  just  because  it  proves 
this,  just  because  it  might  be  prejudicial  to  the  energy 
of  murder,  and  gradually  make  it  clear  to  those  who 
are  fighting  that  they  are  fighting  for  nothing  which 
concerns  them,  that  they  are  urged  on  against  each 
other  by  higher  powers  who  are  pursuing  their  interests 
— for  this  reason,  just  as  I  am  writing  these  lines,  a 
strong  prohibition  against  these  scenes  of  fraternisation 
has   been   issued    by   the    supreme    German    Command. 

'^  Shakespeare,  Henry  V. 


THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  DEED     385 

There  must  be  no  fraternisation,  no  hand-shaking,  there 
must  be  no  pause  in  the  firing,  for  God's  sake,  no !  The 
task  of  murder  must  go  on  without  loss  of  time.  Nulla 
dies  sine  linea,  there  must  be  no  day  without  murder 
and  arson. 

But  all  army  commands  will  be  of  no  avail.  La 
verite  est  en  marche.  Every  hour,  every  day,  brings 
the  illumination  nearer.  And  if  they  will  not — the  gen- 
tlemen behind  the  front — in  the  end  they  must. 

Peace  will  come — soon,  as  quickly  as  possible,  for  it 
must  come.  Woe  to  the  generals  who  still  throw  their 
sword  into  the  balance — woe  to  those  rulers  who  will 
still  refuse  to  hear  the  subdued,  forcibly  restrained  voice 
of  the  nations!  Under  the  placid  surface  of  internal 
peace  ^  the  seething  waters  are  in  agitation,  boiling  and 
bubbling.  Woe  to  those  who  refuse  to  hear  the  subter- 
ranean noises,  and  who  still  confide  their  bark  to  the 
treacherous  waters.  They  will  be  devoured  by  the 
waves! — Discite  moniti!    Learn,  you  have  been  warned! 

^  [Burgfrieden.] 


THE  FUTURE 

What   should   Peace   bring  us? 

The  matter  is  not  ended  on  the  mere  conclusion  of 
peace.  What  should  peace  bring  us?  What  will  peace 
bring  usf 

It  ought  to  bring  what  for  centuries  has  been  the 
object  striven  after  by  most  enhghtened  minds :  not  an 
armed  truce,  but  an  enduring  state  of  peace,  founded 
on  a  sure  basis  of  law.  The  system  hitherto  in  force 
whereby  peace  was  balanced  on  the  bayonet's  point  has 
gone  bankrupt,  bankrupt  for  ever.  The  insanity  of  mili- 
tary preparation,  which  in  1910  cost  the  States  of 
Europe,  in  direct  expenditure  alone,  provided  for  in 
the  Budgets — apart,  that  is  to  say,  from  indirect  expen- 
diture not  so  provided — a  sum  of  approximately  500 
million  pounds,  and  which  since  then  has  become  at 
least  20  per  cent,  more  costly  each  year,  this  insanity 
has  not  fulfilled  the  purpose  which  was  supposed  to 
justify  its  existence.  The  fact  that  the  States  of  Europe 
endeavoured  to  outbid  each  other  in  an  unholy  emula- 
tion in  armaments  by  land  and  by  water,  in  the  air  and 
under  the  sea,  constituted  a  menace  to  peace,  not  a  se- 
curity against  war.  A  perpetually  increasing  feeling  of 
distrust  has  sprung  from  this  iron  seed.  All  diplomatic 
negotiations  became  to  the  nations  of  Europe  an  object 
of  fear  and  anxiety  on  account  of  the  distant  clang  of 
arms,  and  everyone  was  swayed  by  the  oppressive  feel- 

386 


THE  FUTURE  387 

ing  that  this  condition  of  affairs  could  not  continue, 
that  at  length  we  would  be  compelled  to  alter  our  course 
or  be  driven  to  disaster. 

The  catastrophe  has  now  arrived,  the  catastrophe 
which  has  been  so  long  the  object  of  prophecy  and  of 
dread.  But  it  has  dragged  into  its  whirlpool  not  merely 
the  life  and  the  well-being  of  nations;  it  has  engulfed 
also  the  system,  which,  it  was  imagined,  afforded  to  the 
nations  a  deceptive  security. 

THE    SYSTEM     OF    ARMED     PEACE 

On  the  system  of  armed  peace  judgment  has  been 
passed.  In  peace  it  devoured  the  marrow  of  nations, 
and  it  has  failed  in  preventing  war.  The  system  of 
European  equilibrium  has  revealed  itself  to  be  even 
more  fatal  than  the  previous  system,  when  individual 
States,  armed  to  the  teeth,  confronted  each  other.  The 
Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870  was  mere  child's  play  in 
comparison  with  the  struggle  of  the  nations  in  19 14. 
A  mistaken  system  cannot  be  corrected  by  being  drawn 
on  a  large,  instead  of  a  small,  scale.  On  the  contrary, 
the  weaknesses  and  the  defects  inherent  in  it  must  thereby 
be  made  more  patent.  The  guarantee  of  peace  supposed 
to  be  afforded  by  military  armaments  must  work  with 
more  fatal  effect  the  greater  the  numljer  of  States  allied 
with  each  other  in  the  two  scales  of  the  balance.  What 
in  the  ratio  of  i  :  i  was  already  unreasonable  and  per- 
nicious must  be  thrice  as  unreasonable  and  pernicious 
in  the  ratio  of  3 :  3 — pernicious  in  peace,  even  worse 
in  war.  By  the  concatenation  of  alliances  and  ententes 
a  position  has  now  been  reached  which  enormously  sur- 
passes all  the  visions  of  horror  foretold  by  far-seeing 
sociologists. 

The  prophecies  of  Johann  von  Bloch  with  regard  to 
the  character,  the  extent,  and  the  horror  of  a  future 


S88  I   ACCUSE! 

European  war  have  all  been  realised — only  the  realisa- 
tion is  far  worse  than  the  gifted  Russian  statesman 
could  possibly  have  foreseen.  He  could  not  have  imaged 
to  himself  the  development  of  aeronautics,  of  subma- 
rines, of  the  gigantic  siege-artillery,  and  of  all  the  other 
recent  triumphs  of  culture.  But  in  his  monumental 
work  of  1899  he  already  prophesied  that  on  the  occa- 
sion of  the  next  European  war  there  would  be  shown 
to  have  taken  place  in  the  years  since  1870  a  greater 
progress  in  the  mechanism  of  war  than  that  represented 
by  the  development  from  the  age  of  bows  and  arrows 
down  to  the  Franco-Prussian  War.  Even  then  he  had 
prophesied  that  the  new  artillery  would  exercise  such 
a  murderous  effect  that  it  would  scarcely  be  possible 
to  speak  of  a  battle  in  the  former  sense  of  the  word  or 
of  personal  bravery,  and  that  war  must  develop  into 
a  continuous  fortification-war  between  trenches.  He 
characterised  in  all  its  details  the  horror  and  the  terror 
of  the  modern  war  of  machinery,  and  he,  expressed 
doubts — ^and  his  doubts  have  to-day  been  frequently 
confirmed — whether  modern  civilised  Europeans  could 
bear  all  these  fearful  impressions  on  their  mind,  on 
their  senses  of  seeing  and  hearing,  without  giving  way  to 
insanity.  In  such  a  war — so  prophesied  Bloch — there 
would  no  longer  be  a  conqueror  and  a  conquered,  there 
would  no  longer  be  any  possibility  of  giving  proper  at- 
tendance to  the  gigantic  number  of  the  wounded,  unless 
the  Army  Medical  Service  was  made  almost  as  strong 
numerically  as  the  combatants.  There  would  be  no  pos- 
sibility of  obtaining  sufficient  supplies  in  the  exhausted 
countries  in  which  the  battles  took  place.  There  would 
be  no  possibility  of  the  belligerent  States  raising  for 
any  length  of  time  even  the  bare  daily  cost  involved  in 
the  maintenance  of  such  enormous  armies.  All  this  was 
foreseen  by  the  pacifist  Johann  von  Bloch,  not  in  virtue 
of  any  special  gift  of  second  sight,  but  merely  by  rea- 


THE  FUTURE  889 

son  of  his  profound  study  for  many  years  of  these 
questions  of  so  vital  importance  to  the  civilisation  of 
Europe. 

And  now  we  are  experiencing  what  he  foresaw — a 
swaying  backwards  and  forwards  of  these  armies  of 
twenty  million  men — without  end,  without  result,  with- 
out even  the  possibility  of  a  final  decision,  notwithstand- 
ing all  the  inspiring  appeals  of  kings  and  of  the  leaders 
of  armies.  Forwards!  Backwards!  Backwards  and 
forwards!  Such  are  the  constantly  changing  rallying 
cries.  Only  for  the  dead  is  there  no  retreat.  A  village, 
a  farmyard,  a  trench,  a  hillock  demands  thousands  of 
sacrifices.  A  single  well-directed  shrapnel  can — with 
luck — kill  or  mutilate  a  hundred  men.  The  worst  of 
all,  however,  is  that  this  massacre  en  masse  represents 
a  suicide  of  the  nations,  which  must  gradually  perish 
from  loss  of  blood  and  from  exhaustion ;  it  has  but  one 
favourable  consequence,  in  so  far  as  it  is  at  the  same 
time  a  suicide  of  the  political  system  out  of  which  the 
war  was  born — a  suicide  of  this  system,  not  only  in 
internal,  but  also  in  foreign  affairs. 

After  the  war  it  will  not  be  possible — as  even  the  most 
infatuated  militarist  will  admit — to  effect  an  increase  in 
armaments.  Even  in  the  past  the  burden  of  European 
armaments  had  become  an  intolerable  weight.  Emile 
de  Girardin  was  right  when  he  said  forty  years  ago : 
"Misery  could  be  abolished  with  the  half  of  present-day 
European  expenditure  on  war."  The  insanity  of  this 
system  may  be  illustrated  by  the  following  example :  In 
the  primitive  ages  of  human  society,  two  neighbouring 
occupiers  of  the  soil,  when  each  had  to  provide  his  own 
protection,  become  suspicious  of  each  other.  Each  fears 
that  he  will  be  attacked  by  the  other,  whereas  in  reality 
neither  entertains  evil  intentions  against  his  neighbour. 
Instead  of  tilling  their  fields  and  increasing  their  herds, 
they  call  upon  all  their  people,  their  women  and  chil- 


390  I   ACCUSE! 

dren,  their  peasants  and  servants,  to  devote  their  whole 
time,  day  after  day,  month  after  month,  year  after  year, 
to  the  preparation  of  entrenchments  and  barricades 
against  their  neighbour,  to  the  forging  of  arms,  to  the 
creation  of  bows  and  arrows  and  sHngs.  Their  suppHes 
are  gradually  used  up.  The  means  of  obtaining  such 
supplies  elsewhere  are  exhausted.  Both  are  on  the  verge 
of  starvation.  At  last,  in  the  moment  of  supreme  need, 
the  distrusting  neighbours  resolve  to  discuss  matters  with 
each  other,  and,  behold!  neither  of  them  has  ever  had 
any  intention  of  attacking  the  other,  and  all  the  time 
each  has  dreaded  only  that  the  other  was  going  to 
attack  him.  At  a  stroke  the  shadows  of  distrust  dis- 
appear. But  the  dark  shadows  of  the  insane  dissipa- 
tion of  their  strength  will  long  hover  about  their  house 
and  their  home,  and  for  long  years  to  come  will  prevent 
them  from  regaining  their  former  state  of  prosperity. 

The  nations  of  Europe  have  not  been  able  to  discover 
in  time  the  pathway  to  reason,  and  consequently  in 
the  nature  of  things  the  other  solution  of  the  intolerable 
tension  was  bound  to  come  about — the  solution  of  un- 
reason, the  substitution  of  an  open  for  a  latent  state 
of  war.  We  have  already  seen  in  the  course  of  this 
discussion  who  is  responsible  for  the  fact  that  this  so- 
lution by  force  had  to  come,  that  all  attempts  to  bring 
about  an  enduring  state  of  peace  were  bound  to  fail. 
But  even  the  guilty  party  will  now  realise  that  all  his 
military  preparations,  all  his  opposition  to  every  pro- 
posal to  bring  about  an  understanding,  have  brought  him 
no  advantage,  and  that  there  has  to  come  to  pass  what 
we  pacifists  have  always  prophesied :  the  relative  strength 
of  the  various  nations — notwithstanding  the  ruin  of 
them  all — ^has  in  essential  matters  remained  unaltered. 

And  so  judgment  is  passed  on  the  system.  The  possi- 
bility of  resuming  or  strengthening  this  condemned  sys- 
tem is  excluded,  and — ^after  the  final  wreck  of  anarchy 


THE  FUTURE  391 

based  on  force — the  only  course  open  to  the  European 
system  of  States  is  to  return  to  the  thought  which  for 
centuries  the  most  distinguished  minds  in  Europe  have 
preached  as  the  only  means  of  salvation,  whereby  the 
old  world  of  our  culture  can  be  preserved  from  complete 
destruction. 

That  thought  is: 

A    COVENANT    OF    PEACE   BETWEEN    FREE    NATIONS 

based  on  a  mutual  recognition  of  their  rights  and  on 
mutual  confidence — a  federation  of  free  States,  as  Kant 
calls  it.  This  would  be  a  federation  of  nations,  not  a 
State  of  nations  {Ein  Völkerbund,  kein  Völkerstaat),  a 
covenant  which  would  leave  to  the  States  enjoying  mem- 
bership their  full  sovereignty  with  only  the  one  limita- 
tion, that  they  should  not  abuse  this  sovereignty  by  mak- 
ing war  against  any  of  the  covenanting  States.  This 
federation  would  be  based,  not  on  force,  but  on  mutual 
confidence,  on  the  feeling  of  duty,  on  the  categorical 
imperative.  The  sage  of  Königsberg  considered  that 
even  in  his  time  such  a  covenant  of  peace  between  Euro- 
pean States  was  possible,  without  internal  political  or- 
ganisation, without  a  supreme  law-giving  power,  since 
it  corresponded  to  the  interests  of  all  alike,  and  since  it 
was  for  all  alike  a  command  of  duty.  True,  the  higher 
and  stronger  unity,  the  positive  idea  of  a  world-republic, 
hovered  before  his  vision  as  an  ideal  worthy  to  be  pur- 
sued, but,  seeing  that  the  world  was  not  ripe  for  that 
great  ideal,  the  man  of  "practical  reason"  contented  him- 
self with  the  "negative  substitute  for  it,  a  federation 
averting  war,  maintaining  its  ground,  and  ever  extend- 
ing over  the  world,"  Kant  had  no  doubt  about  the 
practicability  of  this  Covenant  of  Peace  (fa^diis  paciß- 
cum),  and  he  only  longed  for  the  moment  when  a  "pow- 
erful and  enlightened  people"  would  make  themselves 


392 


I    ACCUSE! 


the  central  point  of  such  a  federal  union,  and  by  the 
further  adhesion  of  other  nations  would  extend  this 
federation  more  and  more  among  civilised  nations.^ 

This  Kantian  thought,  apparently  so  simple,  is  the 
most  profound  ever  conceived  on  the  subject  of  the  for- 
mation of  a  European  family  of  States  on  a  basis  of 
international  law.  This  is  not  the  offspring  of  an  ideolo- 
gist dwelling  in  the  clouds,  but  of  one  who  knew  his 
fellow-men  and  looked  with  undimmed  vision  on  the 
world  around  him,  drawing  practical  conclusions  from 
the  experiences  of  history  and  from  the  conditions  of 
his  own  time — the  references  to  contemporary  political 
affairs  may  often  be  traced  ironically  between  the  lines. 
He  expressly  states  that  he  is  not  concerned  with  theo- 
retical constructions,  but  he  only  desires  that  the  philoso- 
pher should  be  heard  by  the  King,  because  "the  pos- 
session of  power  is  inevitably  fatal  to  the  free  exercise 
of  reason."  He  is,  it  is  true,  content  with  the  role  which 
statesmen,  with  their  worldly  skill,  commonly  assign  to 
philosophy — the  role  of  a  handmaid — but  he  indicates 
that  this  handmaid's  role  should  be  to  bear  the  torch  be- 
fore her  mistress,  not  to  carry  the  train  behind  her. 
For  the  time  being  he  renounces  his  more  far-reaching 
ideal,  and  contents  himself,  in  the  first  place,  with  ends 
which  are  practically  attainable.^ 

These  ends  are  to-day  infinitely  more  desirable  than 
they  then  were,  and  at  the  same  time  they  are  infinitely 
more  easy  of  attainment.  They  are  infinitely  more  de- 
sirable because  the  condition  of  lawlessness  and  anarchy 
which  Kant  even  then  deplored  must  necessarily  involve 
to-day  much  more  fatal  consequences,  in  view  of  the 
present-day  greatness  and  the  development  of  strength 
of  the  States  of  Europe.  H  the  consequences  of  war 
could  imperil  the  existence  even  of  States  of  a  few  mil- 

^Kant,  p.  134. 
'Kant,  p.  160. 


THE  FUTURE  S93 

lion  inhabitants,  such  as  then  existed,  economically  or- 
ganised in  essential  matters  on  a  national  basis,  with 
production  and  consumption  of  goods  taking  place  for 
the  most  part  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  country, 
what  suicidal  catastrophes  await  the  European  States 
of  to-day  involved  in  the  war,  comprising  as  they  do, 
within  and  without  Europe,  a  population  of  890  million 
souls,  or  53  per  cent,  of  the  whole  population  of  the 
world,  indissolubly  linked  together  as  they  are  like  the 
organs  of  a  vast  body  by  thousands  of  the  finest  nerves 
and  sinews  of  a  spiritual  and  material  nature!  What 
Kant  regarded  as  necessary  for  the  world  of  his  time 
to  preserve  it  from  gradual  destruction  is  to-day  a  mil- 
lion times  more  necessary ;  for  then  each  of  the  belliger- 
ent nations  could  at  need  still  continue  to  pursue  its  own 
independent  life — like  the  separate  sections  of  a  lizard 
— whereas  to-day  the  gigantic  body  of  modern  civilised 
humanity  is  struck  to  the  heart  by  a  world-war,  and  the 
whole  organism  perishes. 

While  it  is  thus  true,  on  the  one  hand,  that  the  con- 
dition of  the  modern  world  infinitely  increases  the  evils 
of  war,  it  must,  on  the  other  hand,  be  remembered  that 
it  offers  infinitely  more  possibilities,  in  comparison  with 
the  past,  of  meeting  these  evils.  To-day  preparations 
have  already  been  made  in  very  great  measure  in  all 
fields  of  international  relations  for  the  realisation  of 
the  Kantian  federation  of  free  States.  Apart  from  what 
are  properly  regarded  as  treaties  between  States,  there 
exist  innumerable  international  organisations  in  all 
spheres  of  intercourse,  trade,  agriculture,  and  learning, 
ranging  from  the  Postal  Union  to  the  agreement  for 
the  protection  of  seals  in  the  Behring  Sea ;  and  there  are 
innumerable  international  institutions  for  carrying  out 
and  supervising  the  agreements  in  question.  Arbitra- 
tion treaties  in  very  great  number  are  already  in  exist- 
ence, with  and  without  the  obligatory  duty  of  summon- 


395.  I    ACCUSE! 

ing  the  court  of  arbitration,  and  these  are  in  part  so 
far-reaching  that  even  so-called  questions  of  life  and 
honour  have  to  be  submitted  to  the  decision  of  arbitra- 
tion. There  exists  in  the  Hague  an  international  court 
of  arbitration,  the  constitution,  procedure,  and  jurisdic- 
tion of  which  have  been  approved  by  the  signatures  of 
all  civilised  States  in  the  world.  In  short,  in  every 
possible  sphere  the  bonds  of  international  community 
are  already  being  drawn  more  closely  together;  only 
in  one  province,  the  most  important  of  all,  affecting  all 
vital  interests  of  the  nations  alike,  only  on  the  one 
question  of  war  and  peace  between  the  great  States  of 
Europe,  Anarchy  and  Lawlessness  still  hold  sway;  here 
Dame  Diplomacy  still  rules  with  her  out-worn  methods, 
with  her  tricks  and  intrigues  of  unregenerate  days,^  witH 
her  antiquated  devotees,  who  instead  of  keeping  in  view 
the  common  interests  of  all,  seek  only  by  all  the  means 
of  political  morality — that  is  to  say,  immorality — to  make 
petty  profits  for  those  from  whom  they  receive  their  in- 
structions. This  diplomacy  is  a  fossil  from  long-gone 
ages  of  history,  an  anachronism  which  is  as  much  at 
home  in  these  present  times  as  an  Indian  medicine  man 
is  in  a  modern  hospital.  As  the  medicine  man  stands 
helplessly  before  the  sufferer  with  his  hocus-pocus  (not- 
withstanding that  he  may  perhaps  create  the  appearance 
of  being  able  to  help  him),  so  the  diplomatists,  as  has 
again  been  proved,  stand  helplessly  before  the  danger- 
ous malady  of  the  nations,  incapable  of  preventing  the 
outbreak  of  the  fatal  evil.  This  is  unaffected  by  the 
personal  efficiency  of  many  individuals  in  diplomatic 
circles  (belonging  to  foreign  nations!);  it  is  a  conse- 
quence of  the  system  on  which  diplomacy  is  based. 

For  hundreds  of  years  now,  from  the  Outline  of  Per- 
petual Peace    (1713),   written  by  the   Abbe  de   Saint 

'  [aus  vorm'drslicher  Zeit:  before  the  Revolution  of  March,  1848, 
hence  reactionary.] 


THE  FUTURE  395 

Pierre,  down  to  Rousseau  and  Kant,  and  on  to  the 
voluminous  modern  literature  of  peace,  an  organisation 
of  modern  States  has  been  sought  for,  which  would,  in 
effect,  render  superfluous  the  activity  of  diplomacy  in 
the  former  sense.  When  the  possessions  of  the  contract- 
ing States  are  mutually  guaranteed,  when  their  spheres 
of  interest  are  apportioned  by  friendly  agreements, 
when  their  commercial  relations  are  regulated  by  treaties, 
and  when  international  intercourse  is  ordered  in  accord- 
ance with  the  march  of  progress,  and  when  any  dis- 
putes that  may  arise  are  submitted  to  arbitration — when 
mutual  confidence  takes  the  place  of  former  distrust,  and 
on  this  sure  basis  military  preparations  are  first  brought 
to  a  standstill,  and  then  gradually  reduced  in  all  na- 
tions alike — all  points  which  in  the  interests  of  all  par- 
ties concerned  are  desirable  and  attainable — then  the 
old  diplomacy  may  be  peacefully  allowed  to  rest  in  the 
cabinet  of  curiosities,  and  in  its  place  a  new  diplomacy 
can  be  established,  corresponding  to  the  needs  of  the 
time,  a  diplomacy  which  needs  no  secret  arts,  no  spies 
in  uniform,  no  palace  and  back-stairs-intrigues,  to  ful- 
fil its  useful  purposes.  Then  diplomatists  will  discharge 
almost  the  same  functions  as  those  fulfilled  to-day  by  the 
plenipotentiaries  to  the  Bundesrat  in  Berlin.  In  saying 
this,  however,  I  desire  expressly  to  guard  against  any 
misunderstanding  which  would  be  involved  in  the  as- 
sumption that  I  consider  that  the  Covenant  of  Peace  of 
Free  Nations  should  in  any  way  be  comparable  with  the 
political  organisation  of  the  German  Empire.  This  Cove- 
nant of  Peace  is  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  kind  of 
union  for  an  end,  a  union  whose  end  is  the  maintenance 
of  peace  and  the  promotion  of  common  interests,  but 
without  tJie  slightest  sacrifice  of  sovereign  rights.^ 
Common   interests   are  already   in    existence   to-day. 

^  See    also   Fried :    Kurse   Ahifklärungen   über    Wesen   und   Ziel 
des  Pazifismus  (Berlin,  1914). 


396  I   ACCUSE! 

They  are  regulated  by  international  agreements,  and 
protected  by  international  Commissions.  The  circle  of 
common  interests  will  automatically  extend  ever  wider 
under  the  logical  compulsion  of  the  development  of  civili- 
sation, of  technical  science,  of  the  conquest  of  time  and 
space,  in  spite  of  the  present  world-war,  and  in  spite  of 
those  of  limited  vision  who  shriek  themselves  hoarse  in 
acclaiming  Germany  as  the  mistress  of  the  universe  in 
the  realms  of  intellect  and  of  science,  or  those  who  de- 
sire to  repress  Germany  into  an  antediluvian  national 
State.  The  international  relations  between  the  nations 
may  be  for  a  time  interrupted  by  the  criminal  short- 
sightedness of  their  leaders  and  rulers,  but  they  will 
again  revive  like  the  earth  in  spring-time  when  the  snow 
has  melted  and  the  storms  of  winter  have  passed  away. 
The  links  which  already  exist  to-day  between  the 
nations,  and  which  after  peace  will  sooner  or  later  be 
strengthened  anew  by  the  might  of  facts,  can  only  be 
extended  in  one  direction;  the  contracting  Powers  must 
pledge  themselves  to  the  maintenance  of  peace  and  to 
mutual  respect  for  the  independence  and  the  possessions 
of  each  other. 

Is  This  a  Utopia? 

Is  this  impracticable  f    Is  this  a  Utopia? 

Bertha  von  Suttner  once  said :  "There  are  three 
phases  through  which  every  spiritual  movement  has  to 
pass ;  in  the  first  men  scoff  at  it,  in  the  second  they  fight 
against  it,  in  the  third  the  reproach  is  hurled  at  it  that 
it  is  forcing  an  open  door." 

If  anyone  400  years  ago  had  said  to  the  Italians  of 
the  sixteenth  century :  "The  day  will  come  when  there 
will  be  a  united  Italian  Fatherland,  no  longer  Florence 
nor  Pisa,  nor  Genoa,  nor  Venice,"  they  would  have 
scoffed  at  the  speaker  as  a  Utopian,  or  would  probably 
have  shut  him  up  in  an  asylum.     If  anyone  had  said  in 


THE  FUTURE  397 

the  Middle  Ages  to  those  living  in  the  fortresses  or  cities 
of  Germany  that  there  would  come  a  time  in  which  they 
would  no  longer  possess  the  right  to  look  after  their  in- 
terests according  to  their  own  strength  and  their  own 
caprice,  they  would  with  a  shrug  of  the  shoulders  have 
left  the  foolish  visionary  to  his  own  dreams.  But  if  any- 
one had  gone  further  and  said  that  not  only  they,  the 
lords  of  the  castle  and  the  town,  but  even  the  lords 
of  wide  territories,  of  whole  kingdoms,  would  one  day 
lose  their  right  of  declaring  war,  and  that  only  the  whole 
German  Empire  would  possess  such  a  right  as  against 
foreign  countries,  they  would  have  had  doubts  as  to  the 
sanity  of  the  speaker,  or,  what  is  even  more  probable, 
they  would  have  chopped  ofif  his  head  for  high  treason. 
What!  Were  they  one  day  to  lose  the  right  of  declar- 
ing war,  the  most  important  and  the  most  essential  part 
of  their  sovereignty?  Would  they  have  to  lay  aside  their 
darling  plaything,  their  soldiers,  or  place  them  under 
the  command  of  a  supreme  lord?  Impossible!  Such  a 
thing  could  not  possibly  be.  Sovereignty  without  the 
right  of  arms  does  not  exist. 

And  yet  it  has  come  to  pass,  and  the  world  has  not 
perished  in  the  process.  And  the  small  and  the  great 
lords  in  Italy  and  Germany  and  elsewhere  are  all  still 
in  existence — except  in  so  far  as  they  have  disappeared 
for  other  reasons.  And  they  lead  a  better  and  happier 
existence  than  they  did  then,  when  they  were  obliged  to 
expend  a  large  part  of  their  income  on  their  personal 
security,  and,  notwithstanding  this,  were  constantly 
threatened  by  the  presumptuous  pride  of  evilly-disposed 
neighbours.  The  community  of  peace  in  which  they  have 
taken  their  place  has  afforded  them  greater  security  and 
increased  well-being,  and  what  they  have  lost  in  sovereign 
rights  is  abundantly  outweighed  by  what  they  have 
gained.  The  Utopia  has  become  a  commonplace,  and  if 
the  prophet  who  saw  these  things  afar  off  would  then 


398  I   ACCUSE! 

have  been  the  object  of  mockery  and  condemnation, 
to-day  the  laudator  tcmporis  acti  would  be  regarded  as 
a  person  of  irresponsible  judgment. 

Countless  instances  of  similar  cases  of  development 
may  be  found  in  history.  It  may,  indeed,  be  said  that 
history  is  in  reality  nothing  more  than  a  continuous  chain 
of  evidence  that  the  impossibilities  of  yesterday  become 
the  possibilities  and  the  realities  of  to-day. 

Why,  then,  should  a  Covenant  of  Peace,  corresponding 
to  the  interests  of  all  nations  alike,  he  regarded  as  an 
impossibility f  If  it  was  possible  for  the  States  included 
in  the  present  German  confederation,  after  being  opposed 
to  each  other  in  1866  in  an  embittered  civil  war,  to 
conclude  four  years  later  "a  perpetual  alliance  in  de- 
fence of  their  territory,  and  of  the  law  in  force  within 
their  frontiers,  and  for  the  promotion  of  the  well-being 
of  the  German  people,"  why  should  it  be  impossible  to 
fashion  a  league  of  nations  with  much  more  restricted 
ends,  without  any  organisation  between  the  States,  only 
with  the  external  aim  of  preserving  the  peace?  Is  such 
a  league  not  reasonable?  Does  it  not  correspond  to  the 
vital  interests  of  all  the  nations  concerned,  of  all  in 
equal  measure?  Is  a  league  resting  on  the  immovable 
foundation  of  the  need  for  peace,  common  to  all  after  so 
fearful  a  world-war,  not  infinitely  more  tenable  than  any 
organisation  based  on  force?  What  would  be  sacrificed 
by  the  signatories  to  a  treaty  establishing  such  a  cove- 
nant of  peace?  They  would  lose  merely  the  right  to 
wage  war  amongst  each  other,  nothing  more.  They  have 
truly  allowed  this  right  sufficient  exercise  in  the  course 
of  the  present  war,  and  have  become  acquainted  with 
its  unspeakable  consequences.  Has  this  right  brought 
them,  or  any  one  of  them,  any  advantage  whatever? 
Has  it  not  brought  them  all,  conqueror  and  conquered 
ahke,  to  the  verge  of  ruin,  and  inflicted  on  them  wounds 
which  will  not  be  healed  for  generations  to  come?    What, 


THE  FUTURE  399 

then,  do  they  surrender  in  renouncing  this  right?  They 
surrender  the  possibility  of  ruining  themselves  and 
others — nothing  more. 

And  what  do  they  gain  in  exchange?  In  the  first  place, 
vn  return  for  the  surrender  of  his  right,  each  one  will  re- 
ceive a  corresponding  duty  from  the  other  parties. 
Rights  and  duties  are  compensatory,  and  to  this  extent, 
then,  a  balance  is  effected.  But  now  comes  the  credit 
side.  Everyone  will  be  secure  from  hostile  attack.  For 
an  unlimited  time  each  nation  will  be  able  to  allow  full 
play  to  its  energies  in  trade  and  commerce,  in  art,  litera- 
ture, and  science;  it  will  be  able  to  develop  without  re- 
striction and  without  opposition  all  the  capacities  given  to 
it  by  nature ;  in  common  with  the  allied  States  it  will  be 
able  gradually  to  reduce  expenditure  for  military  pur- 
poses, which  can  no  longer  serve  for  attack  and  is  no 
longer  needed  for  defence;  and  it  will  be  able  to  apply 
the  money  so  economised  to  education,  the  general  well- 
being,  and  to  social  purposes.  A  new  world  woidd  arise 
within  the  old.  Millions  of  pounds  will  gradually  be 
liberated  each  year  for  the  struggle  against  poverty,  to 
ameliorate  the  condition  of  the  working  classes,  to  dis- 
seminate well-being  and  happiness  on  all  sides ;  and  thus 
by  the  creation  of  a  general  spirit  of  contentment,  Eu- 
ropean society  would  be  assured  against  inner  catas- 
trophes. 

It  is  impossible  to  describe  the  measure  of  the  bless- 
ings which  such  a  league  of  nations  would  pour  out  on 
all  peoples.  With  material  well-being,  with  the  feeling 
of  security  against  a  repetition  of  such  fearful  events 
as  this  war  has  brought  in  its  train,  with  the  enormous 
means  which  would  be  set  free  for  the  objects  of  culture 
and  social  reform,  a  nightmare  would  simultaneously  be 
removed  from  the  spirits  of  our  European  world  of 
culture.     In  every  country  a  new  day  of  spiritual  life 


400  I   ACCUSE! 

would  dawn.  Hatred  and  revenge  would  disappear  from 
the  hearts  of  men,  and  all  nations,  sharing  in  what  would 
now  have  become  a  true  community  of  European  cul- 
ture, reconciled  and  made  brothers,  would  go  forward 
to  meet  their  future  lot  with  pride  in  their  eyes  and  with 
gladness  in  their  hearts. 

I  hear  myself  hailed  as  a  Utopian,  as  a  visionary. 
Naturally;  the  Utopian  of  to-day  is  the  realist  of  to- 
morrow. There  is  nothing  Utopian  in  my  proposal, 
which  has  the  advantage  that  it  is  merely  a  revival  and 
an  extension  of  Kantian  ideas;  even  then  it  was  no 
Utopia;  to-day  it  is  more  practicable  than  ever. 

A  treaty  of  peace  which  rejects  every  idea  of  annexa- 
tion, of  security  based  on  force!  The  fulfilment  of  this 
condition  will  come  about  automatically,  since  the  war 
will  remain  indecisive,  and  in  the  most  favourable  issue 
will  lead  only  to  the  exchange  of  the  objects  pledged 
on  both  sides;  each  side  will  be  glad  if  it  can  only  get 
back  its  former  possessions.  Thank  God  that  it  is  so; 
for  if  a  decisive  victory  of  the  one  side  or  the  other 
— but  especially  of  the  one! — were  conceivable,  the  vic- 
tor would  certainly  merely  annex  as  much  territory  as 
possible  inside  and  outside  Europe,  crush  his  enemies 
to  the  utmost  extent  from  a  military,  political,  and  eco- 
nomic point  of  view,  and  on  the  ruins  of  the  other 
States  rear  a  hegemony  based  on  force.  Such  a  result 
would  inevitably  contain  the  germs  for  constantly  re- 
newed wars;  such  a  treaty  of  peace  would  be  con- 
cluded with  the  stipulation  "until  later,"  and  then — 
Farewell,  League  of  Nations!  Adieu,  Guarantee  of 
Peace ! 

Fortunately,  however,  for  the  blessing  of  mankind 
such  a  result  cannot  ensue.  The  struggle  will  end  with 
a  noil  liquet.  And  what  reason  would  not  have  dictated 
to  the  great  the  power  of  circumstances  will  force  upon 
them.    It  will  be  impossible  for  them — for  any  of  them 


THE  FUTURE  401 

— to  dictate  the  conditions  of  peace,  and  thus  the  record 
of  the  treaty  will  at  least  not  place  in  the  way  of  Euro- 
pean peace  obstacles  on  which  it  could  not  but  stumble 
straightway. 

This  result,  however,  is  unfortunately,  only  a  negative 
one.  If  nothing  more  than  this  is  attained,  the  whole 
tale  of  tribulation  will  recur.  Armaments  and  distrust, 
distrust  and  armaments  in  a  perpetual  vicious  circle — 
further  exhaustion  of  the  nations,  already  completely 
anaemic,  a  renewal  of  diplomatic  tricks  and  dodges,  to 
enable  each  to  get  by  stealth  as  many  fat  scraps  as 
possible  out  of  the  great  soup-dish  of  the  world.  There 
will  be  new  conflicting  interests,  new  causes  of  friction, 
and  in  the  end  new  explosions,  each  worse  than  its 
predecessor. 

In  the  event  of  the  victory  of  one  side,  the  policy  of 
force  and  oppression  would  lead  to  the  new  explosion. 
In  the  event  of  the  struggle  being  indecisive,  the  revival 
of  competing  interests,  the  renewal  of  the  competition 
in  armaments  will  result  in  a  new  state  of  tension  and 
new  discharges. 

The  result  will  remain  the  same,  unless  one  thing  is 
added.  In  addition  to  a  renunciation  of  any  new  order 
of  things  based  on  force,  there  must  be  a  focdns  pacificum, 
a  covenant  of  peace  of  free  nations,  honourably  and  sin- 
cerely intended,  and  as  the  most  important  consequence 
of  this  Covenant  there  must  be  a  gradual  proportionate 
reduction  in  the  strength  of  the  existing  armies  and 
navies  so  far  as  is  compatible  with  an  assurance  of 
the  requisite  security  against  those  nations  still  standing 
outside  the  Covenant  of  peace.  The  more  this  Covenant 
is  externally  extended  and  internally  strengthened,  the 
more  possible  will  it  be  to  make  progress  with  the  dimi- 
nution of  annaments,  and  to  take  in  hand  the  transforma- 
tion of  the  standing  armies  into  militias.  The  develop- 
ment in  this  direction  will  take  place  with  logical  neces- 


402  I    ACCUSE! 

sity.  Since  the  league  will  correspond  to  the  interests  of 
all,  without  doing  violation  in  any  way  to  the  character 
of  their  sovereignty,  since  the  sovereignty  of  each  in- 
dividual member  will  remain  absolutely  unimpaired  in 
its  true  and  essential  content,  and  thus  all  the  advantages 
of  the  league  of  peace  would  be  bought  gratuitously  b> 
each,  it  is  logically  inevitable  that  the  league  should  be- 
come more  intimately  knit  together,  that  confidence  In 
its  existence  should  constantly  increase,  and  that  the 
good  example  thus  given  should  more  and  more  evoke 
imitation  throughout  the  world. 

The  only  right  given  up  on  every  side,  the  right  to 
wage  war  against  others,  appears  in  the  new  organisa- 
tion as  a  Right  to  commit  Wrong,  and  cannot,  there- 
fore, be  regarded  as  a  true  right,  and  thus  its  loss  can- 
not be  regarded  as  a  true  loss.  Thus  the  league  with 
every  year  of  its  existence  will  become  stronger  inter- 
nally and  more  comprehensive  externally.  From  a  league 
of  four  or  five  it  will  grow  to  be  a  league  of  six  or  seven, 
and  finally  a  multiple-entente,  embracing  the  whole  civil- 
ised world.  What  the  wise  men  have  dreamed,  what  the 
nations  have  constantly  striven  after,  will  at  last  become 
the  Truth — not  at  a  stroke,  but  in  the  consciously  directed 
course  of  historical  development,  and  a  new  golden  age, 
which  has  hitherto  appeared  to  us  only  as  the  dream  of 
a  distant  past,  will  blossom  into  reality  in  a  future,  which 
it  may  be  hoped  is  not  far  removed  from  us. 

The  pathway  to  this  beneficent  goal  is  neither  new  nor 
difficult.  If  it  has  hitherto  been  possible  to  conclude  such 
a  league  of  peace  between  two  or  three  States,  it  must 
also  be  possible  to  do  so  between  four  or  five  or  more 
States.  That  the  hitherto  existing  alliances  have  only 
served  the  purpose  of  creating  an  enormous  war  ap- 
paratus for  common  use  is  entirely  due  to  the  fact  that 
they  were  not  sufficiently  comprehensive,  and  that  the 
allied  groups  as  collective  communities  were  opposed  to 


THE  FUTURE  403 

each  other  in  a  hostile,  or,  at  least,  in  a  distrusting  atti- 
tude. The  moment  this  opposition  disappears  and  the 
groups  as  such  become  members  of  a  greater  community, 
every  ground  for  further  military  preparations  disap- 
pears, just  as  it  has  already  ceased  to  exist  within  the 
various  groups. 

If  we  assume  that  Germany  and  Austria,  closely  allied 
with  each  other,  had  existed  alone  in  the  world  without 
having  the  Triple  Entente  or  any  other  group  of  Powers 
in  opposition  to  them,  further  military  preparations  on 
the  part  of  these  two  empires  would  have  been  void  of 
purpose  even  from  the  military  point  of  view,  since 
neither  of  the  allies  had  any  reason  to  expect  that  she 
would  be  attacked  by  the  other.  The  same  holds  good 
in  the  case  of  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente,  if  we 
assume  that  Germany  and  Austria  had  not  been  opposed 
to  them.  Thus  if  all  five  Powers  had  been  united  to- 
gether in  a  league  of  peace,  such  as  now  exists  within 
the  two  groups,  competition  in  armaments  would  have 
been  deprived  of  all  reason  and  purpose,  and  in  the  logic 
of  things  would  have  automatically  ceased.  German 
principalities  and  kingdoms,  so  long  as  they  were  not 
united  to  the  "perpetual  league"  of  the  German  Empire, 
were  obliged  to  be  armed  against  each  other.  With  the 
creation  of  the  German  Empire  this  military  preparation 
disappeared  at  a  stroke,  and  now  only  exists  in  so  far  as 
it  is  directed  against  the  outside  world  in  the  interests  of 
the  protection  of  the  German  Empire  and  of  its  various 
constituent  members.  Italy  also  has  passed  through' the 
same  development  in  various  stages  in  the  course  of  its 
transition  from  the  sovereignty  of  the  individual  city- 
territories  to  the  more  comprehensive  sovereignty  of  the 
individual  kingdoms,  and  finally  to  the  all-comprehensive 
kingdom  of  Italy.  The  same  process  can  be  traced  in 
Switzerland  and  in  the  United  States  of  America. 

In  this  discussion  it  is  irrelevant  whether  the  alliances 


404  I   ACCUSE! 

concluded  led  to  a  unified  State,  to  a  federate  State,  or 
only  to  a  federation  of  States.  It  is  equally  irrelevant 
whether  such  an  alliance  remains  at  the  stage  represented 
by  the  loosest  form  of  a  union  which  would  serve  to  pre- 
vent war.  The  central  point,  which  we  are  here  dis- 
cussing, is  everywhere  the  same :  the  exclusion  by  treaty 
of  every  war  between  the  allied  States.  Whether  be- 
yond this  immediate  object  the  league  should  fulfil  a 
greater  or  smaller  number  of  other  objects  as  well,  or 
whether  it  will  even  develop  into  a  unified  State,  depends 
on  innumerable  factors,  which  vary  according  to  the  vari- 
ous forms  of  the  league,  and  which  will  thus  lead  to  dif- 
ferent results.  It  is  unnecessary  here  to  discuss  these  fac- 
tors (community  of  speech,  of  race,  of  historical  de- 
velopment, of  culture,  &c.).  Our  idea  of  a  union  in  the 
service  of  peace  represents  a  minimum,  which  appears 
worthy  of  our  endeavour,  and  appears  also  attainable, 
even  if  all  the  other  factors  which  lead  to  a  more  in- 
timate union  may  not  be  present.  This  minimum  is 
attainable,  no  matter  how  greatly  the  various  States  as- 
sociated in  the  union  may  differ  in  race,  language,  de- 
velopment of  culture,  and  historical  growth.  For  this 
minimum  of  an  international  union  all  modern  civilised 
nations  are  ripe,  no  matter  how  greatly  they  may  di- 
verge from  each  other  in  the  character  of  their  civilisa- 
tion. 

The  more  limited  the  aim  and  content  of  such  a  league 
of  peace,  the  more  easy  must  it  be  to  call  it  into  being. 
If  il  has  been  found  possible  to  weld  together  sovereign 
States  into  unified  States,  confederated  States,  and  fed- 
erations of  States,  and  if  in  this  process  they  were  obliged 
to  make  a  greater  or  less  sacrifice  of  their  sovereign 
rights,  it  follows  that  it  must  be  a  much  easier  matter 
to  unite  sovereign  States  into  a  union  created  with  a 
certain  end,  in  v/hich,  apart  from  the  right  to  wage  war 
against  each  other,  they  are  not  required  to  make  any 


THE  FUTURE  405 

surrender  of  their  sovereign  rights.     Quod  erat  demon- 
strandum. 

In  my  opinion  these  are  all  practical  considerations 
which  it  may  be  hoped  are  not  diminished  in  value  be- 
cause they  are  firmly  supported  by  logic.  And  let  no 
one  again  speak  to  me  here  of  Utopias  and  perpetual 
peace,  and  so  on.  The  question  is  not  of  perpetual 
peace,  since  the  idea  of  perpetuity  is  not  applicable  to  hu- 
man things,  but  is  a  reservation  of  God  himself.  Even 
the  German  Imperial  Constitution,  which  is  designated  as 
a  perpetual  alliance,  will  succumb  to  the  fate  of  human 
transitoriness.  The  question  is  to  create  human  insti- 
tutions which  as  far  as  possible  will  avoid  human  evils. 
The  institution  represents  the  ideal  postulate;  human  life 
furnishes  the  exceptions.  It  is  no  argument  against  the 
necessity  or  the  usefulness  of  a  political  constitution  that 
a  king  may  indulge  in  a  coup  d'etat,  or  that  the  people 
may  carry  out  a  revolution.  It  is  no  argument  against 
the  necessity  of  a  criminal  code  that  crimes  are  com- 
mitted. The  prevalence  of  immorality  is  no  contradiction 
of  the  moral  law.  Hygiene  does  not  signify  the  abolition 
of  death;  education  does  not  imply  the  production  of 
saints  and  angels. 

The  Covenant  of  Peace  between  the  nations,  then,  is 
not  intended  to  guarantee,  and  cannot  guarantee,  per- 
petual peace ;  it  should,  and  can,  prevent  wars  as  far  as 
possible,  and  it  will  exercise  this  effect  because  abstinence 
from  war  corresponds,  not  only  to  a  moral  requirement, 
but  also  to  the  true  vital  interests  of  the  nations. 

The  Coercive  Force. 

This  at  once  disposes  of  the  usual  question  as  to  the 
coercive  force  which  is  to  bind  the  league  together.  This 
coercive  force  is  in  the  first  place,  duty,  and  in  the  sec- 


406  I   ACCUSE! 

ond  place,  interest.  What  is  the  coercive  force  which 
keeps  the  German  Empire  together?  Who  could  prevent 
Prussia  from  overrunning  Bavaria  and  putting  it  in  her 
pocket?  Could  the  other  States  in  the  federation,  in 
union  with  Bavaria,  by  any  chance  prevent  her  from 
doing  so?  What  these  States  could  accomplish  against 
Prussia  was  seen  in  1866,  when  Prussia,  moreover,  had 
to  fight  against  Austria,  her  present  ally,  as  well.  If, 
therefore,  the  King  of  Prussia  observes  the  Treaty  of 
German  Federation,  he  does  so,  not  because  he  is  con- 
strained by  any  force,  but  because  his  duty  and  his 
interest  demand  that  he  should  do  so.  On  the  same 
grounds  all  treaties  between  States  or  nations,  howso- 
ever wide  or  restricted  be  their  subject-matter,  are  ob- 
served so  long  as  duty  and  interest  alike  demand  that 
they  should  be  respected — interest,  not,  indeed,  in  the 
base  sense  of  a  mom'entary  gain,  but  in  the  higher  sense 
of  a  permanent  advantage,  such  as  can  spring  only  from 
respect  for  Right  and  Morality.  Who  could  prevent  the 
strong  and  prosperous  cantons  of  German  Switzerland 
from  falling  upon  and  annexing  the  weaker  Italian  can- 
tons, which,  further,  belong  to  another  community  in 
race  and  speech,  and  therefore,  in  the  ''nationalist"  view, 
are  inferior,  and  therefore  destined  to  subjection?  No 
physical  force  would  stand  in  the  way  of  such  an  un- 
dertaking; nevertheless,  only  a  madman  would  entertain 
such  an  idea,  since  reason,  duty,  and  interest  impose 
on  the  Swiss  people  the  necessity  of  remaining  true  to 
their  Treaty  of  Federation.  Why  are  commercial,  cus- 
toms, and  shipping  treaties  observed,  even  in  those  cases 
in  which  they  run  counter  to  the  interests  of  one  of  the 
contracting  parties?  Why  does  not  the  stronger  party 
denounce  a  treaty  which  is  unfavourable  to  him  instead 
of  waiting  till  it  expires  or  is  terminated?  Because  the 
duty  of  fidelity  to  engagements  demands  it,  and  be- 
cause even  a  transitory  loss  would  not  outweigh  the 


THE  FUTURE  407 

greater  disadvantage  involved  in  the  fact  that  no  one 
would  ever  again  conclude  a  treaty  with  one  who  had  not 
observed  his  engagements.  Such  examples  could  be  mul- 
tiplied indefinitely.  Analogous  cases  are  further  to  be 
found,  not  only  in  the  external,  but  also  in  the  internal 
life  of  a  State.  If  a  private  citizen  gains  his  case 
against  the  authorities  in  an  administrative  action,  what 
physical  force  compels  the  authorities  to  submit  to  the  un- 
favourable verdict?  There  is  none.  The  authorities 
alone  possess  the  physical  force,  but  the  moral  power  of 
the  verdict,  and  the  higher  interest  of  the  State,  the  in- 
terest of  a  State  based  on  law,  compel  acquiescence  in 
the  judgment. 

Exactly  the  same  will  hold  in  the  case  of  the  obliga- 
tions imposed  on  its  members  by  the  League  of  Peace. 
Duty  and  interest  will  impose  on  the  members  the  neces- 
sity of  observing  their  obligations,  and  if,  notwithstand- 
ing, these  should  be  violated,  the  close  relations  existing 
between  modern  States  will  offer  innumerable  means 
whereby  without  having  recourse  to  bloodshed  the  treaty- 
breaker  may  be  recalled  to  a  sense  of  his  duties.  Among 
such  methods  we  may  note  the  discontinuance  of  com- 
mercial relations,  boycott  of  wares,  exclusion  from  the 
existing  international  organisations;  stoppage  of  post- 
office,  railway,  and  financial  intercourse,  &c.  All  these 
means  will  not,  however,  be  necessary;  for  the  inter- 
est of  continuing  to  be  a  member  of  the  league  and  of 
enjoying  its  advantages,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
dread  of  the  public  stigma,  which  would  make  it  im- 
possible for  the  breaker  of  the  peace  to  have  ever  again 
any  other  relation  of  alliance,  will  prevent  even  the  most 
powerful  member  of  the  league  from  frivolously  acting 
contrary  to  his  duties  as  a  member. 

The  justice  of  this  view  is  proved  by  what  has  actu- 
ally happened  in  the  case  of  awards  of  arbitration.  Of 
the  212  decisions  in  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 


408  I   ACCUSE! 

ttiry,  not  one  remained  unobserved,  although  there  was 
no  compulsion  making  it  necessary  to  submit  to  these 
awards,  and  although  many  of  these  decisions  were  only 
accepted  with  disapprobation  by  the  public  opinion  of  the 
country  concerned,^  on  no  occasion  has  a  State  opposed 
an  arbitration  award  and  refused  to  give  effect  to  it. 
Here,  again,  the  moving  considerations  have  been  the 
duty  of  submitting  to  the  decision  which  had  been  vol- 
untarily sought,  and  the  interest  of  accepting  an  unfa- 
vourable award  rather  than  risking  a  war,  and  being 
revealed  to  the  world  as  a  breaker  of  one's  word. 

So  also  the  Covenant  of  Peace  of  Free  Nations  which, 
after  the  horrors  of  this  war,  is  intended  to  guarantee 
a  true  and  enduring  peace  and  not  merely  a  cessation  of 
hostilities,  will  rest  securely  and  Immovably  on  the  mu- 
tual conßdence  of  the  contracting  nations,  on  the  holi- 
ness of  the  pledged  word,  and  on  the  common  interest 
which  has  welded  the  league  together. 

What  Will  Peace  Bring  Us?  ' 

Is  such  a  large-hearted  peace  policy  to  he  expected  of 
Germany f  Is  it  possible,  having  regard  to  the  internal 
conditions  of  Prussia  and  Germany?  In  my  view  it  is 
not.  So  long  as  Prussia  continues  to  live  under  the  most 
reactionary  constitution  which  is  to  be  found  in  any 
civilised  country  in  the  world,  so  long  as  a  laborious,  pa- 
tient, and  intelligent  people  still  continues  to  be  ruled  as 
it  has  been  for  centuries  by  reactionaries,  Junkers,  sol- 
diers, and  priests,  who  find  their  profit,  not  in  peace- 
ful development,  but  in  military  adventures,  so  long  will 
it  be  impossible  to  think  of  a  sincere  and  upright  peace 
policy  on  the  part  of  Prussian  Germany.  A  family 
of  soldiers,  like  the  Hohenzollerns,  put  in  the  equiv- 
alent of  I  line,  whose  rise  was  due  to  their 
'Fried,  Vol.  i,  p.  156. 


THE  FUTURE  409 

military  efficiency,  will  be  convinced  only  by  a 
strong  counterpoise  in  the  people  that  the  age  of  mili- 
tary conquests  is  past,  and  that  to-day  it  is  only  in  the 
peaceful  competition  of  the  nations  that  laurels  are  to 
be  gained.  As  is  known,  this  counterpoise  in  the  peo- 
ple does  not  exist.  The  absolutism  which  dominates  in 
Prussia,  which  is  only  imperfectly  masked  by  an  outworn 
constitution — a  constitution  without  even  a  lawful  origin, 
having  merely  been  granted  to  the  people — this  Prus- 
sian absolutism  extends  its  influence  even  to  the  Ger- 
man Empire,  notwithstanding  the  democratic  imperial 
electoral  law  and  the  presence  of  confederated  States 
which  are  governed  on  democratic  principles.  The  pre- 
ponderance of  Prussia  in  the  Government  of  the  Em- 
pire and  in  the  Bundesrat,  the  fact  that  the  offices  of 
the  Imperial  Chancellor  and  the  President  of  the  Prussian 
Ministry  are  held  by  one  person,  the  exclusive  military 
power  of  the  Prussian  King  in  his  capacity  of  German 
Emperor,  and,  above  all,  his  right  to  declare  war  and 
conclude  peace  in  the  name  of  the  Empire — in  certain 
circumstances  even  without  the  consent  of  the  Bundes- 
rat— all  these  facts  operate  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  the 
German  Empire  in  reality  only  a  branch-establishment 
of  the  Prussian  Kingdoin.} 

^  Amongst  the  minimum  demands  to  be  insisted  on  in  the  domain 
of  constitutional  law  must  be  included  the  amendment  of  Article 
II  of  the  Imperial  constitution.  In  future  it  must  be  made  impos- 
sible for  the  fate  of  the  German  people  to  rest  on  the  resolutions 
of  one  individual  man.  Even  if  the  concurrence  of  the  Bundesrat 
were  required  before  war  could  be  declared,  this  would  be  insuffi- 
cient to  guarantee  a  people,  who  are  of  full  age,  against  a  repeti- 
tion of  catastrophes  such  as  we  are  now  experiencing  in  horror. 
Even  to-day  it  has  not  become  publicly  known  whether  the  Bun- 
desrat was  consulted  with  regard  to  the  declaration  of  war  against 
Russia  and  France.  Reasoning  from  the  false  assumption  that  an 
attack  on  the  territory  of  the  Union  had  been  committed,  the  con- 
sent of  the  Bundesrat  would  not  have  been  in  any  way  required. 
Nevertheless  in  future  it  will  and  must  be  arranged  tltat  war  will 


410  I    ACCUSE! 

All  the  defects  and  the  faults  inherent  in  the  Prussian 
constitution  exert  their  influence,  like  contagious  dis- 
eases, on  the  body  politic  of  the  Empire.  The  privileges 
of  the  governing  social  classes,  which  from  time  imme- 
morial have  skimmed  the  cream  from  the  milk  in  Prussia, 
have  been  extended  to  the  German  Empire.  Here,  also, 
the  nobility  is  dominant  in  the  military  and  official  world ; 
or  if  the  crown  of  nobility  is  wanting,  its  place  is  taken 
by  those  of  trustworthy  conservative  views.  The  agra- 
rian classes  from  the  provinces  east  of  the  Elbe  have 
left  their  imprint  on  the  laws  of  Germany  dealing  with 
agriculture  and  taxation,  and  have  most  ruthlessly  made 
them  subservient  to  their  interests  at  the  cost  of  the  other 
classes  of  the  population.  The  Prussian  land-councillors, 
whose  influence  before  1870  was  dominant  only  in 
Prussia,  have  pressed  over  the  Elbe,  the  Weser,  and  the 
Rhein  as  far  as  the  Vosges,  and  Herr  von  Koller  and 
Herr  von  Dallwitz  ^  have  been  called  to  impart  true 
Prussian  discipline  and  efficiency  of  thought  to  the  in- 
habitants of  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  Chancellor  shows  to- 
wards the  resolutions  of  the  Reichstag  the  same  sovereign 
indifference  which  Presidents  of  the  Prussian  Council,  in 
accordance  with  an  ancient  tradition,  have  always  shown 
towards  Parliamentary  resolutions — although  they  have 
had  no  reason  whatever  to  complain  of  Parliamentary 
resolutions  hi  Prussia,  at  least  since  the  time  of  the 
conflict;  here,  also,  the  Chancellor  means  to  be  nothing 
more  than  the  faithful  servant  of  his  lord. 

Thus,  then,  there  is  Ahsolutism  in  both  cases — in  Ger- 
many,   Absolutism   ashamed;   in   Prussia,    unashamed. 

be  declared  in  the  name  of  the  Empire  only  by  an  Imperial  law, 
that  is  to  say,  by  concurrent  resolutions  of  the  Reichstag  and  of 
the  Bundesrat. 

^  [E.  M.  von  Koller,  a  native  of  Pommern,  Staatssecretaris  for 
Alsace-Lorraine  1901-8;  Johann  von  Dallwitz,  bom  in  Breslau, 
became  Minister  of  the  Interior  in  1910.] 


THE  FUTURE  411 

There  is  only  this  difference,  that  Prussian  absokitism, 
with  its  complaisant  majority,  achieves  evil  according  to 
its  arbitrary  will,  whereas  German  absolutism,  face  to 
face  with  a  majority  of  a  different  character,  is  obliged 
in  most  cases  to  restrict  itself  to  preventing  the  good. 

Equal  rights  of  religious  confessions  is,  in  Prussia  and 
in  Germany  alike,  merely  a  provision  on  paper,  which 
is  daily  violated ! 

Ministerial  responsibility  in  Prussia  has  not  yet  been 
introduced,  notwithstanding  solemn  promises  for  sixty- 
four  years;  in  Germany  it  has  not  even  been  prom- 
ised! 

The  Prussian  electoral  law  is  still  unaltered,  nothwith- 
standing  a  solemn  promise  in  a  speech  from  the  throne ; 
and  no  effective  alteration  can  be  hoped  for,  if  we  are 
to  judge  from  the  most  recent  utterances  of  conservative 
party-leaders  and  ministers !  On  the  other  hand  there  is 
the  imperial  electoral  law,  which  is  already  undemocra- 
tised  by  an  atrociously  unjust  arrangement  of  constit- 
uencies, and  which  is  constantly  in  danger  of  being  as- 
similated to  the  Prussian  law,  so  that  in  thi*  respect  also 
Prussia  and  Germany  may,  as  far  as  possible,  pursue  the 
same  paths ! 

It  is  superfluous  and  impossible  to  enumerate  here 
all  the  points  in  which  Prussia  is  behind  the  times ;  they 
are  only  too  well  known  to  all  the  world.  The  only 
question  which  is  of  interest  to  us  in  this  connection  is 
whether  a  State  which  is  still  politically  in  a  primitive 
condition  is  capable  of  grasping  great  aims,  which  ex- 
tend far  beyond  its  black  and  white  frontier  posts,  and 
are  designed  to  bestow  a  blessing  on  the  whole  of  civil- 
ised humanity,  and  whether  its  leaders  will  be  prepared 
unerringly  to  pursue  such  aims  as  may  be  recognised  as 
true,  in  opposition  to  all  the  internal  resistance  of  the 
governing  classes  and  cliques. 

These  aims  could  have  been  attained  before  now  with- 


41«  I   ACCUSE! 

out  the  policy  of  the  mailed  fist,  without  the  insanity  of 
military  preparations,  and  without  the  outbreak  of  the 
present  world-catastrophe.  They  could  have  been  at- 
tained by  a  radical  change  in  those  views  which  have 
hitherto  controlled  Prussian-German  policy.  The  Ger- 
man Government  had  only  to  grasp  the  hand  so  often  of- 
fered by  England — from  the  first  Hague  Conference 
down  to  the  last  proposals  of  Grey  at  the  end  of  July, 
1914 — and  all  that  we  are  to-day  hoping,  longing,  and 
striving  for  would  have  been  gained  before  now  without 
shedding  a  drop  of  blood,  without  kindling  a  spark  of 
fire,  without  spreading  death  and  destruction.  Europe 
would  have  stood  in  unity  to-day,  prosperous,  wealthy, 
and  happy,  with  a  brilliant  present,  a  still  more  brilliant 
future,  if  it  had  only  pleased  the  German  Chancellor  to 
listen  to  the  English  Minister's  exhortations  to  peace, 
and  to  consider  that  the  proposed  alliance  of  peace  at 
least  merited  a  trial. 

This  alliance  of  peace  which  was  proposed  by  Grey 
was  the  embryo  out  of  which  the  Kantian' League  in 
the  service  of  peace  would  have  issued,  without  the  pains 
and  the  dangers  of  travail,  in  the  normal  course  of  de- 
velopment. 

It  was  not  to  be  so.  The  itch  for  world-power  had 
seized  our  leaders  and  governors;  the  aims  of  their  am- 
bition— which  were  at  the  same  time  the  aims  of  our 
privileged  classes,  since  they  held  out  to  these  classes  a 
prospect  that  their  privileges,  endangered  through  the 
rise  of  new  national  forces,  would  be  maintained  intact 
— these  aims  could  only  be  achieved  by  force,  and  on  this 
*'rocher  de  bronze"  all  the  barks  of  peace  were  bound  to 
encounter  hopeless  shipwreck. 

Those,  however,  who  by  their  lack  of  comprehension 
or  their  evil  will,  by  their  madness  or  their  criminality, 
prevented  the  work  of  peace  before  the  outbreak  of  this 
war  must  take  care,  after  the  fearful  storm  is  overpast, 


I 


THE  FUTURE  418 

that  they  do  not  deny  the  sunshine  of  a  lasting  peace 
to  the  nations  panting  for  rest  and  happiness.  Let 
him  who  bears  the  responsibihty  of  having  provoked 
this  w^ar,  let  him  who  has  committed  a  crime  for  which 
no  punishment  on  earth  or  in  heaven  offers  sufficient 
reparation,  be  warned  against  taking  upon  his  head  the 
further  curse  of  having  denied  unhappy  nations  the  bless- 
ings of  an  enduring  peace — a  peace  which,  no  matter  who 
is  victorious  or  defeated,  can  never  he  built  on  force,  hut 
only  on  the  free  will  of  free  peoples. 

The  man  who  treads  this  pathway  to  an  enduring 
peace  cannot  recall  the  past,  but  he  can  at  least  make 
the  unfading  palm  of  peace  spring  from  the  blood- 
drenched  fields;  he  will  not  free  himself  from  his  guilt, 
but  many  will  think  in  extenuation  of  his  offence  that 
he  at  least  showed  himself  to  be  a  "part  of  that  force 
which  aye  wills  evil,  but  brings  forth  the  good." 

Should  it  Happen  Otherwise 

Should,  however,  it  happen  otherwise,  should  those 
who  counsel  the  German  Emperor  again  fail,  should  the 
hopes  and  expectations  of  the  nation  once  more  be  de- 
ceived and  the  reaction  within  begin  anew,  perhaps 
stronger  than  ever — and  of  this  there  are  already  many 
indications — should  peace  without  once  more  be  sup- 
ported on  cannons  and  bayonets,  then — we  may  safely 
say — as  Bebel  prophesied,  the  great  general  march  will 
be  followed  by  the  great  crash,  then  the  death-hnell  will 
have  struck,  not  for  the  Government  alone,  hut  also 
for  the  monarchy. 

"Destruction  and  blood  have  ne'er  blessed  a  nation ! 
The  curse  of  the  down-trodden  vanquished — appalling — 
Will  rest  on  the  victor,  exalted  in  station, 
His  forehead  adorned  with  the  green  laurel  wreath. 


414  I    ACCUSE! 

But  the  strong  arm  of  vengeance  is  not  swift  in  falling, 
To  smite  and  destroy  the  misguided  mortal ; 
She  waits  long  and  watches,  and  stands  at  his  portal 
And  appears  to  his  eyes  as  he  wrestles  with  death."  ^ 

The  nations  have  long  seen  the  horrible  thing  drawing 
near,  they  have  long  urgently  warned  the  mighty  ones 
of  the  earth  against  the  crime  of  a  European  war  of  the 
nations,  which,  for  those  guilty  of  the  outrage,  must 
necessarily  bring  in  its  train  the  punishment  of  destruc- 
tion. This  warning  was  nowhere  uttered  so  insistently 
and  so  passionately  as  in  the  great  peace  manifesto  of 
the  International  Party,  adopted  at  Basel  on  November 
25th,  1912,  in  which  it  is  stated: — ■ 

"The  great  nations  of  Earope  are  constantly  on 
the  point  of  being  urged  against  each  other,  while 
it  is  impossible  to  advance  the  slightest  pretext  of 
national  interests  in  justification  of  these  attacks 
against  humanity  and  reason. 

*'The  Balkan  crisis,  which  has  already  produced 
such  a  terrible  tale  of  horror,  would,  if  extended 
still  further,  constitute  the  gravest  danger  for  civili- 
sation and  for  the  proletariate.  It  would  also  be  the 
greatest  crime  in  history  in  view  of  the  glaring 
contrast  between  the  magnitude  of  the  catastrophe 
and  the  insignificance  of  the  interests  involved. 

"The  Congress  therefore  notes  with  satisfaction 
the  complete  unanimity  of  the  Socialist  Party  and 
of  the  working  classes  of  all  countries  in  conducting 

^  ["Kein  Volk  noch  beglückten 
Blut  und   Plünd'rung!   der  Fluch  fällt  entsetzlich, 
Auf  den  mächtigen,  lorbeergeschmückten 
Sieger  von  dem  Besiegten  Zurück! 
Wohl  ergreift  den  Bethörten  nicht  plötzlich 
Eh'rnen  Armes  die  ewige  Rache, 
Doch  sie  wartet,  sie   folgt,  sie  hält  Wache 
Sie  tritt  ernst  vor  des  Sterbenden  Blick."] 


THE  FUTURE  416 

War  against  War.  ...  A  war  between  the  three 
great  leading  civilised  nations  on  account  of  the 
dispute  about  a  harbour  between  Serbia  and 
Austria  would  be  an  act  of  criminal  madness.  .  .  . 
The  Governments  should  not  forget  that  in  the  pres- 
ent condition  of  Europe,  and  in  view  of  the  attitude 
of  the  working  classes,  they  cannot,  without  danger 
to  themselves,  embark  on  a  war.  ...  It  would  be 
madness  if  Governments  should  fail  to  realise  that 
the  mere  thought  of  the  enormity  of  a  world-war 
must  in  itself  arouse  the  horror  and  the  indigna- 
tion of  the  working  classes.  The  proletariate  feel 
it  as  a  crime  to  shoot  against  each  other  in  the 
interests  of  the  profits  of  capitalists,  the  ambition 
of  dynasties,  and  for  the  greater  honour  of  diplo- 
matic secret  treaties. 

"If  the  governing  powers  cut  off  the  possibility 
of  normal  continued  development,  and  thereby  in- 
cite the  proletariate  to  desperate  measures,  they 
would  themselves  have  to  bear  the  whole  responsi- 
bility for  the  consequences  of  the  crisis  provoked 
by  them." 

The  speeches  delivered  to  the  assembled  multitude  in 
the  venerable  minister  at  Basel  by  the  representatives 
of  the  working  classes  of  all  countries,  Germany,  Austria, 
England,  France,  with  Jaures  at  their  head,  were  in 
agreement  with  the  spirit  of  this  manifesto.  It  was 
not  merely  socialist  leaders,  but  also  strictly  orthodox 
preachers,  and  Swiss  Government  officials,  who  uttered 
earnest  words  of  warning  against  the  folly  of  a  Eu- 
ropean war,  against  this  inexpiable  crime  against  hu- 
manity. It  was  urged  that  no  treaty  of  alliance  could 
oblige  Germany  to  shed  even  a  drop  of  German  blood 
for  the  foolish  and  ambitious  policy  of  certain  Austrian 
cliques.    All  the  consequences  would  recoil  on  the  heads 


416  I    ACCUSE! 

of  those  guilty  of  engineering  a  butchery  such  as  the 
world  had  never  seen.  Jaures  clearly  prophesied  that 
the  more  terrible  the  European  war,  the  greater  and 
more  terrible  would  be  the  revolution  which  would 
ensue. 

The  Twilight  of  the  Gods 

And  now  that  has  come  to  pass  against  which  the 
representatives  of  the  people  of  all  countries  raised  such 
insistent  warnings.  Then  the  warning  could  still  achieve 
success;  to-day,  however,  it  must  fail  because  their 
tongues  are  paralysed,  their  hands  are  bound,  their  foot- 
steps are  hampered.  It  is  not  because  of  a  squabble 
between  Austria  and  Serbia  about  a  harbour,  but 
because  of  other  trifles,  which  are  far  more  petty  in 
character,  that  twenty  million  men  in  the  flower  of  their 
age  are  to-day  rending  each  other's  flesh.  It  is  because 
of  a  misunderstanding,  a  question  of  legal  interpreta- 
tion, which  could  have  been  solved  by  half  an  hour's 
consultation  between  experts.  Had  we  not  experienced 
all  this,  it  would  have  been  regarded  as  the  insane  product 
of  a  brain  in  the  last  stages  of  advanced  paralysis. 
Whether  it  was  to  be  an  cnquete  judiciaire  or  policiere, 
whether  the  Austrian  should  be  allowed  to  collaborate 
in  Serbia  in  judicial  or  police  investigation — these  and 
similar  world-shaking  questions — according  to  the  asser- 
tion of  the  guilty  parties  themselves — for  they  do  not 
yet  acknowledge  their  secret  intentions  to  make  war — ■ 
it  is  such  "vital"  questions  as  these  which  have  enabled 
death  to  reap  her  harvest  to-day  and  to  pile  up  moun- 
tains and  mountains  of  bodies.  Confronted  with  such 
a  situation,  even  the  most  placid  of  our  "contempo- 
raries" cannot  fail  to  become  revolutionary.  Even  a 
Philistine  must  say  that  a  political  or  social  organisation 
which  leads  to  such  results  is  ripe  for  destruction.  Even 
his  love  for  the  governing  powers  must  be  transformed 


J 


THE  FUTURE  417 

into  hatred;  even  in  his  atmosphere  Herwegh's  words 
of  a  "Living  Man"  must  penetrate : — 

"Love  cannot  help  us!    Thrust  behind 
Love's  vision  of  salvation ! 
Hatred  !     Break  thou  these  chains  that  bind ; 
Judge,  and  speak  forth  damnation ! 

And  if  proud  tyrants  still  hold  sway. 
We'll  hurl  them  to  disaster. 
Love  long  enough  has  had  her  day; 
Now,  Hatred,  be  our  master."  ^ 

From  the  International  of  Labour  there  was  bound  to 
arise,  and  there  must  now  arise,  the  International  of 
hatred,  hatred  against  imperialism  and  the  doctrine  of 
the  blood,  hatred  against  the  policy  of  blood  and  con- 
quest. The  voices  of  the  people  are  still  paralysed  and 
suppressed,  the  sparks  are  still  glowing  under  the  ashes, 
but  the  tongues  will  be  released,  the  flames  will  leap  up, 
and  the  corrupt  building  of  our  present-day  State  will 
perish  in  fire,  like  so  many  other  glorious  works  of  man 
which  have  been  less  deserving  of  a  fiery  destruction. 
The  blessing  will  come,  not,  however,  from  above,  but 
from  below,  and  there  will  pass  into  fulfilment  Bebel's 
prophetic  word,  the  swan  song  which  he  uttered  shortly 
before  his  death :  "They  will  reap  what  they  have  soivn, 
the  twilight  of  the  gods  of  the  ciml  zvorld  is  breaking." 
Once  before  in  the  history  of  mankind  deliverance  came 

^  ["Die  Liebe  kann  uns  helfen  nicht. 
Die  Liebe  nicht  erretten; 
Halt  Du,  O  Hass,  Dein  jüngst  Gericht, 
Brich  Du,  O  Hass,  die  Ketten! 

Und  wo  es  noch  Tyrannen  gibt. 
Die  lasst  uns  keck  erfassen; 
Wir  haben  lang  genug  geliebt 
Und  wollen  endlich  hassen."] 


418  I    ACCUSE! 

from  the  depths  of  the  people  in  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  the 
Carpenter's  son,  the  Preacher  of  Love  and  of  Compas- 
sion in  a  time  of  bloody  conquest  and  oppression,  the 
protector  of  all  the  weary  and  heavy  laden,  the  great 
revolutiojtary  of  peace;  to-day  He  also  would  have  stood 
in  the  ranks  of  those  fighting  for  peace,  and  would  have 
turned  away  with  sorrow  and  indignation  from  those 
who  call  themselves  by  His  name  and  yet  so  contemptu- 
ously despise  all  His  commands. 

If  the  prophecy  of  Bebel  has  not  yet  been  realised 
to-day,  will  it  be  realised  to-morrow?  It  will  the  more 
certainly  be  realised  the  more  our  leaders  con- 

tinue to  pursue,  after  the  war  is  over,  the  criminal  blind- 
ness which  has  misled  them  to  this  war.  Radical  re- 
pentance within,  organised  assurance  of  peace  without, 
these  are  the  means  which  perhaps  may  even  yet  post- 
pone the  day  of  vengeance  and  of  retaliation.  But  as 
matters  are  with  us  in  Germany  it  is  impossible  to  im- 
agine such  a  repentance  or  such  a  change.  The  system 
which  has  led  to  the  war,  the  consequences  of  which 
were  prophesied,  not  only  by  representatives  of  the  la- 
bouring classes,  but  also  by  many  men  of  penetrating 
vision  from  other  social  ranks — this  system  will  be  pur- 
sued with  increased  energy,  and  will  not  end  until  the 
people  utters  its  word  of  might 

Then,  indeed,  and  only  then,  will  an  enduring  condition 
of  peace  be  assured  among  the  nations,  as  the  presup- 
position of  which  the  sage  of  Königsberg  stated  a  hun- 
dred and  twenty  years  ago  that  the  civil  constitution 
in  each  State  must  be  republican.  For  him  the  institu- 
tion of  a  monarchy  was  necessarily  and  inevitably  con- 
nected with  the  danger  of  ever-renewed  holy  warfare. 
The  grounds  for  this  thought  hold  to-day  with  undimin- 
ished force: — 


THE  FUTURE  419 

"Now  the  republican  constitution,  apart  from  the 
soundness  of  its  origin,  since  it  arose  from  the  pure 
source  of  the  concept  of  right,  has  also  the  prospect  of 
attaining  the  desired  result,  namely,  perpetual  peace. 
And  the  reason  is  this.  If,  as  must  be  so  under  this 
constitution,  the  consent  of  the  subjects  is  required  to 
determine  whether  there  shall  be  war  or  not,  nothing  is 
more  natural  than  that  they  should  weigh  the  matter 
well  before  undertaking  such  a  bad  business.  For  in 
decreeing  war  they  would  of  necessity  be  resolving  to 
bring  down  the  miseries  of  war  upon  their  country.  This 
implies:  they  must  fight  themselves;  they  must  hand 
over  the  costs  of  the  war  out  of  their  own  property ; 
they  must  do  their  poor  best  to  make  good  the  devasta- 
tion which  it  leaves  behind;  and  finally,  as  a  crowning 
ill,  they  have  to  accept  a  burden  of  debt  which  will 
embitter  even  peace  itself,  and  which  they  can  never 
pay  off  on  account  of  the  new  wars  which  are  always 
impending.  On  the  other  hand,  in  a  Government  where 
the  subject  is  not  a  citizen  holding  a  vote  (i.e.,  in  a 
constitution  which  is  not  republican),  the  plunging  into 
war  is  the  least  serious  thing  in  the  world.  For  the  ruler 
is  not  a  citizen,  but  the  owner  of  the  state,  and  does  not 
lose  a  whit  by  the  war,  while  he  goes  on  enjoying  the 
delights  of  his  table  or  sport,  or  of  his  pleasure  palaces 
and  gala  days.  He  can,  therefore,  decide  on  war  for  the 
most  trifling  reasons,  as  if  it  were  a  kind  of  pleasure 
party.  Any  justification  of  it  that  is  necessary  for  the 
sake  of  decency  he  can  leave  without  concern  to  the 
diplomatic  corps,  who  are  always  only  too  ready  with 
their  services." 

So  said  Kant.  .  .  . 

Was  he  right?    It  is  for  the  German  people  to  decide. 

But  if  he  was  right,  what  follows? 


EPILOGUE 

"They  who  do  not  feel  the  darkness  will 
never  look  for  the  light." — BucKLp. 

The  man  who  wrote  this  book  is  a  German. 

He  is  not  a  Frenchman,  a  Russian,  or  an  EngHshman. 
He  is  a  German  who  is  uncorrupted  and  incorruptible; 
who  is  not  bought,  and  is  not  for  sale. 

A  German  who  loves  his  Fatherland  like  anyone  else; 
but,  just  because  he  loves  it,  he  wrote  this  book. 

Born  on  German  soil,  trained  in  German  culture, 
German  in  his  ancestry,  his  speech  and  his  thought,  he 
knows  all  the  virtues  of  the  German  people,  but  he  also 
knows  their  failings  and  their  weaknesses.  In  the  Ger- 
man people,  as  everywhere,  virtues  produce  weaknesses. 
From  the  virtue  of  fidelity  there  springs  the  blind  con- 
fidence which  does  not  inquire  whether  the  good  faith 
of  the  nation  has  been  deceived,  and  from  the  virtue  of 
attachment  there  springs  the  unconditional  adherence 
which  does  not  ask  whether  the  path  pointed  out  leads 
to  guilt  and  destruction. 

The  confidence  of  the  German  people  has  been  basely 
abused  by  its  leaders  and  rulers.  Their  eyes,  which  once 
saw  so  clearly,  have  been  wrapped  in  the  gloom  of  igno- 
rance. Her  citizens  who  loved  peace  have  been  trans- 
formed into  combatants  full  of  hatred  and  vengeance; 
the  representatives  of  high  culture  and  of  intelligence 
have  feeen  changed  into  blind  and  benighted  worshippers 
of  success ;  men  whose  vision  comprehended  the  uni- 
verse have  become  narrow-hearted,  clinging  to  the  soil 
of  their  country;  the  lights  of  art  and  of  science  have 

420 


EPILOGUE  421 

been  replaced  by  "the  spirits  of  the  barrack-yard  tricked 
out  in  academic  freedom." 

The  German  people  has  been  corrupted  and  blinded 
that  it  might  be  driven  into  a  war  which  it  has  never 
foreseen,  never  intended,  and  never  desired.  In  order 
that  it  might  be  liberated,  it  has  been  put  in  chains. 

It  was  to  break  this  charm,  to  liberate  the  people  from 
its  "liberators,"  to  fight  against  falsehood,  that  I  wrote 
this  book  of  Truth. 

From  the  poptdo  male  informato  I  appeal  to  the  popu- 
lum  melius  informandum. 

A  true  son  of  Germania,  I  see  my  blinded  Mother 
tottering  to  the  abyss;  I  leap  forward  to  save  her  from 
the    fatal   plunge. 

May  truth  still  be  spoken  in  the  Germany  of  to-day? 
Or  have  things  already  advanced  so  far  that  it  is  counted 
moral  to  utter  falsehood,  but  immoral  to  speak  the 
truth?  Does  the  good  old  song,  which  we  used  to  sing 
to  the  sound  of  the  rapier,  no  longer  hold: 

"A  pitiable  wretch  is  he 
Who  knows  the  truth  and  yet  can  silent  be."  ^ 

Has  this  ancient  glory  for  ever  departed?  Should  it 
now  read : 

"A  pitiable  wretch  is  he 
Who  knows  what's  false  and  cannot  silent  be."  ^ 

Do  you  dispute  what  I  have  declared  to  be  the  truth? 
First  let  me  speak,  and  then  disprove  what  I  say.  If 
you  can  do  so,  so  much  the  better  for  you !  But  bear 
this  well  in  mind :  the  spoken  word  is  sometimes  dan- 

*Wer  die  Wahrheit  kennet   und   saget  sie  nicht 
Der  ist  fürwahr  ein  erbärmlicher  Wicht. 

'  Wer  die  Lüge  kennt   und  verheimlicht  sie  nicht 
Der  ist  fürwahr  ein  erbärmlicher  Wicht. 


422  I    ACCUSE! 

gerous;  more  dangerous  at  all  times  is  the  suppressed 
word. 


Your  security  within  f  ^  Must  the  peace  within  endure 
until  it  becomes  the  peace  of  a  churchyard?  "Not  now 
— later,"  you  exclaim.  "Precisely  now — only  now,"  I 
tell  you.  What  is  later  but  a  word,  an  unavailing  word, 
is  now  an  act,  an  act  of  salvation.  Hundreds  of  thou- 
sands could  be  saved  from  death,  the  German  people 
could  be  saved  from  destruction — even  now,  even  at 
this  very  moment — ^if  Truth  could  but  force  her  way  into 
the  German  people,  for  Truth  would  mean  a  pause,  but 
Falsehood  is  an  advance  on  the  path  that  leads  to 
destruction. 

You  say  that  the  Truth  helps  our  enemies?  You  great 
children,  who  shut  your  eyes  to  escape  danger.  Long 
ago  the  enemy  knew  the  truth;  there  is  no  one  in  the 
whole  world  who  does  not  know  it.  It  is  everybody's 
secret. 

But  you,  Germany,  you  incorrigible,  trusting  dreamer, 
you  alone  still  slumber,  you  alone  continue  to  sleep,  in 
all  your  unrighteousness,  the  sleep  of  the  righteous.  It 
is  long  since  the  sun  rose  and  spread  her  beams.  But 
you  see  it  not,  in  the  stillness  of  your  night,  behind  the 
closed  shutters  of  your  citadel.^  .  .  .  How  long  must 
Truth  stand  outside  begging  and  shivering  before  the 
doors  of  your  castle,  entreating  in  vain  for  admission, 
while  within  Falsehood  sits  at  the  garish  table?  Open 
the  doors!  Long  enough  has  Truth  been  waiting.  It 
is  time  to  admit  her,  and  to  prepare  for  her  the  place 
of  honour.  In  admitting  such  a  guest,  you  would  hon- 
our yourself. 

^  [Burgfrieden.     See  footnote  p.    io8.] 
*  [Burgfrieden.] 


EPILOGUE  423 

Make  peace  without,  and  within  you  will  not  need 
peace.  Open  the  doors  to  the  free  word,  to  the  light 
that  it  may  illumine  your  darkness,  to  the  air  that  it 
may  blow  away  the  unclean  vapours!  You  are  choking 
within.     Throw  open  the  doors ! 

Do  you  believe  that  the  sun  would  not  rise  if  you  were 
to  wall  up  your  windows  ?  Do  you  believe  that  the  day- 
star  would  not  shine,  because  your  bat's  eyes  cannot 
bear  its  radiance?  Be  sure  that  Truth,  in  spite  of  all 
obstacles,  will  penetrate  into  your  closed  dwellings, 
through  chinks  and  crevices,  like  motes  of  dust ;  she  will 
force  her  way  into  the  house  by  the  chimneys  or  the 
keyholes ;  she  will  gnaw  the  floor  from  under  your  feet ; 
she  will  strike  away  the  roof  from  over  your  head.  Open 
and  let  her  in;  thus  at  least  your  house  will  be  saved. 

If,  however,  you  do  not  hear,  if  you  mill  not  hear — 
even  now — ^your  house  will  fall,  and  you  will  be  buried 
under  the  ruins.  For  I  tell  you  that  if  Germany  con- 
tinues to  gain  ''victories"  such  as  she  has  attained  up 
till  now,  her  victories  will  lead  to  her  death.  .  .  . 

To  prevent  this  I  wrote  my  book,  a  book  of  enlighten- 
ment for  the  German  people. 

History,  which  weighs  guilt  and  innocence  in  its  iron 
scales,  will,  I  am  firmly  convinced,  confirm  the  judg- 
ment which,  with  pain  and  shame,  I  as  a  German  have 
been  compelled  to  pass  on  Germans,  in  honour  of  truth 
and  for  the  well-being  of  the  German  people.  History 
also  with  letters  of  flame  will  inscribe  the  verdict: 
weighed  in  the  balance  and  found  wanting. 

So  I  finish  my  book  as  I  began  it,  with  a  clean  con- 
science, with  the  sure  feeling  of  having  done  a  good 
work,  and,  if  justice  is  done,  of  having  deserved  the 
thanks  of  my  country. 


APPENDICES 

I 

Speech  Delivered  by  the  Chancellor,  Dr.  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  in  the  Sitting  of  the 
German  Reichstag,  on  August  4th,  1914.^ 

A  stupendous  fate  is  breaking  over  Europe.  For 
forty- four  years,  since  the  time  we  fought  for  and  won 
the  German  Empire  and  our  position  in  the  world,  we 
have  Hved  in  peace  and  have  protected  the  peace  of 
Europe.  In  the  works  of  peace  we  have  become  strong 
and  powerful,  and  have  thus  aroused  the  envy  of  others. 
With  patience  we  have  faced  the  fact  that,  under  the 
pretence  that  Germany  was  desirous  of  war,  enmity  has 
been  awakened  against  us  in  the  East  and  the  West,  and 
chains  have  been  fashioned  for  us.  The  wind  then 
sown  has  brought  forth  the  whirlwind  which  has  now 
broken  loose.  We  wished  to  continue  our  work  of  peace, 
and,  like  a  silent  vow,  the  feeling  that  animated  every- 
one from  the  Emperor  down  to  the  youngest  soldier  was 
this :  Only  in  defence  of  a  just  cause  shall  our  sword 
fly  from  its  scabbard. 

The  day  has  now  come  when  we  must  draw  it,  against 
our  wish,  and  in  spite  of  our  sincere  endeavours.  Russia 
has  set  fire  to  the  building.  We  are  at  war  with  Russia 
and  France — a  war  that  has  been  forced  upon  us. 

Gentlemen,  a  number  of  documents,  composed  during 
*  [As  translated  in  Collected  Diplomatic  Documents.] 
424 


APPENDICES  425 

the  pressure  of  these  last  eventful  days,  is  before  you. 
Allow  me  to  emphasise  the  facts  that  determine  our 
attitude. 

From  the  first  moment  of  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict 
we  declared  that  this  question  must  be  limited  to  Aus- 
tria-Hungary and  Serbia,  and  we  worked  with  this  end 
in  view.  All  Governments,  especially  that  of  Great 
Britain,  took  the  same  attitude.  Russia  alone  asserted 
that  she  had  to  be  heard  in  the  settlement  of  this  matter. 

Thus  the  danger  of  a  European  crisis  raised  its  threat- 
ening head. 

As  soon  as  the  first  definite  information  regarding  the 
military  preparations  in  Russia  reached  us  we  declared 
at  Petrograd  in  a  friendly  but  emphatic  manner  that  mili- 
tary measures  against  Austria  would  find  us  on  the  side 
of  our  ally,  and  that  military  preparations  against  our- 
selves would  oblige  us  to  take  counter-measures;  but 
that  mobilisation  would  come  very  near  to  actual  war. 

Russia  assured  us  in  the  most  solemn  manner  of  her 
desire  for  peace,  and  declared  that  she  was  making  no 
military  preparations  against  us. 

In  the  meantime.  Great  Britain,  warmly  supported  by 
us,  tried  to  mediate  between  Vienna  and  Petrograd. 

On  July  28th  the  Emperor  telegraphed  to  the  Tsar 
asking  him  to  take  into  consideration  the  fact  that  it  was 
both  the  duty  and  the  right  of  Austria-Hungary  to  de- 
fend herself  against  the  pan-Serb  agitation,  which  threat- 
ened to  undermine  her  existence.  The  Emperor  drew 
the  Tsar's  attention  to  the  solidarity  of  the  interests  of 
all  monarchs  in  face  of  the  murder  of  Serajevo.  He 
asked  for  the  latter's  personal  assistance  in  smoothing 
over  the  difficulties  existing  between  Vienna  and  Petro- 
grad. About  the  same  time,  and  before  receipt  of  this 
telegram,  the  Tsar  asked  the  Emperor  to  come  to  his  aid 
and  to  induce  Vienna  to  moderate  her  demands.  The 
Emperor  accepted  the  role  of  mediator. 


426  I    ACCUSE! 

But  scarcely  had  active  steps  on  these  hnes  begun 
when  Russia  mobiHsed  all  her  forces  directed  against 
Austria,  while  Austria-Hungary  had  mobilised  only  those 
of  her  corps  which  were  directed  against  Serbia.  To 
the  north  she  had  mobilised  only  two  of  her  corps,  far 
from  the  Russian  frontier.  The  Emperor  immediately 
informed  the  Tsar  that  this  mobilisation  of  Russian 
forces  against  Austria  rendered  the  role  of  mediator, 
which  he  had  accepted  at  the  Tsar's  request,  difficult,  if 
not  impossible. 

In  spite  of  this  we  continued  our  task  of  mediation 
at  Vienna  and  carried  it  to  the  utmost  point  which  was 
compatible  with  our  position  as  an  ally. 

Meanwhile  Russia  of  her  own  accord  renewed  her  as- 
surances that  she  was  making  no  military  preparations 
against  us. 

We  come  now  to  July  31st.  The  decision  was  to  be 
taken  at  Vienna.  Through  our  representations  we  had 
already  obtained  the  resumption  of  direct  conversations 
between  Vienna  and  Petrograd,  after  they  had  been  for 
some  time  interrupted.  But  before  the  final  decision 
was  taken  at  Vienna,  the  news  arrived  that  Russia  had 
mobilised  her  entire  forces,  and  that  her  mobilisation 
was  therefore  directed  against  us  also.  The  Russian 
Government,  who  knew  from  our  repeated  statements 
what  mobilisation  on  our  frontiers  meant,  did  not  notify 
us  of  this  mobilisation,  nor  did  they  even  offer  any  ex- 
planation. It  was  not  until  the  afternoon  of  July  31st 
that  the  Emperor  received  a  telegram  from  the  Tsar  in 
which  he  guaranteed  that  his  army  would  not  assume 
a  provocative  attitude  towards  us.  But  mobilisation  on 
our  frontiers  had  been  in  full  swing  since  the  night  of 
July  30th-3ist. 

While  we  were  mediating  at  Vienna  in  compliance  with 
Russia's  request,  Russian  forces  were  appearing  all  along 
our  extended   and   almost   entirely   open    frontier,   and 


II 


APPENDICES  427 

France,  though  indeed  not  actually  mobilising,  was  ad- 
mittedly making  military  preparations.  What  was  our 
position?  For  the  sake  of  the  peace  of  Europe  we  had, 
up  till  then,  deliberately  refrained  from  calling  up  a 
single  reservist.  Were  we  now  to  wait  further  in  pa- 
tience until  the  nations  on  either  side  of  us  chose  the 
moment  for  their  attack?  It  would  have  been  a  crime 
to  expose  Germany  to  such  peril.  Therefore,  on  July 
31st  we  called  upon  Russia  to  demobilise  as  the  only 
measure  which  could  still  preserve  peace  of  Europe.  The 
Imperial  Ambassador  at  Petrograd  was  also  instructed 
to  inform  the  Russian  Government  that  in  case  our 
demand  met  with  a  refusal,  we  should  have  to  consider 
that  a  state  of  war   (Kriegszustand)  existed. 

The  Imperial  Ambassador  has  executed  these  instruc- 
tions. We  have  not  yet  learnt  what  Russia  answered  to 
our  demand  for  demobilisation.  Telegraphic  reports  on 
this  question  have  not  reached  us  even  though  the 
wires  still  transmitted  much  less  important  infomia- 
tion. 

Therefore,  the  time-limit  having  long  since  expired, 
the  Emperor  was  obliged  to  mobilise  our  forces  on 
August  1st  at  5  p.m. 

At  the  same  time  we  had  to  make  certain  what  atti- 
tude France  would  assume.  To  our  direct  question, 
whether  she  would  remain  neutral  in  the  event  of  a 
Russo-German  War,  France  replied  that  she  would  do 
what  her  interests  demanded.  That  was  an  evasion,  if 
not  a  refusal. 

In  spite  of  this,  the  Emperor  ordered  that  the  French 
frontier  was  to  be  unconditionally  respected.  This  or- 
der, with  one  single  exception,  was  strictly  obeyed. 
France,  who  mobilised  at  the  same  time  as  we  did,  as- 
sured us  that  she  would  respect  a  zone  of  10  kilometres 
on  the  frontier.  What  really  happened?  Aviators 
dropped  bombs,  and  cavalry  patrols  and  French  infantry 


428  I   ACCUSE! 

detachments  appeared  on  the  territory  of  the  Empire! 
Though  war  had  not  been  declared,  France  thus  broke 
the  peace  and  actually  attacked  us. 

Regarding  the  one  exception  on  our  side  which  I  men- 
tioned, the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  reports  as  fol- 
lows : — 

"Only  one  of  the  French  complaints  about  the  cross- 
ing of  the  frontier  from  our  side  is  justified.  Against 
express  orders,  a  patrol  of  the  14th  Army  Corps,  ap- 
parently led  by  an  officer,  crossed  the  frontier  on  August 
2nd.  They  seem  to  have  been  shot  down,  only  one  man 
having  returned.  But  long  before  this  isolated  instance 
of  crossing  the  frontier  had  occurred,  French  aviators 
had  penetrated  into  Southern  Germany  and  had  thrown 
bombs  on  our  railway  lines.  French  troops  had  at- 
tacked our  frontier  guards  on  the  Schlucht  Pass.  Our 
troops,  in  accordance  with  their  orders,  have  remained 
strictly  on  the  defensive."  This  is  the  report  of  the 
General  Staff. 

Gentlemen,  we  are  now  in  a  state  of  necessity  (Not- 
wehr), and  necessity  (Not)  knows  no  law.  Our  troops 
have  occupied  Luxemburg  and  perhaps  have  already  en- 
tered Belgian  territory. 

Gentlemen,  that  is  a  breach  of  international  law.  It 
is  true  that  the  French  Government  declared  at  Brussels 
that  France  would  respect  Belgian  neutrality  as  long  as 
her  adversary  respected  it.  We  knew,  however,  that 
France  stood  ready  for  an  invasion.  France  could  wait, 
we  could  not.  A  French  attack  on  our  flank  on  the 
lower  Rhine  might  have  been  disastrous.  Thus  we  were 
forced  to  ignore  the  rightful  protests  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  Luxemburg  and  Belgium.  The  wrong — I  speak 
openly — the  wrong  we  thereby  commit  we  will  try  to 
make  good  as  soon  as  our  military  aims  have  been  at- 
tained. 

He  who  is  menaced  as  we  are  and  is  fighting  for  his 


APPENDICES  429 

highest  possession  can  only  consider  how  he  is  to  hack 
his  way  through  {durchhauen) . 

Gentlemen,  we  stand  shoulder  to  shoulder  with  Aus- 
tria-Hungary. 

As  for  Great  Britain's  attitude,  the  statements  made 
by  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  the  House  of  Commons  yester- 
day show  the  standpoint  assumed  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment. We  have  informed  the  British  Government 
that,  as  long  as  Great  Britain  remains  neutral,  our  fleet 
will  not  attack  the  northern  coast  of  France,  and  that 
we  will  not  violate  the  territorial  integrity  and  inde- 
pendence of  Belgium.  These  assurances  I  now  repeat 
before  the  world,  and  I  may  add  that,  as  long  as  Great 
Britain  remains  neutral,  we  would  also  be  willing,  upon 
reciprocity  being  assured,  to  take  no  warlike  measures 
against  French  commercial  shipping. 

Gentlemen,  so  much  for  the  facts.  I  repeat  the  words 
of  the  Emperor:  "With  a  clear  conscience  we  enter  the 
lists."  We  are  fighting  for  the  fruits  of  our  works  of 
peace,  for  the  inheritance  of  a  great  past  and  for  our 
future.  The  fifty  years  are  not  yet  past  during  which 
Count  Moltke  said  wc  should  have  to  remain  armed  to 
defend  the  inheritance  that  we  won  in  1870.  Now  the 
great  hour  of  trial  has  struck  for  our  people.  But  with 
clear  confidence  we  go  forward  to  meet  it.  Our  army  is 
in  the  field,  our  navy  is  ready  for  battle — behind  them 
stands  the  entire  German  nation — the  entire  German  na- 
tion united  to  the  last  man. 

Gentlemen,  you  know  your  duty  and  all  that  it  means. 
The  proposed  laws  need  no  further  explanation.  I  ask 
you  to  pass  them  quickly. 


430  I    ACCUSE! 


II 


Speech  Delivered  by  the  Chancellor,  Dr.  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  in  the  sitting  of  the 
German  Reichstag  on  December  2nd,  1914. 

Gentlemen,  His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  who  is  at  the 
front  with  the  Army,  has  requested  me  to  convey  his 
best  wishes  and  heartiest  greetings  to  the  representa- 
tives of  the  German  people,  with  whom  he  knows  that 
he  is  at  one  until  death,  in  storm  and  danger,  and  in 
the  common  care  for  the  well-being  of  the  Fatherland, 
and  he  has  asked  me  at  the  same  time  to  express  to  the 
whole  nation  in  his  name  and  from  this  place  his  thanks 
for  the  unexampled  sacrifice  and  devotion,  for  the  stu- 
pendous task  which  is  being  achieved  at  the  front  and  at 
home,  and  will  still  further  be  achieved,  by  all  ranks 
of  the  nation  without  distinction.  Our  first  thought,  also, 
turns  to  the  Emperor,  to  the  Army,  and  the  Navy,  to 
our  soldiers  who  on  the  battlefield  and  on  the  high  seas 
are  fighting  for  the  honour  and  the  greatness  of  the 
Empire.  We  look  upon  them  full  of  pride  and  with  firm 
confidence,  but  at  the  same  time  we  look  upon  our  Aus- 
tro-Hungarian  brothers  in  arms,  who  faithfully  united 
with  us  fight  the  great  fight  with  brilliantly  maintained 
bravery.  In  the  struggle  which  has  been  forced  upon 
us  we  have  recently  been  joined  by  a  new  ally,  who 
knows  quite  well  that  with  the  destruction  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire  her  political  independence  also  will  come 
to  an  end;  I  refer  to  the  Ottoman  Empire.  If  our  ene- 
mies have  summoned  up  against  us  a  powerful  coali- 
tion, it  is  to  be  hoped  that  they  will  also  have  learned 
that  the  arm  of  our  courageous  allies  reaches  to  the 
weak  points  in  their  world-position.  On  August  4th 
the  Reichstag  showed  the  unyielding  will  of  the  whole 


APPENDICES  431 

people  to  take  up  the  struggle  forced  upon  us,  and  to 
defend  our  independence  to  the  uttermost.  Since  then 
great  things  have  happened.  Who  will  count  the  acts 
of  glory  and  of  heroism  of  the  armies,  the  regiments, 
the  squadrons,  and  the  companies,  of  the  cruisers  and 
the  submarines,  in  a  war  which  flings  its  battle-line 
over  the  whole  of  Europe  and  over  the  whole  world? 
Only  a  later  age  will  be  able  to  tell  of  these  things.  For 
to-day  it  must  suffice  that  in  spite  of  the  enormous  su- 
periority of  our  enemies,  the  war  is  being  carried  on 
in  the  enemies'  country,  thanks  to  the  unconquerable 
bravery  of  our  troops.  There  we  stand  firm  and  strong, 
and  we  may  with  all  confidence  look  to  the  future.  But 
the  enemy's  power  of  resistance  is  not  broken.  We 
are  not  yet  at  an  end  of  our  sacrifices.  The  nation  will 
continue  to  bear  these  further  sacrifices  with  the  same 
heroism  which  it  has  hitherto  shown,  for  we  must,  and 
we  will,  conduct  to  a  happy  end  the  struggle  which, 
surrounded  as  we  are  by  enemies,  we  are  waging  for 
right  and  freedom.  Then,  also,  we  will  remember  the 
wrongs,  some  of  which  have  been  in  violation  of  all  the 
dictates  of  civilisation,  done  to  those  of  our  defence- 
less countrymen  living  abroad,  for,  Gentlemen,  the 
world  must  learn  that  no  one  can  touch  unavenged  so 
much  as  a  hair  of  a  German. 

When  the  meeting  of  August  4th  was  at  an  end,  the 
British  Ambassador  appeared  here  to  deliver  to  us  an 
ultimatum  from  England,  and,  in  the  event  of  a  refusal, 
a  declaration  of  war.  I  was  not  then  able  to  express 
myself  on  the  position  finally  assumed  by  the  British 
Government,  and  I  propose  to-day  to  offer  some  obser- 
vations on  the  point. 

Where  the  responsibility  rests  for  this,  the  greatest 
of  all  wars,  is,  for  us,  clear.  The  external  responsibility 
is  borne  by  those  men  in  Russia  who  inspired  and  car- 
ried out  the  mobilisation  of  the  entire  Russian  Army. 


43S  I    ACCUSE! 

The  inner  responsibility,  however,  lies  on  the  Govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain.  The  Cabinet  of  London  could 
have  made  this  war  impossible  by  declaring  without 
ambiguity  in  Petrograd  that  England  was  not  prepared 
to  allow  a  continental  war  in  Europe  to  develop  out  of 
the  conflict  between  Austria  and  Serbia.  By  speaking 
thus,  France  would  also  have  been  compelled  energeti- 
cally to  advise  Russia  to  desist  from  measures  of  war. 
This  would  have  smoothened  the  path  for  our  action 
of  mediation.  England  did  not  do  so.  England  knew 
the  intrigues  for  war  of  a  small  clique,  of  an  irrespon- 
sible but  powerful  group  about  the  Tsar.  England  saw 
how  things  were  moving,  but  did  nothing  to  spoke  the 
wheel.  In  spite  of  all  protestations  of  peace  London 
gave  it  to  be  understood  in  Petrograd  that  she  was 
taking  her  stand  on  the  side  of  France  and  Russia.  This 
is  proved  clearly  and  incontestably  by  the  publications 
of  the  various  Cabinets,  and  especially  by  that  of  the 
English  Blue  Book  itself.  Then,  indeed,  it  was  impos- 
sible to  hold  things  back  in  Petrograd. 

On  this  question  we  possess  a  witness  who  is  entirely 
above  suspicion,  the  report  of  the  Belgian  charge 
d'affaires  in  Petrograd,  written  on  July  30th.  He  re- 
ports :  "To-day  in  Petrograd  the  people  are  firmly  con- 
vinced, indeed  they  have  assurances,  that  England  will 
stand  by  France.  This  support  has  an  extraordinary  in- 
fluence, and  has  done  not  a  little  to  gain  the  upper  hand 
for  the  war  party." 

Up  to  this  summer  the  English  statesmen  have  re- 
peatedly assured  Parliament  that  there  was  no  treaty, 
no  convention,  no  alliance  which  bound  the  freedom  of 
action  of  the  English  Government  in  the  event  of  war 
breaking  out.  England  could  freely  decide  whether  it 
would  or  would  not  take  part  in  such  a  war.  It  was, 
then,  no  fraternal  obligation,  no  compulsion,  not  even 
a  menace  to  their  own  country,  which  caused  the  Eng- 


APPENDICES  433 

lish  statesmen  to  stir  up  war  and  then  participate  in  it 
themselves.  There  thus  remains  only  one  other  possi- 
bility: the  Cabinet  of  London  allowed  this  world-war, 
this  enormous  world-war,  to  arise  because  it  appeared 
a  favourable  opportunity,  with  the  help  of  her  comrades 
in  the  Entente,  to  destroy  the  vital  nerve  of  her  greatest 
economic  competitor.  Thus,  then,  England  and  Russia 
bear  the  responsibility  for  this  world-war,  for  this  catas- 
trophe which  has  broken  over  Europe  and  over  the  world. 
And  Belgian  neutrality,  which  England  professed  to  pro- 
tect, is  a  mask.  At  7  o'clock  in  the  evening  on  August 
2nd  we  communicated  in  Brussels  the  fact  that  the 
French  plans  of  war,  which  were  known  to  us,  com- 
pelled us  in  self-defence  to  march  through  Belgium. 
But  even  on  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day,  August 
2nd,  that  is  to  say,  before  our  demarche  was  or  could  be 
known  in  London,  England  had  promised  France  her 
support,  unconditionally  promised  it  in  the  event  of  an 
attack  by  the  German  Fleet  on  the  French  coast.  There 
was  no  mention  of  Belgian  neutrality.  This  fact  is  es- 
tablished by  the  declarations  made  by  Sir  Edward  Grey 
on  August  3rd  in  the  House  of  Commons,  and  which  was 
not  known  to  me  on  August  4th.  This  fact  is  confirmed 
by  the  English  Blue  Book  itself. 

How  could  England  maintain  that  she  had  seized  the 
sword  because  Belgian  neutrality  was  violated  by  us? 
This  is  said  by  English  statesmen  to  whom  the  past  his- 
tory of  Belgian  neutrality  was  known.  When  on  August 
4th  I  spoke  of  the  wrong  that  we  were  doing  in  invading 
Belgium,  it  was  not  then  clear  whether  the  Govern- 
ment in  Brussels  might  not  in  the  hour  of  need  agree 
to  spare  their  country,  and  to  withdraw  under  protest 
to  Antwerp.  You  will  remember  that  after  Liege  was 
taken,  on  the  proposal  of  the  Army  Authorities,  a  re- 
newed request  in  this  sense  was  directed  to  Brussels. 
On  military  grounds  the  possibility  of  such  a  develop- 


434 


I    ACCUSE! 


ment  had,  in  all  circumstances,  to  be  kept  open  on  August 
4th.  We  had,  indeed,  indications  that  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  had  fallen  to  pieces,  but  positive  proof  in  writ- 
ing was  lacking.  English  statesmen,  however,  knew 
these  proofs  quite  well.  As  a  result  of  the  documents 
found  in  Brussels  it  has  been  established  how  and  how 
far  Belgium  gave  up  her  neutrality  in  favour  of  England, 
and  two  facts,  consequently,  are  now  well  known  to 
all  the  world.  When  our  troops  marched  into  Belgium 
in  the  night  of  August  3rd  to  4th  they  were  in  a  coun- 
try which  had  long  ago  riddled  its  neutrality,  and  the 
further  fact  is  clear  that  it  was  not  on  account  of  Bel- 
gian neutrality,  which  she  had  herself  broken  long  ago, 
that  England  declared  war  against  us,  but  because  she 
believed  that  with  the  help  of  two  great  military  con- 
tinental Powers  she  could  become  our  master.  Since 
August  2nd,  since  she  promised  to  support  France  in 
war,  England  was  no  longer  neutral,  but  was,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  in  a  state  of  war  against  us.  The  reasons 
advanced  by  English  statesmen  for  this  declaration  of 
war  were  of  the  nature  of  a  spectacular  show,  intended 
to  confuse  their  own  country  and  neutral  States  with 
regard  to  the  true  grounds  of  the  war.  Now  that  the 
Anglo-Belgian  plans  of  war  have  been  unveiled  in  all 
their  details,  the  policy  of  English  statesmen  is  char- 
acterised for  all  time  in  the  history  of  the  world.  Eng- 
lish diplomacy  has,  indeed,  accomplished  one  other 
achievement.  On  her  summons,  Japan  tore  from  us 
the  heroic  Tsingtau,  and  thereby  violated  Chinese  neu- 
trality. Did  England  take  any  steps  with  regard  to  the 
violation  of  this  neutrality?  Has  she  shown  in  this 
case  her  concern  for  the  maintenance  of  the  rights  of 
neutral  States?  Gentlemen,  when  I  was  called  to  my 
present  office  live  years  ago,  the  Triple  Entente  stood 
firmly  opposed  to  the  Triple  Alliance.  This  was  the 
work  of  England,  intended  to  assist  in  giving  effect  to 


APPENDICES  435 

the  fundamental  principle  of  English  policy,  pursued  for 
centuries,  that  is,  to  oppose  the  strongest  Power  on  the 
continent  for  the  time  being.  In  this  fact  lay  from  the 
outset  the  aggressive  character  of  the  Triple  Entente 
as  opposed  to  the  purely  defensive  significance  of  the 
Triple  Alliance;  for  a  nation  as  great  and  as  strong  as 
the  German  cannot  be  hampered  in  the  free  develop- 
ment of  its  forces.  In  view  of  this  political  constellation 
the  way  to  be  followed  by  German  policy  was  clearly 
indicated.  We  had  to  endeavour,  by  arriving  at  an  un- 
derstanding with  the  individual  Powers  of  the  Entente, 
to  banish  the  danger  of  war;  we  had  at  the  same  time  so 
to  strengthen  our  defensive  forces  that,  if  war  should 
come,  we  would  be  strong  enough  to  carry  it  through. 
As  you  know,  we  have  done  both.  In  the  case  of  France 
we  always  encountered  the  old  thoughts  of  revenge. 
Nourished  by  ambitious  politicians,  these  thoughts 
showed  themselves  to  be  stronger  than  the  desire  for 
neighbourly  relations  with  us  which  was  doubtless  en- 
tertained by  a  part  of  the  French  people.  In  the  case 
of  Russia  it  is  true  that  we  arrived  at  particular  agree- 
ments, but  the  firm  alliance  between  Russia  and  France, 
the  opposition  of  Russia  to  our  ally  Austria-Hungary, 
and  a  hatred  of  Germany  nourished  on  Pan-Slav  am- 
bitions prevented  any  understanding  designed  to  avoid 
the  danger  of  war.  The  freest  position,  comparatively 
speaking,  was  occupied  by  England.  Speaking  in  Par- 
liament, English  statesmen  have  again  and  again  with 
the  greatest  emphasis  defended  and  boasted  of  the  free- 
dom enjoyed  by  the  British  Government  in  arriving  at  a 
decision.  This  was  the  first  place  in  which  an  under- 
standing could  be  sought,  which  would  then,  in  fact, 
have  guaranteed  the  peace  of  the  world.  In  this  di- 
rection I  was  bound  to  exert  my  efforts,  and  I  did  so. 
The  way  was  strait,  as  I  well  knew.  In  the  course  of 
centuries  the  insular  manner  of  English  thought  has  es- 


436  I   ACCUSE! 

tablished  a  political  principle  with  the  force  of  an  ax- 
iomatic dogma,  the  principle  that  an  arhitrium  mundi 
belongs  to  England,  which  can  only  be  maintained  by 
the  uncontested  control  of  the  seas  on  the  one  hand, 
and  on  the  other  by  the  balance  of  power  on  the  con- 
tinent, which  has  been  so  often  mentioned.  I  never 
hoped  to  be  able  to  break  this  ancient  English  princi- 
ple by  force  of  persuasion.  What  appeared  to  be  possible 
was  that  the  increasing  strength  of  Germany,  the  increas- 
ing risk  involved  in  a  war,  would  have  enabled  England 
to  see  that  this  principle,  so  long  represented  by  Eng- 
lish policy,  had  become  out  of  date,  and  was  no  longer 
practicable,  and  that  a  peaceful  settlement  with  Germany 
was  to  be  preferred.  This  dogma  was,  however,  so 
firmly  rooted  that  it  paralysed  all  efforts  to  arrive  at  a 
decisive  understanding.  The  negotiations  received  a  new 
impulse  in  the  crisis  of  191 1.  The  English  people  recog- 
nised overnight  that  it  had  been  standing  before  the 
abyss  of  a  European  war.  Compelled  by  popular  sen- 
timent, the  English  statesman  desired  to  approach  Ger- 
many. By  long  and  painful  labour  it  was  possible  to 
arrive  at  agreements  with  regard,  to  economic  int>erests, 
which,  in  the  first  place,  affected  Asia  Minor  and  Africa, 
and  were  intended  to  diminish  possible  sources  of  politi- 
cal friction.  The  world  is  wide,  it  has  room  enough  for 
the  free  development  of  both  nations  side  by  side,  if 
only  the  attempt  is  not  made  to  hinder  and  restrict  them 
in  their  free  development.  That  is  the  principle  which 
our  policy  has  always  defended.  But,  Gentlemen,  while 
we  were  so  negotiating,  England  was  incessantly  intent 
on  drawing  closer  her  relations  to  Russia  and  France. 
The  most  decisive  point  in  this  is  that,  apart  from  the 
sphere  of  politics,  closer  military  agreements  were  being 
concluded  to  meet  the  case  of  a  continental  war,  Eng- 
land conducted  these  negotiations  as  far  as  possible  in 
secret.     When  anything  of  this  nature  trickled  through 


APPENDICES  437 

to  the  public,  as  has  happened  more  than  once,  the  Eng- 
lish Government  endeavoured  to  represent  the  matter  to 
Parliament  and  in  the  Press  as  entirely  innocent.  We 
did  not  remain  ignorant  of  these  agreements  of  England. 
I  have  laid  papers  on  the  subject.  The  whole  situation 
was,  in  fact,  that  England  was  ready  to  come  to  an 
und»erstanding  with  us  on  particular  questions,  but  the 
chief  and  the  first  principle  of  English  policy  remained 
unaltered :  in  the  free  development  of  her  powers  Ger- 
many had  to  be  kept  in  check  by  the  balance  of  power. 
That  represents  the  frontier  line  of  friendly  relations 
with  Germany.  For  this  purpose  the  Triple  Entente  was 
elaborated  to  the  utmost.  As  her  friends  desired  mili- 
tary assurances,  the  English  were  at  once  ready  to  give 
them.  The  ring  was  thus  completed.  England  is  sure 
of  France's  adherence,  and  therefore  of  Russia's  also. 
But  as  a  result  of  all  this,  England  also  binds  her  will. 
If  France  or  Russia,  where  the  existing  chauvinistic 
circles  find  their  strongest  support  in  the  military  con- 
nivance of  England,  if  France  or  Russia  desire  to  strike, 
England  is  morally  delivered  into  the  hands  of  her 
friends.  And  what  is  the  object  of  all  this?  Germany 
must  be  kept  down.  We  have  not  been  remiss  in  warn- 
ing the  English  Government.  Even  at  the  beginning  of 
July  of  this  year  I  indicated  to  the  English  Government 
that  their  secret  negotiations  with  Russia  with  regard 
to  a  naval  convention  were  known  to  me.  I  drew  their 
attention  to  the  serious  dangers  which  this  policy  on  the 
part  of  England  involved  for  the  peace  of  the  world. 
Fourteen  days  later  my  prophecies  were  fulfilled.  From 
all  these  facts  bearing  on  the  general  situation  of  affairs 
we  drew  the  consequences.  In  rapid  sequence  I  brought 
before  you  the  greatest  defence  proposals  known  in  Ger- 
man history,  and  in  full  knowledge  of  the  dangers  which 
surrounded  us  you  have  willingly  and  in  a  spirit  of  self- 
sacrifice  granted  to  our  country  what  was  needed  for 


438  I    ACCUSE! 

her  defence.  As  soon  as  the  war  had  broken  out,  Eng- 
land threw  aside  all  external  show.  It  was  openly  and 
loudly  proclaimed  that  England  would  fight  until  Ger- 
many was  crushed  economically  and  by  force  of  arms. 
The  hatred  of  Germany  nourished  by  the  Pan-Slavs 
exultingly  applauds  the  sentiment;  France,  with  the 
whole  strength  of  an  old  soldierly  nation,  hopes  to  be 
able  to  wipe  out  the  stain  of  1870,  Gentlemen,  on  this 
we  have  only  one  answer  to  give  to  our  enemies:  Ger- 
many cannot  be  annihilated. 

Like  our  military  forces,  our  financial  forces  also  have 
given  a  brilliant  account  of  themselves,  and  have  with- 
out any  reservations  placed  themselves  in  the  service 
of  our  country.  Our  economic  life  has  been  maintained; 
unemployment  is  relatively  small.  Germany's  power  and 
skill  in  organisation  constantly  seek  in  new  ways  to  avoid 
coming  evils,  and  to  wipe  out  existing  injuries.  No  man 
and  no  woman  seeks  to  avoid  sharing  in  the  common 
and  voluntary  task ;  no  recruiting  drums  need  to  be  beat 
for  this  purpose.  Everything  in  life  and  in  wealth  is 
surrendered  for  the  only,  and  the  great  object,  for  the 
land  of  our  fathers,  for  the  hope  of  our  children  and 
descendants.  A  spirit  is  being  manifested,  a  moral  great- 
ness of  the  nation,  such  as  has  hitherto  never  been  known 
in  the  history  of  the  world.  If  this  spirit  of  sacrifice 
shown  by  millions  of  our  nation  in  arms  against  a  world 
of  enemies  is  despised  by  our  opponents  as  militarism, 
if  they  abuse  us  as  Huns  and  barbarians,  if  they  scatter 
cursed  lies  throughout  the  whole  world — we  are  proud 
enough  to  remain  unconcerned.  This  wonderful  spirit, 
which  glows  through  the  hearts  of  Germany  in  unprec- 
edented unity,  in  the  unquestioning  surrender  of  each 
to  each,  this  must  and  will  be  victorious.  When  a  glori- 
ous and  a  happy  peace  has  been  achieved,  we  will  main- 
tain this  spirit  as  the  holiest  inheritance  from  this  fear- 
fully earnest  and  great  time.     As  if  by  the  power  of 


APPENDICES  439 

magic  the  barriers  have  disappeared  which  during  a  bar- 
ren and  dull  age  have  separated  the  various  parts  of  our 
nation — the  barriers  which  we  reared  together  in  mis- 
understanding, in  envy,  and  distrust.  It  brings  a  sense 
of  freedom  and  of  bliss  that  at  last  the  whole  of  this 
rubbish  and  trash  has  been  swept  away,  that  only  the 
man  counts,  each  equal  to  the  other,  each  holding  out 
his  hand  to  the  other  in  a  single  and  a  holy  cause.  I 
again  use  the  words  of  the  Emperor  on  the  outbreak  of 
war :  "I  no  longer  know  any  parties.  I  know  only  Ger- 
mans." Gentlemen,  when  the  war  is  past  parties  will 
return;  for  without  parties,  without  political  struggle, 
there  can  be  no  political  life,  even  for  the  freest  and 
the  happiest  nation;  but.  Gentlemen,  we  will  struggle  to 
see — and  I  for  my  part  promise  to  do  so — ^that  in  these 
struggles  there  may  be  only  Germans. 

I  bring  to  a  conclusion  my  few  observations; — this  is 
no  time  for  words — I  cannot  discuss  all  the  questions 
which  move  most  profoundly  the  nation  and  myself. 
One  word  more:  faithfully  and  with  a  feeling  of  warm 
gratitude  we  think  of  the  sons  of  Germany  who  on  the 
battlefields  in  the  east  and  the  west,  on  the  high  seas, 
on  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  and  in  our  colonies  have 
given  up  their  life  for  the  Fatherland.  Before  their 
heroism,  which  is  now  stilled,  we  unite  ourselves  in  the 
vow  to  endure  till  the  last  breath,  in  order  that  our  de- 
scendants and  our  sons  may  be  able  to  labour  in  the 
service  of  the  greatness  of  the  Empire  in  a  stronger 
Germany,  free  and  assured  from  foreign  menace  and 
force.  This  vow  will  ring  out  to  our  sons  and  brothers 
who  are  still  fighting  against  the  enemy,  to  the  heart- 
blood  of  Germany  which  springs  up  in  countless  and 
nameless  acts  of  heroism,  for  which  we  are  prepared  to 
give  up  all  that  we  have ;  it  will  ring  out  to  our  country- 
men abroad,  to  those  kept  back,  to  those  in  peril,  to 
those  who  care  for  us  afar  ofif,  to  those  who  are  in  prison 


440  I    ACCUSE! 

and  to  those  abused.  We  will  persevere,  Gentlemen, 
and  I  ask  you  to  confirm  this  by  accepting  these  meas- 
ures. We  will  persevere,  until  we  have  the  assurance 
that  no  one  will  again  disturb  our  peace,  a  peace  in 
which  we  mean  as  a  free  nation  to  tend  and  develop  our 
German  character  and  our  German  strength. 


Ill 

Circular  Note  of  the  Chancellor,  Dr.  von  Beth- 
man-hollweg,  to  the  imperial  ambassadors, 
DATED  December  2dTH,  1914.^ 

Headquarters, 

December  24th,  1914. 
In  the  speech  made  by  Minister  President  Viviani  in 
the  French  Chamber  is  contained  a  passage  that  France 
and  Russia  had  on  July  31st  agreed  to  the  English  pro- 
posal to  stop  military  preparations  and  to  begin  negotia- 
tions in  London.  If  Germany  had  given  her  assent, 
peace  could  have  been  maintained  even  at  this  last  hour. 

As  I  cannot  at  the  present  moment  contradict  from 
the  Tribune  of  the  German  Reichstag  this  false  state- 
ment made  in  the  French  Parliament,  I  see  myself  com- 
pelled to  send  the  following  exposition  to  you  with  the 
request  to  make  an  extensive  use  of  it. 

The  British  proposal  for  a  conference  which  is  printed 
in  the  English  Blue  Book,  No.  36,  arises  on  July  26th. 

Its  contents  say  that  representatives  of  Germany, 
France,  and  Italy  should  meet  with  Sir  Edward  Grey 
in  London  for  the  purpose  of  discovering  an  issue  from 
the  difficulties  which  had  arisen  in  the  Serbian  matter. 

'  [As  translated  in  the  Appendix  to  Mr.  J.  W.  Headlam's  His- 
tory of  Twelve  Days.] 


APPENDICES  441 

From  the  beginning  Germany  took  its  stand  on  the  point 
that  the  Serbo-Austrian  conflict  was  an  affair  which 
only  concerned  the  two  States  immediately  indicated. 
Sir  Edward  Grey  himself  also  later  recognised  this  point 
of  view. 

Germany  was  obliged  to  reject  the  English  proposal 
for  a  conference,  for  it  could  not  allow  that  Austria- 
Hungary  should  be  subjected  to  a  tribunal  of  the  Great 
Powers  in  a  question  which  concerned  its  national  exist- 
ence and  which  only  concerned  Austria-Hungary.  It  is 
clear  from  the  German  White  Book  that  Austria-Hun- 
gary looked  on  the  proposal  for  a  conference  as  unac- 
ceptable. By  the  declaration  against  Serbia  it  gave  evi- 
dence of  its  firm  will  to  regulate  the  Serbian  question 
alone  without  the  intervention  of  the  Powers.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  it  declared,  in  order  to  satisfy  all 
just  claims  of  Russia,  its  complete  territorial  disinterest- 
edness as  regards  Serbia.  As  Russia  was  not  satisfied 
with  this  assurance,  European  questions  sprang  out  of 
the  Serbian  question,  and  this  first  found  its  expression 
in  a  difference  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia. 
In  order  to  prevent  a  European  conflict  developing  out 
of  this  difference,  it  was  necessary  to  find  a  new  basis 
upon  which  immediate  action  of  the  Powers  could  be 
begun.  It  was  Germany  to  whom  belongs  the  merit  of 
having  first  trod  this  ground. 

The  Secretary  of  State,  von  Jagow,  in  his  conversa- 
tion with  the  British  Ambassador  on  July  27th  pointed 
out  that  in  the  wish  of  Russia  to  negotiate  directly  with 
Austria-Hungary  he  saw  an  improvement  of  the  situa- 
tion and  the  best  prospect  for  a  peaceful  solution.  From 
the  day  on  which  it  was  first  expressed,  Germany  sup- 
ported in  Vienna  with  all  the  energy  which  stood  at  its 
command  this  desire  by  which  the  English  conference 
idea  was  according  even  to  the  Russian  opinion  for  the 
time  put  aside.    No  State  can  have  striven  more  honestly 


4,42  I    ACCUSE! 

and  with  more  energy  to  maintain  the  peace  of  the  world 
than  Germany  had. 

England  also  now  gave  up  the  idea  of  pursuing  her 
conference  idea  and  on  her  side  supported  the  concep- 
tion of  direct  negotiations  between  Vienna  and  Petro- 
grad (Blue  Book,  No.  67). 

These  negotiations,  however,  met  with  difficulties,  and 
difficulties  which  did  not  arise  from  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, but  from  the  Entente  Powers. 

If  Germany's  endeavour  was  to  be  successful,  it  re- 
quired good  will  on  the  part  of  the  Powers  who  were 
not  immediately  engaged;  it  required  also  that  those 
who  were  principally  engaged  should  hold  their  hand, 
for  if  either  of  the  two  Powers  between  whom  mediation 
was  to  be  made  interrupted  by  military  operations,  ac- 
tion which  was  proceeding,  it  was  from  the  beginning 
clear  that  this  action  could  never  attain  its  end. 

Now  how  did  it  stand  with  the  good  will  of  the 
Powers?  The  attitude  of  France  is  clearly  shown  in  the 
French  Yellow  Book.  She  did  not  trust  German  assur- 
ances. All  the  steps  of  the  German  Ambassador, 
Freiherr  von  Schoen,  were  received  with  mistrust.  His 
wish  for  mediating  influence  of  France  at  Petrograd 
was  not  regarded,  for  they  believed  that  they  must  as- 
sume that  the  steps  taken  by  Herr  von  Schoen  were 
intended  "ä  compromettre  la  France  au  regard  de  la 
Russie."  The  French  Yellow  Book  shows  that  France 
did  not  take  a  single  positive  step  in  the  interest  of  peace. 

What  attitude  did  England  take  in  the  diplomatic 
conversation  ?  She  gave  the  appearance  of  mediating  up 
to  the  last  hour,  but  her  external  actions  were  directed 
to  a  humiliation  of  the  two  Powers  of  the  Triple  Al- 
liance. England  was  the  first  Great  Power  which  or- 
dered military  preparations  on  a  great  scale  and  thereby 
created  a  feeling,  particularly  in  Russia  and  France, 
^hich  was  in  the  highest  degree  adverse  to  mediatory 


APPENDICES  443 

action.  From  the  report  of  the  French  Charge  d af- 
faires in  London  on  July  22nd  (Yellow  Book,  No,  66), 
it  follows  that  as  early  as  July  24th  the  Commander 
of  the  English  Fleet  had  discreetly  taken  steps  for  the 
collection  of  the  Fleet  at  Portland.  Great  Britain,  there- 
fore, mobilised  sooner  even  than  Serbia.  Moreover, 
Great  Britain  refused  just  what  France  did,  to  act  in  a 
moderating  and  restraining  manner  at  Petrograd. 

On  the  warning  from  the  English  Ambassador  at 
Petrograd  from  which  it  was  clearly  to  be  seen  that 
only  a  warning  to  Russia  to  hold  back  her  mobilisation 
could  save  the  situation.  Sir  Edward  Grey  did  nothing 
but  let  matters  go  their  own  way. 

At  the  same  time,  however,  he  believed  that  it  would 
be  useful  to  point  out  to  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary, if  not  quite  clearly,  still  sufficiently  so,  that  Eng- 
land could  also  take  part  in  a  European  war.  At  the 
same  time,  therefore,  when  England,  though  letting  drop 
the  idea  of  a  conference,  gave  the  appearance  of  wish- 
ing that  Austria-Hungary  should  show  itself  conciliatory 
under  the  mediation  of  Germany,  Sir  Edward  Grey  di- 
rects the  attention  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador 
in  England  to  the  mobilisation  of  the  English  Fleet 
(Blue  Book,  48),  gives  the  Russian  Ambassador  to  un- 
derstand that  England  also  could  take  part  in  a  war,  and 
at  once  informs  the  Ambassadors  of  the  Triple  Entente 
of  this  warning  which  he  had  addressed  to  Germany,  by 
which  action  the  victory  of  the  war-party  in  Petrograd 
was  sealed. 

This  was  just  the  attitude,  which  according  to  the 
better  informed  opinion  of  the  English  Ambassador 
Buchanan  was  the  worst  adapted  for  bringing  about  good 
feeling  between  the  Powers. 

Under  these  difficulties  it  would  be  regarded  as  a  spe- 
cial success  that  Germany  succeeded  in  making  Austria- 
Hungary  inclined  to  follow  the  wish  of  Russia  and  enter 


444  I    ACCUSE! 

into  separate  conversations.  Had  Russia,  without  on 
her  side  taking  mihtary  measures,  continued  the  negotia- 
tions with  Austria-Hungary  which  had  only  mobiHsed 
against  Serbia,  the  complete  prospect  of  maintenance  of 
the  world's  peace  would  have  been  maintained.  Instead 
of  this  Russia  mobilised  against  Austria-Hungary,  by 
which  Sazonof  was  quite  clear  (see  Blue  Book,  78)  that 
with  this  all  direct  understanding  with  Austria-Hungary 
fell  to  the  ground.  The  laborious  result  of  the  German 
negotiations  for  mediation  was  thereby  overthrown  by  a 
single  blow. 

What  happened  now  on  the  part  of  the  Entente 
Powers  in  order  to  preserve  peace  at  this  last  hour  ? 

Sir  Edward  Grey  again  took  up  his  conference  pro- 
posal. In  accordance  also  with  the  view  of  M.  Sazonof, 
the  suitable  moment  had  now  come  in  order,  under  the 
pressure  of  Russian  mobilisation  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary, again  to  recommend  the  old  English  idea  of  quad- 
ruple conversation  (German  White  Book,  page  7). 

Count  Pourtales  did  not  leave  the  Minister  in  doubt, 
that  according  to  his  view  the  Entente  Powers  thereby 
were  requiring  from  Austria-Hungary  just  what  they 
had  not  been  willing  to  suggest  to  Serbia,  namely,  that 
she  should  give  way  under  military  pressure. 

Under  these  circumstances  the  conference  idea  could 
not  possibly  be  sympathetic  to  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  Notwithstanding  this,  Germany  declared  in 
London  that  she  accepted  in  principle  the  proposal  for 
the  intervention  of  the  four  Powers,  but  that  it  was 
merely  the  form  of  the  conference  which  was  disagree- 
able to  her.  At  the  same  time  the  German  Ambassador 
at  Petrograd  pressed  Sazonof  on  his  side  also  to  make 
concessions  in  order  to  render  a  compromise  possible. 
It  is  well  known  that  these  efforts  remained  fruitless. 

Russia  herself  seemed  to  take  no  more  interest  in  the 
further  mediatory  activity  of  Germany  at  Vienna,  which 


APPENDICES  445 

was  continued  until  the  last  hour.  She  ordered  the 
mobilisation  of  all  her  forces  in  the  night  between  July 
30th  and  31st,  which  must  have  the  mobilisation  of  Ger- 
many and  the  later  declaration  of  war  as  its  consequence. 

In  view  of  this  course  of  events  it  cannot  be  under- 
stood how  a  responsible  statesman  can  have  the  courage 
to  maintain  that  Germany,  who  found  herself  confronted 
by  Russian  mobilisation,  military  preparations  of  France, 
and  the  mobilisation  of  the  English  Fleet,  could  on  July 
31st  still  have  saved  peace  by  the  acceptance  of  a  con- 
ference which  was  to  be  conducted  under  the  arms  of  the 
Entente  Powers. 

It  was  not  Germany,  who  continued  to  mediate  up 
Vienna  up  to  the  last  hour,  who  made  the  idea  of  media- 
tion by  four  Powers  impossible;  it  was  the  military 
measures  of  the  Entente  Powers  who  spoke  words  of 
peace  while  they  determined  to  make  war. 

V.  Bethmann-Hollweg. 


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